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PREFACE

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The War Inevitable or Starting A New Page

Igor Ivanov

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Today Ukraine is stirring up information hysteria around the relations with Russia to shape national identity and seek economic and military assistance as victims, while the West turns a blind eye to Ukraine's internal management issues, and clumsy actions of Russian propaganda only serve to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments across Ukraine. In fact, however, Russia's launch of this special military operation is related to the invasion of Yugoslavia by the NATO in 1998, the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty in 2002, its aggression against Iraq in 2003 and its continuous approach to Russia's borders. As a result of the short-sighted policies of Western countries, the United States and Europe are now facing the most serious and dangerous security crisis in decades, but the situation is now more complex than it was in the 1990s, and the feelings of mistrust, suspicion and confrontation will continue. And Moscow's recognition of the independence of the republics of Donbass will bring Russia to a new stage of confrontation with the West, which will last a long time in the international political and economic sphere.

Keywords: Ukraine crisis, NATO, Russia

Is War Inevitable?

Over the past days and weeks, media outlets have been proliferating all kinds of apocalyptic predictions and scenarios on the immediate prospects of the Ukrainian crisis. Journalists, experts, and politicians claim — with all seriousness — that a Russian-Ukrainian war can hardly be thwarted, not to mention article that seek to explore a purported coup in Kiev, the crushing response of the West, or even the looming nuclear conflict of global dimensions.

We shall try to find an answer to a number of interwoven questions, which might arise in the minds of those who face this wave of dire prophecies and predictions. Why has this information attack been unleashed? Who is behind this and who is deriving profit from it? What is really going on and what could happen to the Ukrainian issue in the near future?

Starting off with Moscow's plans and intentions. Anyone who is slightly familiar with the structure of power in Russia knows well that it is few people who are especially close to the power circles that are aware of the true plans and the motives of the Russian authorities. As a rule, these people tend to avoid showing up in the media. Strong statements are usually made by those tasked by their superiors to attract a lot of exposure or by those who act at their own discretion to be noticed and appreciated by their top management. Obviously, none of these talking heads are privy to any of the Kremlin's plans, which means they are simply working out their tasks at a higher or lower professional level. Regrettably, being baseless and of no practical value, the campaign —

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launched by such “concerned” people about the allegedly impending war in Ukraine — invariably affects the public sentiment in our country, causing either panic or warmongering. This bellicose campaign, coupled with its dire consequences, has the potential to seriously demoralize and traumatize Russian society. Time will tell what repercussions this may bring about; still, nothing good can obviously be expected from this wave of hysteria.

It can be assumed that some in Russia need another anti-Ukrainian campaign to deflect attention from the country’s severe socio-economic and political problems, to raise the population’s patriotic spirit, or to unite the country. If one thinks so, one is likely to be seriously disappointed over time. The very idea of war against Ukraine or in Ukraine is insufficient for a new national idea; it is not even close to a platform on which Russian society could be consolidated.

Now let’s take a look at this problem from Ukraine’s perspective. We have to admit that there are many in the country who are interested in stirring up information hysteria around the relations with Russia, and for various reasons. They assume that playing the role of an innocent victim of the bloodthirsty Russia can only bring benefits to Ukraine.

First, they believe that this way it would be easier to implement a plan in order to shape a new national identity. Second, the West might be willing to turn a blind eye to Ukraine’s domestic scandals, corruption cases and other issues. Third, one can count on increased economic and military aid by playing the victim. Fourth, numerous clumsy actions of Russian propaganda only serve to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments across Ukraine. Therefore, it is logical to assume that Kiev will go on with doing everything it can to heat up tensions in the media environment.

The campaign around Russia’s alleged imminent aggression in Ukraine is also good for Washington and its Euro-Atlantic allies. It provides a distraction from their own domestic problems, allowing for cohesion within the archaic NATO and diverting attention from the ignominious flight of the Western troops from Afghanistan. By focusing on what is going on around Ukraine, the White House is trying to counter the Europe-wide perceptions that the Atlantic string of U.S. foreign policy is finally receding into the background of U.S. priorities, giving way to the Indo-Pacific, which is more important to Washington.

Long Story Short, Everyone Is Minding Their Own Business, Spinning A Propaganda War Around Ukraine

Are there any forces that might actually be interested in a full-blown rather than a propaganda war in Ukraine? The situation looks different here. If one puts aside the opinions of fierce fanatics and professional instigators, it turns out that no one needs an actual war with the use of modern weapons, countless casualties and immense destruction. Everyone would lose from such a war, be it Russia, the West, or Ukraine. This would entail such political, military, and economic costs for everyone that it would not be easy to recover for decades, not merely years. The repercussions of a major war at the center of Europe would be no less lasting than the ramifications triggered by the Chernobyl disaster, which have persisted for almost forty years. Who would be willing to take such a risk?

We allow ourselves to draw a relevant, if not too original, conclusion, leaving all the forecasts and scenarios of a military conflict at the heart of Europe to the conscience of numerous slacktivists. The only decent way out of the current situation is for all sides to immediately meet at the negotiating table on mutual security guarantees. Russia, the United States, and NATO have all presented their proposals on this matter. The positions of the parties are known. Now we must come to agreement.

Russia-NATO: On the History of the Current Crisis

To produce an adequate analysis of a particular complex international issue — and even more so to try to resolve it if necessary — it is imperative to have complete objective information on this topic. This information should include both the background of the problem and possible scenarios for its future development. It is the foundation of the foreign policy stance, and specific actions are taken within the framework of this position, taking into account the reactions of other actors of world politics.

Recently, in Russian and foreign media as well as among experts there has been a heated debate on Russia-NATO relations and on numerous security issues in the Euro-Atlantic. The opinions couldn't have been more divergent. One narrative is that Russia has officially considered joining the Alliance; another is that there were verbal or other types of agreements of non-expansion to the East; and a whole host of other viewpoints.

I served as First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia from 1994 to 1998, and I was Head of the Ministry from 1998 to 2004. That is why I am privy to some information about those aspects of Russia-NATO relations that have been my scope of responsibility. I would like to share several facts that — in my opinion — have a direct bearing on the current Moscow-Brussels interaction.

First, I have never heard of Russia ever officially requesting membership in NATO. There may have been some talk about it in a personal capacity, but not much else.

Second, in the post-Cold War era, Russia has always firmly opposed to NATO expansion, to the East in particular. Moscow's arguments have long been well-known, and Russian representatives have repeatedly expounded them at all levels, all negotiations and all meetings.

The first round of NATO enlargement, namely the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, was the subject of serious discussions in Moscow with the participation of the relevant ministries and agencies. In a nutshell, it can be stated that Russia did not have many response options to the enlargement. Moscow had two options: to lead a difficult political struggle to assure nations of the West of the advantages of the then unique opportunity to build a single security space in Europe with no dividing lines, or to opt for rigid ultimatums and unilateral measures with a focus on military and technical means of response to any undesirable actions of the Alliance.

I vividly remember our lengthy meetings with Yevgeny Primakov, which resulted in a preference for a political-diplomatic tool. At that time, it was generally agreed that Russia was not ready to resort to the military-technical option either politically or economically as well as militarily, and an attempt at its implementation could have had dire consequences for the country, which was then undergoing a deep internal political and social crisis.

Russia's consolidated position was to launch negotiations on a new European security architecture that were to run in parallel to the ongoing process of NATO enlargement, which Russia could not stop at that time. This architecture could replace the military-political confrontation in the Euro-Atlantic that took shape during the Cold War. The talks culminated in the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation in Paris on May 27, 1997. As an aside, neither party — to the present day — has expressed its wish to withdraw from this agreement, signed almost a quarter of a century ago.

At the same time, intensive negotiations were underway to adapt the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) concluded in Paris in 1990 to the new realities in Europe after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty and the Charter for European Security were signed in Istanbul in November 1999 during the OSCE Summit. All these documents, which practically recognized the

new political and military reality in Europe, created a legal framework for substantive negotiations on the establishment of a “common and comprehensive security model for Europe for the 21st century” based on the principle that “the security of all states in the Euro-Atlantic community is indivisible”.

In 1998, NATO committed an act of aggression against Yugoslavia. It was NATO’s first unambiguous attempt to assume the role of the world’s policeman, which was to be reinforced by the United States’ policy of imposing a unipolar world order model in which Washington and its allies could decide the destinies of the world and other nations at their own discretion.

NATO’s aggression in Yugoslavia was a heavy blow to Russia-NATO relations, and all contacts between Moscow and Brussels were suspended for some time. Many European capitals saw a massive wave of demonstrations, condemning the military actions of the Alliance and demanding an end to the senseless bombing of Yugoslav cities. The war was eventually stopped, but NATO’s international standing was seriously undermined.

Russia most vigorously condemned NATO’s unlawful aggression in Yugoslavia. Our country made tremendous efforts to stop it and reach a political settlement of the conflict.

In this environment, contacts between Russia and NATO to develop a framework for further cooperation between the parties in the interests of European security were renewed. On May 22, 2002, the leaders of Russia and nineteen NATO member states signed the Rome Declaration, intended to “turn over a new leaf” in their relations in order to strengthen cooperation to collectively address common threats and security risks. The NATO-Russia Council was established for consultations and joint actions on a wide range of security issues in the Euro-Atlantic area. The Council, which included both political and military structures, was to become “the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between NATO and Russia”. It was hoped that the NRC would become a forum for discussing and agreeing on all European security issues that could either way affect the fundamental interests of both NATO countries and Russia.

The facts outlined above are only the general framework within which relations between Russia and NATO developed in the 1990s and at the beginning of this century. I can solemnly state that Russia has not taken any actions that threaten or could be interpreted as a threat to the security interests of the United States and its allies in Europe over these years. On the contrary, the Russian Federation has been invariably open to cooperation with Western partners, as it demonstrated, *inter alia*, after 9/11.

Unfortunately, this constructive line of interaction assumed by Moscow was apparently perceived as a manifestation of weakness by Western countries. Without any sensible explanations, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, waged — together with its allies — a bloody war in Iraq in 2003, expanded provocative actions along the perimeter of the Russian borders. Russian representatives have consistently pointed to all these facts, calling on Western partners for a meaningful dialogue.

It should be noted that Russia’s constructive policy has not received a proper response, which required Moscow to take the necessary measures to ensure the security of the country. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke frankly about all this in his Munich speech of 2007.

History cannot be written from an event that benefits one. Western experts often try to make it look like all the problems in Russia-NATO relations began solely after the military conflict in South Ossetia in 2008 and the political crisis in Ukraine in 2014.

I can reasonably argue that if these events had not been preceded by the deliberate policy of the United States and its allies to destroy the emerging fragile foundations of Russia-NATO relations, the conflicts in the South Caucasus and around Ukraine could have been avoided or at least their transition to the military phase

could have been prevented. The U.S. and Europe are well aware of the fact that it was not Russia who provoked these conflicts, that in both cases they tried to present Moscow with a *fait accompli*, causing severe damage to its security interests.

As a result of Washington's and its allies' myopic policy, the U.S. and Europe are now facing the most acute and dangerous security crisis in decades, whereas Russia is again confronted with the same question it encountered in the mid-1990s, i.e., how to respond to NATO's aggressive and wholly unilateral policy. Unfortunately, like almost three decades ago, the choice of options is still narrow, and one has to choose between a political-diplomatic and a military-technical response.

I do not feel in position to give any specific advice, especially since I do not have all the information necessary to do so. I am fully aware of the fact that critics of a political-diplomatic settlement can rightly say that previously such attempts have failed, and that the West understands only the language of *Machtpolitik*. There is no point in entering the disputes with such reasoning.

However, logic suggests that if a country strives for a long-term system of European security, its establishment should be accompanied by political agreements. These will be very difficult to achieve in the short term. The situation in Europe is even more complicated now than it was in the 1990s, and many things have to be started from scratch. Mutual distrust and suspicion, as well as the inertia of confrontation, will not be quick to overcome.

But nothing is impossible if there is a political will to move forward, thinking about long-term interests rather than immediate gains. Russia's bargaining power is stronger today than it was 30 years ago, because unlike in the 1990s, our country has everything it needs to ensure its own security. It would be better for all if Russia's national security eventually became an integral part of Europe's comprehensive security in the 21st century.

Starting A New Page

The decision has been taken, with Russia officially recognizing sovereignty and independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics. The establishment of diplomatic relations is followed by economic, humanitarian and military aid, as well as other measures necessary to formalize the statehood of the new subjects of international life.

This is an important decision that will undoubtedly have far-reaching ramifications — for the Russian-Ukrainian relations and, more broadly, for security in Europe and globally. It's no exaggeration to say that another page of history, which began during the acute crisis in and around Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014, has been turned.

If one speaks directly about the citizens of the DNR and the LNR, the ongoing turnaround offers them new hope for a peaceful life. Lack of confidence in the future prevented people from planning ahead, working properly, building families, and raising children for more than eight years. In the meantime, the prospect of stability and predictability opens up for the Donbass, the absence of which makes sustained development hardly possible. If diplomatic recognition from Moscow is backed by rapid and considerable progress on acute economic and social problems, which is what the inhabitants are counting on, their support for such a development will be maintained.

The Minsk agreements, designed to resolve the perennial crisis over "specific districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine" through negotiations, are rendered meaningless under these conditions. The much-hoped-for accords, around which such passions were running high, will now merely remain in the textbooks of modern history. Most likely, the same fate will befall the Normandy format, established to implement the

agreements to include representatives of Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany. This does not mean that the negotiations around Ukraine should essentially be put paid. But if they are resumed under certain circumstances, they will most probably be held in a different format, with other actors involved, and with a different agenda.

Kiev's reaction to the events is what has been "expected". Ukraine is well aware that it is effectively unable to prevent Moscow's decision from being implemented. Therefore, the Ukrainian leadership has set a course to derive the maximum benefit of this defeat in the long term. Politically, it is important now for Ukraine to enlist the support of as many states as possible for its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This explains Kiev's increased activity at the UN and other international organizations. Accordingly, one should not expect any succession of diplomatic recognition of the new states by the international community. In this respect, the DNR and LNR are unlikely to be more successful than Abkhazia and South Ossetia, recognized by Russia in 2008.

It is easy to predict that Ukraine will accord a particular focus on capitalizing on its image as a "victim of aggression" in order to increase economic aid from the West. And here Kiev may well succeed, since Western countries, which cannot stick up for Ukraine militarily, will be willing to make serious economic injections to demonstrate their solidarity with the Ukrainian leadership. It is still an open question how effectively this aid will be used, and to what extent it will be used to modernize the Ukrainian economy and social sphere.

As for the military aspects, Kiev and Western countries are likely to drown out the issue of NATO membership, as well as to rush the rebuilding of the entire military machine of Ukraine to the standards of the alliance. One can expect increased military and technical assistance to Kiev from certain NATO countries, including supply of modern weapons. The calculation of this whole policy is simple, which is to show the people of Ukraine — and not only them — the advantages of "friendship" with the West. However, Western countries will continue to have significant discrepancies over the specific formats and the level of military support for Kiev.

Obviously, Moscow's recognition of the DNR and LNR will be used to the maximum extent possible by the West for its information war against Russia. Our country will face difficulties in many multilateral forums and international organizations, from the UN to the OSCE and the Council of Europe. The issues of Ukraine's "territorial integrity" will inevitably be raised in bilateral talks between Russia and its Western partners.

Speaking of the international consequences of Moscow's decision, we should assume that we are entering a new phase of confrontation with the West because of the diplomatic recognition of the Donbass Republics. The scale and the specifics of this confrontation are yet to be assessed, but it is already clear that it will drag on for a long time and will encompass various areas of international politics and economy. One should hardly expect that in the foreseeable future such forces will prevail in the West that are disposed to a fundamental reappraisal of the current policy of "containing" Moscow and are ready to offer Russia some new option of détente or reset.

Western states are more "prepared" than they were in 2014 for this stage of confrontation with Moscow. In recent days, weeks and months, an unprecedented information attack on Russia has been conducted, all possible means and methods to manipulate public opinion are being used. This campaign, whose target audience is not only Russian citizens but also their own, is becoming protracted. In practical terms, we should expect a gradual introduction of the already announced sanctions, designed to affect the most sensitive areas of the Russian economy. Sanctions pressure is coming to be one of the main instruments of Western foreign policy, and this pressure is becoming more sophisticated and more focused over time.

It is likely that recent developments around Ukraine will have longer-term strategic implications, including in the area of security. Western states have long ago abandoned the idea of establishing an indivisible security system in the Euro-Atlantic, which was much discussed at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Now we can

expect them to speed up the strengthening of their own security, relying on NATO, which will be announced at the upcoming summit of the alliance to be held in Madrid this June.

Although the rhetoric of many Western leaders still contains the thesis that security in Europe cannot be built without, much less against Russia, NATO has — in fact — consistently moved to make “containing” Moscow the main goal and the main justification for maintaining NATO in the 21st century. Ukraine may be assigned the role of a shield against the “Russian threat” in these plans.

Today opens a new chapter of modern European history, with its challenges and opportunities, hopes and disappointments, victories and defeats, gains and losses. A lot of unexpected and unexplored things lie ahead, so one should not count on a quiet life in any case.

When Persisting Delusions Vanish

The day of February 16, 2022 will come to be a remarkable moment for the history of contemporary international relations. Scrutinized by some Western politicians and proliferated in the media, the news that Russia will certainly attack Ukraine on this very day has not been confirmed, which is to say the least.

What happened then? Was it another slip-up of the Western special services or was it the treachery of an unpredictable Moscow? There is more than ample room for every possible guesswork and speculation on this topic.

However, professional diplomats, like any other people, can naturally make mistakes, but as a rule, they draw their conclusions based on a grasp of history, individual facts of the emerging situation, an in-depth analysis of the problem underlying the crisis and everything that surrounds it. That is, from the very beginning of this propaganda coup around Russia’s allegedly aggressive plans for Ukraine, IR experts realized that there won’t be a real war. Either way, there will be no war in its classic sense with the large-scale use of all types of weapons, decisive offensive operations, the seizure of enemy territories, etc. This was well known in Washington, Paris, London and other European capitals. Obviously, it was also known in Kiev.

Then why is Europe experiencing one of the worst crises in recent years? Why it is now, at the beginning of the 2022, that one started talking about the possibility of a new big war in Europe?

It should be noted that this whole campaign about allegedly forthcoming aggression began at exactly the time when a serious talk about security guarantees in the Euro-Atlantic, initiated by Russia, was beginning to take place, albeit not without difficulties. Moscow has made ambitious proposals with its vision of the problem. The proposals were formulated in a tough, but accessible-to-all way. Their essence was that Russia is not satisfied with the current state of European security and therefore it cannot be maintained.

The West could choose from two possible options. Either the Atlantic partners take into account Russian legitimate interests and all together fight against common security threats, as it was enshrined in many joint documents, or each party ensures its own security, without regard to the concerns of others. In that way, the future of Ukraine and its place in European structures is only one element of a more general issue of Euro-Atlantic security, albeit a very important one.

Washington and its allies have proven reluctant to such an open and fundamental conversation. This became evident from the official responses received from the US and NATO. Obviously, there are some positive elements in these answers, but there is still no willingness to talk about key security issues. If one steps back from the intricate diplomatic wording, it is very clear that the central component of the Russian proposals is the assurance of each side that the other party’s military capabilities will not pose a threat to its own security, which the Western

countries are trying to avoid discussing. For this purpose, the relevant mechanisms of interaction between military and diplomats are jointly established, and control procedures, verification, etc. are agreed upon.

All these fundamental principles have been developed and enshrined in many joint documents, but have gradually become more blurred by Washington and its allies in an undisguised manner. As a result, we have witnessed the retreat from the noble idea of forming a “common security space in the Euro-Atlantic” to such security situation, which today looks much more alarming than even that of the Cold War.

Against this backdrop, NATO strategists have decided to resort to the methods they repeatedly used to manipulate public opinion that were aimed at justifying their policies. That were the cases of NATO’s aggression in Yugoslavia, preparations, and then the Iraq War itself. There are many examples of such manipulations. The toolkit is changing, methods and forms are being improved, new faces are being involved, but the essence remains the same, which is to present their policies in the best possible light and to denigrate in every way those who do not agree with it or who are willing to suggest alternative options.

This time a similar scenario was used towards Ukraine. A substitution of concepts typical of the West has taken place, whereby Moscow’s mythical aggression against Ukraine became the center of the discussion, instead of Russian proposals for a new security architecture in Europe to be accepted. In the meantime, the long-term interests of Ukraine itself were, of course, not taken into account.

Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that times are changing. Today it is becoming increasingly difficult to mislead public opinion even with the use of massive and deliberate propaganda. First, the memory of the many “former merits” of most of these propagandists is still fresh. Let us recall, for example, the inability of many Western experts and many politicians to predict the developments in Afghanistan last summer and fall. Second, now one can use a variety of sources of information and form one’s own opinion instead of blindly keeping up with the popular schemes of biased propagandists.

It was hoped that right lessons will be drawn from this sad story. Long past the time when one could whistle past the graveyard with impunity, instigating international crises. Now it is time to sit at the negotiating table and begin serious substantive conversations about the whole complex set of Euro-Atlantic security problems that has accumulated over the past decades. Setting it aside until better times means multiplying risks of repeated acute political crises with no winners.

I happened to take part in such negotiations and edit the final documents. When I read them now, I have mixed feelings. On the one hand, I realize how much potential for common security these documents had. On the other, I see that eloquence can lose its meaning if it is not supplemented with the appropriate tools for implementation. I keenly hope that this time it would not be the same.

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Social Media in Information Warfare

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Social media have become a completely new field for information warfare. Social media have impacts on those, who unlike the television audience, desire for information and are not informationally passive. In the “Conflict in the south-east of Ukraine” new players have appeared in information warfare — active, authoritative bloggers, who have their own pages on social media and thousands of subscribers. They actively influence the audience and have professional exposure to the official media. In 2022 social media are actively involved in the dissemination of information in the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Social media are also used by the authorities, professional politicians, and propagandists of the opposition, which is especially evident from YouTube video hosting. Meanwhile, many fakes about the crisis appeared on social media and mainly come from abroad. Therefore, it's important for journalists, who are likely doctors of society, to fulfill their responsibilities in military operations.

Keywords: social media, information warfare, Ukraine crisis, fake news, Russia-Ukraine crisis

Journalism researchers interpret information warfare as a deliberate discrediting of a political, economic, and ideological opponent with the help of compromising information. Specialists give “information warfare” broader meaning. They think the open and hidden targeted information impact of social systems on each other was in order to obtain some material things (Grabelnikov A. A., 2011, pp. 81–101). Many articles and books have been published on this subject (Belyaev Dmitry, 2014; Korovin V., 2014; Panarin I. N., 2014; Starikov Nikolay, 2014).

Social media such as Facebook, V Kontakte, Twitter, Odnoklassniki and others have become a completely new field for information warfare. Social media have impacts on those, who unlike the television audience, desire for information and are not informationally passive. Meanwhile, the interactivity of the Internet gives them the opportunity to oppose the official versions of what is happening with themselves. Social media users distribute exclusive information, including videos and messages, which are then actively used by the media of oppositions.

It is very obvious in the “Conflict in the south-east of Ukraine”. Several information warfares intertwined there at once, and it is difficult for ordinary people to figure out who is fighting with whom and what goals they are pursuing. The most massive and obvious weapon in the conflict is the Ukrainian media. They didn't fulfill their main functions at that time, namely, an objective reflection of reality. Their task is to introduce political and social myths into the mass consciousness, which are beneficial to the ruling elites. Their activities were divided

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in several directions — internal and external: Firstly, to their own population; secondly, to the enemy's media, which means Russian media; thirdly, to the world media to create a positive image of their country and denounce the aggressor (Russia). After the collapse of the USSR, the Ukrainian media (and educational institutions along with them) have managed to raise a new generation, for which the main enemy is the Moska (Moskal — on knives; Who does not jump is a Muscovite!), communists (komunyaku — to Gilyak, which means hang the communists). These sentiments were especially manifested in western Ukraine, where they openly erected monuments to Stepan Bandera, they sang the exploits of the division of the SS troops “Galicia” and other war criminals. Later, it was known that these forces captured the Kyiv Maidan and began to impose their views on the entire country. All this resulted in an open confrontation between the West and the East of Ukraine, a coup d'état, an illegitimate government, the loss of Crimea by Ukraine, the formation of the republics of the DPR, LPR, “Novorossiya” and civil war. Today, the information (cold) war has grown into a hot one. Now it is a component of the military confrontation, and the local media are already acting in accordance with the military plans of the Ukrainian government and the oligarchs.

They are openly supported by the Western media, which have nurtured this conflict. Most of them kept quiet about the true state of affairs in Ukraine. The German TV channel “KlagemauerTV” published a video, in which it accused the largest German and world media of a criminal conspiracy aimed at a monstrous distortion of information about events in Ukraine. According to German journalists, the presentation of materials in most Western media is “impossible to beat” and it is aimed at strengthening the influence of “the organizers of the war in Ukraine”.¹ Therefore, the population of the EU countries is completely unaware of what is happening and had to learn the truth about the events in Odesa, Mariupol, Donetsk, and Lugansk by chance from rallies and pickets organized by immigrants from Russia and Ukraine in the capitals of European countries. Western media are also active participants in information warfare. Considering that they cover up to 80% of the information space in the world, their point of view on Ukrainian events is both dominant and overwhelming.

Since the Ukrainian media have been bought up by local oligarchs, they are also waging internal wars among themselves, protecting the political positions of their masters and compromising opponents (the battle between the media of Kolomoisky and Firtash). Later, I. Kolomoisky waged war against the President of Ukraine P. Poroshenko. “After the collapse of the system of succession of power in Ukraine, which was the result of an armed coup, Kolomoisky sees Poroshchenko's dubious legitimacy as an opportunity for himself. If Poroshenko did not seize power in Ukraine, then he can separate this area from Ukraine, which is already under his control and his vassals (already called by many ‘Kolomoisky Khagan’)”²

New players have appeared in information warfare — active, authoritative bloggers, who have their own pages on social media and thousands of subscribers. They actively influence the audience and have professional exposure of the official media. One of them is Anatoly Shariy, a Ukrainian, who lives in Europe and constantly reveals fakes in the Ukrainian media. His page is on the 10th line of the Ukrainian Facebook rating in 2014 (without any advertising, he has 100 thousand subscribers and 40 million views in three months on YouTube since the Ukraine crisis).

Fake is falsification, forgery, and deceit. In social media, fakes can be internet rumors disguised as real news,

¹ The German TV channel showed the truth about the Euromaidan and accused the major Western media of collusion, March 11, 2014, Nakanune, available online at: <https://www.nakanune.ru/news/2014/3/11/22344375>.

² Rojsers A. Kolomoisky vs Poroshenko: Wall to wall, July 16, 2014, Odnako, available online at: <http://www.however.org/blogs/kolomoyskiy-vs-poroshenko-stenka-na-stenku/>.

fake pages, which imitate the pages of real users — containing identical personal data, photo albums, records and so on. In the political struggle, they are created to compromise with politicians and other defendants. Anatoly Shariy mainly exposed video clips and photographs of the Kyiv media, which are trying to give out information materials of past years from Chechnya, Iraq, Syria, and other hot spots for the “atrocities” of the separatists in the Donbas. They indulge in these informational crimes not for a good life: mainly Russian journalists work on the battlefield (who are targeted for hunting — that’s why they die), and Ukrainian journalists got their news from military headquarters, which were located far from the clashes.

In order to organize the publication of objective video materials from the battlefields, the journalist of the TV and radio company “Crimea”, Dmitry Taran — the column “information warfare” host since March 2014 (the videos of these programs are posted on his youtube account³), suggested that the local residents report themselves — take photos by mobile phones, video cameras or cameras with video filming of the events taking place around them and post it on social media. In his opinion, such a massive horizontal spontaneous movement will break the information blockade, will enable residents of other regions of Ukraine, and enable other countries to see the true state of affairs, rather than get information from edited pictures of Kyiv.⁴ Residents as participants in information warfare, in fact, guaranteed the objectivity of reflecting the results of the enemy’s attack with their mass of amateur publications.

In social media, you can find instructions, on how to detect fakes, for example, fake pages. 1) all photos of a person were uploaded on the same day. 2) all posts on the pages are uploaded on the same day. 3) complete lack of subscribers, a small number of friends. 4) and if there are a lot of friends and subscribers, look at the likes: a small number of likes under the posts, that is most likely fake.⁵

The daily routine of individual information fighters in social media is to catch, denounce, compromise, to reveal the truth, etc. They conscientiously do this routine work. In addition, there are many groups on social media that have their own pages, which cover the true situation in the southeast of Ukraine.

On Facebook, for example, there is a group page, which is called “Great Patriotic Information Warfare”. Its organizers wrote “you can discuss current news, express your opinions, and spread the necessary, useful information. Here we honor the history of our ancestors, we respect our traditional confessions and family values, we respect the elders, and we have the right orientation. we glorify the culture of Russian civilization.” On November 5, 2014, the group already had 2,938 members.

Because of social media, militias and residents of the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics have the opportunity to convey to a large Internet audience the truth about what is really happening in the Donbas. This was reported on Facebook on the pages of the “News of the Donetsk People’s Republic” (1285 participants — the number in March 2014), “New Eastern Ukraine” (3101 participants), “Be New Russia!” (1580 members, “Donbas’ support group! (Everything you would like to know about the war in the south-east of Ukraine. Latest news”), “Donbas people’s militia” (4194 members, “The fate of Donbas is in our hands. Join us!”), “Slavic peace against fascism”, (8345 participants, “...there will be a moment when the Slavic peoples unite. And a ruler will come to power in the Russian state, who will be able to bring together all the Slavs. And

³ Dmitry Taran, Information War, May 30, 2014, *YouTube*, available online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uIt31ZVL7c0&list=PLDAuNWwvITBEEFoJ5osgDO9XZOaVRsEH&index=27>; Dmitry Taran, Information War, July 10, 2014, *YouTube*, available online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ftxXo016zs>.

⁴ Appeal to the people of Donetsk on the information war, available online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FM6onFpHQrY&list=PLDAuNWwvITBEEFoJ5osgDO9XZOaVRsEH&index=4>.

⁵ How to understand VKontakte that this is a fake page? *Otvety*, available online at: <https://otvet.mail.ru/question/168552517>.

most importantly, he will be able to stop numerous wars. — Vanga”), “Novorossiya-actual” (3011 participants), “news of Novorossiya” (2849 participants), “Novorossiya” (6578 participants).

All these participants, who make up groups in networks, also conduct active information work on their own pages, fight against fakes from official Ukrainian and Western media reports, reprint and distribute the most relevant and important posts, messages and video materials. The new information force — the interactive audience of the Internet — significantly affects the mindset of users and public opinions about the events in Novorossiya. I think this topic requires more attention of modern media researchers. After all, information warfare is moving from traditional media to internet media.

The above content was published in 2014 — the first months of the military confrontation in the Donbas (Grabelnikov A. A., November 5, 2014). The past eight years have shown that the information warfare there has not weakened, on the contrary, the war has become more severe. Moreover, Kyiv often won victories in it (Revyakina Anna, February 8, 2022). Why did this happen? A survey of Donetsk journalists and bloggers showed that “we are losing the information war because we try to tell the truth, while the enemy lies and does not blush. Firstly, ordinary people are more likely to believe lies in their rationality. Secondly, one fact can generate 100500 lies of facts — nothing limits them. Accordingly, truthful information is simply overwhelmed by misinformation, like an avalanche... We have a conscience, and therefore we often do not cross red lines. Unfortunately, this is impossible in information warfare... As a result, it turns out that more and more misinformation is pouring into our minds, and we respond with uncertain actions... One might get the impression that since the truth is on our side, then we don’t need to protect it. We are taught from childhood that the truth will reveal itself and that lies will be exposed sooner or later. Unfortunately, the reality is not as it seems. It is the truth that needs both powerful armor and protection, not because it is weak, but because too many do not want and are afraid to hear it (Revyakina Anna, February 8, 2022).

The special military operation, which began on February 24, 2022, again sharply aggravated the situation on the information frontline. Social media are actively involved in the dissemination of information, unlike the media filled mainly with texts of the population, where each author judges what is happening in their own understanding. Social media are also used by the authorities, professional politicians, and propagandists of the opposition, which is especially evident from YouTube video hosting. In the current media field, foreign information sources play an important role, which launched a fierce war against Russia with the help of fake news and information provocations. Maxim Zamshev (Максим Замшев), editor-in-chief of Literature Gazeta (“Литературной газеты”), stressed “the information warfare is worse than the real one in some places. You can trust only verified information and do not be distracted by Instagram bloggers’ nonsense” (Zamshev Maxim, 2022, pp. 2–8). President V. V. Putin (В. В. Путин) also emphasized that our country and other countries were constantly faced with cynical deceit and lies from the West. For example, the West deployed weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. “It was unbelievable and shocking, but the fact remains. A lot of lies are also told at the national level and on the platform of the UN, which results in huge casualties, destruction, and an incredible surge of terrorism (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2022).

Today, in the special military operation of Russia, the information and psychological warfare in Ukraine has reached a scale that was simply unimagined before. On March 1, 2022, the head of the Civic Chamber’s working group on combating the spread of misinformation, Alexander Malkevich (Александр Малькевич), announced that almost 1,400,000 misinformation about the situation in Donbas had been detected in Russian Internet in just a week. “In 2020, we identified 35 thousand fakes, in 2021 we have already identified almost 90 thousand fakes.

This year, in two months, excluding fakes about Donbas, about our special operation, 20,000 fakes were discovered.”⁶

The Ukrainian authorities created information isolation from the Russian media, misinformed the population of their country with their messages, disorientated them, caused panic, and intimidated them with the atrocities of the Russian troops, but at the same time talked about the heroic victories of the armed forces of Ukraine, which in some places drove the enemy back to the Russian borders. In order to prove this, blogger Yuriy Podolyaka (Юрій Подоляка) showed on his YouTube channel, journalists even rework maps and move cities. In the news of TSN TV channel, the city of Lozova from the south of the Kharkiv region moved 300 kilometers to the north-west between Bogodukhov and Akhtyrka in order to show that the battles near Lozova are taking place not far from the Russian Federation.⁷

The President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky (Владимир Зеленский) was also actively involved in the video deception, talking about the 15 dead courageous soldiers who defended Snake Island in the Black Sea. He also awarded the title of “Hero of Ukraine” to all of them. Fortunately, total 82 inhabitants of the island all survived and surrendered to the Russian warship.⁸

In the fakes of Ukrainian cyberfighters military stories of 2014 in Donbas are actively used as today’s ones to disorient and intimidate the population. Videos about conflicts in other countries and even computer games are used for the same purpose. For example, the destruction in Beirut after the explosion in the port in 2020 is presented as the result of the shelling of Kharkiv, although the sea is clearly visible in the background of the picture. They are not shy about staged scenes. Many media claimed that a large hole in the kindergarten was shot by the Russian army. Many Western correspondents were invited to inspect it. The interior of the building hit by rockets has few intact parts. But there the windows are not broken, and even the toys on the shelves, the lamp on the ceiling, and other items remained untouched. Also, all the Western media went around the same photo with a pregnant woman who allegedly escaped from a maternity hospital in Mariupol shot by Russian troops. A local fashion model starred as a woman in labor. But the terrorist attack, organized by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Donetsk on March 14 with the help of the Tochka-Utactical missile, in which 21 people were killed and 37 were injured, but they were “not noticed” by Western or Ukrainian media and social media.

Many fakes are not from Ukrainians but from abroad. According to Igor Ashmanov (Игорь Ашманов), a well-known specialist in the field of information technology, information centers have been created around the perimeter of Russia that creates disinformation for different social strata. The production and distribution of fakes are based on the principle of viruses. Social media are filled with them and objective news is removed. Thus, Facebook introduced de facto censorship, blocking the publications of Russian media. The vision of the situation from Russia became inaccessible to the Facebook audience. It is no coincidence that Roskomnadzor (Роскомнадзор) blocked Facebook in Russia — for distorting information, closing the pages of major Russian media and pro-Ukrainian political advertising (Panin Igor, 2022, pp. 9–15). Later, the General Prosecutor’s Office demanded that Meta be recognized as an extremist organization (it owns Facebook and Instagram), which allowed their users to publish calls for violence against the Russian military participating in a special operation in Ukraine,

⁶ OP said that about 1.4 million fakes about the situation in Donbass were revealed in Runet, March 1, 2022, *TASS*, available online at: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/13910503>.

⁷ Podolyaka Yuri (March 4, 2022). War in Ukraine. what does “honest” news look like for “aquarium fish”, *YouTube*, available online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrTFBCIPTb0>.

⁸ In Ukraine, they admitted that they lied about the border guards from Snake Island, the appeal of the “dead” AFU officer, *YouTube*, available online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jUtAgpuP3-s>.

as well as against the leaders of Russia and Belarus, and ban its activities in Russia. The Foreign Ministry sent a note to the American embassy in Moscow initiating a criminal case against the management of Meta. The maximum penalty for this crime is five years in prison.

Roskomnadzor also restricted access to the websites of Meduza (Медуза) and Radio Liberty (both publications are also recognized in Russia as foreign agents), the BBC Russian Service, and several Ukrainian media. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova (Мария Захарова) said the BBC plays a big role in undermining Russian stability and security, adding that Russia has been the victim of “unprecedented information terrorism that is creating hysteria around Ukrainian events”. The website of the media company Deutsche Welle was also blocked. Their broadcasting in Russia had previously been terminated, and employees of the Moscow office were deprived of accreditation. The sites of Present Time (“Настоящего времени”), New Times, Crimea. Reality (“Крым.Реалии”), and the Russian-language version of Interfax-Ukraine (“Интерфакс-Украина”) were also blocked. At the request of the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ukrainian publications Gordon (“Гордон”), Correspondent (“Корреспондент”), and Ukrainska Pravda (“Українська правда”) were included in the list of banned sites. Experts believe that since February 24, the Security Service of Ukraine has managed to post millions of fakes on Facebook, “fake resources” spent \$1.7 million daily on the Russian-language network, and \$5 million on the English-language network.⁹

Now a lot of fakes are spreading in the information space, the purpose of which is to lay all the responsibility on Russia. Domestic producers of disinformation have also joined Western and Ukrainian side. TV channel Rain (“Дождь”) and the radio station Echo of Moscow (“Эхо Москвы”), were convicted of information sabotage within the country. Rain has long been recognized in Russia as a media-foreign agent. At the request of the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia, Roskomnadzor restricted access to the resources of the channel.¹⁰ And the Echo of Moscow was taken off the air. According to the department, the websites of the TV channel and radio station contained materials with calls for extremist activities and disinformation about the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine. After that, Rain suspended work, and the board of directors liquidated the Echo of Moscow and the radio station’s website.

Roskomnadzor also demanded that the materials of Novaya Gazeta (“Новая газета”), Mediazona (“Медиазона”), and other media outlets be removed for calling what is happening in Ukraine a war. A week after the start of a special military operation in Ukraine, in response to information terrorism, the State Duma Committee on State Construction and Legislation approved an amendment introducing criminal liability up to imprisonment for up to 15 years for spreading fakes about the actions of the Russian Armed Forces. It is proposed to supplement the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation with Article 207.3 “Public dissemination of knowing disinformation about the Russian Armed Forces”. Such acts will be punished by a fine of up to 1.5 million rubles or imprisonment for up to three years. If an official position is used or there are mercenary motives for disseminating disinformation about the Russian Armed Forces, then the fine will be up to 5 million, and the term of imprisonment — from 5 to 10 years. If the spread of fakes caused serious consequences, then the term of imprisonment will be from 10 to 15 years. It is proposed to supplement the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation with a new article “Calls for the introduction of restrictive measures for Russian citizens or Russian legal entities”. Such actions will be punishable by a fine of up to 500 thousand rubles, by restriction of freedom,

⁹ Zelensky thanked Meta after allowing calls for violence, March 22, 2022, *RBC News*, available online at: https://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/13/03/2022/622e481b9a794724f4df8b01.

¹⁰ TV channel “Rain” suspends work, March 3, 2022, *TASS*, available online at: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/13952963>.

or by deprivation of freedom for up to three years with a fine of up to 200 thousand rubles.¹¹

“War, including information war, removes many peacetime taboos, it is foolish to believe the decency of the enemy here,” Vitaly Tretyakov (Виталий Третьяков) writes in *Literature Gazeta*, “our information policy needs to be radically changed today. If you see a ‘fifth column’ of traitors, it must be informationally killed, just like an external enemy. Of course, everyone is entitled to their own opinion. But it’s one thing when you talk about something in the kitchen with your wife, and it’s quite different when you, a famous person, speak in a public space and millions of fans trust you. This is no longer your own business, which means that you will have to be responsible for these words.” (Sarkisov Georgy, Vitaly Tretyakov, 2022, pp. 9–15).

Experts urge citizens to keep information hygiene, which must be followed at this time. It is necessary to create civil information defense — the interaction of social media users with each other to identify fakes, and expose disinformation.

An example of the general mutual assistance between people is shown by the activities of the Ukrainian journalist Anatoly Shariy (Анатолий Шарий), who organized streaming on his YouTube channel from the first day of the special operation in Ukraine. He abandoned the standard media reflection of hostilities, when journalists support one of the parties. And he focused on the mutual help of people, who suffered from hostilities. “We are not interested in geopolitics, there are other channels for that,” he says. “The main thing for us is to help equal, real people.”¹² Users themselves take an active part in this, sharing information from their places. These messages are rechecked by the editorial team of Anatoly Shariy. Only after that these messages are brought to the attention of the audience. The main task is to separate the truth from fakes, to filter out information stuffing. Since there is propaganda on both sides of the war, exaggeration of their military successes and losses of the enemy, many turn to the Shariy channel, which has become their eyes and ears, a reliable source of information and support in a difficult situation. His stream is watched by 100 thousand to 220 thousand of people. In total, Shariy has 2.9 million subscribers on YouTube. He conducts his programs from the European Union.

In the modern information world, it is difficult for a simple user to distinguish. Nevertheless, there are reliable resources, whose objectivity comes first. Among them are bloggers Yuri Podolyaka (Юрий Подоляка) and Mikhail Onufrienko (Михаил Онуфриенко). Their opinions are gaining several million views. Yuri Podolyaka, for example, is an engineer, who worked at the Sumy television center. However, he’s always interested in military history, tactics, and strategy of military operations. In 2014, he began to blog on LiveJournal, describing the war in Donbas. His analytical reviews were a great success. So he accurately predicted the Battle of Ilovaisk. He came to the attention of the Security Service of Ukraine and was forced to move to Russia. And now he has been fighting on the information frontline for eight years. Today he is invited as an expert to the programs of Channel One Russia (Первый Канал) (“The Great Game/Большая игра”), Vladimir Solovyov (Владимир Соловьев) and others also join this show. His activities can be fully attributed to the journalism profession.

The well-known journalist and politician Vitaly Tretyakov (Виталий Третьяков) emphasizes “the atmosphere in a society largely depends on journalists, which means that a journalist must be responsible for every word of his article. We all like doctors, and it is also important for us — do not to harm. This is the main thing in our career” (Sarkisov Georgy, Vitaly Tretyakov, 2022, pp. 9–15). This responsibility especially increases

¹¹ Anton Novoderezhkin, The State Duma Committee approved the amendment on imprisonment up to 15 years for fakes about the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, March 3, 2022, *TASS*, available online at: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/13945709>.

¹² Anatoly Shariy, We broadcast truth and common sense, *YouTube*, available online at: <https://www.youtube.com/user/SuperShariy>.

in the conditions of military conflicts.

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Stupider Intelligence: The IC in a Post-Truth World

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Articles and commentaries abound about how we live in a “post-truth” world, where alternative facts, fake news, and anti-intellectualism freely compete with recognized authoritative sources and peer-reviewed research in the battle for control over public opinion. Substantive topical engagement has been set aside by a reliance on talking points and buzz words, while factual rebuttals are easily dismissed as irrelevant and non-consequential. While most of these analytical commentaries are motivated to get to conclusions about the darker consequences of a hyper-technologized society or criticisms of the current political environment in America, this paper looks at an angle of the debate that has gone wholly unnoticed and unanalyzed: how does intelligence operate in a world no longer uncomfortable with the manipulation and corruption of information? The assumptions that intelligence professionals should feel adept in an environment overwhelmed by informational subterfuge are missing a crucial element for practitioners: dealing with subterfuge while acquiring information from targets is normal; dealing with it from the people you are meant to provide intelligence product to is highly detrimental. Analyzing how the IC attempts to overcome this problem fundamentally addresses the current state of Intelligence in American politics today and likely for the foreseeable future.

Keywords: IC, Post-Truth World, fake news, intelligence

Introduction

Articles and commentaries abound about how we live in a “post-truth” world, where alternative facts, fake news, and anti-intellectualism freely compete with recognized authoritative sources and peer-reviewed research in the battle for control over public opinion. Substantive topical engagement is set aside by a reliance on talking points and buzzwords, while factual rebuttals are dismissed as irrelevant and non-consequential. Most analyses of post-truth society are motivated to get to conclusions about the darker consequences of a hyper-technologized society or criticize the current political environment in America. This paper looks at an angle of the debate that has gone wholly unnoticed and unanalyzed: how does intelligence deal with a world not just fully comfortable with the manipulation and corruption of information but perhaps surrounded by a society that de facto embraces the post-truth era? The assumptions that intelligence professionals should feel adept in an environment overwhelmed by informational subterfuge are missing a crucial element. Dealing with subterfuge from adversaries while acquiring information is normal. Figuring out how to provide intelligence product within a post-truth society, arguably to a post-truth president, is still undetermined. Analyzing whether the IC can overcome this problem, while examining how other disciplines have attempted to address it as well, reveals just how much the current state of intelligence in America today and likely for the foreseeable future

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could be undermined.

Just about any analysis of post-truth society regardless of end objective is required to start with how the Oxford dictionaries named “post-truth” as their word of the year in November 2016. The immediate context was not only the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States but also the Brexit decision in the UK, where the electorate decided to voluntarily remove itself from the European Union. Most educational institutions and mainstream media organizations portrayed these two events as “proof” that a post-truth world had been depressingly concretized. Formally defined as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”, the term post-truth has actually been in existence since the early 1990s. But it only became Oxford’s word of the year because of the organization documenting a 2000% increase in its overall usage across all media and other communication channels during the 2016 calendar year (Yalçinkaya B., Dönmez A., Aydın F., & Kayali N., 2018, pp. 53–64).

Donald Trump being elected in and of itself would not necessarily carry post-truth consequences to the American Intelligence Community (IC). Even subsequent studies that have shown the President to, on average, make at least 5.5 misleading or outright false claims per day do not automatically prove a direct consequential impact on the IC (Kristiansen L., & Kaussler B., 2018, pp. 13–52). But having the President of the United States appear at times to be engaged in open public relations warfare with his own IC does demand a new analysis be added to the growing list of disciplines trying to understand how post-truth impacts their work and what can be done about it. No matter what, it is a strange new information world indeed. The low point for intelligence was arguably not the President patronizingly questioning the IC’s professionalism, competence, and patriotism. Rather, it was his Tweet comparing the IC’s supposed leaking behavior with Nazi Germany¹. Taken in sum, any analysis is more than just an attempt to repair damage done to the relationship between the chief executive and the IC. It is also not a jingoistic attempt to protect the reputation of the American Intelligence Community. Rather, the effects of post-truth (when it is represented by bogus attacks on core political institutions and fundamental principles of the democratic system) when aimed at the Intelligence Community can signal an erosion of critical norms in liberal democracy. When the connection between power and truth become less than solid, then the damage can be very real and far deeper than esoteric debates over philosophy (Kristiansen L., & Kaussler B., 2018, pp. 13–52).

The following analysis will first investigate the state of the current literature on post-truth as a general phenomenon across several disciplines. While most lament its evolution and pervasiveness across society overall, there is divergence in terms of understanding how deep the problem is and even how best to define its reach and scope. Other disciplines, like conservation, education, and globalization have done an excellent job examining how post-truth impacts their specific worlds and have even made attempts to offer remedies and solutions. Interestingly, it will be shown how those solutions overall tend to be wildly divergent. Thus, it is unlikely such analyses offer direct insight for the IC. A detailed examination of the tension between President Trump and the Intelligence Community will then follow, not just to document how badly things currently stand but to reveal how post-truth attacks do not so much impact job efficiency and procedural etiquette as they do undermine societal faith in the industry as a whole. The analysis also emphasizes how scholars, analysts, and media commentators alike might need to think twice before simply suggesting that the real solution to the IC

¹ Available online at: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1868529097>.

post-truth problem is to just patiently wait for the exit of Trump from the White House. After all, while it might be true that President Trump could very well be the epitome of the post-truth phenomenon currently, it can also be argued that he is but a symptom of a larger societal evolution, not its cause. As such, his ultimate fade from the political scene does not guarantee the removal of the post-truth problem for the IC. It is understandable, the desire to see this problem wrapped up conveniently in the embodiment of a single person. Unfortunately, this analysis reveals that society-wide problems are best resolved societally and not wholly focused through the lens of one controversial individual, no matter how lofty their title or power. This is shown at the end by briefly examining how British and Russian intelligence have been impacted by the phenomenon regardless of Trump as figurehead.

Ultimately, this analysis asks some difficult and pointed questions that are necessary if society-at-large wishes to progress beyond the post-truth era. Even that end goal, ultimately, might be under question: what is society's endgame when it comes to post-truth? Are citizens unknowing dupes in the process or willful participants pushing the phenomenon forward?

Understanding what is to become of terms such as critical reasoning, analytical thinking, conceptual analysis, and falsifiability will go a long way in shedding light on how damaging post-truth will be, not just for intelligence professionals but for Americans overall. Affirming what one believes is not the same as confirming what one thinks. It is easy to recognize the distinction between affirm and confirm. What tends to be missed, however, is the significance of difference between *believe* and *think*. Affirming belief is a largely subjective process, given to emotions and rarely analytical. Confirming a thought is a mostly objective process, absent emotions and supported through analysis. Post-truth will find victory or defeat upon this intellectual battlefield and the consequences for many different disciplines and professions could be stark. After all, some consider post-truth thinking to be a de facto departure from Enlightenment ideas: that a victory for post-truth is in reality the death of experience and expertise, the centrality of fact, humility in the face of complexity, and the need for further study and respect for divergent ideas (Hayden Michael, 2018). A post-truth world may put intelligence together with some strange bedfellows: journalism, academia, the courts, and science. May this necessity lend itself to new opportunity, where citizens building the future understand how important it is to base society on best judgment, objective reality, and truth-telling (Hayden Michael, 2018).

The Post-Truth Phenomenon: What Is It and Why Does It Matter?

The flurry of analysis that has focused on the concept of post-truth began in earnest when the Oxford dictionaries made it their word of the year in 2016. Thus, it can be somewhat forgiven that few people go back to its true beginning, all the way back to 1992, when a little known Serbian-American playwright coined the term (Picciotto R., 2019, pp. 88–96). At the time, Tesich was attempting to ascertain the true long-term political and societal consequences on America emergent during the generation that had passed since the Watergate scandal of President Nixon. He decided that American citizens didn't want bad news anymore, no matter how true or vital to our health as a nation and that in a fundamental way we, as a free people, have freely decided that we want to live in some post-truth world ((Picciotto R., 2019, pp. 88–96). Ultimately, his point was that the pursuit of truth seemed to always be accompanied by the presence of bitter disappointment and bad news so pervasively that it would in fact be best to just be lied to. This came with a special caveat, however: this lying had to be done in the interests of the people, according to their worldviews and still aligned with national security (Picciotto R., 2019, pp. 88–96).

This would be more scientifically confirmed by 2016, when no less than a Nobel Prize-winning psychologist tied this to the concept of “cognitive ease”, in which humans often have a tendency to avoid facts that would be challenging to their brains and force them to think in ways that are uncomfortable compared to previously held facts². A decade before this, it was brought to the forefront of the public imagination in America when the late night host and popular comedian coined the term “truthiness”, in which people seemed to be opting more for “facts” that would just “feel true”, regardless of whether they were actually true or not. No less impressive, Colbert’s whimsical term would not only become a formally recognized word, it was selected by Merriam-Webster as its “word of the year” in 2006. The ten years between these two notable observations can be seen as the true laboratory in which the worst of Tesich’s original fears in the 90s came true. Post-truth found its ultimate calling in a public sphere where there was a near derisive loss of trust in governmental institutions and the infrastructure in which people began to obtain their information underwent massive and fundamental changes³. This perfect storm, where President Bush’s Global War on Terror met face-to-face with Zuckerberg’s Facebook algorithms, created a semi-conscious trap that some intellectual circles awkwardly call “homophilous sorting”: the natural tendency of like-minded individuals to form clusters⁴.

This negative zeitgeist was perfectly captured by the famous Kremlin propagandist-cum-journalist, Dmitrii Kiselyov, who declared that “the age of neutral journalism had passed...because what you select from the huge sea of information is already subjective”.⁵ And if people are uncomfortable with taking analytical conclusions from such biased sources, there are plenty of other studies that seem to back up Kiselyov’s derision. A large survey conducted on Turkish university students not only proved that today’s college-age people are aware of the existence of post-truth fake information online, its overall pervasiveness, they still tend to select information sources that trend in the direction of their preconceived and predetermined ideas (Yalçinkaya B., Dönmez A., Aydın F., & Kayali N., 2018, pp. 53–64). Studies with these types of depressing observations might help explain the trend that emerged under Tesich. The existence of discriminating filters, automatic fact-checkers, and other technology-driven platforms that could help people discern post-truth sources from ones with veracity depend on the willingness of the users to employ them. And study after study in the 21st century seem to indicate such willingness is not in ample supply when it comes to people’s patience⁶. Thus, most resolutions for battling post-truth seem to work around the consumers of information as *part of the problem and not potentially as part of the solution*.

Ultimately, where Tesich and his colleagues truly went unknowingly awry was in proposing resolutions disconnected from the true source of the problem: the people themselves. Perhaps worse, this would become a tendency in the literature that continues to this very day (as will be seen upcoming when the disciplines of conservation, education, and globalization are viewed through the prism of post-truth). Thus, the true loss was in so perfectly describing the scourge of what post-truth was to become but feel the best scenario for fighting its advance was *to elevate a bureaucratic profession with more prestige, status, and reputation* (Picciotto R., 2019, pp. 88–96). Tesich believed if the process of “evaluation” could achieve true professional status, with guiding principles, ethical guidelines, competencies, and control over the formal designation, then post-truth would finally have a legitimate rival with which to compete. It was a de facto elitist resolution to what was fast

² Available online at: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1817953241>.

³ Available online at: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1817953241>.

⁴ Available online at: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1817953241>.

⁵ Available online at: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1817953241>.

⁶ Available online at: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1817953241>.

emerging as a populist problem. This proposal would become the standard habit of modern post-truth analyses: policy over people, elitism over populism, and bureaucratic expertise over street-level grassroots approaches. Tesich perhaps did not know he was creating a legacy that would impinge the very fight he wanted to engage. But create it he did.

Studies like the Turkish university one above are the true descendants of Tesich's societal pessimism. Instead of thinking of ways to instill popular motivation to utilize readily-available technology and inculcate higher standards of personal judgment, analyses seek ways to front-end install platforms that do the judgment ahead of time. Indeed, as the world moves deeper into an automated, technologized age, the resolutions seem to only become more impersonal and less independent. As the age of post-truth seems to be de facto creating a political world of rampant disinformation, this has stark consequences. Instead of developing more discerning human beings, they are being bypassed entirely in favor of hard-wired programs that can evaluate criteria for them, without their knowledge. Automated quantitative programs that can perform conceptual analysis to root out disinformation before it reaches a potential consumer is being regarded as a *safer and more reliable* solution than working with actual people (Fallis D., 2015, pp. 401–426). Indeed, intellectual pessimism needs to be overcome for it limits what are likely the most direct and efficient potential resolutions for combating post-truth disinformation. Sometimes the pessimism comes across as so much benign condescension, patronizing consumers of modern information as helpless victims (Bremner J., 2018, pp. 11–12). These arguments should basically be listed under the “educators” white knight brigade, as they inevitably seek to address the problem by proclaiming their need to be a vanguard to help people understand how to properly vet valid information from disinformation, how to create an activated public and stop them from being so passive. Sometimes, the elitism that subtly informs such arguments is not so subtle:

First, there is a need to engage with the kind of “post-truth” politics that has emerged as a significant, anti-democratic and anti-progressive trend (see, e.g., Stokes, 2016; Viner, 2016). Second, progressive post-positivist academics are uniquely equipped to engage with post-truth politics, and we have a particular responsibility to do so — beyond as well as within academia. Third, progressive, postpositivist academics need to go beyond the safe, postmodern haven of critique and instead do more to inform and propose positive (although not positivist) and positional, rather than merely oppositional, alternatives. Fourth, in fashioning such new positive perspectives for the post-truth world, post-positivists can draw inspiration from modernist as well as postmodernist sources, notably from the avantgardes of the 20th Century (Tallis B., 2016, pp. 7–18).

Aside from the fact that the above quote is barely intelligible for a mass, non-specialist audience, it symbolizes how poorly the elites have not just communicated to but directly involved everyday people in creating solutions to the problems of post-truth. Instead of trying to attempt whatever the above quote is angling for, might it not be more efficient to craft proposals built on encouraging everyday people to take pride of responsibility in the quality of their information consumption?

While Tesich should be applauded for coming to his rather unique societal observation so early, it is clear he had no idea he was merely tapping into what was the front-edge of the coming post-truth wave. In fact, he should not have been looking back a generation to Watergate and reflecting on where society had come. He should have been looking forward a generation, through the “adulthood” years of Generation X, and try to ascertain where society was going to go. For this shift in viewing position would have allowed people to know that while the phenomenon that would come to epitomize post-truth (emotionality, subjectivity, willing falsehood, manufactured facts, and alternative realities) has always in one way or another been evident in

politics for eons, it has arguably never been so pervasive and multi-layered as it is in the 21st century. Little-known scholars writing for little-read journals about little-propagated theories that undermine science in favor of arbitrary societal constructs have minimal impact. But press forward into a highly-technologized world where the scholars, peer-reviewed journals, and understanding of theory are now basically bypassed for instantaneous communication across a legitimately global non-elite audience and you have the ideal foundation for the explosion of “populist post-truth”. Just consider how Tesich and his colleagues in the early 90s were fearing these new developments:

In the post-truth world, civil debate vanishes as reactionary rhetoric flourishes. Arguments specifically designed to hinder principled dialogue combine the perversity thesis (whereby any action proposed by a political adversary is portrayed as likely to generate the exact opposite of what was intended); the futility thesis (according to which political adversaries’ attempts at social transformation will produce no effects); and the jeopardy thesis (which holds that proposed reforms are bound to endanger previous hard-won accomplishments)...There is something qualitatively different about its current incarnation. It is the symptom of deep policy dysfunctions grounded in a unique historical context. It reveals significant threats to the public welfare. It reflects deep dissatisfaction with the status quo and it is opening the door to populist leaders (Picciotto R., 2019, pp. 88–96).

This quote perfectly reflects the fears of the global environment currently, fully 38 years ahead of its time. In fact, it seems fair to argue this quote better describes life in 2019 than it did the fears of what may have happening in 1991. Principled dialogue is now, apparently, a mere formal exercise in which at least two parties engage in a series of monologues, each one patiently or impatiently as the case may be waiting for the other to finally stop talking, never having listened in the meantime, so that they would have the floor in which to begin their ongoing soliloquy. Post-truth, disinformation, and elitist anti-populism work now in tandem to produce the full culmination of Tesich’s fears across far too many disciplines.

Post-Truth and Conservation

Any discussion about the impact of a post-truth society on intellectual disciplines has to include conservation. One of the primary topics of conversation, from high-level think tanks to late night comedy show hosts, is the battle over the narrative of climate change. Indeed, scientists themselves in this area have often thrown up their intellectual hands lamenting their overall lack of ability for dealing with the *public relations* aspect of the issue in today’s politicized world.

Thus, some of the best analysis of how disciplines are truly impacted by post-truth come from the world of conservation analysis. The innate humility of climate scientists means they have always been quick to emphasize the conjecture aspect of their predictive models. Since their analytical conclusions carry significant societal intervention impact, conservationists have laudably admitted that simply communicating the science as facts is not going to be enough (Rose D., 2018, pp. 518–524).

What this means is that conservation scientists in real terms have always accepted that the best way to communicate important information that has real-world influence is to include aspects like values, justice, pragmatics, and stakeholder interests (Rose D., 2018, pp. 518–524). Simply “doing good science” means nothing if you don’t have scientists talented in communicating that science onward to non-scientists. Therefore, the discipline of conservation has notably been focused on how they have by and large lacked that ability, which has negatively affected their reach and influence. While this is both practical and admirable overall, it is more interesting to note how the discipline seems to accept the existence of a post-truth world not only in terms

of not being able to reverse it, but in terms of how to better educate and train their own scientists to cope with such a world far into the future. In other words, conservation is literally trying to build a better mouse scientist, not a mousetrap, by inculcating new understanding about how scientific evidence has to be considered as only one of several factors affecting even a purely scientific issue (Rose D., 2018, pp. 518–524).

This pragmatism hints at a rather fundamental philosophical question that seems to lie underneath almost all post-truth arguments, regardless of the field being impacted: whose reality counts? (Rose D., 2018, pp. 518–524). In this aspect at least, conservation has done far better than most fields by admitting that greater progress and significance are achieved when you are able to connect with people and make them believe they are either fully invested in the outcome or have a genuine participatory stake in the process overall. Ultimately, success comes when people are made to feel the end outcomes are being achieved by them or with them, but not when the outcomes are being done *to* them. This battlefield formulation is quite common in the post-truth world, where collaboration and open facilitation are rejected and adversarial lines in the sand are drawn instead.

Conservation is ahead of many other disciplines to have this level of introspection and pragmatic reflection when it comes to the post-truth fighting world, even if at the moment it feels it is still losing the overall fight.

Post-Truth and Education

Education considers itself as damaged and endangered by the emergence of the post-truth world as conservation science. Given that it considers itself to be a beacon for developing global citizenship, critical thinking, and analysis, it is perhaps no surprise that the discipline's reaction to post-truth has been less introspective and more angered. Thus it is not difficult to find lamentations about how “facts are now futile”, “bubble worlds” reign supreme, and the capacity for moral thinking has been denigrated and compromised (Peters M., 2017, pp. 563–567). The dual body blow of Trump's election and the Brexit referendum is seen as an unholy coincidental alliance where older neoconservative values are infiltrating white working-class post-industrialized areas of poverty and despair. For many in education, post-truth is seen as a *de facto* rejection and/or refutation of a liberal internationalist order, something that is most certainly *not* a step for progressive thinking and societal advancement (Peters M., 2017, pp. 563–567). To a large extent, the discipline of education has dug its collective heels in and thrown down a gauntlet quite separate from the reaction seen in the world of conservation:

If education is equated almost solely with job training rather than a broader critical citizenship agenda for participatory democracy, we can expect the further decline of social democracy and the rise of populist demagogue politicians and alt-right racist parties. In the era of post-truth it is not enough to revisit notions or theories of truth, accounts of “evidence”, and forms of epistemic justification as a guide to truth, but we need to understand the broader epistemological and Orwellian implications of post-truth politics, science and education. More importantly, we need an operational strategy to combat ‘government by lying’ and a global society prepared to accept cognitive dissonance and the subordination of truth to Twittered emotional appeals and irrational personal beliefs (Peters M., 2017, pp. 563–567).

Unlike conservation, which sought to find a navigable path through a morass of obstacles, education sees post-truth as a fundamental threat to its overall existence. Or at least an enemy with the capability of changing how its educators do their business to a dire extent. In this way, post-truth is not simply a societal progression for the worse. It is a turning of society upside down and rendering the true importance of education, its core values, into insignificance.

Interesting to note, this is why the emphasis is much more on political activism, on physical intervention in the political process, rather than on “doing better research” or communicating at conferences in a more compelling way. Education has decided that the prevalence of post-truth as a societal descriptor is so dominant that subtle strategies connected to revisiting theories or better epistemic justifications amounts to nothing more than just so much elitist nonsense that would be ultimately ignored.

Ironically, these latter strategies are being shunted aside in an effort to get education back on a more solid footing where just such strategies can once more be engaged. In short, education yearns to get back to the world where theoretical arguments and epistemological debates can be its bread-and-butter. But right now that is impossible given that education has formed the post-truth debate to not be one of waging war with education but to be about the very survival of liberal democratic principles and free-learning society. It is about striving to stop the inexorable march to demagogic, false populist, anti-intellectual de facto gang warfare.

Post-Truth and Globalization

If conservation is striving to find its way reluctantly in a here-to-stay post-truth world and education is fighting — tooth, claw, and nail — to prevent post-truth from remaining relevant in the world, then globalization is still for now navigating a middle course that largely remains aloof but intellectually engaged and curious about how post-truth will proceed. Part of this may of course be because globalization somewhat proudly thinks post-truth is largely a consequence of its own doing. It feels post-truth is merely a response to global socio-economic uncertainty, most of which is brought on or intensified by the increasing primacy of globalization (Chacón R., 2018, pp. 7–27). In short, modern-day populism, neo-nationalism, and post-truth functioning are nothing but negative symptoms, compensations, to the victory of globalization as a systemic world order of economic activity and advancement. Thus, not wanting to be a victim of having the baby (globalization) thrown out with the bath water (post-truth), there is a fascinating hedging of intellectual bets within the discipline when discussing it:

On one hand, we have transformed our planet to such an extent that some of its fundamental realities can only be understood from the supra-human standpoint of a science that “sees” what no individual can see or even conceive. On the other hand, our survival as a species may depend on acknowledging such inconceivable truths. But for such a work of acknowledgment to be effective, there must be political spaces and sovereign authorities (Chacón, R., 2018, pp. 7–27).

When wading through the nuance, what one finds is a discipline not seeing post-truth as a threat or as an immutable object impervious to change. Globalization simply sees it as a consequence of multiple modern realities. As such, it is just as malleable as any other political phenomenon. The key is figuring out the right approach in which to address it. The inevitable flow of all things good — capital, information, technologies, images — must also have an inverse reactive flow of some things bad — global warming, pandemics, terrorism, criminality (Chacón R., 2018, pp. 7–27). That structural yin-yang of life cannot be altered. Post-truth, therefore, is more about the collective response of self-actualization in the face of this onslaught, good and bad (Chacón R., 2018, pp. 7–27). In formal terms, globalization is treating post-truth as its dependent variable, while so many other disciplines are treating it as the independent. It is not for this study to determine which approach is ultimately correct. But it is important to note how this methodological divergence does absolutely change the manner and attitude with which this discipline sees the “problem” compared to others.

Post-Truth and Intelligence

As a phenomenon, post-truth is interesting because it manifests its impact value far beyond pure intellectual exercises. As seen in the previous three disciplines, while each has had formal scholarly concerns about the dangers of post-truth, its more profound damage has been seen to exist in the real world, impacting not just the pursuit of truth but actual employment and legitimacy. This perfectly encapsulates how the Intelligence Community, and intelligence as an intellectual discipline, has bumped up against post-truth. Arguably, intelligence is potentially more harmed in real terms than many other fields/disciplines, exactly because its uniqueness value is based on the ability to not just produce hard-to-obtain and hard-to-access information, but to produce knowledge product that literally can only come from its specialists. As two famous “celebrity scientists” (Neil deGrasse Tyson and Cara Santa Maria) have said publicly, the biggest problem is not that people have lost the ability to judge what is true and what is not, but that the “very idea of evidence and logic is being threatened by individuals and interests with the power to do real harm.” (Sartwell C., 2017, May 6, p. A.13). This is indeed the area where intelligence as a field and discipline sticks out far more than all the others: the holder of the most powerful office in the world, the President of the United States, is basically the primary object for intelligence product. If post-truth reaches all the way up to the President and impacts his thinking, then there is little else that could be more damaging to the IC. As hinted at earlier, the list of post-truth moments against the IC continues to grow today at an alarming rate:

- Trump called the IC “extremely passive and naïve” when it comes to its own assessment of Iran
- Trump dismissed the IC’s assessment of the threat still represented by North Korea
- Toward the end of the Obama administration, when an American intelligence report was produced first purporting the possible interference of Russia in the 2016 election, Trump’s first reaction was to question the “credibility of its spies”⁷.
- The White House accused the IC of “illegally leaking” information and de facto creating the “fake news” environment that breeds nothing but distrust and hatred. Trump called the IC “un-American” for its continued leaking to the press⁸.
- Trump demanded an investigation into the FBI and DOJ for supposedly illegally infiltrating and surveilling the Trump campaign for purely political purposes (Megerian Chris, 2018).
- Trump ended the long-established practice of the President’s Daily Brief (PDB), in which chief intelligence officials started the President’s day off with a summary of global concerns and threats.

While it is true Trump is by no means the first Commander-in-Chief to have tense relations at various times with the Intelligence Community, the manner in which this tension is being played out publicly and is covering issues of impropriety, professionalism, legitimacy, relevance, and need is unique. First, viewing the IC as just another tool to manipulate and utilize for political convenience and partisan interests is *not* the norm and does fundamentally undermine one of American democracy’s little-emphasized but crucially-important aspects: keeping intelligence professional, non-partisan, and apolitical. Second, the IC needs this structural relationship intact and honored because it is often responsible to deliver news to the President that is not aligned with his direct policy wishes and political agenda. Fracturing that atmosphere or rendering the IC unable to deliver such information impartially undermines American national security, the *raison d’être* of the IC. Third, moves like

⁷ “Trump tells US spy chiefs to go back to school”, *BBC Report*, January 30th, 2019.

⁸ Available online at: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1868529097>.

ending the PDB without formal articulation and logical reasoning but hinting at being able to get the same information elsewhere and more quickly (i.e., Fox News) calls into question the very legitimacy of the IC as an organization and decreases its value publicly before the entire nation. Perhaps unlike any other discipline, post-truth has not hurt intelligence in an abstract or unintentional way. Rather, post-truth has been wielded more like a weapon in the very hands of person intelligence has to answer to directly, thus impugning their motives, character, and abilities and making them less-than-viable in terms of public confidence⁹.

Even Nixon, who had every right to despise his own Intelligence Community at the end of his Presidency, did not come close to calling into question his agencies' professionalism or hinting at their own in-house political partisan agenda-mongering. More importantly, today's political environment has social media tools like Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram to intensify the practical reach and impact of post-truth statements. Trump has utilized these tools to maximum detriment of his own IC. It is not just about having the President's ear or getting him to value intelligence product. The manner in which post-truth statements are blasted across Twitter have undeniably produced an effect on the morale of agents already within the IC and on the effectiveness of the IC to recruit new talent to the job of national security. In addition, when the President of the United States denigrates his own IC through the use of post-truth posturing, it is not a far leap to imagine foreign intelligence agencies from questioning the value and veracity of partnering with the American IC, of trusting its information, and of de-valuing its influence.

Ultimately, a post-truth world for the IC is one that simply rejects the value of data, exults in emotionality, dismisses expertise, and arrogantly waves off objective intellectualism as elitist propaganda. While it is obvious why these trends would be anathema to every academic discipline and intellectual profession, they are especially damning to the Intelligence Community. The principles of evidentiary data, non-subjectivity, apolitical evidence collection, highly developed expertise, and rational intellectualism are the core bedrock upon which the intelligence profession is not just built but upon which it has always staked its relevance and reputation. A world run amok with post-truth would be difficult enough to deal with. But to have the High Priest of such a world literally the chief executive you must report into, this might simply be untenable for the future of classical intelligence as a profession and discipline. After all, when one of the most famous proponents of an intelligence career publicly retells how he found it necessary to mentor one talented young individual away from pursuing employment with the IC, explaining, "Don't put yourself at risk for the future. You have a lot to offer." (Hayden Michael, 2018).

Someday, then it may no longer be in a post-truth world. It may be a post-truth TwilightZone.

Conclusion

Some might argue that there is a legitimate place for post-truth in the modern world, especially in the contemporary world of politics. After all, perhaps the derision with which post-truth is held is a deflection by opponents unable to carry their own beliefs to full popularity and power. Making fun of others or dismissing their ideas as illegitimate based on emotionality has always been a preferred method of elites to ignore the masses. Justified anger has always been a driver of social change for decades, if not centuries (Fox C., 2016). Perhaps post-truth is just the newest manifestation of such anger and therefore deserving of more serious consideration as legitimate expression? Those not wanting to see post-truth written off so easily further

⁹ Available online at: <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1858208995>.

emphasize the danger of reducing “facts” down to only what is measurable (Fox C., 2016). Number crunchers outsourced by politicians unable to make compelling arguments to reach the people should not be automatically granted victory over people who lack three letters after their last names but still feel as adamant about their own positions and arguments.

While there is no doubt some legitimacy underlying these arguments — elitism in and of itself is no guarantor of rightness just as emotion-based argument built on volume alone is not — it is important not to be swept away by the misdirection. In the end, too many of these supposed justifications for post-truth boil down instead to feel-good justifications by the misinformed so as to not feel it necessary to become better informed. The important scholarly principle of “falsifiability” comes into play here. Any scholar worth his/her salt has to construct research and ask questions that do *not* in fact have self-evident or predetermined answers. To do so would be to nullify the legitimacy and purpose of the research before it even began. Falsifiability, therefore, is embracing the notion that we can be *wrong* rather than doing everything possible to ensure we end up right. This is an equally important concept taken for granted within the intelligence profession, where research and analysis are governed by the holy principles of collect the data, follow the evidence, let it speak for itself. Post-truth is the literal antithesis of falsifiability. It can serve no positive purpose engaging the IC or intelligence as an intellectual discipline.

When governments get involved in the post-truth phenomenon, actively working with it rather than being a stalwart enemy against it, the results can be more than stark. Russia’s use of post-truth in the form of misinformation, disinformation, control of facts, alternative narratives, and the like, has a direct and strategic domestic purpose. It creates a destabilizing effect within society that does not threaten the functioning of the country as a whole but certainly undermines the ability of oppositional organizations from gaining any real foothold and momentum against the regime in power (Surowiec P., 2017, pp. 21–27). In the end, Russia fulfills its own power system where the state dominates, suffers no fools, and accepts no challengers. Post-truth, therefore, is not something the Russian state feels burdened by but is effectively utilized by the state as a sort of manipulative soft power over society as a whole (Surowiec P., 2017, pp. 21–27). Others have even more eloquently explained the dangerous consequences when such domestic post-truth practices are allowed freedom on the global stage:

We submit that the widespread publicity surrounding Russia’s hacking activities in international politics...conceals the origins and daily practices of the trolling culture in Russia and its subsequent spillover into the international realm. In the contextual analysis that follows, we argue that empirical manifestations of a trolling frame...represent a wider practice of what we call *neutrollization* — a type of localized desecuritization-by-trolling...Kremlin trolls generate meaninglessness, neutralizing civil society attempts to cast the regime as a societal security threat (Kurowska X., & Reshetnikov A., 2018, pp. 345–363).

Ultimately, this is the battle that intelligence wages when the executive branch thinks it can get just as good information from a post-truth world and thereby completely bypass the entire industry of the IC: formally accepted and governmentally-utilized post-truth denudes the public of power, reduces its ability to participate, and renders its influence factor to near impotence.

Post-truth works best in at least a quasi-authoritarian political space, as its ultimate role undermines an informed and activated public. While other disciplines certainly suffer, intelligence is arguably hurt worse because of the nature of its role in the democratic space and the responsibilities it is meant to uphold. As is seen currently in the White House, post-truth run amok within the government does not just undermine how informed

the public is. It basically removes all of the IC's viable functions.

In order to avoid accusations of cherry-picking Russia as the worst possible case of post-truth/governmental collusion (pun intended), studies on British intelligence show a similar destabilizing effect that pushes the community toward failure (Keenan J., 2017, pp. 190–213). When trying to ascertain why British intelligence performed so poorly post-2004 during the buildup of its alliance with the United States for the Global War on Terror, it was found that the British had a tendency to rely on “proxy intelligence” (Keenan J., 2017, pp. 190–213). What this meant in a nutshell was that an overreliance on their American diplomatic counterparts to provide data proved disastrous for British intelligence because it was not entirely aware at the time that the US government was caught operating in an entirely “post-truth political environment” (Keenan J., 2017, pp. 190–213). Thus, when controlling for political regime type and international adversarial status, post-truth still operates within the intelligence environment like an infection and not just an obstacle: the end product is compromised, leading to poor organizational performance.

A last word of warning must be issued to those who feel the potential failure of Trump to gain reelection in 2020 is the answer to solve all of society's post-truth problems. While it seems highly doubtful that a new President would try to mimic the animosity currently between the White House and the IC, Trump has shown, for better or worse, that it is possible to conduct affairs without having a close and positive relationship with the IC, to the detriment of intelligence overall. Perhaps more importantly, his exit from the White House would unlikely create a sudden cathartic societal epiphany where the population as a whole no longer would fall victim to post-truth thinking or manipulation. The trend pre-dated Trump. It will inevitably post-date him as well. Living in a post-truth world matters for intelligence because it creates a society, a populace, and a working environment detrimental to its purpose and function. A post-truth world creates a world of “stupider” intelligence not by choice but by de facto force. And that world is not only more ignorant and misinformed. It is more dangerous as well.

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The World Order Crisis and the Future of Globalization

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The notions of globalization have changed as the process has developed and its geographic spread has expanded and deepened. As we move into the 2020s, we can see that not all the hopes and expectations of 30 years ago have come to pass. Some predictions were postponed until some indefinite future date, while others were consigned to the scrap heap of human errors. The understanding of the driving forces behind globalization and its internal logic gradually changed. There were significant shifts in the dominant assessments of the complicated balance of the positive and negative aspects of globalization, its principal achievements and inevitable side effects. The systemic global crisis of 2020 has had a huge impact on the notions of globalization, placing the future of globalization as such in jeopardy and mercilessly revising the fundamental paradigms of globalization that had seemed unshakeable 30 years ago. Essentially, however, this crisis has merely articulated the changes in the discourse that had been brewing for a long time. The intellectual and political offensive of anti-globalism started long before 2020. Some think that the 2000s were the historically short “golden age” of globalization, and the 2010s demonstrated the limited and reversible nature of many of its trends.

Keywords: future of globalization, ideological, liberal norms and values

Introduction

“Man came silently into the world”, as the great 20th-century French philosopher and theologian Pierre Teilhard de Chardin shrewdly observed. The same can be said of globalization — globalization came into the world silently, and we do not even know for sure when it happened. The debates on exactly when this process started still rage to this day, and the range of opinions on the matter is great. Some date the start of the globalization to the late 20th century. Others connect it with the establishment of global governance institutions after World War II. Some believe that the foundations of globalization were laid down during the industrial revolution of the 18th-19th centuries, while others push the origins of emergence of a global world back to the era of the Age of Discovery in the 15th-16th centuries (Thomas L. Friedman, 2005).

Whatever the case may be, modern international discourse on globalization is about 30 years old. Historically, this discourse was a natural extension of the debates on interdependence that had been going on in the West for at least the last quarter of the 20th century as a counterbalance of sorts of the neorealist narratives that dominated the expert milieu.

Politically, the emergence of this discourse is connected to the end of the Cold War and the feeling that the world had overcome its split into two opposed systems that were almost entirely isolated from each other.

Ideologically, since the early 1990s, globalization has been linked with the triumph of political liberalism

and was seen as a mechanism for disseminating liberal norms and values beyond the “historical West” to the rest of the world.

Technologically, the emergence of the internet and the concomitant revolution in information and communications technology was the crucial stimulus for the development of the discourse.

Economically, today’s discussions of globalization are connected with the sharp increase in global trade and investment that took place in the late 20th century, the global trend towards lower tariffs and other trade barriers, and the successes in implementing regional integration projects (the European Union, ASEAN, NAFTA, etc.).

Naturally, the notions of globalization have changed as the process has developed and its geographic spread has expanded and deepened. As we move into the 2020s, we can see that not all the hopes and expectations of 30 years ago have come to pass. Some predictions were postponed until some indefinite future date, while others were consigned to the scrap heap of human errors. The understanding of the driving forces behind globalization and its internal logic gradually changed. There were significant shifts in the dominant assessments of the complicated balance of the positive and negative aspects of globalization, its principal achievements and inevitable side effects. Ultimately, these developments produced the interdisciplinary field of research in international relations and global economics called *globalistics*, which aims to identify the causes, essence and principal trends of globalization, its consequences for human society and its interconnections with other political, social and economic processes in the world today.

Certainly, the systemic global crisis of 2020 has had a huge impact on the notions of globalization, placing the future of globalization as such in jeopardy and mercilessly revising the fundamental paradigms of globalization that had seemed unshakeable 30 years ago. Essentially, however, this crisis has merely articulated the changes in the discourse that had been brewing for a long time. The intellectual and political offensive of anti-globalism started long before 2020. Some think that the 2000s were the historically short “golden age” of globalization, and the 2010s demonstrated the limited and reversible nature of many of its trends.

Heated discussions continue on when exactly the breaking point in global trends took place and what its specific manifestations were. Many link the change in global development trends with Trump’s coming to power and his pointed rejection of two strategic integration projects — the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Others believe that the start of the crisis was marked by the outbreak of the U.S.-China trade war in 2017-2018. Still others search for the breaking point in the more distant past, pinpointing the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, when the global community missed its historic chance to develop a new and more efficient way to manage the global economy. And others focus on political premises of the current problems, such as the gradual departure of a number of post-communist and neo-communist states in Eurasia from the liberal development track that had previously seemed to be the only way.

In any case, the systemic global crisis of 2020 has given a powerful new impetus to the lurking doubts concerning globalization. The anti-globalists are celebrating their victory, while the globalists are on the defensive with no chance of launching a counterattack in the foreseeable future. The crisis has cast into sharp relief the many faults and obvious fragility of the globalization model of the early 21st century (Globalization 1.0) in its economic, technological, political, military-technical and humanitarian dimensions. The term “globalization” has by now acquired negative connotations almost worldwide, the expert discourse has come to

be dominated by various alternative scenarios for the subsequent development of the international system. Alarmist forecasts, geopolitical antiquity, and even geopolitical eschatology have become the *fad du jour*.

This work is a two-pronged attempt to correlate the current history of globalization (1990–2020) with the systemic world order crisis that has broken out this year and to put forward certain suppositions concerning the possible dynamics of globalization in the future. By “future”, we mean two temporal horizons. The nearest horizon (2020–2022) allows us to assess the immediate consequences that the current crisis will have for globalization — many of these are quite evident even today. The medium-term horizon (2020–2030) allows us to consider more remote consequences of the crisis, many of which are not yet as obvious. The author submits the following preliminary conclusions for his reader’s judgement:

- Experts and politicians alike still operate with different interpretations of the notion of globalization. The “narrow” understanding of globalization applies to international integration in its various dimensions, while the “broad” interpretation includes descriptions of social processes taking place in individual societies and states under influence of the development of cross-border interactions with other societies and states.
- We need to draw a distinction between the notions of “globalization” and “global governance”: while the former describes objective economic, financial, informational and other manifestations of an emerging global human community, the latter applies to principles, regimes, mechanisms and institutions intended to regulate this process. Global governance is impossible without globalization, but the development of globalization does not necessarily result in the concomitant development of global governance.
- The notions of globalization have been amended and even radically altered over the past 30 years. The initial globalization “mythology” has gradually given way to more balanced and realistic assessments of the phenomenon. On the other hand, a new “mythology” has gradually begun to emerge that is connected not with failed optimistic expectations, but rather with the newly established stable notions of the negative consequences of globalization.
- The 2020 global crisis has become the most serious test for globalization since the 1990s. We will likely see apparently a decrease in the connectedness of global society over the next few years, although this process will develop at different rates in different areas and in different regions of the world.
- Nevertheless, there is no reason to proclaim the “end of globalization,” or even a long-term and comprehensive trend towards deglobalization. The objective logic of global economic and social processes and possible technological breakthroughs promise a new “golden age” of globalization, maybe even in the early 2030s.
- The crisis has put the brakes on many of globalization’s most powerful engines, such as transnational corporations, universities, academic think tanks, liberal media and civil society. Nevertheless, these engines continue to impact global processes. Social and professional groups interested in continuing globalization in its various dimensions will not go anywhere either.
- The idea that the international system will return to the Westphalian principles need many qualifications at the very least, since the crisis has exposed the ineptitude of many multilateral bodies and international organizations, as well as of most nation-states. Only strong and efficient states are capable of being full-fledged and responsible participants in globalization processes.

- The current dynamics of the crisis lead us to the conclusion that there will be a sharp decline in the pre-crisis level of global connectedness in 2020-2021 and will then slowly and inconsistently bounce back over the next four to five years, or possibly by the end of the 2020s (2022–2030). Some aspects of globalization (cross-border information flows) will demonstrate higher dynamics than others (foreign direct investment, trade and international migrations).
- At the same time, the world-order crisis has demonstrated the stability of some multilateral mechanisms (for instance, within the European Union), as well as the absence of any realistic alternatives to moving towards a deeply integrated global community.
- The next stage of globalization will be significantly different from the globalization model of the early 21st century. Along with the persisting financial, trade and economic aspects, Globalization 2.0 will be increasingly dominated by social, information, communications and humanitarian processes and by the growing pressure that global problems exert on all parties to international relations. Overcoming global inequality and the need to redistribute resources planet-wide will be the principal challenges of Globalization 2.0.
- Efficient development of Globalization 2.0 is possible provided that the traditional balances between state sovereignty and interdependence, regionalization and globalization, and the interests of individual states and global public good are adjusted.
- The emergent slowdown of globalization and the onset of deglobalization create many additional tactical opportunities for Moscow. However, since a new stage of accelerated globalization appears inevitable, Russia needs to start purposefully preparing in advance for this stage (Globalization 2.0) in order to fit into the new-generation globalization with greater efficiency than in the 2000s (during Globalization 1.0).
- In the long term, the balance of the positive and negative aspects of globalization will be determined by the expansion or narrowing of the gap between the rate of development of globalization as the basis for a global society (the objective trends of humanity's progressively deeper integration in various areas) and the quality of global governance as the political superstructure of society (the available mechanisms for the global and regional management of these trends).
- The transition to a new understanding of globalization and a new quality of global governance is closely connected with the worldwide generational change of political and economic elites capable of leading Globalization 2.0.

Amending the Concept

The *Great Russian Encyclopedia* defines globalization as the current stage in the internationalization of international relations, economic, political and sociocultural processes, characterized by heightened intensity. Its most obvious manifestations are consolidation of the single global market, the active development of international ties in finance, trade and manufacturing, the expansion of the flows of money, goods and people, the accelerated adaptation of social structures to the dynamic economic processes, cultural universalization, and the emergence of a common information space based on cutting-edge computer technologies.

Two presumed features of globalization stand out in this definition, and both are manifested on a global scale. Globalization is both a mechanism of integration and a mechanism of the universalization (alignment) of humanity. Russian researchers note that “globalization is the process of global economic, political, cultural and

religious integration and alignment”. If we place the emphasis on integration, then it makes sense to talk about globalization in its “narrow” meaning, as a phenomenon that exists primarily at the level of the international system, as a totality of trends unfolding today in global economy and politics. Accordingly, globalization should be the focus of attention of international relations scholars and, to a lesser degree, economists, sociologists, cultural anthropologists, etc., who are engaged in studying domestic social trends in individual countries.

If we place the emphasis on universalization (alignment), then the term “globalization” is used in the broad sense, spanning both the international level of the development of global society and the economic, social, cultural and anthropological shifts within individual states. Accordingly, international relations specialists have no longer have any reason to claim methodological and conceptual leadership in the study of globalization. Their research is focused only on the tip of the “globalization iceberg”, touching its “superstructure”, its supra-national dimension, only.

In our opinion, integration and alignment cannot be seen as parallel, much less mutually determined, processes. In real life, integration and alignment do not so much complement as they do oppose each other. In a large number of areas, integration requires that the comparative advantages of a system’s individual elements be articulated, which means that, rather than advancing the alignment of these components, globalization promotes their progressively narrow specialization. Globalization highlights the uniqueness of each state and society against the backdrop of closer communication with other states and societies. At the same time, alignment does not always entail intense interaction between states and societies — this alignment may easily emerge as the response of radically different societies to similar problems and opportunities. This idea formed the basis of the “convergence” concept that was popular in the mid-20th century, whose proponents believed that the USSR and the United States were accumulating common elements not because they actively interacted with one another, but because they were forced to respond to identical or essentially similar challenges in their social and economic development.

One example from even further back in history is Russia’s complicated and contradictory relations with Europe from the 18th to the early 20th century. These relations were characterized by two interrelated, yet starkly different trends. On the one hand, Russia was being “Europeanized,” that is, it was gradually becoming more tightly integrated into the system of economic, political and military relations on the European continent. On the other hand, Russian society was subject to “Westernization”, in that it was or the acquiring the generic features of the Western European way of life. The periods of intense “Europeanization” during the reigns of Nicholas I and Alexander III were far from being the periods of accelerated “westernization” of the Russian Empire. Similarly, the first years in power of President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping were a period of China being actively integrated into the global economic and political systems, but this integration was not accompanied by similarly energetic alignment of China’s society with some “global” standards.

The Peterson Institute for International Economics, an influential American think tank, offers a more cautious interpretation of globalization: “Globalization is the word used to describe the growing interdependence of the world’s economies, cultures, and populations, brought about by cross-border trade in goods and services, technology, and flows of investment, people, and information.” In our view, however, reducing globalization to growing interdependence excessively waters down the phenomenon, since such a view fails to sufficiently stress its planetary and systemic nature. Interdependence, for instance, is growing within the European Union, but the European integration is confined to a single region and could still continue

in a world generally dominated by deglobalization.

Apparently, any description of globalization must include its integrational function at the level of the entire global economic and political system, and not only at the level of its subsystems. For instance, the renowned American economist Joseph Stiglitz describes globalization as “the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders” (Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2003).

As a working definition of the term, we could use the formula proposed by Viktor Kuvaldin: “Globalization is a comprehensive process of developing trans-global ties and relations that leads to the emergence of a global human community.” (Kuvaldin, V. B., 2017). This formula makes moot the question of globalization as the alignment of the western (liberal) development model, including its political, value-based and other parameters, yet puts forward the question of humanity transitioning to a new stage of unity as the final result of globalization. However, it remains somewhat unclear what the term “global human community” means.

Historically, the concept of “globalization” has been used primarily to describe international economic trends. However, it is not only national economies that are involved in global processes, as entire societies are as well. Consequently, the diverse social aspects of globalization deserve just as much attention as the economic dimension. International cooperation in counteracting common planet-wide problems (climate change, resource shortages, pandemics, major man-made and natural disasters, etc.) is an important part of globalization.

It appears that we can also justifiably talk about security problems currently being globalized as well, since many of these problems (the non-proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons, arms trafficking and international terrorism) are of a pronounced global, not regional or local, nature. The globalization of security is clearly manifested in new non-conventional areas (such as cyber security, energy security, food security, and others). The globalization of security problems is related to the general global tendency to blur the lines between security and development issues. However, since the globalization of security has very specific manifestations, they, as a rule, are a subject of separate discussions. In this work, I have attempted to stay away from them as much as possible.

We should also warn against the relatively widespread identification of globalization with technological advancement and shifts in production paradigms. The globalization of the early 21st century is frequently perceived as a direct consequence of the third industrial revolution. Naturally, globalization is largely based on revolutionary technological shifts, but these shifts have a host of consequences that, strictly speaking, do not apply to international relations. For example, the automation of manufacturing in some countries frequently results in greater inequality, regardless of how embedded these countries are in global production chains. Moreover, technological advancement in manufacturing could promote both globalization and its alternatives, from regionalization to localization.

Finally, the concept of “globalization” is closely linked with the concept of “global governance.” Logic suggests that the increasing interdependence around the world should ultimately produce new principles, procedures and mechanisms for governing global society. Some researchers suggest that we consider globalization as, among other things, a process of the expanded reproduction of global public goods. In our opinion, however, it would be a mistake to consider global governance a part of globalization. Globalization is

a set of objective, often random trends in global development. Global governance is the result of subjective decisions intended to set these trends in order. The interaction between globalization and global governance is interaction between the socioeconomic base of global society and its political superstructure.

Humanity cannot transition to a new level of global governance without continuing globalization, yet globalization in and of itself does not necessarily produce an evolutionary and ordered transformation of global governance. The growing gap between the objective needs of globalization and the inefficiency of global governance today is one of the fundamental problems in both development and security.

Humanity's historically inevitable transition to a new level of global governance may prove smooth and relatively peaceful, or it may be abrupt and violent. The future global governance may vary widely in its level of democracy, the role that individual states and their alliances play therein, the principles and mechanisms of the global redistribution of resources, etc. Humanity is capable of responding in very different ways to the objective challenges of globalization, yet no one can "cancel out" this phenomenon, just like no one can return to the past.

The Myths of Globalization¹

In the late 20th century, a unique combination of geopolitical, economic, technological and other factors typical for the 1990s produced a sharp upsurge in the popularity of concepts and theories related to globalization. A huge number of myths rapidly formed around globalization, including many clearly inflated expectations. Globalization was frequently perceived as a universal instrument for resolving nearly all of humanity's problems. Naturally, reality proved to be somewhat different, which resulted in inevitable disappointment in globalization and the widespread rise of anti-globalists of all kinds. Let us list the most popular globalization myths that were refuted or cast into doubt in the course of historical development.

Revolution or stagnation? Three decades ago, most observers believed that globalization would produce a rapid and radical restructuring of the system of international institutions, legal norms and foreign policies of individual states. The global political superstructure was expected in some manner to become compliant with the changed global economic base. However, this revolution in the global world order has yet to take place. Even if we talk about the evolution of the global system, certain reservations are necessary. There are equal grounds to believe that, the system of global governance institutions and its legal framework have been stagnating for the last two or three decades.

The security and development institutions that were established in the preceding era (the United Nations and NATO; and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization) have demonstrated a high level of stability, confining themselves to superficial adjustments of their priorities, procedures and operational principles. Neither the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union, nor the quick rise of international terrorism, nor the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 brought about any revolutionary changes in the global institutions. In other words, fundamental shifts in the base of the global society (globalization) were not followed by similar shifts in its superstructure (global governance).

In an attempt to remain intact and unchanged, the traditional institutions and mechanisms of global governance have become increasingly inefficient with each passing year, thereby discrediting the principles of

¹ This section is based on my presentation at the 2019 Beijing Forum (Kortunov Andrey, 2019).

multilaterality. The newly established institutions (G20, BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) have failed to assume the global governance functions that proved too challenging for the bodies inherited from the preceding era. The world system has actually become less governable over the past 30 years. The gap between the objective level of humanity's unification and the subjective recognition of this unification by leaders, political elites and societies at large has generally continued to grow. Sadly, in most cases, public discontent was aimed not at the archaic superstructure, but at the base itself, that is, at globalization as such.

A Common Good or a Polarization Factor?

In the 1990s, many believed that “a rising tide lifts all boats”, that is, the benefits of globalization will in some manner become available to all. In some way, this opinion was confirmed: the “average” inhabitant of planet Earth today has a better quality of life than three decades ago. Yet the distribution of goods was far from equal. Over the past 30 years, globalization has divided the world into winners and losers. And the dividing line between the two is not always one that separates the “successful” from the “unsuccessful” states. Far more frequently, the line runs within states, between individual social, age, and professional groups, between large metropolitan areas and rural areas, between rich and poor regions. That is, the line runs between those who in some way “fit” into the new paradigm and those who were “left behind”. For instance, over the last 40 years, the average income of the poorest households in the United States has not risen. On the contrary, it has fallen significantly.

Intra-state socioeconomic polarization inevitably generates political polarization that repeatedly reproduces weak coalition governments (in liberal democratic states) and fragile populist regimes (in non-liberal states) that are incapable of making unpopular and painful decisions. In turn, when a state is weak, it has limited capabilities to participate fully in globalization processes, not to mention spearheading the creation of new global governance mechanisms.

Incidentally, we would like to stress that it would not be entirely correct to see the growing socioeconomic inequality as an ineluctable consequence of globalization alone. Suffice it to point out the example of the Scandinavian states, which have “fit in” with globalization perfectly, yet have the world's lowest Gini coefficient. References to globalization as the root cause of all problems frequently disguise the unwillingness of the leaders (and experts) of a given state to admit their own mistakes and miscalculations in social and economic spheres within nation-states, and their desire to play the blame game by pointing the finger at factors outside the scope of their national jurisdiction.

Permanence or Discreteness?

At the turn of the 21st century, globalization was frequently perceived as a more or less linear, permanent and continuous process. It was assumed that with time, the pace of globalization would steadily increase and opposition to it would gradually peter out. Yet, as early as the 2010s, and especially when Donald Trump came to power in the United States and the United Kingdom launched Brexit proceedings, it became quite clear that globalization could slow down or even be reversed in some areas and for some countries. Moreover, the shifts in trends might be triggered by different and often hard to predict events, ranging from unexpected results of national elections to a rapidly spreading epidemiological crisis.

The slowing down of globalization processes may stem not only from the resistance of those social and professional groups that were “left out” of the new technological and economic paradigms, but also from the specific features of these paradigms as such. For example, the fourth industrial revolution may result, among

other things, in humans being ousted almost completely from manufacturing, a sharp drop in labour demand in developed countries and, consequently, an equally sharp reduction in international migration flows. That is, labour supply from the developing world will increase, but demand for labour in the developed world will decline rapidly. Another example is the development of “new energy” (renewable sources and shale hydrocarbons), which sooner or later may bring down global trade in oil and gas — one of the pillars of the global trade in general. Energy production will be increasingly local instead of global, and the localization of energy production will be inevitably followed by the localization of energy-intensive economic sectors.

More generally, we should note that the economic confrontation between the United States and China is only getting worse, spreading into more technologically advanced economic sectors, rather than the traditional ones. The generally held belief in the early 21st century that, since new technologies were a “universal public” good, they would forever remain outside politics and, moreover, would gradually marginalize traditional politics, failed to materialize. Twenty years ago, it was inconceivable that a discussion about the reversibility of globalization could even take place, but here we are, and terms such as “globalization crisis”, “deglobalization” and even “post-global world” are now becoming fashionable.

Synchronization or Asynchrony?

Since the early 1990s, globalization research has focused primarily on the financial and economic aspects of this phenomenon. However, from at least the end of the 20th century, the trend has been to view globalization as comprehensive process that affects all aspects of human life. That is, globalization was treated in the “broad”, rather than the “narrow” sense. Like an engine pulling train cars behind it, financial and economic globalization was assumed to inevitably entail social, cultural and political globalization, that is, humanity was expected somehow to be able to synchronize globalization dynamics in all these areas. As they interacted, these areas were expected to generate cumulative effects that would accelerate globalization in general. This myth most likely stemmed from the fact that most globalization theories were developed by economists and technocrats. Accordingly, we should not be surprised that these opinions were characterized by economic and technocratic determinism.

In fact, it turned out that “resistance” to globalization was noticeably higher in some areas of life than in others. Moreover, as we have noted above, integration and unification are not linearly dependent on each other. This is why it is impossible at the current juncture to synchronize economic and political globalization, for example. The growing gap between economics and politics has turned out to be the greatest threat to globalization as a whole: economic imperatives demand strategic, systemic, global, continental and multilateral solutions, while political needs put tactical, situational, local and unilateral priorities in the foreground.

Within individual states, “identity politics” increasingly prevails over “interest politics,” and consequently, the gap between the economic and political responses to globalization and everything related to it widens even further. Contrary to the hopes and expectations of economists, economics did not prevail over politics. On the contrary, politics started to increasingly get the upper hand over economics and prescribe decisions that were far removed from the formal logic of economic expediency. Paradoxically, globalization has significantly expanded the opportunities for forming global alliances of anti-globalists who have already matched their opponents in terms of their ability to establish international coalitions.

Alignment or Pluralism?

The current interest in globalization emerged at around the same time that political and economic

liberalism started to prevail around the world. In the 1990s, the notions of “liberal globalization” and “global liberalism” were viewed, if not as synonymous, then at least as intrinsically related. That is, the final victory of the liberal economic and political models was expected to both accelerate globalization and become one of its inevitable results (that is, globalization was interpreted in the “broad” sense mentioned above). In this context, any non-liberal development models were treated as manifestations of something archaic, as symptoms of inconsistent and incomplete modernization hindering their proponents from successfully “fitting” into the new global world.

Today, this causality looks far less convincing than it did three decades ago. Political and economic liberalism is going through hard times. Its fundamental principles are being questioned even in the “historical West”, while alternative socio-political and economic models are demonstrating stability, and in some cases even a high degree of efficiency. A textbook example of this is the differences in the ways that the United States and China handled the COVID-19 pandemic.

Accordingly, this raises the question of combining the planet-wide universalism of globalization with the remaining pluralism of national development tracks, including both economic and political tracks. The rules of the game in the global world should be balanced in such a manner as to be equally comfortable for the greatest number of participants, who are at various stages of socioeconomic and political development. This is an entirely new task that was not discussed at all some 10–15 years ago.

Core or Periphery?

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, new “waves” of globalization were expected to spread from the economic, political and technological core of today’s world (the conventional “collective West”) to the periphery. Large “semi-peripheral” states such as Russia, China, India, Brazil, etc. were expected to act as relay mechanisms. Experts predicted that, as these waves rippled away from the core and approached the periphery, resistance to globalization would increase, thus giving rise to conflicts, trade wars and growing isolationism and nationalism, and that these impulses would travel back to the global core in a weakened state.

History, however, has demonstrated that in many cases, globalization “waves” travel in the opposite direction, from the periphery to the core, and the “collective West” is attempting to block itself off from the periphery by placing restrictions on migration, returning to protectionism and repatriating manufacturing that had previously moved abroad. Rising nationalism and xenophobia serve the same purpose. The United States, which many see as the unconditional leader and the principal national driver of globalization, lags behind developed states in virtually all dimensions of globalization. It even lags behind China in terms of its involvement in global trade.

The ratio of economic potentials of the core and the periphery is gradually changing as well. At the start of the current stage of globalization in 1995, the seven leading developing economies (China, Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey and Mexico) had a combined GDP by purchasing power parity of approximately half of the combined GDP of the western “seven” (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Canada and Italy). In 2015, the two “groups of seven” had equal economic potentials, and in 2040 the economic potential of the “developing seven” will be approximately twice that of the “developed seven”.

At present, the collective West is generally more involved in globalization than the collective non-West, yet the question of who will be the driving force of globalization in future remains open. In any case, with the Trump administration coming to power in the United States, China has thrown its hat into the ring in the

competition to become the global leader in defending the achievements of globalization. A comparison of the approaches of China and the United States to international cooperation during the coronavirus has raised doubts as to whether the United States is still prepared to lead the defence of the achievements of globalization over the last few decades. At the same time, it is unlikely that the United States will revise its approach to globalization completely should Joe Biden win the presidential elections this November. This approach is based not so much on the personality of the incumbent president, but rather on the change in the global balance of power, which does not favour the United States.

In a broader sense, there are doubts about whether or not globalization has a single “geographical centre”, as well as about globalization’s relations with individual groups of states. The development of globalization is increasingly looking like a network process without a clear geographical hierarchy. In the future, the notions of “core” and “periphery” could lose their previous meanings, since any country will manifest elements of both.

Therefore, it is fair to say that there has been a certain “demystification” of the concept of globalization over the past three decades. Hopes are no longer pinned on globalization as a universal means of resolving all of humanity’s problems in the near future. On the other hand, instead of being idealized, globalization is now demonized and frequently blamed for problems it has nothing to do with. These accusations often take the form of “conspiracy theories” and refer to a “global shadow government”, “cosmopolitan financial circles” and the like that allegedly manage globalization for the benefit of its narrow group interests. The need for a discussion of globalization that would be politically unengaged, academically correct, and span a broad range of disciplines persists, especially taking into account the sizeable “new generation” of myths that are being rapidly created around this concept.

A Historical Perspective on the Changing Trends

It is no longer possible to deny the significant negative effect that the global trends of 2020 have had on globalization. Some experts believe that the crisis has not introduced anything fundamentally new into the global trends, rather, it has merely accelerated the global development trends that had already emerged, including those related to globalization. Even if this is the case, it raises the key question of whether we have reached the point of no return, that is, whether the current deglobalization trends are irreversible, at least in the medium term (three to five years). A lot depends on the answer to this question, both for the foreign policies of individual states and for the condition of the international system in the foreseeable future.

Let us turn to the popular annual DHL Global Connectedness Index, which measures the connectedness of countries according to four indicators: (1) “trade” (global trade), (2) “capital” (foreign investment), (3) “information” (cross-border information flows), and (4) “people” (international migration). The index has been published since 2001 and allows us to see whether there are long-term trends in the levels of connectedness of countries². Naturally, each of the four connectedness parameters has its own dynamics, and their fluctuations can balance each other out. For instance, increased volumes of foreign direct investment can result in the manufacturing of goods and services being localized in a partner state, thereby reducing exports into that state. The expansion of information transfer and the development of corresponding information and communications technologies makes it possible to increase the opportunities for remote work and thereby reduce the need in foreign labour and the intensity of cross-border migration flows.

² There are also other approaches to global connectedness that are both more complex and more comprehensive than we do not discuss in this paper (for example, Godehardt, Nadine and Karoline Postel-Vinay, 2020).

Nevertheless, the long-term dynamics of connectedness are intriguing. The authors of the latest report (2019) single out three phases in the evolution of global connectedness in the 21st century. The first phase (2002–2007) is characterized by the rapid growth of the connectedness of all indicators. The second phase (2007–2009) is marked by a sharp drop in connectedness, which affected investment first and then trade, while cross-border migration and information flows continued to grow steadily. The third phase (2009–2018) demonstrated a slow and uneven recovery to the pre-crisis level of connectedness, although growth in international investment and trade lagged significantly behind the growth of people and information flows. The cumulative pre-crisis level of connectedness in 2007 was only exceeded in 2013. Meanwhile, there was practically no growth in connectedness just a year later, in 2014. In the authors' opinion, 2016 was the last relatively positive year, after which a period of stagnation set in that soon led to a new drop in global connectedness.

A comparison between the two phases of increased global connectedness (2002–2007 and 2009–2018) clearly shows that the forecasts made at the beginning of the century about the exponential growth of the main globalization indicators did not pan out. Apparently, many of the explanations for this “malfunction” should be sought in the economic management of the principal global economic actors and the patterns to be found in the long-term cycles of the development of new technologies (such as the exhausted economic effect of the third industrial revolution). Many experts believe that the lessons of the 2008–2009 crisis have not been fully learned and the global financial management system has not been properly restructured. Even though the world managed to avoid a protracted depression in the late 2000s, it did nothing to ensure that another financial crisis would not appear in the future.

Additionally, even though the 2008–2009 crisis was structural in nature, it did not result in a restructuring of the global economy. The aim of the anti-crisis measures was, rather than rehabilitating the financial sector (which would inevitably have involved bankruptcies and heightened risks), to preserve its “backbone” actors. This decision was tactically advantageous since it helped avoid acute conflicts between the world's leading economic players. But it proved to be strategically self-defeating, as it did not create the conditions for returning to pre-crisis growth rates in global connectedness. Consequently, the 2020 crisis could be treated as a distant echo of the events of 2008–2009, when the world missed the unique opportunity to transition to a new level of global governance in a relatively favourable geopolitical situation.

In view of the above, we should focus specifically on the renaissance of the political factors in international affairs that characterized the second phase of the global “globalization cycle”. While many in the early 21st century believed that the politics of nation-states had been fully transformed into a mechanism for serving their economic interests, in the 2010s, political and national security priorities demonstrated their clear advantage over economics in their capacity as decisive factors in determining the international behaviour of great powers. At that point in time, Russia and the United States became locked in a geopolitical confrontation that was later supplemented by the U.S.-China confrontation.

The first confrontation axis (Washington–Moscow) had a relatively minor impact on global connectedness due to the very low level of economic interdependence between Russia and the United States. However, the second axis (Washington–Beijing) has, in a matter of a few years, crashed the main indicators of global connectedness (primarily in global trade and foreign investment). Optimistic forecasts of the exponential growth of the global economy have given way to worrying expectations of economic sanctions and trade wars.

It is important to note here that the slowdown of globalization processes in the 2010s manifested itself with greatest clarity in the fundamental economic indicators (foreign investment and global trade), and nowhere else (cross-border flows of people and information). By the mid-2010s, the growth rate of global trade had started to fall below that of global GDP — the first time this had happened in the post-war era. And by 2019, that growth had fizzled out completely, even though that year was relatively good for the global economy as a whole. The situation with international investment activity was roughly the same. In the early 21st century, the global economy was the principal engine of globalization, but it has now become a drag on it. Apparently, the powerful incentive towards economic integration that had emerged in the early 1990s had largely exhausted itself just 20 years later.

Subjective factors, most notably Donald Trump's coming to power in the United States, certainly accelerated the petering out of global connectedness trends. Had Hillary Clinton won the U.S. elections in 2016, it is quite likely that both the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) would have been launched by the end of the decade, and the United States would have remained a party to the 2015 global climate accord³. However, U.S.-China trade, economic and geopolitical contradictions would have mounted regardless of who happened to be in the White House, and the attendant slowing down of globalization was historically inevitable in any case. Transatlantic trade and economic differences were objective problems, which is why the TTIP talks were moving along with much difficulty even during Barack Obama's presidency.

The "offensive" launched by politics against economy created direct obstacles for developing international connectedness (such as unilateral sanctions and trade wars) and sharply increased the volatility of the international relations system by establishing a global psychological atmosphere that was radically different from the early 21st century. As a rule, the economic interests of states are more rational, more stable and, consequently, more predictable than their political interests. When the international system was "politicized", the role of subjective, emotional and situational factors in the decision-making of key actors increased, producing a feeling of uncertainty and instability, which, in turn, inevitably held back the development of interconnectedness, especially in trade and investment.

We should also remember that even at its peak, international connectedness was not as significant as it might have appeared. For instance, in 2018, global trade accounted for only 21 percent of the global trade turnover; international tourism accounted for 16 percent of global tourism; foreign direct investment accounted for 6 percent of total investment; international phone calls made up just only 7 per cent of total phone calls in terms of their duration; first-generation international migrants constituted 3 per cent of the global population; and foreign students made up only 2 percent of the global student body. Despite the rapid progress in information and communications technologies, internationalization in the service industry (14 percent) was much lower than in commodities markets (29 percent).

Proceeding from the dynamics of the development of connectedness over the first two decades of the 21st century, we can assume that there will be a sharp decline in connectedness over the next 18–24 months (2020–2022), which will then recover slowly and inconsistently over the next four to five years, maybe by the

³ In addition to the historic Paris Agreement, 2015 saw the adoption of another landmark treaty intended to accelerate global integration: the United Nations approved the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development that is to replace the Millennium Development Goals adopted in 2000.

end of the 2020s (2022–2030)⁴. In this case, unlike in the recovery phase of the previous cycle (2009–2018), cross-border movements of people will not improve the general indicators, since it is unlikely that international travel will not bounce back quite as fast. Experts predict a large number of restrictions on international migration, with some of these restrictions most likely long outliving the COVID-19 pandemic.

Cross-border information flows remain the only connectedness parameter that may demonstrate rapid and sustainable growth. Theoretically, progress in information and communications technologies could give an additional boost to other manifestations of globalization. However, even online trade will be inevitably slowed down by the restrictions imposed on those components that involve interacting offline, such as delivery services (unless these services are fully automated). More generally, we should note that the inevitable widening of the gap between online and offline globalization could, in and of itself, become a crucial factor in the destabilization of the global society.

An entire range of additional factors could accelerate the return to pre-crisis levels of connectedness, such as an effective COVID-19 vaccine being created and used globally, Joe Biden winning the U.S. presidential election in November, the rapid recovery of the Chinese economy, etc. Meanwhile, other factors could slow the process down — for example, COVID-19 becoming a seasonal disease, U.S.-China economic and political relations exacerbating further, a new wave of right-wing populism rising in Europe, etc. As far as we can see today, the provisional balance between new opportunities and new risks favours the latter.

Looking at the near-term prospects for globalization, the most obvious negative factors appear to be high budget deficits in most developed states, the possible devaluation of national currencies, and the possibility of the world sliding into a protracted depression. The growth of cross-border information flows may be hindered by regional and global cyber wars moving to a new level and governments continuing to expand their attempts to establish national control of the internet. A new international migration crisis comparable to the one experienced by Europe in 2015-2016 would be a significant obstacle to a new rise in cross-border people flows.

Any medium- or in particular long-term forecasts of globalization dynamics for the next decade should take possible new technological breakthroughs into account, similar to the ones that took place at the beginning of the century (the global transition from the third technological paradigm to the fourth technological paradigm). Another revolution is possible in information and communications technologies, biotechnologies, the development of advanced materials, etc. However, not every technological revolution will act as a catalyst for global integration. At least some of them are likely to produce effective local alternatives to globalization. For instance, the widespread use of robots creates conditions for establishing limited manpower production, which, in turn, reduces the need to import foreign labour and opens up additional opportunities to localize manufacturing chains. Advances in 3D printing will move in the same direction, as they can bring entire manufacturing sectors into close proximity with the end customer. “Sustainable consumption,” which has become so popular of late, may also work against economic connectedness, as it restricts the consumer impulses of the “new middle class” both in the global North and in the global South.

On the other hand, the accelerated digitalization of the global economy and other areas of social life could serve as a catalyst for globalization, not only in manufacturing, but also in education, the development of cross-border civil society, international professional unions, etc. In all likelihood, over the next decade, humanity will be pushed towards closer integration and growing common challenges — from climate change to

⁴ There are also more optimistic forecasts of a rapid recovery to previous levels of connectedness levels (Inozemtsev, Vladislav, 2020).

problems of global and regional security.

Let us emphasize once again that just because there has been an objective increase in the connectedness and interdependence of countries and regions does not mean that the national elites recognize this fact. Unfortunately, there are reasons to agree with the opinion that, since the early 21st century, we have been witnessing a “deterioration” of the ruling elites, who are losing their capacity for strategic thinking and long-term planning. Very often, the quality of ruling elites does not match the scale of challenges they face and significantly limits the search for agreements even on the most crucial global development issues. Additionally, the poor quality of the ruling elites has a negative impact on the societies led by these elites, bringing many clearly outdated stereotypes and biases back to life. Public consciousness in many countries is regressing before our very eyes into archaic modes of thinking, which is becoming a grave and possibly long-term obstacle to humanity’s progress towards unification.

Limits to the Strengthening of States

Once the current systemic crisis arrives at its still vague yet inevitable end, a new world order will emerge, and as analysts ponder it, most of them agree that nation-states will further grow in power in relation to other international actors. Strictly speaking, this strengthening is already going full throttle. How stable is this trend and what consequences could it have for the future world order?

States are on the offensive on two fronts at once. On the one hand, the crisis has laid bare the obvious weakness and vulnerability of non-state actors in global politics: both the private sector and civil society have proved incapable of positioning themselves as major centres of influence and active participants in making crucial foreign policy decisions. On the other hand, the crisis has shown how ineffective and even fragile multilateral intergovernmental institutions and international organizations are, including such different bodies as the UN, the European Union, the EAEU, G20, G7, the WTO, the WHO, etc. So, both sub-state and supra-state bodies have failed the historical casting process for the part of effective crisis manager.

The ideas of polycentrism, of national sovereignty and states’ sovereign equality, of non-interference in one another’s domestic affairs, of a balance of forces and interests, and of religious (and also political, ideological, socio-political and any other) pluralism in international society are highly appealing to many societies and particularly to the national elites that are tired of the endless postmodernity of recent decades. The crisis is conducive to restoring the old — and, as many see it, natural — hierarchy of identities that foregrounds belonging to a particular state.

The crisis is significantly changing the customary balance of social and political forces. To a certain extent, it is taking the world back to the old traditional hierarchies of the 20th century and even of earlier periods in history. Officials, the military, the defence complex, special services and, to some degree, the traditional “manufacturing” middle class are universally bolstering their standing. Due to their professional identities, none of these people have ever been ardent proponents of globalization and multiple group identities. Globally oriented social and professional groups such as the new creative class, the private financial sector, cosmopolitan-minded political elites, liberal media and comprador intellectuals are losing their status and influence. In other words, the world is going back to modernity and, in some ways, even collapsing into archaic modes of existence.

The pandemic and the new economic recession have generated public demand for paternalist strategies in domestic policy and for nationalism in foreign policy. In the last few decades, this demand has never been

stronger. State leaders have gained unprecedented additional opportunities for manipulating public sentiments, fears and expectations, and have learned to exploit new sources of their legitimacy. Many of those leaders have succeeded in providing for the explosive growth of their popularity simply by demonstrating a “hard-line” approach to combating the coronavirus, by generously injecting money into the national economy, by applying protectionism in foreign trade, and by declaratory isolationism.

At dramatic points in their history, societies “rally around the national flag”, and this effect has clearly manifested itself both in authoritarian political systems and in liberal western democracies. In the European Union, for instance, Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orban was vested with emergency powers, but so too were the leaders of Belgium, France, Germany and other states of “old Europe”. Naturally, given the epidemiological emergency of the first half of 2020, many unresolved socioeconomic and political problems were put on the backburner, and promises previously made to voters were “nullified” owing to a “force majeure”. Accordingly, presidents and prime ministers gained more room for manoeuvre, including in their foreign policies.

The “return to Westphalia” concept has been enjoying a resurgence of late, but after the pandemic and the structural global economic crisis, it needs at least some major qualifications.

First, the strengthening of nation-states is far from ubiquitous. As a rule, states bolster their standing if they were strong prior to the current cataclysms. Hardly anyone will earnestly discuss a “Westphalian renaissance” in the Middle Eastern Mashriq or the African Sahel. On the contrary, when a crisis hits, weak state institutions in fragile states become weaker and lose the remnants of their legitimacy, which is precarious as it is. Quite frequently, such states’ social functions are assumed by non-governmental bodies, including religious organizations, fringe political movements, tribal alliances, and even organized crime (such as the drug cartels in Latin America). A deepening crisis of a national and government identity is opening the way for alternative group identities such as tribal, ethnic, denominational, regional and many others. Accordingly, transnational actors in global politics (such as political Islam) gain additional opportunities.

Second, public consolidation around the state cannot be seen as a universal pattern even in the developed countries of the global North. Yes, this consolidation has occurred in many European states. Even so, polls conducted in the United States did not show a sharp upsurge in Donald Trump’s popularity even during the crisis. Both “Trumpists” and “anti-Trumpists” remain steadfast in their political views. If consolidation taking place in the United States, it is that of the Democratic party supporters, which puts a question mark over the current president’s re-election prospects in November. Most societies of the global North remain economically, socially and politically divided, which certainly severely restricts the processes of nation state strengthening. This certainly applies to foreign policy: split societies do not establish a social and political basis for a consistent, predictable, strategically oriented foreign policy.

Third, it is far from obvious that both the nationalist fad and the current trend of state strengthening will hold up in the medium term, to say nothing of the long term. Today’s generations are far less patient and less constant in their attachments than their remote 17th century ancestors. When it comes to today’s voters, there is but a thin line between their love and their hate. Many experts believe that, should there be no success in combating the pandemic and the recession, public support for national leaders will decline sharply in the very near future. And this applies not only to individual leaders but to the ideology of national egoism in general. It is also evident that the defeated social and political forces have not conceded their historical defeat and are energetically preparing to get their own back. Today, globalists are weakened, but they have not gone away and

are still a force to be reckoned with. Some people even predict that, already in 2021, liberal internationalists and enthusiasts of multilateralism will launch an energetic global counter-offensive under the banner of the newly elected U.S. President Joe Biden.

Fourth, the strengthening of nation-states does not necessarily mean that the interaction between such states will automatically produce a system similar to the 17th century Westphalia or 19th century Concert of Europe. These systems were relatively homogeneous in their political, cultural, economic and other dimensions, and they had a very limited number of participants. Today's world is far larger and far more diverse than Western Europe of the 17th century. At the same time, today's world is characterized by a far greater degree of coherence and interdependence than the European states of Modernity. This means that reducing today's international relations to traditional inter-country relations is an excessively complicated enterprise that is, most likely, utterly impossible.

Fifth, it is highly doubtful that the current crisis of international organizations and multilateral institutions (ranging from the UN and NATO to the European Union and the WTO) is an indicator of nation-states getting stronger. Indeed, none of these organizations has been able to act as a leader channeling the efforts of international actors into restoring the governability of the international system. Yet is it fair to contrast states with multilateral international institutions? Only a strong and responsible state is capable of acting as an energetic and reliable participant in a multilateral body. Only a strong and responsible state is ready to delegate some of its sovereignty to an international organization⁵ [9]. Let us not forget that the UN was created by strong international actors, not weak ones. Strong states made the European Union possible. A conclusion begs to be drawn: a crisis affecting the multilateral system does not reflect a strengthening of states; it reflects a weakening of states that cannot afford to have strong international institutions even though no one doubts that such institutions are needed today.

Finally, it is possible that the supposed strengthening of states will be accompanied by shifts in their current priority systems in favour of their domestic problems. Accordingly, the post-crisis world will see a more isolationist China, India, United States and Russia, and a more inward-looking European Union. The consequences of this priority shift for the international system are yet unclear. The isolationism of great powers will not necessarily deliver a fatal blow to global or regional stability. Yet it is far from obvious that the isolationist world will prove more stable and reliable: the power vacuum left in many regions by the withdrawal of great powers could be filled by irresponsible actors, including non-state ones.

Nation-states are in fact weakening, which casts doubt on the widespread claim that the crisis will accelerate the transformation of the international system and move it towards a U.S.-China bipolarity. There are many arguments against this point of view, such as the United States (clearly) and China (less so) emerging from the crisis in a greatly weakened state, incapable of global leadership. The principal problem in the United States is the abovementioned deep-running socio-political split that prevents it from conducting a consistent and even predictable foreign policy. China's main problem is its international image, which was additionally tarnished during the pandemic when it was suspected of all kinds of wrongdoing, from concealing information about COVID-19 to the Chinese military being involved in the development of the virus.

Owing to the systemic crisis, the traditional non-state globalization drivers, such as universities,

⁵ Accusing the WHO of inefficiency while nation-states are unwilling to vest the organization with additional powers and increase its budget appear hypocritical (Rudd Kevin, 2020).

independent think tanks, liberal media, civil society institutions and the globally orientated private sector have found themselves temporarily relegated to the background of global politics. All these actors face increasing difficulties as they attempt futilely to preserve the global political status they have gained in the last two or three decades.

Most of the leading drivers of globalization are failing to preserve the traditional format of their activities or transition to an online mode of work. It is thus premature at the very least to say that cross-border educational, academic, social, cultural and humanitarian interaction has been successfully “converted” to new formats. A global survey conducted in April 2020 showed that approximately 40 per cent of applicants who had considered studying abroad had been forced to revise their plans because of the pandemic. It could be five years before student mobility returns to its 2019 level. In turn, decreased international educational mobility is highly detrimental to individual universities and entire states (Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, for example) that rely on the export of education services. What is particularly significant though is that lower educational mobility will have an inevitable negative impact on the quality of the new generation of national political and intellectual elites — the generation that will determine future of their countries in the middle of the 21st century.

Other trends in the current deglobalization processes have similar effects, wearing away the fabric of international humanitarian interaction in all its manifestations. According to the most conservative estimates, the number of foreign visitors to the United States in 2020 will drop by 23 percent (or 18 million people) compared to 2019. Societies cut off from each other and locked within the borders of their nation-states become increasingly parochial, and it is easier for national governments to manipulate them.

Nevertheless, there are limits to the decline in the international activities of non-state actors as a consequence of the current crisis. Sooner or later, nation-states willing to pursue an effective foreign policy in the extremely complicated and rapidly changing global environment of the 21st century will need all these actors. The 2020 crisis, like all crises of the past, does not cancel out the significance of “soft power” as a foreign policy instrument. Additionally, the current trend towards national isolation and the “governmentalization” of international relations will inevitably be curtailed by the capabilities of modern information and communications technologies. And contemporary society will inevitably produce social and professional groups that are geared toward horizontal international interaction.

It will take several years to restore the pre-crisis balance between state and non-state actors in international relations. For some states, this process may be less protracted and less painful, while for others, it will be lengthier and more contradictory. The temptation to pass off the current forced and temporary restrictions as desirable and permanent will persist. On the whole, however, not only is it inevitable that non-state actors will become more active, but it is also vital in terms of stabilizing the international system as a whole and preparing the global community for a new round of globalization (Globalization 2.0) in the more distant future. The next few years of deglobalization will give states a chance to fine-tune their mechanisms for interacting with non-state actors in global politics and economics. And the success of this endeavour will largely determine the global political weight of states in the 2030s and far beyond.

The Relevance of Multilateralism

The coronavirus pandemic and the start of a global economic recession have once again confirmed the existence of a global society on our planet, and even those states and regions that are most distant from each

other are still interdependent. The crisis has again shown the clear need for states to take collective action, as well as the value that the multilateralism principle has for global politics.

Theoretically, the 2020 crisis could have become a milestone in the history of international relations, pushing all countries to interact in more actively with one another and to use particular multilateral approaches to resolve common problems. Common sense would suggest that, in times of crisis, national leaders should decisively revise their foreign political priorities, exhibit greater flexibility and willingness to compromise in their relations with opponents and rivals, and abandon secondary, situational tasks in order to restore the stability of the entire system of international relations. The international community could have emerged from the crisis sooner and at lesser costs had it actively resorted to multilateral institutions, regimes and mechanisms in economics, healthcare, research and development, education, and so on.

Nevertheless, one of the most obvious side effects of the crisis has been the rise of anti-globalists, isolationism and xenophobia, the demonstration of the low productivity of multilateral formats of interaction between states. It turned out that multilateral cooperation mechanisms were not ready to work effectively in the new historical conditions.

The most vivid example of the departure from multilateralism was offered at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Trump administration decided to close its borders to EU citizens — a decision made without any consultations with America's allies in Europe. This decision was immediately subject to sharp criticism both from EU politicians and in the United States itself as defiant, provocative and devoid of practical meaning.

However, the EU member countries soon followed suit, placing restrictions on international air travel. Moreover, these restrictions applied both to travel between the EU and third states and to travel within the EU itself. Some EU member states went even further, applying these restrictions to their domestic travel. Moreover, the start of the pandemic in general raised doubts about whether the fundamental EU principles were still relevant. Some experts believed that the EU countries lost between four and six weeks as a result of the inability of their to promptly agree on joint action, which led to COVID-19 spreading widely across the European Union and its neighbouring states.

As the global epidemiological situation deteriorated, it was becoming increasingly clear that neither the UN Security Council nor the G20 were willing to assume the role of the global anti-pandemic headquarters. In the first weeks of the pandemic, member states of such alliances as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) had different, sometimes significantly diverging national strategies for combating the coronavirus. The pandemic served as a test that revealed a number of institutional, political and economic problems within multilateral organizations that had been ignored or resolved in better times. The unifying and coordinating role the World Health Organization (WHO) in the fight against the pandemic turned out to be very limited⁶. And the Trump administration's decision to withdraw from the WHO has put the very future of the organization in question.

A popular opinion in Russia is that the crisis has laid bare the essential flaws (institutional, ideological and political) of predominantly western multilateralism models. The “old” western multilateralism was contrasted with the “new” multilateralism embodied by such alliances as BRICS, the SCO and the EAEU. However, it must be stressed that these “new” bodies were not particularly successful in combating the coronavirus, and

⁶ At the same time, credit should be given to the WHO for its prompt and precise assessment of the threats and risks related to the pandemic (WHO, February 28, 2020).

cooperation between their members was mostly bilateral instead of multilateral.

The crisis has proved that while multilateralism *à la carte* is more or less operational under “normal” conditions, it rapidly demonstrates its inadequacy in emergencies that affect the vital interests of nation-states. The crisis has also shown that attempts to build effective multilateral mechanisms cannot overlook the question of common principles and values, even in their most limited understanding.

The apparent lack of international solidarity and willingness to undertake multilateral actions was also evident in the global response to the UN Secretary General’s March 2020 call for a “global ceasefire” amid the coronavirus pandemic. Indeed, military hostilities did initially cool off in many conflict areas, the positive effect was short-lived. Barely two or three weeks later, armed violence throughout the world went back to its pre-crisis levels.

In some cases, this was down to one side believing an armistice maintaining the status quo would put them at a disadvantage, preventing them from achieving a “final and decisive” victory over the enemy. In other cases, the problem boiled down to the lack of an effective infrastructure to monitor the compliance of the sides with the truce. Significantly, the UN Security Council proved unable to reach a consensus on conflict situations and enshrine this consensus in relevant resolutions. Finally, we should not forget the “habituation effect”: in March, the pandemic was perceived as an unprecedented disaster on a global scale, whereas by April and May, the participants in many conflicts already viewed COVID-19 as one of the “independent variables” to be accounted for when planning combat operations.

The decline of multilateral institutions and regimes and the strengthening of nation-states started long before COVID-19 appeared on the scene. On the whole, humanity’s willingness to work together to fight common challenges, be they epidemics or natural or man-made disasters, has been declining for at least the last decade. The features of global politics we have become accustomed to in years — the systematic cultivation of nationalism and national exceptionalism, the implicit and explicit encouragement of xenophobia, the arrogant disregard for international law, and the prioritizing of tactical interests over strategic interests — all entered international practice back at the start of the 21st century.

The international community was more willing to cooperate two decades ago. When the so-called “bird flu” epidemic broke out in the early 21st century, U.S. epidemiologists immediately came to the aid of their Chinese colleagues in identifying the carrier virus (H5N1). Consequently, the highly dangerous “bird flu” outbreak (with a mortality rate of 60 per cent) was nipped in the bud, and only several hundreds of people fell victim to the virus. Naturally, at the time, the United States had not imposed any restrictions on cooperation with China, and China itself was not viewed as a fierce geopolitical enemy. Today, the fight against coronavirus has not served to unify states. Quite the contrary — it has pitched countries against each other, thus exacerbating competition between both nation-states and national development models. National programmes for developing a coronavirus vaccine increasingly look like the Soviet-American space race of the 1950s-1960s.

We must admit that the proponents of multilateralism turned out to have been intellectually unprepared for the crisis, unable to propose a well-thought-out and realistic concept for combating COVID-19 globally. Their calls to humanity to unite often sounded like empty declarations and slogans divorced from reality. And, given the epidemiological threat (unprecedented for the 21st century), people were not inclined to take these calls seriously. Both the pandemic and the economic recession that followed reaffirmed an old truth: multilateralism and the preoccupation with the common good enjoy broad public support when things are going well — when the economy is growing and people prosper. But when crises, trials and tribulations hit, societies begin to

favour transactional approaches in foreign policy.

At the same time, claims that the 2020 crisis has brought about an irreversible decline or even the death of multilateralism appear unfounded. We cannot say that the principles of multilateralism do not work at all during pandemics. Looking at the experience of the European Union, we have to admit that some of its member states did manage to reach an agreement. The coronavirus pandemic has shone a light on what had previously been regarded as insignificant institutional weakness of the European Union: principal public healthcare issues in the European Union remain the responsibility of its member states, not Brussels. Against this backdrop, the pandemic has turned into a major test EU unity, comparable to the test of the 2015–2016 migration crisis.

Nevertheless, despite the initial poor response of the EU member states to the pandemic in Italy, Brussels was fairly prompt in achieving agreements on coordinating approaches to procuring medical equipment, medication and personal protection gear, and on increasing overall funding for antiviral vaccine research. Additionally, the decision was made to relax financial discipline rules for member states, which allowed those states that had been hit particularly hard to significantly increase their budget deficits⁷. The EU member states reaffirmed their refusal to introduce protectionist measures within the Union. The European Central Bank pledged to allocate €750 billion (approximately 4 percent of the total EU GDP) to financial interventions to prevent a collapse of the European economy.

On the whole, we can state that, despite the difficulties in the decision-making process, internal disagreements and additional problems, financial and economic policy of Brussels during the crisis turned out to be better thought-out, balanced and strategically oriented than those of Washington. We can also note that in adopting the crucial financial and economic decisions related both to the pandemic and the recession, the European Union acted in a more prompt and organized manner than it did in the similar situations in 2008 and 2012. It would thus be an exaggeration to talk about a deepening crisis in the European Union's use of internal multilateral mechanisms and procedures. On the contrary, we should acknowledge, albeit with certain reservations, that some of Brussels' key bodies have "matured". Paradoxically, Brexit has strengthened these procedures and mechanisms, since achieving a pan-European consensus with London in the picture certainly would have been far more difficult.

In the longer term, the European Union plans to create its own reserves for combating the coronavirus and hopes to achieve "strategic autonomy" in counteracting new pandemics. It is still difficult to say whether these plans will fully materialize. Some predict that the pandemic might, among other consequences, entail the European Union abandoning the consensus principle in its decision-making, which will certainly mean major changes not only for European institutions, but also for the fundamental principles of the "European project" as such.

Despite all the obvious shortcomings of multilateral mechanisms, their opponents have not yet offered any convincing alternatives to multilateral solutions in overcoming the systemic crisis, including its epidemiological component. Attempts to wall oneself off from one's neighbours and partners and prohibit the export of medical equipment, personal protective gear and medications do not produce the desired result in terms of checking the spread of the coronavirus at home. The policy of "trade wars" with partners creates an

⁷ The European Union believes that suspending the Stability and Growth Pact (Maastricht) is a manifestation of pan-European solidarity and a demonstration of European unity. However, if the suspension becomes protracted, it could drive a deeper wedge between the South and North of the continent and result in Northern Europe completely refusing to underwrite Southern Europe's sovereign debts.

additional negative background that exacerbates problems related to the pandemic. The example of the United States, which led the world in coronavirus cases as early as March, really pushed this point home.

If the hypothesis of the revival of Westphalia, of the triumph of national egoism, and the low effectiveness of multilateralism were true, the United States under Donald Trump should have been able to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic far better than the European Union. In reality, however, as of early August, the United States had over three times as many coronavirus cases (4.7 million cases in the United States vs. 1.5 million cases in the European Union). Already in summer, unemployment in the United States reached 13 percent vs. 6.7 percent on average in the European Union. It is even more surprising that the differences in the strategies for combating the pandemic are, on the whole, far greater between individual U.S. states than between EU member states' national strategies. With the exception of the special case of Sweden, the EU states approached the epidemiological crisis in ways that were far more similar to one another than the approaches of California and New York, Massachusetts and Arizona, New Jersey and Florida, Vermont and Texas.

Apparently, the obvious failure of American unilateralism during the crisis served as a check of sorts on the growth of nationalist and isolationist sentiments in Europe. By early summer, most Europeans saw the United States not as a role model, but as an example of how not to deal with the crisis. Some had predicted radical shifts in sentiments in favour of Eurosceptics, yet surveys showed that six months into the crisis, no such shifts in the European Union had taken place.

Looking into the future, we can assume that multilateral approaches will continue to develop in some manner or other. Their development will slow down under the pressure of populism and the inertia of unilateral practices, and because of the difficulty of achieving compromises at a time of economic hardships. In the near future, mechanisms of institutional multilateralism will likely prove more efficient at the regionally (in Europe and Southeast Asia, for example), rather than globally. At the global level, a new generation of multilateral institutions will be shaped through the gradual institutionalization of effective multilateral regimes. We can also assume that movement towards multilateralism will start with technical, relatively specific matters, rather than with strategic, politically sensitive issues.

The institutionalization of multilateralism will be slow and inconsistent at least for the next few years. The ruling elites will have to change their mindsets significantly. This is particularly true for the leading global powers (the United States, China and Russia), which do not have considerable historical experience with multilateralism. They will probably have to learn from the experience of other global political actors, such as the European Union. We would like to add that the question of multilateralism remains relatively undeveloped at the conceptual level. Filling the many gaps in the areas should be a priority for specialists in international relations theory.

Nevertheless, it would be hard to imagine a 21st-century world without a multilateral dimension to its global politics. The notions of the "death of multilateralism" as a result of the systemic crisis of 2020 appear greatly exaggerated, to say the least. Alternative world orders, such as "atomization" of global politics and the international system collapsing into a scattering of nation-states, the revival of imperial projects with a rigid hierarchy of relations, the emergence of new global ideologies or religions capable of uniting humanity, are unlikely to emerge. It is multilateralism, as the fundamental principle of uniting humankind to solve common problems, that is most adequate to the international realities in the era of globalization.

Global Governance Dilemmas

As we have noted above, the history of the first 20 years of the 21st century clearly demonstrates the gradual fizzling out of the powerful globalization impetus that emerged during the 1990s. The systemic crisis of 2020 has brought many latent manifestations of deglobalization to the fore, although it does not seem to have changed the strategic vector of the movement of global society towards a global community. The unification of humankind has slowed down in different ways in different regions and in different dimensions of international life. It would probably be wrong to try to find one main reason for the failure of trends that previously seemed to have no alternatives. We are talking an entire range of objective and subjective obstacles that emerged as the connectedness of humanity grew at the turn of the centuries.

Apparently, the main reasons for the slowdown in globalization lie not in the phenomenon as such, but rather in the inability or unwillingness to efficiently govern the course of global integration. That is, the principal problems are in one way or another linked to the lack of global governance mechanisms that are adequate to the new realities of international life. For various reasons, the national elites in most countries were not prepared for the fundamental transformation of global political systems. They have always seen the risks associated with this transformation as being greater than the risks associated with preserving the status quo.

The biggest contradiction of our era is the contradiction between humanity's objective need to transition to a new level of global governance on the one hand, and the "conservative" sentiments of the national elites guarding the status quo on the other. Societies need international cooperation. The elites are fearful of losing part of their power and legitimacy and thus cultivate populist nationalism, protectionism and xenophobia. Nationalism, in turn, creates its own dynamics, as it transforms elites into hostages of the sentiments and perceptions they had themselves created. The recent negative dynamics of U.S.-China relations is a typical example. At the expert level, everybody seems to understand that some kind of an agreement with China is needed, but the political logic of confrontation sets a long-term course for exacerbating the confrontation, which will undoubtedly survive the current presidential campaign and continue to prevent Washington and Beijing from achieving any compromises.

The slowdown of globalization in the late 2000s and the start of deglobalization in the 2010s is not a unique case in history. Revolutions are often followed by a period of restoration. However, no restoration ever reproduced the *ancient regime* exactly as it was before. The pre-revolutionary France of Louis XVI (1774–1792) and the "restored" France of Louis XVIII three decades after the French revolution (1814–1824) were two very different countries. Today, globalization is retreating, but that does not mean simply restoring the "normalcy" of the past, a "normalcy" that had been distorted by some situational circumstances of a unique historical moment that will never be repeated. Humanity will somehow continue the process of integration, although the exact forms and pace may vary widely.

Comparing the systemic crisis of 2020 and the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, we can only conclude that the need for joint efforts today is greater, while readiness for such efforts is less. Superficially, this paradox appears to be a negative side effect of the changing dynamics in U.S.-China relations⁸. The problem, however, goes far beyond the relationship between Washington and Beijing. The deeper underlying reason is the abovementioned asynchrony of globalization in today's world. Economic logic demands that systemic interests,

⁸ Today, some American experts claim that the inevitable "economic decoupling" of the United States and China will be one of the few positive outcomes of the coronavirus pandemic (Andrew A. Michta, 2020).

long-term strategies and complex solutions that are not always clear to the average person be taken into account. Political logic, on the contrary, is geared towards national interests, short-term objectives and populist solutions that are clear to everyone (“pseudo-solutions”). Since politics today clearly prevails over economy, economic expediency is relegated to the background.

Since there is no reason to believe that the situation will radically change in the near future, humanity is poised to enter a decade of heightened risks in the “restored” neo-modernity system. As for the content of global politics in the decade to come, the most desirable situation would be to focus on minimizing the negative consequences of bringing the archaic modes of existence and thinking back into international affairs and prepare for a new attempt to construct a modern global governance system given the probable strengthening of globalization trends (Globalization 2.0). Focusing on “error analysis and improvement”, that is, on achieving at least a general consensus on the key issues that have proved to be stumbling blocks in the way of international integration since the early 21st century, could be one of the crucial tasks of the upcoming period. The lack of such a consensus has largely set the limits for the globalization of the start of the century (Globalization 1.0). Let us list some of these issues.

Sovereignty and Interdependence

The “restoration” era that is approaching will apparently emphasize, among other things, unshakeable and indivisible state sovereignty. These emphases in and of themselves testify to the weakness of states that attempt to provide themselves with guaranteed protection against external influences, even when their domestic practices do not comply with generally accepted international standards and norms. On the other hand, as Edward Hallett Carr rightly notes, “the ineptitude of sovereign states” is “the ideology of predominant Powers which find the sovereignty of other states a barrier to the enjoyment of their own predominant position.” (Carr, E. H., 1939).

Still, states will continue to demonstrate their inability to fully exercise their right to sovereignty. The experience of recent decades has shown that sovereign states are frequently incapable of protecting their borders against illegal migrants, the consequences of environmental disasters in neighbouring territories and, finally, from epidemiological diseases. The gap between rights stemming from state sovereignty and the presumed obligations of these sovereign states will continue to widen. Many small and “nearly failed” states demonstrate the formal signs of state sovereignty, which is an illusion. Yet they stake their claim to “Westphalian” status. Great powers treat state sovereignty on the basis of their current interests. In their opinion, effective state sovereignty is a sort of privilege possessed by very few.

In any case, the area of effective practical application of the formal principles of “traditional” sovereignty will continue to narrow further. The EU example is telling in that regard: the sovereignty of its member states over public healthcare nearly caused the European Union to collapse during the coronavirus pandemic, as it brought with it a chain of unforeseen consequences. Consequently, some of those powers had to be at least temporarily removed from the hands of national governments and transferred over to the European Union’s supranational bodies. Therefore, a new understanding of the balance between sovereignty and interdependence is needed, an understanding that would increase the willingness of states to engage in collective action. There should be a realization of the fact that interdependence and the concomitant need for collective action are not a threat to state sovereignty, but one of the forms of its practical implementation based on the possibility and even desirability of “divisible” sovereignty.

Undoubtedly, we will need to adjust the concept of “Westphalian sovereignty” that prohibits external actors from interfering in the distribution of powers within states. To quote Robert Cooper’s famous adage concerning the collective or distributed sovereignty of the EU member states, we can suppose that Globalization 2.0 will feature “a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other’s domestic affairs” (Cooper Robert, 2003). Building such a system on a global scale will be immeasurably more difficult than doing it on a regional scale, but this task will have to be handled in one way or another in order to avoid further devaluation of the concept of sovereignty.

Regionalization and Globalization

Given the current crisis of universal institutions (in particular, the WTO, and, to some degree, the entire UN system), regionalization appears to be the most practicable format of multilateral international cooperation. Large trade and economic partnerships are forming at an increasing pace, while regional political and strategic alliances are emerging far more slowly. But here too, shifts towards deeper integration are noticeable (such as the development of the political component of the ASEAN’s activities).

The ongoing consolidation of the building blocks of the new world order makes it somewhat simpler to transition to a new level of global governance. A more limited number of actors makes it easier to achieve agreements and makes the system more stable and predictable. However, regionalization entails multiple risks, from institutionalizing competition between regional groups to the collapse of the existing technological, informational, financial and other spheres. Rigid regionalization can create obstacles to effective cooperation in resolving global security and development tasks. Finally, given the weakness of many regional integration projects in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and the post-Soviet space, we can suppose that regionalization will prove to be a *de facto* politically correct euphemism for the emerging bipolar structure.

It would appear that it is vitally important to ensure that regionalization be a necessary stage in the process of globalization, rather than an alternative to it. This, in turn, requires making sure that individual regional integration groups are theoretically compatible (for instance, compatibility of EU and EAEU procedures, standards and norms), even if setting up effective practical cooperation between these groups in the near future appears impossible.

On the other hand, this gives rise to the problem of countries, or possibly entire continents (such as a major chunk of the Middle East, Africa and some post-Soviet states), being left out of viable regional integration projects. Highly flexible formats should be developed to aid their cooperation with integration projects (such as BRICS+). In this case, the regional affiliation principle should not limit cooperation opportunities.

Finally, global problems should have global solutions. That is, regionalization should not result in divergent approaches to such problems as climate, food and energy security, managing transnational migration, etc. Commonality, or at least the theoretical compatibility of these approaches should form the backbone that will keep the global system from collapsing into regional components and will create conditions for subsequently “assembling” these components into a single whole.

Interests of States and Global Goods

One of the fundamental problems of Globalization 1.0 was that it came to be seen (and even more so of late) as a global “zero sum game.” The globalization of competition (be it commercial, financial, technological, professional, social or any other kind of competition) presupposed that the strongest actors would gain new

advantages under new conditions, while the weak actors would bear the costs. The fight for the limited resources, be it raw materials, human capital, or financing, would inevitably split the world into winners and losers, with the number of winners not necessarily exceeding the number of losers. And if this is indeed the case, then resistance to globalization will increase in the course of its development. The winners will be forced either to “pay off” the losers or attempt to wall themselves off from them. Neither approach promises long-term stability.

This view of globalization, however, completely ignores another, equally important dimension, namely, the globalization of cooperation as a mechanism for creating global public goods. Even if we limit ourselves to the economy, we will note such public goods as international standards for the protection of intellectual property, the fight against cross-border economic crime, international cooperation in counteracting tax evasion, etc.

Moving beyond the economic dimension of globalization, we will see that the set of global public goods can be much broader. Globalization offers new opportunities for jointly combating pandemics, international terrorism and climate change that were simply not available in the past. The concepts of “winners” and “losers” do not apply here, nor do the rules of the “zero sum game”, and globalization serves as the requisite platform for protecting universal human interests. If the deepening interconnectedness of states leads to the relationship between globalizing competition and globalizing cooperation moving in favour of the latter, then the socioeconomic and political basis of globalization will similarly expand, as will its historical prospects.

Economic Efficiency and Social Justice

The only way for globalization to be a sustainable project is if its dividends are no longer privatized by narrow financial and economic elites, while its costs are no longer distributed between the middle class and the poorest social groups. During the 2008-2009 crisis, most developed countries undertook tremendous efforts to save their biggest banks because they were “too big to fail”. There is a similar temptation in the current crisis to focus efforts on helping large “backbone” enterprises in the manufacturing sector. In the meantime, millions of small- and medium-sized businesses in developed countries, not to mention households, are in danger. The first order of business should be to help them. Otherwise, the 2020 crisis will bring about another surge in right-wing populism and mass anti-globalist movements. It is telling that right-wing anti-globalist movements have slimmer chances in countries with strong welfare state traditions (such as the countries of Northern Europe), where dividends and costs are distributed relatively equally among all sectors of society.

The same applies to the inequality of states, to the so-called “North-South” divide. Bipolarity is usually perceived as a geopolitical, military-technical, economic, technological or any other confrontation between the United States and China. In our opinion, however, deglobalization will most likely result in another type of bipolarity, namely, economic bipolarity, and then the political disjunction of the global North and South. Given the rapid development of new technologies, the North will be able to sharply increase its productivity and cut its workforce demand. Greater life span and the involvement of older age groups in production will move things in the same direction. At the same time, natural resources will be used with greater efficiency, and the global North will sharply decrease its resource dependence on the global South or will overcome it altogether. We are already seeing this long-term trend in hydrocarbons.

This demographic and resource self-sufficiency will make it possible to put the slogans of right-wing populists about closing down borders, restricting trade and, consequently, curtailing economic assistance

programmes into practice. The North will be able to not interfere in regional and local conflicts in the South, etc. Accordingly, the gap in living standards between the North and the South will grow at an even faster pace, while the danger of new pandemics breaking out in the South will increase. Naturally, some countries in the global South will be able to make a socioeconomic leap and successfully integrate into the post-crisis division of labour, but they will be few and far between. Others will be doomed to high socioeconomic inequality, the constant danger of sliding into archaic political modes, and other problems of incomplete modernization. Chronic armed conflicts, both civil and international, cannot be ruled out either.

In the long term, globalization should involve effective mechanisms for the large-scale redistribution of resources from the wealthy North to the poorer South. Globalization 2.0 should be driven primarily by growing demand in the global South achieved through shaping a large middle class there. These mechanisms should be radically different from the traditional technical and financial aid programmes developed half a century ago. International aid programmes are highly unpopular today in many states of the North, primarily the United States. Some experts believe that these programmes can be “depoliticized” by making them purely technical, that is, by transferring them into the realm of “global public goods.” Another option is to turn technical and financial assistance programmes from charities into investment opportunities, with a particular emphasis on various forms of social entrepreneurship.

Globalization, Crisis and Russia

Since the early 21st century, the Russian leadership has demonstrated a contradictory attitude to globalization. On the one hand, the official rhetoric during Vladimir Putin’s first years in power clearly indicated the Kremlin’s desire to transform Russia into an integral part of the global economy. On the other hand, documents and speeches by state leaders repeatedly noted the risks associated in one way or another with globalization, such as deepening inequality, increased financial instability, the spread of cross-border economic crime, etc. Emphasis was also repeatedly placed on preventing globalization from undermining the standing of nation-states as the principal actors in global politics and economics.

Economists noted strong protectionist tendencies as early as the 2000s, long before the acute political crisis between Moscow and the West broke out in 2014. For example, in 2008 a list of over 30 economic sectors was approved in which foreign investment was only allowed with governmental permission (this list included, for instance, fisheries, TV and radio broadcasting and publishing). Subsequently, the list was expanded significantly. At the same time, control was tightened over foreign civil organizations and foundations in Russia, which had worked almost unhindered in the past. Russian branches and offices were closed down in a number of cases. These trends were stepped up following a series of “colour revolutions” in some former Soviet republics and the “Arab Spring” in the Middle East and North Africa.

At the start of the century, Russia was enthusiastic about possibly joining international regimes and organizations. Now, this sentiment was gradually giving way to suspicions and growing uncertainty concerning the value that such memberships could have for Russia. Doubts started to appear as to whether economic interdependence had the capability to curb international conflicts.

There were objective reasons for these changes. Looking at the results of globalization in the late 2010s, we have no choice but to conclude that far more people lost out than gained, including members of the elites and the general public. Russia’s attempts to integrate into the global division of labour in the 2000s were marginally successful, but on the whole, this endeavour turned out to be a failure: the structure of Russia’s

exports changed little and the country was unable for several reasons (including those that had nothing to do with economy) to become a full-fledged member of global technological chains. On the other hand, Russia's dependence on the outside world was increasing, which produced new economic and political risks. The financial crisis of 2008–2009 was unexpected and quite painful for Russia. When Russia's relations with the West transitioned into an acute crisis (in 2014), Russia's foreign political integrational agenda totally yielded to the geopolitical agenda, and a well-thought-out alternative to Russia's comprehensive integration into the global economy was not proposed either then or later.

Russia is dominated by narratives of a deep crisis of the liberal world order and of the relevancy of the Westphalian principles of structuring the international system, and we can say that the 2020 systemic crisis and accelerating deglobalization generally agree with these narratives. Moreover, the current global events can be viewed as a *post factum* confirmation of Russia's strategy of bolstering national sovereignty as much as possible, building a rigid top-down power structure, implementing multiple import substitution programmes, and other recent priorities in state-building and economic development.

Without closing our eyes to all the difficulties and challenges the Russian leadership is facing as a result of the 2020 crisis, we must admit that Russia was better prepared for the crisis than many of its foreign rivals and competitors. For a long time now, Russia's strategy has been largely devised to deal with a hostile international environment, a world where globalization is retreating, geopolitical interests prevail over economic expediency, international conflicts have the upper hand over cooperation, and unilateral actions prove to be more efficient than multilateral ones.

As in many other countries, the need to counteract the systemic crisis creates new sources of legitimacy for the Russian leadership, which generally favours those in power and not the political opposition. In some way, it would be fair to say that the crisis allows the authorities to write off many of their unfulfilled promises and unimplemented plans, putting it down to “force majeure” circumstances. Theoretically, we can even assume that the prerequisites are now in place to institute a new “2020 coronavirus consensus” in lieu of the 2014 “Crimean consensus” that is running out of its rallying potential. However, this is only possible if the authorities demonstrate their ability to cope with the economic recession and the COVID-19 pandemic while incurring minimal losses to living standards and retaining the prospect of a rapid post-crisis economic growth. Thus far, the question of the effectiveness of Russia's strategy to combat economic problems and the virus remains open.

Like every major global crisis, the coronavirus pandemic not only generates additional risks, challenges and threats to the foreign policies of every single country, but also opens up new opportunities and prospects for them. Russia is no exception. In our opinion, Russia's case is unique in that its opportunities are mostly tactical and situational, while the threats are strategic and systemic. A specific balance of opportunities and threats depends on a large number of variables, but primarily on how Russia ultimately copes with COVID-19 compared to other states, particularly its principal international opponents. Any comparative advantage that Moscow has in combating the virus and the recession, be it the number of infected and dead or the relative scale of economic losses, will somehow expand Moscow's range of opportunities in the post-virus world. Any failure will increase foreign political threats and curtail opportunities. Let us attempt to compile a preliminary list of these opportunities and threats.

One of the most obvious opportunities afforded by the crisis and accelerating deglobalization is the favourable prospects for Russia to more actively advance its narrative of the nature of the current international

system, its development drivers, and the desired parameters of the new world order. We have already noted that over recent years, the Russian leadership has persistently promoted its own “Westphalian” picture of international relations that emphasizes the priority of nation-states and the importance of sovereignty and puts a question mark over the stability of Western solidarity and the effectiveness of Western multilateral diplomacy. Not only does the current create a huge number of additional opportunities for Russia’s domestic and foreign propaganda, but it also justifies the Kremlin’s ambitions to act as one of the principal architects of the post-crisis world order.

Some Russian analysts were quick to conclude that the liberal political model is inferior to the authoritarian model in emergency situations in terms of its effectiveness. This conclusion is not entirely valid, given the relatively successful response to the pandemic in such liberal democratic states as New Zealand, Taiwan, Germany, Finland, Norway, Denmark and Iceland.

Additionally, the 2020 crisis creates at least the theoretical possibility of the West adjusting its geopolitical priorities. The global pandemic and recession may well result, among other things, in the Western elites revising their perceptions of the hierarchy of external threats and, accordingly, a shift may occur in the system of foreign political priorities. COVID-19 and the economic downturn are rapidly eroding the prevailing idea of recent years that Russia is the “main problem” of global politics and the “main threat” to the interests of the West. It is unlikely that such a mental shift will immediately result in practical positive changes in Moscow’s relations with its western partners, but we do believe that it will open up opportunities for a “mini-reset”. At the very least, it will likely prevent the further escalation of the confrontation between Russia and the West, and may lead to the latter putting less pressure on Moscow.

The crisis and the accompanying deglobalization have produced an expanding “power vacuum” in many regions. Proposals to roll back international commitments were gaining popularity in developed states, primarily the United States, long before the COVID-19 pandemic. The coronavirus and the economic downturn, however, will apparently become a powerful catalyst for such sentiments, which will have an increasing influence on foreign political practices. This development will manifest itself, in particular, in the possible reduction of bilateral and multilateral financial and economic aid programmes for the global South and in reduced levels of military and political commitments to developing partner states. The expanding “power vacuum” in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and the post-Soviet space may create additional situational opportunities for Russia’s foreign policy.

At the moment, however, we are talking mainly about potential opportunities. We have to admit that the West has yet to find any grounds for a major revision of its established views and opinions of Russia. The West did not accept Russia’s proposal that unilateral sanctions be abandoned while the world is combating the pandemic and the recession. Many western politicians and commentators believe that Putin “is a more dangerous virus than COVID-19”. The attempts of Russia and China to develop more active international cooperation in combating the pandemic are frequently interpreted as the desire of Moscow and Beijing to use the coronavirus as a publicity stunt. Russia is still accused of waging a disinformation and propaganda campaign against the West and of destabilizing western political institutions by supporting right-wing populists and other radical political groups. Instead of softening the mutual mistrust between Russia and the West, the crisis has served to only exacerbate it, which stands in the way of expanding cooperation even in the least sensitive areas.

As western experts analyze Russia's strategy for combating the pandemic, they disagree on the extent to which the coronavirus can create new dimensions to the current state of relations between Russia and the West. Some believe that the pandemic, exacerbated by the economic crisis and the collapse in global oil prices, will make Moscow more vulnerable to Western pressure, as a result of which the West could force the Kremlin to make concessions on crucial issues, including the issue of the sovereignty over the Crimean peninsula. Others note the Kremlin's attempts to rally Russian society under the banners of patriotism and counteracting a new external threat. They believe that COVID-19 has not changed the perceptions of the Russian leadership, which, on the contrary, views it as just another element in the deeply hostile world surrounding their country. Consequently, there is reason to expect the pandemic to produce any shifts on issues that divide Russia and the West.

Curiously, Russian and Western experts only seem to look at the likelihood of Moscow taking any steps to improve relations with the West, clearly proceeding from the premise that it is undesirable, irrelevant or utterly impossible for the West to make any changes. Donald Trump is often suspected of being willing to make such changes, and these suspicions serve as another reason to vote for Joe Biden in the November elections.

Naturally, Russian efforts to supply aid to countries that have been hit particularly hard by the pandemic is perceived as politically motivated and ineffective. The supposed uselessness of Russian aid and the selfishness of its actions are highlighted at every opportunity, including with reference to anonymous sources. The term "aid" itself is frequently put in quotation marks. Incidentally, a similar narrative is used to describe China's aid programmes.

In addition to everything else, the pandemic and the economic recession have laid bare the flaws in the hierarchy of threats and challenges of most western countries. Most politicians are hung up on Russia and the traditional security agenda, and this obsession was of no help in preparing for the crisis or responding to its challenges in a timely manner. The crisis, however, raised concerns about the military production capabilities of the West, and of the United States in particular, and their adequacy to the changing national security demands. Accordingly, there are growing fears among the "hawks" that the pandemic and the recession could lead to cuts in NATO budgets, the "appeasement of Putin", and other things.

We can assume that deglobalization will entail at least a temporary worsening of Russia's global economic standing. The experience of the last global financial crisis of 2008–2009 allows us to make the prediction that Russia will suffer more from the upcoming wave of deglobalization than most of the world's developed economies. As far as we can see, the pandemic's immediate economic consequences will prove no less significant in Russia than in the United States or the European Union, although it might take longer for the Russian economy to recover, and the process will more painful than in the West.

The prospects for the sustainable recovery of the global oil market remain unclear. Russia's accumulated financial reserves will shrink. The timeframe for the Russian economy to achieve the average global growth rate will be revised, and the threat of its global marginalization will increase. Accordingly, there is a danger that the resource base of Russia's defence and foreign policies could weaken. This includes support for Russia's allies and partners, the financing of international organizations, and Russia's participation in costly multilateral initiatives (for instance, implementing the Paris climate accords).

However, even Moscow's most consistent critics are forced to admit that the crisis has not yet required Moscow to radically revise its economic strategy or its foreign political priorities, although this situation may well change should the crisis turn out to be more protracted for Moscow than for its geopolitical rivals and

competitors. The negative consequences of the crisis for the “national brand” are no less important if Russia’s current socioeconomic model remains unchanged in the post-crisis world (and if the crisis spurs a restructuring of the global economy as a whole).

The possible further growth of isolationism in Russia possibly may also involve certain risks. The initial response of Russian society to Moscow’s efforts to aid a number of foreign states (from Italy to Venezuela) in combating the coronavirus was mixed. On the whole, however, the pandemic and a more complicated domestic economic situation certainly strengthen isolationist sentiments and reduce popular support for an active and energetic foreign policy. In the past, the Russian people were happy to see their country flexing its muscles in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, as it was confirmation of Russia’s “great power” status. Now, however, such demonstrations are increasingly interpreted as an unjustified waste of shrinking resources. We can conclude that the post-crisis world will make it more difficult to justify the continuation of the present “great power” foreign policy course in the eyes of the public.

The exacerbation of the situation with the United States and China also contains certain potential challenges. The COVID-19 pandemic, which triggered a global recession, has only accelerated this trend. A key theme of the current U.S. presidential campaign is the desire on the part of Donald Trump and Joe Biden to prove to the public who will take the harder line on Beijing. The confrontation between the two countries makes it difficult for the UN Security Council, the WHO, the G20 and other international organizations to work effectively. The emergence of rigid bipolarity creates, in addition to the systemic risks that all international actors face, a number of specific threats for Russia. In a bipolar world, the increasing asymmetry of the economic and technological potentials of Moscow and Beijing is becoming increasingly visible, while the opportunities for cooperation with China’s real or potential opponents (for instance, with India, Vietnam or even Japan) are becoming progressively more problematic.

As for the impact of the 2020 crisis on Russia-China relations as such, there is reason to believe that the current gap between the political and military dimensions of cooperation between the two countries on the one hand and its economic and social dimensions on the other will grow increasingly wider. Political interaction will strengthen against the backdrop of declining global and regional stability, and military-strategic and military-technical interaction will step up accordingly. On the other hand, the presence of an entire range of unfavourable factors (the pandemic, the collapse in oil prices and the slowdown of the Chinese economy) will likely bring about a significant drop in Russia–China bilateral trade. Even if Russia’s hydrocarbon exports to China do not drop much in physical terms, the decrease in monetary terms will be more noticeable. Experts also predict a likely decline in Russian imports from China, which is particularly painful when it comes to hi-tech equipment and components.

Like the United States, Russia has never been a leader in developing the principles and mechanisms of multilateralism. Moscow has traditionally attached greater importance to multipolarity or polycentrism. Naturally, Russia’s conservative nationalists are attempting to derive maximum political gains from the West’s obvious inability to adhere to its declared values of solidarity and collective action⁹. The liberal rhetoric of multilateralism is proclaimed to be either hypocrisy, or self-deception on the part of liberal analysts. The

⁹ We should note that Russia, too, has had its difficulties in coordinating a response to COVID-19, even with its closest partners. In particular, the pandemic was, if not the cause, then at least a pretext for more frictions between Moscow and Minsk, with Belarusian leadership levelling harsh criticism at Moscow for Russia’s “unilateral” measures to tighten border control, as well as for its overall approach to combating COVID-19 (Astapenia Ryhor & Anaïs Marin, 2020).

example of Italy, which has been particularly hard hit by the pandemic, is especially telling here.

On the other hand, the scale of the global problems that became evident in 2020 allows Russia to try and position itself as a responsible global political actor willing to engage in international cooperation over ideological barriers and political differences. Hence the calls for a pooling of efforts and Moscow's increased activity in the United Nations, the G20 and other international organizations. In this respect, the pandemic is starting to play the role in Russian foreign policy that had previously been assigned to international terrorism. However, Moscow's calls have been largely ignored by its western partners thus far. First, because they do not believe in the sincerity of the Russian leadership and view Moscow's proposals as an instrument in waging an information war against the West. Second, because Western leaders are not yet entirely clear on whether or not Russia can actually make a tangible contribution to the international effort to counter the coronavirus. Nevertheless, work in the area needs to be stepped up, appealing not so much to individual leaders as to the public opinion of the West.

Russia may have several years of deglobalization, which could stretch into the mid- or late 2020s. We would like to stress once again that, despite all the costs and risks that deglobalization entails for Russia, it does create relatively favourable conditions for continuing the current foreign policy course, postponing the issue of revamping the conceptual framework and instruments of Russia's foreign policy. However, we need to remember that a new wave of globalization will eventually spread throughout the world, including Russia. It is not difficult to predict that this new wave will be higher and more powerful than the one the world experienced in the late 20th and the early 21st centuries. This means that Russia needs to prepare itself for this wave right now, so that it does not fall behind other leading global political actors and does not repeat the mistakes made during Globalization 1.0.

We are talking not only about adjusting the current perceptions of the Russian authorities here, which apparently view current deglobalization processes as historically inevitable. A far more difficult task would consist in overcoming the sentiments that currently dominate in Russian society — self-sufficiency, extreme suspicion of the outside world and outright isolationism stemming from Russia's historical experience, national psychology and social instincts. Russian society needs to start looking at the world not through the lens of security challenges, but through the lens of opportunities for its own development. The fundamental task of Russia's foreign policy during Globalization 2.0 is to help Russian society integrate itself into the coming global world without sacrificing its national identity to globalization.

This is a very difficult task, yet it can be handled. We need to remember that Russian civilization originally emerged as a by-product of the international trade route “from the Varangians to the Greeks”. Thus, the tendency towards closedness and the perception of the outside world as hostile and dangerous cannot be considered an immanent feature of this civilization.

Conclusion

Given the ambiguities of the upcoming period of deglobalization and the supposed pivot towards Globalization 2.0, it would seem that a very difficult decade awaits humanity. These difficulties will increase manifold if our objective is not merely to minimize the damage from breaking or significantly curbing the usual economic, financial, humanitarian and other ties, but also to attempt to make the transition of global society to a new level of globalization in the 2030s as painless as possible. Accordingly, the quality requirements of state leaders and national elites (political, economic and intellectual) are increasing sharply.

The main lesson of the last 30 years should probably be the understanding that market mechanisms as such cannot serve as a universal solution for economic and political problems, either at the level of the individual elements of the global social system (states) or at the level of the system as a whole. Accordingly, market mechanisms — both at the level of states and at the level of the international system — should be supplemented with the recognition by the national elites of their social responsibility and with well-thought-out strategies for balancing the tasks of advancing economic growth and preserving social justice. In other words, unless spontaneous globalization is augmented with adequate global governance mechanisms, it will inevitably produce repeated crises and generate deglobalization impulses.

The difficulty in the planet-wide transition to a new world order is exacerbated by the rules of the game in the global system changing simultaneously with the changing balance of power within that system, and the 2020 crisis has become a catalyst of both the former and latter trends. Both trends are very painful for the principal actors and increase the appeal of those strategies that are based on prioritizing the nearest narrow national interests. In the upcoming decade, the global arena will likely lack a global leader that is willing to regulate the transition and act as the principal generator of global public goods. For various reasons, as far as we can see, neither the United States, nor China, nor the European Union, nor Russia will be such a leader. In these circumstances, it is particularly important for the elites of the main world players be able to achieve a consensus on the basic rules of the game for the transition period. It is still difficult to determine the timeframe for transitioning to a new model of global governance, but it will most likely stretch until at least the middle of the 21st century.

Sadly, we have to admit that the current generation of ruling elites in most countries, the so-called “baby boomers” (born in 1945–1965), was not adequate to the demands of history. This explains the failure of Globalization 1.0, which manifested itself in the unwillingness or inability to transition to a new level of global governance, despite the obvious need for such a transition. Hence the advance of the counter-elites represented by populists, nationalists and anti-globalists that has been accelerating since the 2008–2009 crisis and which in many ways set the stage for the largely unexpected crisis of 2020. This resulted in the persistent attempts to go backwards instead of forwards when trying to find solutions to the problems caused by the crisis in the world order.

However, the 2020 crisis itself has accelerated the renewal of elites, and this process will likely produce fundamental generational shifts in the elites of most states in 2021–2024. The baby boomers will be replaced by Gen Xers (i.e., people born in 1965–1985) and Gen-Y (millennials born in 1985–2000)¹⁰. We can assume that these generations — the first formed in the realities of the 21st century — will be more receptive to universal human values and more willing to take collective action. Although it would of course be wrong to idealize Generations X and Y, and indeed Gen Z that will follow.

In terms of the prospects of Globalization 2.0 and the quality of global governance, the degree to which the new generation of elites are ready for a large-scale and historically protracted re-distribution of the goods of globalization from the winners to the losers, both within individual states and between them, is of particular importance. The question remains as to whether a change of generations will be enough to produce such a shift in consciousness, or whether some external shock will be required that will be far greater than the systemic

¹⁰ These generational ranges are largely conventional. Sociologists have not arrived at a consensus regarding the specific timeframes of generation changes. Additionally, new generations may appear in different countries and continents at different times.

crisis of 2020.

“Never waste a good crisis.” This paradoxical adage credited to Winston Churchill is more relevant today than ever. Neither Russia, nor any other state, should waste the systemic global crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. It would be very disappointing if the international community were to respond to the events of 2020 in the same near-sighted, fearful and inadequate manner that it responded to the events of 2008–2009. A crisis does not give anyone grounds to cross out their past mistakes or forget their past achievements. Yet a crisis is not just a convenient pretext, but also a solid reason to shake up one’s old foreign political “wardrobe”. A closer inspection would most definitely reveal things that are moth-eaten, no longer fit, or simply went out of fashion a long time ago.

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Geopolitical Struggle and Tensions in US-Russian Media Diplomacy

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Think tank basically standing on the government's standpoint and solving government problems that media diplomacy is mainly aimed at tracing the truth of events and systematically presenting different voices. Media people doing international news reporting must distinguish between international news reporting and tracing the truth. Media people need time to think about the thinking patterns of people who walked in and out of the revolving doors, such as Congress, government, political parties, and think tanks in the international community, to provide the country, the governments with realistic predictions.

Keywords: geopolitical struggle, media diplomacy, Putin

In development process of RT's management model is basically Americanized, but the core ideas still prioritize the interests of Russia, particularly in the context of the proliferation of think tanks in the US and the growing Republican-Democratic struggle in Congress, RT found more NGOs and non-mainstream think tanks that wanted to have a voice in the early stages of its development, and gave more support to Barack Obama, the first democratically elected president of the US. Until today, Obama's policies have been resisted by the government, Congress, think tanks, and pro-Republican consortia, and Obama was also rated as the worst president of the United States after World War II. However, the truth was that Obama did not send any troops in the face of complicated international situation, and many lower-level people in the United States had praised Obama's medical policies. The friendly relationship between RT and Obama played a key role in easing the current increasingly freezing relations between the United States and Russia. In the government's foreign policy, public diplomacy and the media complement help each other, and can even prevent the country from falling into a deadlock in the Cold War at critical moment in US-Russian relations.

Changing Media Rules and Audience Needs

Before 1949, Western newspapers were mainly pornographic news, and the audience's needs were relatively simple. After the beginning of the Cold War, Western audiences began to turn to hard news. In "Washington Post", "New York Times" and other major newspapers for the Watergate Incident pushed the authority of major newspapers to the apex and further improved the Western concept of the fourth right of the media. The fourth right of Western countries mainly refers to the circle of media people. This circle has a

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certain understanding and values of international events. Although it is different from the country it is commenting on, the media people will not admit the naivety of their perceptions, including the problem that has always existed with regard to China's cognition. With the persistence of the disintegration and the end of the Cold War in 1991, the appreciation and reading level of Western audiences had risen fatally, and they were no longer satisfied with simple news reports. At the same time, the audience's overall demand for news has also greatly increased. Unlike the demand for indoctrinating news, readers both in the West and the East have a substantial increase in the demand for in-person and guided news reviews. The popularity of talent shows and matchmaking programs that emphasize fan participation, as well as the fact that People's Daily's "Global Times" and "Reference News" rank among the top two newspapers in terms of reading volume reflect that the audience is very concerned about their country and diplomacy. In this case, the all-round media person in international communication is particularly important. In international issues, all-round media people must not only report international events to the country, but also achieve a full impact on international audiences. They must upload their own videos through their own Facebook and YOUTUBE, and they must also let local media people, NGOs, and non-mainstream think tanks appear on Chinese overseas media and influence the world can they tell the story of China clearly.

Today, the media is still the main ideological tool to defend national interests and promote national values abroad that communication scholars attach importance to the influence of the media, while political scholars attach importance to how to use the influence of the media to achieve the goal of defending national interests and government decision-making. The interactive relationship between the two has become an indicator of gaining public opinion. In the past, the home country was the field for the media in the class struggle, but now the international community has become a new field for the media to defend national interests. A strong global media network is an important means for survival and development in an international body with unbalanced information. Global information warfare has become a modern non-traditional strategic warfare that challenges the boundaries of national sovereignty. As an important role in non-traditional strategies, the media can achieve the effect of driving people without fighting. Losing the right to speak in the media means losing the weapon to express national stance and national dignity, and giving up the right to control media management means surrendering.

Theoretical Basis of Russian Media and Characteristics of Information Policy

In 1998, the Russian Ministry of Communications and Informatization (Министерство Российской Федерации по связи и информатизации) formulated the Russian terrestrial digital TV and broadcasting plan (О внедрении наземного цифрового телевизионного вещания в России). According to this, the Russian Ministry of Transport issued a strategic plan to gradually shift from analogue to digital broadcasting and TV ("Стратегия поэтапного перехода от аналогового к цифровому телевизионному и звуковому вещанию"). The plan mainly started in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Nizhny Novgo. The three cities were tested first. After that, Russia began the process of digitizing radio and television to improve the digital divide across Russia, including individual use gaps, investment issues, information gaps between the rich and the poor, gaps in infrastructure, imperfect policies, and so on.

According to the regulations from the Russian Printing and Mass Communication Agency (Приказ Роспечати от 12.03.2014г №47 "О внесении изменений в Правила предоставления из федерального бюджета субсидий федеральным государственным бюджетным учреждениям, подведомственным

Федеральному агентству по печати и массовым коммуникациям, на цели, не связанные с возмещением нормативных затрат на оказание государственных услуг”) on March 12, 2014, Russia basically adopts a budget protection policy for public media and news reports, which mainly made the functions and attributes of the Russian media closely inseparable from the development of the country. In fact, as early as June 15, 2012, Regulation No. 177 (15 июня 2012 г. №177 “Об утверждении Правил предоставления из федерального бюджета субсидий федеральным государственным бюджетным учреждениям, подведомственным Федеральному агентству по печати и массовым коммуникациям, на цели, не связанные с возмещением нормативных затрат на оказание государственных услуг”) began to regulate the Printing and Mass Communication Agency, specific news reports and the funding required by the media. If the media reports involve government policies and the subjectivity is the continuation of government policy, then the federal government must fund relevant reports in accordance with the law. In this way, the government and the media's guidance in news reporting and the use of funding regulations are regulated.

Centralized Information Space Policy of Russia

Putin has positioned the television media as a cultural cause since the second term of the president. He issued an order to reorganize the Russian Ministry of Publishing, Radio and Television, the Ministry of Press and Publication to operate independently, and the Ministry of Radio, Television and Culture to merge into the Ministry of Culture and Mass Communication for comprehensive development of Russia's national television station. The Russian government implements a management form of the state-owned media public service system. The Russian oligarchs have gone from absolute control to the loss of control in the field of mass communication. This is basically a process in which the media returns to the basic characteristics of the fourth power structure. However, at this time, the Russian media is more like a combination of state agencies and corporate organizations, such as the All-Russian State Television and Broadcasting Company (ВГТРК).

In September 2000, Putin issued a presidential order amending one of the original “On the Improvement of National Electronic Media Work” issued by President Yeltsin, which had given local governments the power to appoint the heads of local radio and television stations. The new order transferred the power of the local government to appoint the head of the local state broadcaster to the head office of All-Russian State Television and Broadcasting Corporation, which not only had the power to appoint the head of the local state broadcaster, but also had the financial power to prepare the budget and operate the revenue. This was mainly to prevent the abuse and waste of funds by the leaders of the local national radio and television companies. President Putin firmly controlled the local media through the centralized management of the All-Russian State Broadcasting and Television Corporation. At the same time, with the establishment of seven federal administrative regions, Putin appointed plenipotentiary representatives directly responsible to the president and responsible for organizing in the federal district and implementing the President's policy, regularly reporting to the President the security issues, socio-economic and political situation in the Federal District. Putin established a new form of media and political centralization to strengthen the authority of the central government and promote the integration of the country, and solve the local administration since collapse of the Soviet Union Separate governance and the dangers of separatism.

Putin's prerequisite and foundation for “information space integration” and “media centralization” were mainly that Russian journalists had strong on-site resilience, which was very suitable for the production method of live broadcast of the news section of “News”. In addition, the news program had special reporters stationed

in the local area. These reporters had a relatively familiar grasp of local news and could truthfully and accurately reflected local news. Under Putin's "centralized media" environment, reporters were directly responsible to the central media, and local radio and television were also under central management. Second, although Putin implemented the "nationalization" policy of "information space integration" and "media centralization", this did not deviate from the principle of journalist professionalism, because the Russian media law actually granted journalists greater news. The right of collection provided reporters with relatively relaxed interview space. Therefore, Russian reporters actually enjoyed a lot of news autonomy. On the contrary, the Russian media law had more restrictions on media managers. Such a combination of news autonomy and management restrictions was mainly adapted to the general environment of the Russian media. In Putin's media management concept, it embodied a kind of thinking that both management and self-discipline existed at the same time.

Generally speaking, after the baptism of freedom of communication and the turbulence of the media transition period, the Russian media has basically cultivated its own new generation of journalists who are familiar with on-site reporting and good at writing. In addition, the Russian media management does not interfere with the news content of journalists under normal circumstances, and the news editorial department also enjoys greater autonomy in the news. Generally speaking, the boundaries of Russian news reports are not critical reports. The red line of news and the police demarcation area mainly lies in issues that "immediately and obviously" endanger national security and national interests.

Russian Electronic Media Is Closely Related to the Operation of State Capital

The relationship between Russian electronic media and state capital has often become a concern of media researchers and the press. In Western communication theories, the concept of political economy is invoked to explain the regime's manipulation of the media, and "state capitalism" and "state corporatism" are still influential in how the surrounding world views Russia and China.

Russia's state-owned media can be classified into three forms of ownership: "State media owned by the state", and its funds mainly come from the budget prepared by the government. "State-owned media owned by the state", the state government agencies and the private sector jointly hold shares, and the state government holds more than 51% of the equity. "State-owned media owned by state-owned energy companies", commercial media were purchased by state-owned energy companies in the process of "nationalization", and state-owned energy has its own media committee responsible for the management and operation of its media. Among the Russian media, the only state-owned media that has a budget is generally called "state media" in Russia. The state media in the field of radio and television mainly refers to the all-Russian television and broadcasting company group at the central federal level.

Putin mentioned in a speech at Columbia University in 2003 that the media could not be owned by two or three pockets. In Putin's overall vision of media reform, the media cannot be viewed solely from the perspective of profitability. If the media is controlled by commercial capital, then the media must give priority to commercial purposes, and the media will lose its social stability function. Therefore, the media must be owned by the state. The media must consider the major premise of the state and social interests if it is funded by the state, and the state must become the regulator of social interests. British "Financial Times" reporter Andrew Jack called it "liberal authoritarianism".

In conclusion, when the Russian state society is not yet completely stable, many problems must be solved

by the state government rather than capitalists. At this time, the state needs the media to assist the government in identifying problems. Whether from Lenin or Stalin to Putin, the media is definitely a tool for Russia to become a world power. The media will not restrain the government from outside the system. This is not in line with Russian traditions.

Integrating Russian International Publicity mechanism, “RT” International News Agency Was Established¹

On December 9, 2013, President Putin signed the Presidential Decree “Several Measures to Improve the Operational Efficiency of State-owned Media” (О некоторых мерах по повышению эффективности деятельности государственных средств массовой информации).² According to the presidential decree, the establishment of the “RT” International News Agency (Международное информационное агентство “Россия сегодня”) was confirmed, and institutions such as RIA Novosti and the Voice of Russia Broadcasting Company were dismantled to improve the overall external operation efficiency of the state media. According to Putin’s presidential decree, it needs to be implemented as follows:

- 1) Revocation of the federal budget agency “National Television and Radio Program Foundation” (федеральное государственное бюджетное учреждение “Государственный фонд телевизионных и радиопрограмм”) and transfer of its property rights to the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “All-Russian State Television and Radio Corporation” (Всероссийская государственная телевизионная и радиовещательная компания). Cancellation of the “Russian Book Commission” (Российская книжная палата) and transfer of its property rights to the “Ita-TAS” news agency.
- 2) The editorial department of “Russia” was reorganized, and the editorial department of “Motherland” magazine was merged into it. The establishment of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “RT” International News Agency. To establish as the main basic policy of the international news agency “RT” to report abroad on the state policy and social life of the Russian Federation. It was confirmed that the general manager would be the sole executive agency of “RT” International News Agency, and his appointment and dismissal would be confirmed by the president.
- 3) The Russian state broadcasting company “Voice of Russia” (Российская государственная радиовещательная компания “Голос России”) was revoked and its property rights were transferred to the International News Agency of RT. The federal budget agency “Russian International News Agency” (РИА Новости) was abolished. Confirmed the cancellation of the International News Agency (РИА Новости), its founder rights would be transferred to the “RT” International News Agency, and its property rights would be transferred to the “RT” International News Agency.
- 4) According to the 2004 Presidential Decree “On Approval of Strategic Enterprises and Strategic Joint Companies” (“Об утверждении перечня стратегических предприятий и стратегических акционерных обществ”) list, RIA Novosti was changed and cancelled. The first point of the third paragraph of the Presidential Decree No. 30 of January 15, 1998 “On the inclusion of separate items into the National Collection of Special Items of the People’s Cultural Property of the Russian

¹ “Introduction to Today Russia International News Agency”, *Russian News Network*, available online at: <http://rusnews.cn/about/>.

² Указ (2013, Декабрь 9), “О мерах по повышению эффективности деятельности государственных средств массовой информации”, *Администрация Президента РФ*, available online at: <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/19805>.

Federation” (“О включении отдельных объектов в Государственный свод особо ценных объектов культурного наследия народов Российской Федерации”) was recognized to be invalid.

- 5) The Presidential Decree would enter the State Duma’s legislative process within 15 working days. Ensure that the official operation of the “RT” International News Agency would be completed within one month. Financial support measures would be completed within one month. And other related measures will be completed within three months. The presidential decree would take effect immediately after it was signed.

“RT” International News Agency was mainly based on RIA Novosti and merged into the “Voice of Russia” radio station. According to this, RIA Novosti officially entered history at the end of February 2014, retaining the RIA Novosti brand. Since then, “RT” International News Agency, as the only official Russian foreign media propaganda machine, has become a new multimedia international media group that combines the functions of RT International News TV Channel, News Agency International Department and Radio Station. Dmitry Kiselev (Дмитрий Киселев) was appointed as the general manager of the agency, and Margaret Simonyan (Маргарита СИМОНЬЯН) served as the editor-in-chief of the agency. The head office is the original site of RIA Novosti, located on Zubovsky Boulevard in Moscow. The position of the “RT” International News Agency is to convey Russian policies to the international community and report on Russian social life. “RT” International News Agency’s corporate strategic partners include 550 companies including unitary enterprises and state-owned enterprises in the Russian Federation (Никольский А., 2014). The Russian State Duma had passed the annual budget of 268 billion rubles for the International News Agency “RT” for 2014-2015, and it was expected to remain at this level in 2015-2016.³

President Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov (Дмитрий Песков, 2014), stated that any country and any status needed media that represents its own country’s position and voice. Propaganda weapons were an indispensable tool. Kremlin administrative director Sergei Ivanov (Сергей Иванов, 2014) said that the establishment of the “RT” International News Agency could improve the efficiency of International Publicity, reduce and optimize domestic and local news resources, and concentrate on focusing on International Publicity. After the establishment of the agency, the primary publicity task was to report to the international community the 2014 Winter Olympics and Paralympic Committees in Sochi, Russia (Лебедева А., 2013).

RIA Novosti’s original 69 news workstations across the country would be reduced to 19, and 150 reporters would be reduced to 20. The development focus of “RT” International News Agency is to compete with the Associated Press, Reuters and other international news agencies in the international information market. In this regard, the editor-in-chief of “RT” Margaret Simonian said that it was necessary to expand the amount of international information, to reduce the overlap with the TASS in domestic and CIS information, to optimize the overall structure of foreign news and to reduce the waste of overlapping resources. She also said that as a modern multimedia news agency, “RT” should provide the global news market with a strong and diverse news source option (Афанасьева А., 2014). “RT” International News Agency is the most visited Russian media platform. Every year, the press center organizes more than 1,500 news events. Participants include high-level state officials, representatives of large commercial and private businesses, representatives of the Russian Social

³ “Госдума разрешила передать ‘России сегодня’ бюджеты ‘РИА Новости’ и ‘Голоса России’”, Ведомость, 2014, Январь 24, available online at: <http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/21836911/gosduma-razreshila-peredat-rossii-segodnya-byudzhety-ria>.

and Political Federation, and foreign guests.⁴

Regarding the reorganization and revocation of RIA Novosti, in addition to saving the country's overall internal news budget expenditure, the strength and effectiveness of international propaganda in the past ten years of the establishment of Russian TV Today is also the reason why Russia's International Publicity agency is moving towards internationalization, youth and modernization. The editor-in-chief of the "Komsomolskaya Pravda" (Комсомольская правда), Vladimir Songgorkin (Владимир Сунгоркин, 2014), told the "Newspaper. RU website" (Газета.Ру) in the article "Information War Victims" that the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis was the last straw to overthrow RIA Novosti. Ukraine's internal division and support for integration with the European Union had caused great criticism of Russia's International Publicity mechanism. Many sources indicated that Moscow's top officials were dissatisfied with RIA Novosti's failure to do a good job in Ukraine's news and public relations and defend Russia's national interests. Songgorkin believed that Russia had long been trapped in local interests while ignoring the international news market, and its capital investment in international propaganda was far less than that of many major countries. It was roughly estimated that EU NGOs invested at least 50 million euros in the Ukraine incident alone. In addition, the appointment of Kiselev's personnel showed that the upper-level had decided to strengthen media control over foreign propaganda. The former editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Svetlana Mironyuko was a more liberal and social media leader. Serev belonged to the party's fighter and fighter, and was also Putin's hand-picked man. His leadership style was bound to move towards Putin's hope to strengthen Russia's international image and defend Russia's national interests (Брызгалова Е. & Фаляхов Р., 2014).

Today's Russian TV channel has successfully built the most popular international TV channel in the United States and Europe. Public diplomacy is a supplement to one-track diplomacy, and media diplomacy will first go international. Media that can influence international public opinion is a prerequisite for telling Chinese stories. The media pursue the truth in international reports, and make good use of the obligation of media people to maintain the government's position in international reports. Finding the truth about any event can supplement the source of information in diplomatic decision-making. Cultivating omnimedia people who influence the world is also a major issue facing China. Simonian, the general manager of RT, has set many first records in Russia in external publicity, and has successfully built the most popular international TV channel in the United States and Europe. Obviously, the future function of the "RT" International News Agency is toward the policy of fully concentrating its firepower to propagate Russian policies to the international community.

Integration of RTTV and International Publicity System

Since collapse of the Soviet Union, before 2000, the Russian media was basically controlled by an oligarch and served the oligarchic economy. From 2000 to 2006, the Russian media entered the stage of professional media personnel. At this time, the media personnel and the government were combined, and the government mainly controlled the signal rights of TV stations and radio stations, newspaper printing plants and equipment imports. In 2006, the media, the government, and state-owned enterprises were fully integrated. However, due to the chaos in the early stage of the development of the Soviet and Russian state systems, TASS, state television, and newspapers faced major problems in management and funding sources. To this end, Putin focused on reshaping RIA Novosti, Russian State Television, Voice of Russia, Komsomolskaya Pravda, and

⁴ Available online at: <http://rusnews.cn/about/>.

Moscow Komsomolskaya News. However, the development of the world's media had become more entertaining and sensational in reporting. It was difficult for the media to cooperate with the rise of Russia, because the three issues of Russia's rise (integration of the CIS countries, cooperation between Russia and the European Union, and Russia's role in Asia) were hardly the subject of the audience's main concern in Russia. Therefore, how to make use of the experience and management of RT TV, which had been engaged in Russian foreign propaganda as a commercial media, become the main problem facing Putin's team.

RT is an all-English broadcast international television station established in 2005 supported by the Russian government with a grant of 33 million US dollars. Its role is equivalent to the British Broadcasting Corporation of the United Kingdom, France 24 of France, the German Voice of Germany and the Public Broadcasting Corporation of the United States. The RT International English Channel was launched in Moscow in December 2005. It was Russia's first all-digital TV network channel, employing more than 100 journalists from all over the world. Margaret Simonian, who was only 25 at the time, became the youngest editor-in-chief of a major Russian television network. Putin visited the RT New Media Building in the summer of 2013 to meet with reporter representatives and stated that RT would break the Anglo-Saxon media monopoly (Timothy McGrath, 2014).

In June 2007, RT began to place the best programs of its own TV station on YOUYUBE, becoming the first Russian TV station to cooperate with YOUYUBE. RT Editor-in-Chief Margaret Simonian said that the contract with YOUYUBE was in response to the majority of viewers who were accustomed to watching TV programs online through computers, and RT provided free programs to all YOUYUBE users. These were all for RT's expansion of the global audience.⁵

RT mainly adopts the operation mode of a public relations company to provide TV stations with topic issues. In the early stage of its operation in the United States, it established various topics suitable for American society and invited people from all walks of life in the United States to participate in related projects, and distributed research funds according to the projects to establish the source of guests after the establishment of RTTV in the future. RT relies on Russian and international professional media professionals to go deep into NATO countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel. Looking for guests from related activities, establishing relevant lobbying mechanisms in some breaking news or hot news reports in the future, and using the media and guests to form a certain degree of public opinion pressure, this makes non-mainstream groups in the United States attach great importance to the opinions from RTTV.

However, RTTV is a commercial operation. Unlike RT, RTTV is a TV content provider and a platform for discussion by American political and economic figures. It itself does not hold any position on American issues. RTTV exists in the United States and other Western countries in the form of a company, relying on news topics to attract the attention of non-mainstream think tanks and NGOs in the United States, and presenting its own views on related topics in TV programs. Its guests and content basically serve the non-mainstream society in the United States. Because of the lobbying of interest groups, Washington represents mainstream political opinions and New York represents economic interest groups. Although these interest groups are small in number, they have huge influence.

In the process of working for the rise of the country, Russia put the media on the same important basis as energy and weapons to rectify. The "RT" TV station internally represents a comprehensive combination of

⁵ Телеканал RT открыл филиал на YOUYUBE. Лента.Ру, Июнь 4 2007, <http://lenta.ru/news/2007/06/04/YOYUBE/>.

professional media, think tanks, government and state-owned enterprises. Externally, it combines international media personnel, non-governmental organizations, lobbying groups and local operators, so that “RT” TV station specializes in landing countries’ non-mainstream public opinion and develops into the most influential international publicity system, and the international multimedia opinion channel which is different from Western mainstream media. With the tension and confrontation between the United States and Russia in the Ukrainian crisis, RT US Taiwan has become the target of the United States’ use of judicial investigations as a means of attack. How does Putin use RT to counteract the offensive propaganda of the United States in international public opinion, and also tend to conduct preventive media diplomacy against the offensive propaganda of the United States. From 2013 to 2014, as Putin returned to the global layout of the Kremlin, he integrated the major International Publicity machines such as RIA Novosti and Voice of Russia into the organizational structure of RT International News Agency. The goal is to develop RT into the world’s largest The multimedia international outreach system. The Ukrainian crisis belongs to the fiercest battlefield in which the Russian foreign propaganda system and the American media are competing for geopolitical superiority at this stage.

Russian International Publicity System Related With Rising of Nation

From collapse of the Soviet Union to 2000, the Russian media was basically controlled by an oligarch and served the oligarchic economy. After Putin became the president of Russia in 2000, the first problem he faced was how to obtain funding sources and master the ideological propaganda machine, in order to regain Russia’s national strength and popular confidence from the economic and psychological levels. Putin’s idea of a powerful country was to place the three major industries of media, energy, and weapons under government control, squeeze the oligarchs out of these areas or become supporting actors, and force the oligarchs to concentrate on economic activities rather than political operations. The nationalization of large industries was Putin’s first step in governance. From 2000 to 2006, the Russian media entered the stage of professional media professionals. Professional media professionals did not need to consider business and economic issues too much, so that they could better exert their own professionalism and policy analysis capabilities. At this time, the combination of media people and the government became a characteristic. The government mainly controlled the signal rights of television stations and radio stations, newspaper printing houses and equipment imports. After 2006, the media, the government, and state-owned enterprises were fully integrated. However, due to the chaos in the early stage of the development of the Soviet and Russian state systems, TASS, state television, and newspapers faced major problems in management and funding sources. To this end, Putin focused on reshaping RIA Novosti, Russian State Television, Voice of Russia, and “Russia”, “Komsomolskaya Pravda” and “Moscow Communist Youth League” as the primary targets of media service government policy propaganda and interpretation. After 2008, think tanks joined the media diplomacy system and became the source of major decisions in Russia and abroad. At the end of 2013, RT became Russia’s largest international news agency, striding forward to the world’s largest multimedia outreach machine. The Ukrainian crisis was the fiercest battlefield in which the Russian outreach system and the American media were competing for geopolitical superiority at this stage.

Wu Fei and Hu Fengyung (2006) believed that Putin’s media development approach was consistent with international relations, that was, the Russian government must protect existing natural resources. Natural resources should be a powerful weapon for the rise of Russia which should be a powerful weapon for Russia’s

rise, and likewise the media must serve as an ideological weapon for shaping Russia's ideology, which cannot be developed overnight (Wu Fei & Hu Fengyung, 2006). As the world's media development was increasingly focusing on entertainment and reporting, it was difficult for the media to cooperate with the rise of Russia. The rise of Russia is mainly divided into three parts: the integration of the CIS countries, the cooperation between Russia and the European Union, and Russia's role in Asia. It can be said that these three topics were hardly the main concerns of the audience in Russia. In this way, how to draw on the experience and management of RT TV, which has been specializing in Russian foreign propaganda through commercial media, has become the main problem facing Putin's team. In 2013, Putin set out to build RT into Russia's largest multimedia platform. It was necessary to reorganize RT's successful international influence experience with domestic media resources to make the Russian media fully internationalized with the most effective and cost-saving methods. On the one hand, Russia's internal media must serve as the backing of Russia's international propaganda; on the other hand, the process of international propaganda could interact with domestic public opinion at any time to maintain the familiarity of domestic public opinion with international issues, reduce the gap between domestic and foreign public opinion, and prevent internal a crisis that could seriously polarise internal opinion when it was attacked by international opinion. This role had been effectively played in the Ukrainian crisis. The high level of Russian diplomacy had formed the idea that the color revolution was to use the divided public opinion of other countries and the media propaganda machinery to cause huge public opinion pressure inside and outside other countries, until the pressure of public opinion was loosened or the regime is disintegrated. This seemed to have become the latest diplomatic offensive weapon of the United States, and what Russia wanted to carry out is preventive diplomacy.

Konstantin Kosachev (2012), President Putin's plenipotentiary representative of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the editorial board member of the Russian in Global Affairs, believed that the international competition in the 21st century had transformed from hard power to soft power, and the damage and cost of hard power had been overwhelming. Therefore, competition in geopolitics on the international stage had already been a policy tool and diplomatic method to shape or destroy the enemy through culture and information.

Kosachev gave the example of how intervention by force in Saddam Hussein's and Ghadafi's regimes, despite having only a small number of supporters in Russia, was a way that caused great concern within Russia and was difficult for Russia to accept. The Western media portrayed Russia as a supporter of these regimes and an ideological enemy of anti-Western values because Russia did not agree with the overthrow of these regimes by force, and the same pattern applied to the interpretation of Russia's attitude towards the Assad regime in Syria, where the Western media portrayed Russia and China as opposed to Western values for not opposing the Assad regime on ideological grounds. The dual struggle of "supporting or opposing Western values" carried out by the Western media has resulted in seldom different views in the international mainstream media news, thus forming a monopoly of Western information on the interpretation of international events. The current concept of how international events are formed in people's minds has become the field of soft power struggle between countries, which is similar to the concept of class struggle as a historical driving force in Marx's theory (Kosachev K., 2012, pp. 47-48).

RT as the International Operating Model of the Primary Outreach System

RT's global landing process and its international operating model are the most representative in the United

States. RT America was developed with the help of Alexei Yazlovsky, the Russian-born business operator of RTTV America in the United States. RTTV America itself is a commercial operation media content production and technology transmission company. RT operates in the manner of a public relations company and established the “RT” American station. Its programs are international TV channels that directly contact the audience. The reporters are entirely from the United States and composed of international journalists, RTTV America itself is a US company, and RTTV America can avoid disputes with US laws when it invests and cooperates with it. Then, behind the commercial operation, RTTV America began to raise relevant capital. In this way, in the early stage of RTTV America’s operation in the United States, RTTV America would set up various issues suitable for American society. These issues existed in the form of related projects. The project would invite many people from all walks of life in the United States to participate, including holding various types of seminars. These seminars would invite a large number of researchers from the United States to attend and distribute funds which estimated to be between US\$5,000 and US\$10,000 to these researchers in accordance with the project. This method of contact had laid the foundation for the future operation of the guests behind the RT America program. RT has different roles and relationships with RT America and RTTV America, and there are very big organizational differences: RT is the boss of the Russian outreach system; RTTV America is the provider of TV content and channels, becoming a platform for contacting local relations; RT America has become a platform for discussion by American political and economic figures, as a TV channel to provide audiences with hot topics in the future. RTTV America itself does not hold any position on American issues. First, it exists in the United States as a company; then RT America relies on news topics to attract the attention of non-mainstream think tank researchers and NGOs in the United States, and invited them to TV programs, putting forward the unit’s views on related issues; after that, RT became the most well-known foreign TV brand concerned by non-mainstream audiences in the United States. RT America's rise because its guests and content basically served the non-mainstream society of the United States. Due to the lobbying of interest groups in the United States, in the mainstream society of the United States, Washington represented the mainstream political opinions and New York represented economic interest groups. The group had a small number of people, but its influence was huge. Therefore, RT America has become the most popular international TV channel that attracts non-mainstream opinions from the United States.

RT mainly relies on Russian and international professional media professionals to penetrate into NATO countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, and then relies on RT’s corporate operating model. In the early stage, it mainly adopted the operating model of a public relations company and found the guests needed by RT in the future in some related activities. These program guests could first legally obtain relevant research funds through legal activities, and in the future, under the premise of some breaking news or continuous news reports, relevant lobbying mechanisms can be established. Using the media and guests to form a certain degree of public opinion pressure, this model made non-mainstream groups in the United States attach great importance to the opinions from RT America. During the Ukraine crisis, the relationship between the United States and Russia deteriorated and it withdrew its ambassador to Russia. With the annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation, the United States began to jointly impose economic sanctions on Russia with Western countries. The battle of public opinion had been fierce, and the United States also begun investigations against RTTV America, which was based in Washington. The Russian “Kommersant” (Газета Коммерсантъ) published an article on April 8, 2014, titled “America’s Eyes on RT” (В США присматриваются к телеканалу RT). The article pointed out that the head of RTTV America Aleksei Yazlovsky

Ji was prosecuted by the US authorities, accusing him of tax fraud and attempting to conceal \$26 million in income. In 2014, the RTTV tax fraud case was heard by the Federal Court of the Western District of California.

Alexey Yazlovsky was a participant in the Russian puzzle game show KBH. He also participated in the talk show “Good night with Igor Ugornikov” (Добрый вечер с Игорем Угольниковым), which was broadcast on Russian TV station RTR in cooperation with RIA Novosti and International Film and Television Company. Yazlovsky immigrated to the United States in the late 1990s and became a US citizen in 2002. He registered an animation and film production company-RTTV America in Washington, DC in 2005. The company has four offices in Washington DC, New York, Miami and Los Angeles.⁶

RT Editor-in-Chief Margaret Simonian (2014) told Kommersant that RTTV was a commercial company, and RT was a contractual commercial partnership. RT had no right to interfere with the company’s tax payment. It is precisely because the company was related to RT that this matter had been hyped up as a “barbaric scandal” by the Western media. She said that the commercial contract between RT and RTTV would be terminated. Yazlovsky was only RT’s contractor, and RT did not participate in the company’s accounting operations. However, the article still pointed out that RT America was actually operated by RTTV, and the registered address was also the same as that of the company. Roman Tokman (коммерческий представитель RT Роман Токман), RT’s commercial representative in Washington, told the online publication “The Washington Freedom Beacon” of the American non-profit organization “Center for American Freedom”, a non-mainstream non-profit organization that adheres to conservatism, that Yazlovsky was not responsible for RT America. He only provided commercial services for program shooting, broadcasting and technical equipment. RT was the buyer of RTTV products, and the owner of RT America. Margaret Simonian said that they disagreed with the US authorities’ allegations that the RTTV tax issue had anything to do with them, which damaged the reputation of their television station.⁷ According to the “The Washington Freedom Beacon” report, the head of RTTV America Alexei Yazlowski would face a three-year prison sentence, and his trial would be postponed from June 2014 to December 5th. Currently, he was cooperating with US federal investigators. Alexei Yazlowski’s RTTV America company hired “RT” TV station staff in the United States, and his other company, International TV Service (Intl. TV Services), employed “Voice of Russia” (VOR) radio station staff to work in the United States. “Voice of Russia” is being investigated by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for racial discrimination in employment (Goodman A., 2014).

RT America is positioned on the RT covering US news page as a report from a Washington DC studio, completely different from mainstream American television’s polemical coverage of news, features and talk show discussions. While reporting the other side of the story, it is not necessary to make any conclusions, but to ask questions that have not yet been answered.⁸ Following the RT America news program “Breaking the set” hostess Abby Martin in her own program made remarks against Russian military interference in Crimea. RT America’s other female anchor Liz Wahl in 2014 On March 5, 2015, followed the same pattern and issued a brief resignation statement in the live news, stating that she could not continue to work on the television station established by the Russian government.

However, in an interview with CNN, Abby Martin was later asked if she had been accused or suppressed

⁶ В США присматриваются к телеканалу RT. Газета Коммерсантъ, 2014, Апрель 8, available online at: <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2447620>.

⁷ В США присматриваются к телеканалу RT. Газета Коммерсантъ, 2014, Апрель 8, available online at: <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2447620>.

⁸ On Air, RT, available online at: <http://rt.com/on-air/rt-america-air/>.

by the news from the upper echelons of RT. She stated that she was not accused or controlled by the editor-in-chief of the unit. She claimed that she could be free to express her views in the program she hosted. On the contrary, she received the understanding and support of the editor-in-chief. Criticism on the other hand, the influence of the US government on the US media also occurred in the US military intervention in the war in Iraq. From this perspective, Abby Martin argued that the US commercial corporate media was also a propaganda machine for the US government and criticizes the same US military interventions that people did not agree with. The combination of RTTV America and RT America and non-mainstream organizations in the United States gained recognition from the news media and non-mainstream organizations in Occupy Wall Street activities.

Regarding the two female news anchors of RT America publicly criticizing the Russian government's military operations in Crimea, RT's editor-in-chief Margaret Simonian (2014) published an editorial on the RT website entitled "About Abby Martin, Liz Wahl and media wars". In the article she mentioned that Abby Martin did not agree with the position of the United States and she was proud for the freedom of expression that she enjoyed in RT, but Abby Martin could not get the approval of the American mainstream media. In less than a day, the American mainstream media went from praising her to reprimanding her. While Liz Wahl's resignation was praised as a hero by the American mainstream media. The American mainstream media claimed that we planned the entire incident (Simonyan M., 2014). In March 2012, RT was blocked by YOUTUBE for reporting on the Occupy Wall Street movement. At that time, YOUTUBE explained that it was a technical failure. Coincidentally, in March 2014, it was blocked by YOUTUBE due to reports of the Ukrainian crisis. YOUTUBE explained that it was due to many factors and serious violation of YOUTUBE playback policy, etc. RT was being surrounded by Western governments and media mainly because of RT's influence in international news, indicating that Western media were not comfortable with the rapid development of media in emerging countries, and at the same time, they were also very concerned about RT's inspiring role for media from other developing countries, including China, India, and Brazil, to play a unique role in the world's communication system.

RT America opposes the so-called mainstream views of the United States. By increasing the opportunities for communication with the mainstream U.S., taking advantage of the characteristics of the U.S. political mainstream being controlled by Jewish groups, and the principle of dealing with tough opponents, it eases relations between Moscow and Russian Jews. Putin also hosted Jewish groups in Russia and had good relations with Israel. From 2008 to 2012, as Russian President Medvedev and Obama came to power at the same time, Medvedev represented the direction of relief for Russia and the West, especially the United States. At this time, it coincided with the non-mainstream public opinion represented by US President Obama and his concern about domestic affairs, bringing an unprecedented environment of relaxation to RT. RT America and Barack Obama have remained relatively friendly, with RT America being less critical of Obama's policies, mainly rebutting White House policies with practical examples, but being confrontational with Congress and the Pentagon, and somewhat cooperative with the State Department. Among them, RT America basically criticized the Pentagon for its completely incomprehensible attitude on the issue of NATO's eastward expansion. The relationship between RT and the United Kingdom is to use information from the United States as much as possible on some issues, making it impossible for the British and American media to cooperate fully on the Russian issue to generate a substantial threat. RT and Germany basically adopt an attitude of mutual cooperation and basically support the operation of their EU, but basically adopt a more cooperative attitude towards Germany's actions in

NATO.

Ukraine Crisis Intensifies Russian-U.S. International Controversy Machine

In February 2014, the Russian International Affairs Committee (RIAC) held a round table on “Journalism and Diplomacy” in response to international media coverage of the Sochi Winter Olympic Committee and the Ukrainian crisis, aiming to explore the objectivity of international news and its role in shaping the image of the country. The meeting was attended by the chairman of the conference, former Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov and CEO Andrei Kortunov, as well as the president of the Russian Foreign and Defense Policy Committee and the editor-in-chief of the Russian in Global Affairs Fyodor Lukyanov. Fyodor Lukyanov believed that the media was like the reflection of the two sides of a coin and a mirror. Many things had been distorted by media reports, and they had broken away from the truth of the original facts. Andrei Kortunov argues that the current polarization of the media, both at home and abroad, the tug of war between those who sought to enter the world community and those who feared changing the international status quo, made the media reflect the seriousness of international trends themselves. Igor Ivanov extended this view, arguing that politicians and diplomats relied on international information every day, and the responsibility of international journalists was becoming more and more important. How to make people with a background of international affairs professionals continue to invest in the state media was still Russia’s current challenge (Rozin I., 2014).

Pavel Sharikov, director of the Center for Applied Research of the Institute of American and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, believed that online media was the most effective communication tool and platform for revealing information in Ukraine’s information public opinion war. Its characteristic was that it used information attacks to shape public opinion and purpose was to break the confidence of the enemy. He believed that Russia's loss in the information war lied in the loss of support and trust from the West. Russia used a more flexible action to report the correctness of its position, and the effect was not obvious, let alone whether it had enough soft power to achieve the set goals. The reason was that, first of all, the polarization of Russian society was worrying: the support of the government authorities and the opposition had a clear stand. However, the opposition is more skilled in the operation of online media than the government. Sharikov believed that there was no doubt that the Alexei Navalny team, the head of the website, mainly manipulated public opinion in Moscow to achieve its political goals. The result was that the more these people opposed the Russian authorities, the trust they received in the West far exceeded that of Russian government officials. One example was that the US sanctions listed for Russian officials was based on an article published by Navalny in the New York Times. Sharikov believed that Russia lost the international public opinion war. The Russian-Georgian war was an example. At the time, international public opinion accused Russia of attempting to restore the Soviet Union. This was represented by the former US national security adviser Brzezinski (Sharikov P., 2014). According to the report of the fact-finding commission established by the European Union, the conflict started in Georgia.⁹

⁹ Regarding the conflict in the Russian-Georgian war, the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) formed by the European Union had an in-depth report in 2009, from history, geostrategy, energy interests, and whether it violated International human rights law and many other aspects to judge the whole story of the Russian-Qiao war conflict. This report pointed out that the United States had invested a considerable amount of military and funding in Georgia, and the European Union also had economic assistance. The conflict between the Georgian authorities and the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had deteriorated after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The relationship between Russia’s peacekeeping role and Georgia had deteriorated after the 2003 Color Revolution. After Saakashvili took power, military

Natalia Burlinova, the host of the Russian Gorchakov Foundation's Public Foreign Policy Program, pointed out that after the Russian-Georgian war, the Russian government realized that it must strengthen the propaganda work of international public opinion. Therefore, RT had introduced international news coverage in Spanish and Arabic, in addition to an all-English channel, and The Voice of Russia's multi-language plan had also been strengthened, showing that the Russian government had begun to pay attention to the influence of international radio and television media on the international community. Regarding how to develop Russia's soft power diplomacy in terms of think tanks, in 2010, the President of Russia Medvedev ordered the establishment of the Gorchakov Foundation with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, the Russian International Affairs Commission (RIAC) was established with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education. This was Russia's first modernized national think tank, whose main goal was to enhance the research integration among Russian experts and to enhance the status of Russian experts in the world (Burlinova N., 2013). The chairman of the Russian International Affairs Committee was former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. The main role of this think tank was to combine Russia's international media and national think tanks as a new way to enhance Russia's soft power diplomacy. Relation University served as the cornerstone of providing international reserve talents and supporting the overall leadership decision-making mechanism of the think tank system, in order to promote the cooperation and connection of talents between schools and think tanks, and to form the research foundation and core strength of Russia's overall soft power diplomacy.

After 2000, the All-Russian State Television and Broadcasting Company which the largest official media group in Russia, began to reorganize, with the goal of improving Russian cultural identity as the development of local industries. In recent years, the federal budget for the main development of media has been invested in modernization of infrastructure and digital transmission.¹⁰ Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov believed that the West was manipulating the global audience's interpretation of the events in Ukraine. In response to U.S. Secretary of State Kerry's claim that RT was Putin's advocate, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said that RT was to reverse the unilateral anti-Russian ideological propaganda carried out by Western media such as CNN and BBC, in order to provide an independent and balanced report with different views (Kabeev V., 2014). In

expenditures increased eight times compared with Shevarnadze's period, from 1% to 8% of GDP. The issue of the legality of the use of force by both parties was a very controversial place. The Georgian authorities violated the law first, and the Russian peacekeeping forces legally counterattacked in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but the invasion of Tbilisi was illegal later. The report believed that the tensions and conflicts in the South Caucasus region could only be eased after coordination and consensus had been reached among various interests. This report can be found at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_09_09_iiffmgc_report.pdf.

¹⁰ According to the latest analysis report of the "Report on the Russian Television Industry: Current Status, Trends and Development Prospects" (Телевидение в России. Состояние, тенденции и перспективы развития. Отраслевой доклад) published by the Federal Information and Mass Communication Agency under the Ministry of Information and Mass Communication of the Russian Federation for the period 2012-2013, Russian television Development was mainly the continuation of the accumulation of development in the past ten years, reflecting the momentum of the modernization process of Russian society. The report believed that the most important concern is still the improvement of the overall social mechanism that takes into account professional cooperation, national media, advertising market, legislative environment, and the needs of people from all over the country. In particular, television still played the most important national social and communication system. It was characterized by the manifestation of various forms of language, culture and religion, as well as the role of preserving the overall unity of society, ensuring that the majority of the Russian people had access to the main communication channels of the Federation, as well as maintaining the integration of the Russian information space and implementing the goal of integration. One of the most important tasks was to complete the digitalization project of TV transmission. The industry report on "Report on the Russian Television Industry: Current Status, Trends and Development Prospects" can also refer to the report published on the website of the Federal Agency for News and Mass Communication under the Ministry of Information and Mass Communication of the Russian Federation. The URL is: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/30_09_09_iiffmgc_report.pdf.

fact, the problem facing Russia's international news was the issue of Russia's international status. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the old tradition was destroyed and the new propaganda system was undergoing transformation. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war determined that Russia's International Publicity system moved towards a more offensive, globalized, and public-relative media diplomacy strategy.

In the Ukraine crisis, the United States adopted a complete confrontation on the news battlefield, but most think tanks in Russia believed that they could not fall into anti-American or isolate themselves. Therefore, regarding the impact of the Ukraine crisis, Russia's main official think tanks engaged in soft power diplomacy include: The Russian International Affairs Council, Gorchakov Foundation for Public Diplomacy Support, The Russkiy Mir Foundation, and The National Committee for BRICS Studies. They looked at this matter from the perspective of Russian talent mobility. Experts from these units said that the impact and harm of the US economic sanctions on Russia should be minimized, with the goal of maintaining the attraction of foreign talents from Russia to return to domestic services, and continuing to promote the direction of economic integration to retain Russia's economic and energy advantages. This would prevent an exodus of Russian scientists as a result of the economic downturn following the US sanctions. During the period from 1989 to 2004, at least 30,000 Russian scientists had been hired to work abroad with high salaries, which would continue to cause major harm to Russia's national security (Koshkin P., 2014).

Pavel Koshkin, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Russia Direct", a Russian official think tank, and Ksenia Smertina, a researcher on European security issues at The Russian Center for Policy Studies, believed that the soft power research on how to improve Russia's national image has become the most common topic of concern among journalists, diplomats and politicians (Smertina F., 2014). Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian Policy Research Center has been concerned about the control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The center looks at US-Russian relations from the perspective of getting rid of the ideological shackles of the Cold War and establishing Russia's role in the larger international strategic security. The Ukrainian crisis became a victim of US-Russian geopolitics, but the resolution of elevated international conflicts in the context of the need for greater international strategic cooperation has prompted the US and Russia to reflect on the possibility of reconciliation, a view held by the Russian Commission on International Affairs, which looked at the resolution of international conflicts and crises from a diplomatic path and the key role of information in the negotiation process. For example, Yury Dubinin, a professor at the Moscow State University of International Relations and former Soviet ambassador to the UN Security Council, believed that diplomacy was a creative path and art for peacefully solving problems, and its primary task was to collect information, which could clarify both parties. Information could clarify the goals of negotiations between the two parties, measure the scope of compromise, and put forward a bargaining chip for asking prices, so he believed that "information is power" (Dubinin Y., 2013).

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The Early Experience and Its Enlightenments of CCP's Media Diplomacy

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The media diplomacy thought initiated by the CCP from Yan'an is main component of the Party's diplomatic thoughts. The CCP has always attached great importance to the use of media diplomacy to determine domestic and international united fronts of dependence, unity and struggle in its foreign relations, and has made important contributions to the victory of Chinese national liberation struggle and the building of the PRC. In its 100 year's development, the CCP carried out media diplomacy through international friendly journalists, introduced the United Front thought and its ruling concept, and had important impact on Sino-foreign relations. From historical wisdom, we obtained profound enlightenment, which have important reference significance in deep understanding and implementation of General Secretary Xi Jinping's thoughts on diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the New Era, especially his thoughts on media diplomacy, as well as in creating good international public opinion environment.

Keywords: the CCP, early stage, media diplomacy, experience, enlightenment

Introduction

The CCP attached great importance to media diplomacy since its early stage in 100-year's history, it is of great importance to look back and summarize the glorious practice and valuable experience of it. In the mid-1930s when the CCP initiated media diplomacy, it conveyed its diplomatic idea of "Alliance to the United States and Anti-Japanese" through a group of foreign progressive and friendly journalists represented by the well-known American journalist Edgar Snow, which in turn prompted President Roosevelt to adjust the U.S. policy toward China during the War of Resistance Against Japan. In the early founding of the PRC, the CCP expanded channels and dimensions of communication with foreign political parties through media diplomacy, and strived to smash the US imperialists' attempts to create "two Chinas". Whether as a participatory party during the War of Resistance against Japan or as the ruling party after the establishment of the PRC, the CCP attached great importance to the use of media diplomacy to determine domestic and international united fronts of dependence, unity and struggle in its foreign relations, which made great contributions to the victory of the Chinese national liberation struggle and the building of the PRC. In the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics under Xi Jinping's diplomatic ideology, media diplomacy has played an active role in promoting the CCP's external communication and exchanges, and has also developed into brand new connection way and exchange platform between Chinese and foreign political parties. By retracing the CCP's

media diplomacy thought during the Anti-Japanese War and the early founding of PRC, we explored its great course in media diplomacy, which is of great important reference significance to deeply understand and implement General Secretary Xi Jinping's new era diplomatic thoughts with Chinese characteristics, especially Xi Jinping's media diplomatic thought, correctly treat and hand current Sino-foreign relations, and create good international public opinion environment.

Establishing United Front of “Alliance to the United States and Anti-Japanese”: The CCP's Launching Point for Media Diplomacy

The opening of the CCP's media diplomacy era can be said to have a major bearing on the first trip to Northwest China by American journalist Edgar Snow in the fall of 1936. The CCP Central Committee proposed its willingness to establish cooperative relations with European and American countries at Wayaobao Conference in December 1935. However, after the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, the CCP was completely isolated from the outside world by the Nationalist Government, and it was continuously stigmatized by the KMT using its press privileges. Therefore, the CCP Central Committee decided to start with media diplomacy and invite Western reporters and writers to interview in northern Shaanxi, so that the diplomatic philosophy and policies of the Party can be better known to outside world, which is conducive to the Chinese Anti-Japanese War and the improvement of the Party's international influence. Snow was not the first American journalist to cover China, but he was the first to arrive at Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Revolutionary Base when the CCP needed media diplomacy the most, and reported real situation of the Party and Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to the world through the most influential British and American newspapers. He was also the first American with whom Mao Tse-tung had direct contact after he became leader of the Chinese Communist Party.

The CCP attached great importance to Snow's coverage of border area, and the CCP Central Committee convened the Politburo Standing Committee to discuss Snow's interview outline. It was the first special meeting in history of the Party to discuss international relations. Mao had a conversation entitled “The CCP and World Affairs” with Snow. He pointed out that Japanese aggression threatened not only China but also world peace; Japanese imperialism was not only the enemy of China, but also enemy of people of the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Mao believed that the United States was an anti-war country, and that the United States would form united front with the Chinese people; President Roosevelt was an anti-fascist, and China could cooperate with such people (Baijia Zhang, 1991). This was the first time that the CCP had expressed its willingness to form anti-Japanese united front with the United States and other countries in the world, and it positively evaluated the positive role played by the United States in the Far East.

Mao and other leaders of the CCP Central Committee took the initiative to open up to Snow in Yan'an, and Snow, with his keenness as a journalist and profoundness as a historian, wrote a series of news works from Yan'an that shocked China and the world. Based on his field interviews in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region from June to October 1936, Snow wrote a documentary reportage of “Red Star Over China”, which accurately and vividly presented the growth and revolutionary performance of the CCP and the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to the international community. Central leaders such as Mao Tse-tung, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai set an example. They were good at making friends with foreign journalists and dealing with news media, and promoted the CCP's anti-Japanese propositions internationally through foreign journalists and mainstream media they represented. It played a key role in spreading positive image of the CCP and guiding public opinion at home and abroad. After Snow's “Red Star Over China” was published in Britain and the

United States in 1937 and 1938, broad public at home and abroad not only approached the struggle history of Chinese people under the CCP's leadership, but also deeply appreciated the concrete content of friendship between Chinese and American people that it implied. "Red Star Over China" was published in the United States on January 3, 1938, and became precious resource for American people and government to understand China. American President Roosevelt's understanding of the CCP also began with this book, which led him to adjust his policy towards China from "supporting Chiang Kai-shek" to "supporting Chiang Kai-shek and allying with the CCP". Snow's "Autobiography of Mao Tse-tung", published in English "Asia Monthly" in the middle of 1937 was also translated into Chinese by professors and students in Fudan University. It was published and distributed nationwide, which greatly inspired Chinese people to embark on the road of anti-Japanese and national salvation.

The important role that Snow played at the critical moment of Chinese nation's Anti-Japanese War undoubtedly left a deep impression on the CCP. Mao commented on Snow in an interview with a German reporter the following year: "When we were forgotten by the whole world, only Snow came here to get to know us and tell the outside world what happened here. Therefore, we will always Remember Snow's great help to China (Edgar Snow, 1984). It was also under the pioneering and guidance of Snow, the "Northwest Visiting Group of Chinese and Foreign Journalists", composed of famous reporters from major domestic and foreign newspapers from the second half of 1936, went to Yan'an and Jinsui Anti-Japanese War Front to conduct interviews, thus forming three climaxes of media diplomacy in the CCP's early days.

In June 1944, due to the pressure at home and abroad, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to agree the group to visit Yan'an, which was a major event in the early history of the CCP's media diplomacy. There were 21 people in the group, in which 6 foreign journalists named Stein, Epstein, Foreman, Maurice Budo, Shanan Khan, and Pujinke were from the Associated Press, Reuters, United Press, TASS, etc. They faithfully spread the new look of Yan'an and base areas behind enemy lines to the whole world. Epstein had written many articles for "New York Times" and "Time", and authored "China's Unfinished Revolution"; Stein was the author of "Red China Challenges"; Foreman published "Red Report from China"; Budo in Reuters published "I'm Back from Northern Shaanxi". This was the largest coverage on the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines by foreign journalists and media after Snow's "Red Star Over China".

The CCP Central Committee then invited Anna Louise Strong to visit the Eighth Route Army headquarters in Wutaishan, Shanxi in January 1938, where she interviewed Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, He Long, Liu Bo Cheng and others. She subsequently wrote the book "One Fifth of Mankind", enthusiastically praising new People's Army under the leadership of the CCP. In February 1941, shortly after the Southern Anhui Incident, Strong made a special trip to New York to fulfill Zhou Enlai's great trust to find a friend who worked for the New York Herald Tribune and publish an inside story on the South Anhui Incident. President Roosevelt attached great importance to it; he opposed Chiang Kai-shek's launch of an anti-communist civil war at this time, so he issued a warning to the KMT regime, which played a certain role in preventing the collapse of Chinese anti-Japanese camp.¹

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the CCP's Eighth Route Army Office in Chongqing actively carried out united front work with the U.S. Through various means and occasions, the CCP representatives propagated its anti-war policies and ideas to American journalists and military and political personnel in China, eventually

¹ Zhou Enlai secretly meets with Strong, the Chinese Communist Party News Party History Channel.

prompting the U.S. government to dispatch a military observation team to Yan'an in June 1944 without interference from Chiang Kai-shek, and the U.S. government established "quasi-official relations" with the CCP. On August 18, the CCP Central Committee issued an internal "Instruction on Diplomatic Work", describing the significance of the mission as "the launch of our international united front and the beginning of our diplomatic work". It also indicated that the CCP's media diplomacy of "uniting the U.S. against Japan" changed from foreign propaganda to "semi-independent diplomatic work" (Jun Niu, 1992).

In July 1946, the CCP Central Committee invited Strong to interview in Chinese Soviet area again. After flighting to Shanghai, Strong finally arrived in Yan'an in early August after a long journey. He was received several times by leading comrades of the Central Committee. Mao accepted two exclusive interviews with Strong in late August, and had long talks with Strong on many issues, including postwar international political relations with the U.S.-Soviet relationship at its core and whether the Communist Party could win final victory after the outbreak of a full-scale civil war in China. On the basis of his assertion that "The atomic bomb is a paper tiger", he went on to make a series of famous assertions such as "All reactionaries are paper tigers" and "In the long run, the real power belongs not to the reactionaries but to the people" (Wensheng Shi & Xiaoling Yang, 2020). Through his media diplomacy with Strong to the United States, Mao took the initiative to lead China's social conditions and public opinion, condense the hearts of the party, the people, and the military. It was of great importance to guide the people's armed forces under the leadership of the CCP to adopt correct strategies and tactics to overthrow KMT's reactionary rule and establish the PRC.

Sino-Italian Political Party Contacts Enrich Economic and Trade Dimension of CCP's Media Diplomacy

From the 1950s to the 1960s, the communication between the CCP and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) once became one of the most important channels for direct communication between leaders of the two parties. At the invitation of the CPC Central Committee, a five-member delegation headed by P. Nenni, general secretary of the PSI, visited China from September 29 to October 20, 1955. The intensive coverage of Nenni's visit to China by Chinese and Italian party organs at the time highlighted the direct and profound impact that Nenni's visit had on the Italian government's reopening of negotiations on the establishment of mutual trade institutions between Italy and China in 1964, and thus on the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries 15 years later. The People's Daily, an organ of the CCP Central Committee, published the Xinhua News Agency's "Premier Zhou Enlai Meets with Nenni" on the National Day in 1955, reporting that Premier Zhou Enlai had spoken with five members of the Nenni delegation on September 30 about Sino-Italian relations and the prevention of "two Chinas" conspiracy, pointing out that "if Italy cannot establish diplomatic relations with China yet, we can wait. We advocate negotiating with Italy on the issue of diplomatic relations, which also includes talks about trade. The Italian Foreign Minister proposed to talk about trade in London, and we are ready to answer: It is possible to talk about trade before establishing diplomatic relations, but we strive to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations first. If he refuses to talk about it, we can also talk about trade". Zhou Enlai's statement on behalf of the CCP Central Committee had a greater impact on Nenni's specific actions to promote economic and trade relations between two countries after returning to his country.

"People's Daily" reported on October 4, page 1, that Chairman Mao Tse-tung pointed out when talking about the international environment and external pressure on the establishment of diplomatic relations between

China and Italy, “the problem lies in the pressure exerted by the United States on Italy not to recognize People’s China. As long as the Italian government can resist this pressure, we can establish diplomatic relations immediately. It is estimated that it will take some time.” On October 5, the Italian newspaper *Unità* also reported on Nenni’s meeting with Chinese leaders, emphasizing the significance of Nenni’s visit to China in advancing relations between the two countries. “Beijing’s newspapers today published on page one the meeting between Mao Tse-tung and Nenni. It confirms the importance of Nenni’s visit to China, which was not simply a friendly visit, but the first act to open up Sino-Italian political relations.”

“People’s Daily”, on October 8, page 3, published a press release authorized by Xinhua News Agency on “Mr. Nenni’s speech at the welcoming meeting of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference”. During the grand welcoming meeting held for the delegation by CPPCC with more than a thousand people, Mr. Nenni expressed his strong desire to strengthen relations and establish diplomatic relations between Italy and China: “One of the reasons why I came to China, besides getting to know you, was to highlight the absurd situation of the current relations between our two countries. I hope that this situation will not continue for long. In any case, I will be happy to bear witness when I return to Rome that all I see here is the friendship with Italy and the Italian people, the emphasis on the labor of our workers, peasants and technicians, and the understanding of our country’s problems; What I see is only the desire to rebuild diplomatic relations between the two countries as a starting point for establishing commercial relations based on needs and interests of the two peoples.”

During his visit in Beijing, Nenni also pointed out in an exclusive interview with the “People’s Daily” on the status and prospects of China-Italy relations on October 8. “The relationship between China and Italy is unfortunately hindered by the following fact, which is: our government does not recognize the legitimate government of the PRC, but maintains relations with the so-called Taiwan government, though this relationship is completely nominal and unreal. I once conducted a huge and open campaign that normalized the diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between Rome and Beijing. I have seen very good emotions and desire to make it happen in Beijing. I hope to convince our parliament and government, which are afraid of offending the Americans. As for the Italian people, they have long been ready to cooperate with China in friendship.”

In addition to large and continuous report on Nenni’s visit to China in *People’s Daily*, the PSI’s organ, “Forward”, the Italian Communist Party’s organ, *Unità*, and other newspapers made a lot of relevant reports, which attracted close attention from the Italian government, political parties and all sectors of society. Three days after his returning, Nenni himself summarized his trip to China in the Socialist Party’s organ “Forward”. He considered it absurd not to recognize the Beijing government; the signing of trade agreement with China would allow a huge amount of trade between Italy and China. Nanny also noted in a speech that “I have just returned from a trip which, in the case of the Socialist Party, was intended as a way of making public opinion, the parliament and even the government concerned with normalizing our relations with China and improving relations with the Soviet Union.” (Pietro Nanni, 1956).

On January 24, 1969, the foreign ministers of the Chinese and foreign Italian center-left governments of Nenni announced in the House of Representatives that they recognized the PRC and expressed their willingness to establish diplomatic relations with China. They also raised the issue of restoring the legitimate seat of the PRC in the United Nations. Nenni’s speech in the House of Representatives caused sensational reaction in Italy and abroad, especially in the United States and Europe (Quanxi Yu, 2015). The Sino-Italian negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations lasted from January 1969 to November 1970 under the impetus of Nenni,

who was a major participant in the first phase of negotiations. The normalization of Sino-Italian relations was a major event in diplomatic history of the PRC, marking the beginning of the bankruptcy of the Western camp led by the United States to contain China. In October 1971, less than a year after the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Italy, the PRC resumed its legal seat in the United Nations. As an Italian scholar pointed out, “from political point of view, the most important thing was Nenni’s visit...where he had an indelible and favorable impression of China, which played a decisive role in his subsequent understanding of Chinese issues and influenced the role of PSI in Sino-Italian relations.” (Guido Samarani & Laura De Giorgi, 2011).

Four Enlightenments From the CCP’s Early Practices of Media Diplomacy

The media diplomacy thought initiated by the CCP from Yan’an has developed and taken deep roots in rich practice of political party interactions, process of Sinicization of Marxism and exchange of international political party theories. Now the CCP’s media diplomacy is facing more complicated situation, more arduous tasks and more glorious missions. It is necessary to draw the strength from the glorious history of the Party’s early media diplomacy and promote its foreign relations work in new era. And all require us to obtain profound enlightenment from the historical wisdom of the CCP when it crossed cultural and ideological differences, introduced truth about the anti-Japanese base areas to the world through international friends and had an important impact on Sino-American relations. It is of great practical significance for us to improve the Party’s media diplomacy theory and open up a new situation of party diplomacy.

First, the CCP’s media diplomacy thought not only had important guiding significance at that time in terms of the basic principles of handling foreign relations and foreign policy, but also has had tremendous and far-reaching historical impact on the CCP’s foreign policy on the road of national rejuvenation since the founding of PRC. Especially since the 18th Party Congress, the Party Central Committee, with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, has carried out colorful practice of media diplomacy based on profound historical experience in its foreign work, and the CCP’s media diplomacy has been found active in conceptual innovation and system construction. In overseas visits, multilateral conferences and receptions for foreign and political party leaders, Xi and other central leaders have actively introduced the Party’s governing philosophy and practical experience to the international community through various means, such as talks, speeches, interviews or articles, to enhance the international community, especially foreign political party dignitaries’ understanding and appreciation of China’s development path, political party system and governing philosophy. Guided by Xi’s important thoughts on the Party’s foreign affairs, the CCP has paid more attention to grasping the laws of media diplomacy and has developed in inheritance and innovation, as the world’s politics and economy are experiencing grand changes that has not occurred in a century. It has also enriched the contemporary connotation of its media diplomacy in six aspects: strengthening political leadership, promoting political party contacts, deepening special research, building a network of people, enhancing international image, and consolidating the foundation of public opinion (Tao Song, 2017).

Second, the CCP’s media diplomacy is, in the final analysis, to handle the network of relationship, especially with foreign journalists. During the Anti-Japanese War, Zhou Enlai asked everyone in the International Propaganda Group that subordinated to Southern Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, to make friends with foreign journalists and explain the position of the Party to people at home and abroad. The CCP leaders showed good manners in their dealings with foreign journalists and won praise. What is lacking now in

U.S.-China relationship is a 21st century Snow, to present real China and the CCP to the international community. Some American and Western journalists who vilify China through “gray and black filters”, distort China by “transposition” and smear China with fabrications. Therefore, the CCP’s media diplomacy work should make full use of unique advantage of its wide communication channels to continuously strengthen communication with other countries. The in-depth communication and exchanges between media and people from all walks of life strive to change the understanding of foreign journalists who are biased towards the CCP, and subtly cultivate new-age Snows, who will become friends of the Party and the backbone to know China and make good relations with China. They are encouraged to show good image of the Party and China in a targeted manner, which making media diplomacy content reach the public in target countries directly, so as to accumulate and expand CCP’s “circle of friends” and “media circle” in the world, and create a stable, healthy and friendly external governing environment for the Party’s governance.

Third, the CCP has continuously strengthened media diplomacy on the theme of economic and trade cooperation in party diplomacy, enriching the economic and trade dimension of its media diplomacy in the new era. It is an important task of the CCP’s party diplomacy to find ways to meet bilateral or multilateral economic and trade cooperation through party cooperation. Especially since the 18th CCP National Congress, party diplomacy has become important part of the CCP’s media diplomacy to serve domestic economic construction and promote economic and trade cooperation. For example, the International Department of the CCP has held “China-Arab/-Africa Medium & Small Business Cooperation Forum” in Ningbo in 2009, “2010 Petrochemical Industry Forum Yangzhou China — Arab States in the Gulf” and “ICAPP Conference on Poverty Alleviation” in Kunming China in 2010, etc., establishing a new platform for promoting economic and trade cooperation between China and relevant countries and regions. At the second “China-Europe High-Level Political Parties Forum” hosted by the CCP, representatives from Chinese and European business circles discussed relevant economic and trade issues, and reached intentions on cooperation in new energy, new materials, energy conservation and environmental protection, information and bio-industry, high-end manufacturing and other fields. These media diplomatic forums with the theme of economic and trade cooperation not only inject new vitality into China’s foreign relations, and enhance the level of inter-party exchanges between China and foreign countries, but also open up new channels for the CCP’s party diplomacy and expand the economic and trade latitude of the media diplomacy.

The last, but not the least, continuing efforts need to be made to deepen and expand the CCP’s media diplomacy theory. Exploring new propositions and dealing with new problems, so as to make new contributions that keep pace with the times to effectively build a new type of party relationship. China is moving closer to center stage, the CCP must not only grasp overall stability of international environment, but also pay attention to complex situation of international security challenges. As the connotation and denotation of the CCP’s foreign relations continue to expand, the Party’s media diplomacy is also facing unprecedented opportunities and challenges. The International Department of the CCP can establish a permanent media diplomacy structure to clearly articulate the long-term vision that media diplomacy play roles in developing party relations and enhancing national security. In addition, the Party’s media diplomacy needs to fulfill the same mission in terms of funding, expertise, policy and social participation, which requires the workers to “keep pioneering, committed and enterprising spirit, as well as always take the initiative to learn and self-innovation”. They should keep up with the development of the times, and broaden their knowledge and business level in media diplomacy, so that the Party’s media diplomacy strategy can grasp the direction of the entire discourse system

from a global perspective, and strive to build a political party discourse system with Chinese characteristics, style and vision, as well as new expressions and concepts of media diplomacy that integrate China and abroad. The 100-year-old CCP is now at the right time to strengthen its media diplomacy infrastructure and develop a future-oriented media diplomacy strategy.

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An Insoluble Problem: The Harding-Makarios Negotiations, Turkey, and the Cause of Cypriot Enosis

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Early in the Cyprus Emergency, Governor John Harding and Archbishop Makarios began a series of negotiations aimed at bringing about a peaceful resolution to the violence. The contentious discussions centered on two divisive issues: the political autonomy of a Cyprus freed from British rule, and the position of Turkey on the island. Though it seemed to both official and unofficial circles that a negotiated agreement was within reach, a last minute display of brinksmanship by Makarios derailed the potential agreement. Harding ordered the Archbishop's arrest and focused on coercive measures against Greek-Cypriot nationalists. Makarios was taken into exile and violence on Cyprus escalated to new heights. The failure of dialogue condemned Cyprus to further years of war and conflict and highlighted the apparently irreconcilable political divisions which would plague the island for decades to come.

Keywords: Greek-Cypriot nationalists, negotiations

Introduction

On 4th October 1955, the day after his arrival in Cyprus, the new governor, Field Marshal Sir John Harding, met with Archbishop Makarios to begin negotiations to resolve the violence plaguing the island. Six months earlier, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters had begun a campaign for *enosis* — the unification of Cyprus with Greece — with targeted attacks on British security forces. Described by historian Robert Holland as “one of the most protracted and complex exchanges in the history of British decolonization” (1998, p. 85), the Harding-Makarios negotiations defined the early phase of the Cyprus Emergency. They were also the first direct, high-level discussions between British leaders and the Greek-Cypriot community aimed at solving the *enosis* question. Their failure resulted in the deportation of the Archbishop with three other leading Greek-Cypriots and the escalation of violence to its peak levels.

Though there were numerous obstacles to peace, a last minute demonstration of brinksmanship by the Archbishop, and the inability of the two sides to deal effectively with the nature of Turkey's role in the island, prevented a settlement. The failure of the negotiations, in turn, resulted in an escalation of violence. Harding, temporarily freed from the strictures of public diplomacy pursued the physical destruction of the *enosis* forces. Colonel George Grivas, EOKA's military commander, unencumbered by Makarios's political maneuvering and hesitancy redoubled attacks on British forces.

A mutual obstacle during the negotiations was the fact that both Harding and Makarios were playing

conflicting roles. Harding was both diplomat and military enforcer (Holland, 1998, p. 83). The field marshal personified unpopular coercive measures and the oppression of British rule. Harding found it equally challenging having to discuss a settlement with Makarios, the man he felt was responsible for the violence that claimed the lives of British soldiers and terrorized Cypriot civilians and law enforcement officials.

As much as the discussions centered on these protagonists, there were other parties involved. On the British side, the secretary of state for the colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd — who came to Cyprus during the final phase of negotiations in an attempt to clinch a deal — played a pivotal role alongside the prime minister, Anthony Eden. Archbishop Makarios had frequent recourse to his councilors within the Ethnarchy. Some of these, especially Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia, were instrumental in contributing to a particularly uncompromising approach in the negotiations (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 32; Averoff-Tossizza, 1986, pp. 56, 63, 95). Grivas remained in control of the military aspects of the struggle. While the colonel did not hector Makarios into obstinacy, he did encourage the belief that EOKA violence had real influence. Both Grivas and Makarios failed to realize that while violence might bring the British to the negotiating table, it would also limit the scope of concessions available to British policymakers, both because of domestic concerns and international pressure from Turkey. Turkish-Cypriots remained in constant communication with Harding, keeping the governor informed of their attitude towards any potential settlement and providing further limits on British concessions. This paper will explore the substance of the negotiations between Harding and Makarios.

The period between October 1955 and March 1956 was critical not only for the conduct of the British campaign in Cyprus, but for the broader issues which divided the island at that time. A number of those issues which proved stumbling blocks in 1955–1956, particularly the role of Turkey and the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot population, remain critical to understanding the divisions within Cyprus today. The paper will argue that the failure to come to a negotiated settlement during this time owed much to the incompatible aims of the two sides, but foundered on demands by Makarios for concessions beyond what had been agreed to with Harding and because of the inability of the Greek-Cypriot side to recognize the substantial limits Turkish concerns placed on British policy options.

Making a Start

As the new governor prepared to sit down and talk, Harding's instructions from Lennox-Boyd were to avoid declaring a state of emergency (Holland, 1998, p. 84). Instead, he was to focus on "moving on the road to self-government if possible". On the day of Harding's arrival, Makarios asked the Ethnarchy Bureau for views on the upcoming negotiations. Several key points emerged: First, the bureau members emphasized that the British had to recognize the principle of self-determination for Cyprus. Second, a pre-determined time limit (not exceeding five years), pending the implementation of self-determination, would have to be agreed. Third, they had to clear up the "nonsense about the Cyprus question being a Greco-Turkish dispute" (Ethnarchy, 1955, p. 12). Turkey's direct involvement had been assured by the Tripartite Conference in London, and by the fact that Turkish-Cypriots remained concerned about their political and social future. Geography and history meant that Turkey would want a say in the future of the island. The British proposals put forward on the penultimate day of the conference (6th September) offered both a "new constitution" and the prospect of "self-government", but these concessions would be circumscribed by "the proper safeguards and guarantees required by the international situation and the protection of the interests of the communities concerned" (Tripartite Conference, 1955, p. 41).

These proposals would serve as the starting point for the negotiations between Makarios and Harding. No point of contention was more obvious than the role of Turkey and the position of Turkish-Cypriots. The Ethnarchy continued to ignore the reality that an insistence on self-determination — and through it the prospect of placing Turkish-Cypriots under Greek rule — would be unacceptable to the Turkish-Cypriot minority and the Turkish government. The disruption stemming from these objections would be unacceptable to the British as well. From the first meeting it was clear to the field marshal that Turkey's position in any settlement was the major stumbling block. Turkish interests affected both self-determination and a time-table for its implementation. Prime Minister Eden's emphasized the Turkish realities in a note to the new governor on 8th October. Makarios' "real purpose" he wrote: "is to manoeuvre us into excluding consultation with the Turkish Government. . . . I cannot judge whether the Archbishop's purpose is to divide us from our allies, particularly the Turks. If the latter, of course we cannot give way to him." Harding was also convinced that Makarios's primary aim was to reduce Turkey's influence on decisions in Cyprus and to settle the affair on a bilateral basis between Greek-Cypriots and the British government.

The Times echoed this conclusion writing that "[t]he Turkish view is that there can be no question of even the acknowledgement of the right of self-determination, and how this can possibly be reconciled with the Greek Cypriots' demand [of self-determination]" (1955a, p. 6). Whatever concessions the British were prepared to make, they could not commit "themselves to anything that might make *enosis* possible" (Mayes, 1981, p. 81). As Harding reported to the Prime Minister, Makarios was seeking a fundamental change in the British attitude towards Cyprus and there was "no hope" of this¹. Hubert Faustmann argues that this first round of negotiations failed because of "the British refusal to exclude a Turkish veto over Greek-Cypriot self-determination and to grant a Greek majority in parliament" (2001, p. 20). Turkey was the key factor preventing compromise, but it was not simply the refusal to grant Turkey a veto which scuttled a compromise. British policymakers had legitimate fears that Turkish opposition would become violent when confronted with any scenario which hinted at *enosis*. As British diplomats in Ankara cabled London, there was "practically no hope" of securing Turkish acquiescence to introducing a constitution in Cyprus². Britain was bound to Turkey under NATO and the Baghdad Pact. Makarios and the pro-*enosis* faction in Cyprus stubbornly refused to recognize this fundamental limitation of the British position.

On 16th November, Harding announced a new program of economic and social development to run concurrently with the constitutional overtures. The plan would involve £38 million in expenditures on rural development, irrigation, electricity, inland telecommunications, port development and education, all aimed at bringing new prosperity to the island (Times, 1955b, p. 10). Such an investment aimed at improving the standard of living for all Cypriots and securing "hearts and minds" for the administration. If the British government hoped that advertising a massive investment in Cyprus's future would help turn opinion in its favor, it was seriously mistaken. To Greek-Cypriots, the investment represented the unwelcomed message that Britain envisaged a long-term presence on the island.

Neither the negotiations nor the governor's investment pledge reduced EOKA activity. On 19th November 1955, 41 bombs exploded across the island. On the 24th, two British soldiers were killed in a gun-battle. While 74 acts of violence were recorded in October, there were 217 in November (Hansard, 1957, p. 104). The rising tide prompted Harding, in spite of the cautions from the colonial office, to declare a state of emergency

¹ TNA, WO 32/16260, Telegram No. 792 from the Prime Minister to Governor Harding, 8th October 1955.

² TNA, WO 32/16260, Telegram No. 792 from the Prime Minister to Governor Harding, 8th October 1955.

on 26 November. Emergency regulations were a common tool used by the British government during this period. They “gave the security forces plenty of latitude but with few of martial law’s drawbacks . . . the security forces operation within a clearly defined legal framework”, but one which “permitted them to employ a very high degree of often lethal force” (French, 2011, p. 103). In Cyprus, these emergency powers also translated to large-scale detention of individuals suspected of “terrorist” activities. In early December 1955, Harding and Makarios were once more at the negotiating table, but Harding was not optimistic about the prospects for a settlement. As he wrote to the secretary of state for the colonies on 2nd December, if discussions break down “I shall be forced to take really strong measures over a protracted period, no matter how unpleasant they may be, to keep the situation under control”³. Harding’s hardline position was as much a demonstration of his own convictions as an exhortation to Her Majesty’s Government to retain its firm stance with regard to Cyprus, or, in the event of concessions, to make them soon and openly. “I cannot conceive of anything more damaging for the future of this island”, Harding warned, “or for our worldwide strategic position than to make a stand now and later on to surrender to public opinion and coercion. Again with great respect I would urge that if concessions are to be made let them be made now, otherwise let us stand absolutely firm and see the business through.”⁴.

On both a professional and personal level, Harding’s patience was wearing thin. After their meeting on 21st November Harding had developed a degree of personal distaste for Makarios (Holland, 1998, p. 95). This antipathy extended to his attitude towards other leading figures in the Cypriot Church. By December, the field marshal was satisfied that the best way to end the violence was the destruction of EOKA, to be achieved, in part, by the removal of Makarios and Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia from the political arena. Such a move had already been discussed at the highest levels of the British government, even before Harding’s arrival. In September, the Cabinet had decided against authorizing the deportation of the Bishop of Kyrenia due to the possibility of a backlash in public opinion⁵. Harding would not be swayed. At the beginning of December, he once more laid out his views in favor of deportation to the colonial secretary if negotiations broke down⁶.

The Bishop of Kyrenia’s continued preaching of *enosis* rhetoric infuriated Harding. On 5th December, he wrote to Lennox-Boyd in exasperation, referencing a particularly incendiary speech and requesting immediate permission to “proceed with deportation”⁷. In spite of the provocations, the British government, wary of the risks, remained reluctant. W. H. Young of the Foreign Office minuted on Harding’s request:

However justified the Governor’s exasperation, the present seems a bad moment tactically to proceed to extremes. We have gone to great lengths to keep the negotiations with the Greek Government alive and the Secretary of State and the Colonial Secretary took great pains in the debate yesterday to leave the way open for the Archbishop and the Greeks. There can be little doubt that the expulsion of a leading Bishop, however justified, would put an end to any hope of a negotiated settlement.⁸

On 9th December, a revised formula for constitutional progress was given to the Greek government. British policymakers hoped that a formula devised by London and cleared by the Greek and Turkish

³ TNA, WO 32/16260, Telegram No. 817 from Governor Harding to the Prime Minister, 11th October 1955.

⁴ TNA, CO 926/277, Telegram No. 835 Steward to Foreign Office, 13th October 1956.

⁵ In Cyprus, there was a maximum of 2,109 detainees from a population of 369,854 Greek-Cypriots. This represented 570 detainees per 100,000 people, the third most in British counter-insurgency operations during this period after Kenya and Brunei.

⁶ IWM, Harding Papers, AFH 10, Telegram No. 1153 from Harding to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2nd December, 1955.

⁷ IWM, Harding Papers, AFH 10, Telegram No. 1153 from Harding to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2nd December, 1955.

⁸ TNA, FO 371/117661, Memo by RW Selby, 17th September, 1955.

governments would serve as a foundation for progress in the discussion with Makarios, providing direction and mutual reassurance. The relevant paragraphs read (points of subsequent contention with Makarios are in bold):

It is not therefore their [HMG's] position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategic situation and on account of the consequences **on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean**. If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to work for **a final solution consistent with the treaty obligations [NATO and the Baghdad Pact] and strategic interests of Her Majesty's Government and its allies**, which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when self-government has proved itself a **workable proposition** and capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community⁹.

British policymakers felt that careful wording, particularly the obtuse double negative, and soft generalities were required to prevent any of the involved parties from reacting negatively. Negative feeling in Turkey had been high for some time. As the ambassador in Ankara, Sir James Bowker, noted to the Foreign Office: "the Turks are nervous and suspicious that during the last three months Her Majesty's Government may have shifted their stand on the question of self-determination". According to Bowker, leading Turkish officials impressed upon him their concern that Britain's position on Cyprus might be modified by continued negotiations with Makarios. They had only "mistrust of any dealings with the Archbishop". To prevent a rift with Turkey, Bowker advised that British policymakers should be careful to "keep the Turks as regularly informed as possible about what is going on over the Cyprus issue and continue to give them all possible assurances calculated to tranquilize them about our position and policy"¹⁰.

British policy, by necessity, was a balancing act. In a telegram to the foreign secretary, Harding identified "five major factors to be considered" as part of the Cyprus question: "a) the position of the Archbishop, b) the attitude of the Greek Government, c) the feelings of the people of Cyprus including the Turkish community, d) The security situation and e) the attitude of the Turkish Government"¹¹. The difficulty in reconciling these five points was brought home by a letter from Foreign Secretary Macmillan to Lord Home, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. "All the indications at present", wrote Macmillan, "are that this [a clause forbidding *enosis*] would be totally unacceptable both to the Greek Government and to the Greek Cypriots. Conversely, a treaty without such a stipulation would hardly be acceptable to the Turks."¹² These were the obstacles facing Makarios and Harding as two leaders prepared for their next round of discussions.

Harding and Makarios began their third, and final, phase of negotiations on 9th January 1956. The situation in Cyprus was precarious and the direction of events on the island hinged on their discussions. EOKA's violence during the winter had continued in spite of Harding's new emergency powers. Harding cabled Alan Lennox-Boyd in the early hours of 10th January, after his meeting with Makarios. "I had a meeting with the Archbishop this evening", he wrote "which lasted about two and a quarter hours. It was inconclusive but at any rate established that he is prepared to continue discussions on the basis of the revised formula"¹³. Makarios'

⁹ IWM, Harding Papers, AFH 10, Telegram No. 1165 from Harding to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3rd December, 1955.

¹⁰ TNA, FO 371/117675, Telegram No. 1185 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5th December, 1955.

¹¹ Minute by WH Young (Foreign Office), 6th December, 1955, on Telegram No. 1185 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5th December, 1955.

¹² TNA, FO 371/123863, Cyprus – Revised Formula Given to Greek Government on December 9th, 1955.

¹³ TNA, FO 371/123863, Note from Ambassador James Bowker to J. G. Ward, 20th December 1955.

apparent pedantry was an irritant to the more direct Harding¹⁴.

A one page memorandum outlining the British formula had been drafted and given to Makarios. The Archbishop raised three points of concern which Harding conveyed to Lennox-Boyd:

The third sentence and particularly the reference to “consequences on relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean”. (2) The statement that a final solution should be “consistent with the treaty obligations” of HMG and its allies. (3) The qualification that discussion of the future of the island would have to wait until self-government had proven itself “a workable proposition”¹⁵.

Although the British formula did not mention Turkey or Turkish interests directly, points one and two clearly referred to Cyprus’s northern neighbour. To Harding, the reason behind Makarios’s objections remained clear. As he wrote to Lennox-Boyd: “[Makarios] left me in no doubt that what is behind his objections on points (1) and (2) is the assumption that Turkey would exercise a deciding influence over the exercise of self-determination and the reaching of a final solution”¹⁶. Point three related directly to the ability of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to work together in governing the island.

Just two days into their discussions, a further complication regarding the place of Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community in the crisis was added. On Grivas’ explicit orders, EOKA initially did not conduct operations against Turkish-Cypriots. However, in early January 1956 Grivas changed his mind, believing that “it was impossible to avoid all actions against them” (1964, p. 73). As Grivas writes, “certain Turks in the police worked energetically against the Organisation particularly in Paphos, and the area commander there, Yannis Droushiotis, decided one must be executed” (1964, p. 73). Droushiotis presented Grivas with the case against a particularly active Turkish-Cypriot police sergeant, Abdullah Ali Riza; Grivas authorized the sergeant’s assassination. On the morning of 11th January, an EOKA gunman caught up with Riza as he was returning to his home in Paphos and shot him in the chest. He died on his way to the local hospital (Times, 1956, p. 8). Grivas’ radical change in EOKA’s policy at this critical time was an error. It reinforced claims regarding the insecurity of Turkish-Cypriots, further raised tensions between the two communities, and provided Turkey with opportunities to push its agenda more strongly with the British.

Word spread quickly throughout the island and by afternoon, Turkish-Cypriot shops in every town had closed in protest. Greek flags were pulled down and Greek-Cypriot shops were stoned, breaking their windows¹⁷. Telegrams and letters of protest from Turkish-Cypriot groups flooded into Governor Harding. In his telegram, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the Chairman of the “Cyprus Is Turkish” party in Cyprus, bluntly laid out his feelings: “The Turkish community is enraged at the unprovoked attack on the Turkish police sergeant who was killed by Greek terrorists this morning... This act of violence . . . is bound to spread and with catastrophic repercussions for the whole Middle East.”¹⁸ According to British reports, Turkish-Cypriot rioting on 11th January damaged 28 houses and shops belonging to Greek-Cypriots¹⁹. It was just the beginning of intercommunal conflict and the British administration would be hard-pressed to bring it under control. While the Turkish-Cypriot factor gained force, the negotiations between Harding and Makarios were reaching a critical stage and Britain was in no mood for concessions that would upset Turkey.

¹⁴ TNA, FO 371/123863, Telegram No. 5 from Harding to the Foreign Secretary, 2th January 1956.

¹⁵ TNA, FO 371/123863, Personal Letter from Macmillan to Lord Home, 4th January 1956.

¹⁶ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 50 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10th January 1956.

¹⁷ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 50 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10th January 1956.

¹⁸ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 50 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10th January 1956.

¹⁹ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 50 from Harding to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 10th January 1956.

Decisions

Two days after the riots, Makarios and Harding met for the sixth time. According to the minutes kept by the Ethnarchy secretary Nicos Kranidiotis, the meeting “was carried out in a polite manner compared to that of the previous meeting”²⁰. The increased courtesy did not narrow the divide. Makarios asked for the deletion of three phrases from the British formula of 9th December. First, he asked for the deletion of the caveat that self-determination could not be applied immediately in Cyprus because “it is not now a practical proposition both on account of the present strategical situation and on account of the consequences in relations between NATO powers in the Eastern Mediterranean”. Second, Makarios wanted Harding to remove the statement that the government would work towards a final solution of the Cyprus problem “consistent with the treaty obligations and strategic interests of Her Majesty’s Government and its allies”. And third, he wanted discussions on the future of the island to be reserved until (limited) self-government had proved itself “a workable proposition”²¹.

On the first point, Harding was willing to modify the phrase “on account of the consequences in relations between NATO powers”, to read “on account of the present strategic and political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean”. He hoped that the removal of the reference to NATO would reduce the latent presence of Turkey. Makarios was unsatisfied, however, arguing that the word “political” had to be deleted as redundant since “the obligations stemming from it are contained in ‘strategical’”²². Unable to achieve common ground, Makarios suggested moving on to the second point. The Archbishop felt that the reference to “treaty obligations” in relation to the nature of a final solution was unnecessary and asked that it be removed. Harding was unwilling to concede this point either because, in his view, the British government would be open to being accused of bad faith, both in Cyprus and by its allies, if it did not mention the significance of treaty obligations²³. Here again, Turkey’s presence loomed large. As Harding and Makarios debated the point concerning “treaty obligations”, the discussion melted into the third point of contention dealing with the political situation during a period of self-government and its effect on a final solution. The back-and-forth on this point provides an illuminating microcosm of the talks and is worth quoting at length:

Gov [Harding]: HMG recognize straight away that no treaty exists which excludes the application of the principle of self determination to Cyprus. In any case, I would not like to prolong the discussion. I would simply like to know whether you regard the retention of treaty obligations and of the condition of the political situation as a cause for the discontinuance of the talks.

H[is] B[eatitude] [Makarios]: I know the views of my people and of my counsellors and I am sure that this reference to the treaties will not make a good impression. On the contrary it will give grounds for England to be accused of bad faith.

Gov On the contrary, Great Britain must put forward these conditions right from the beginning so that she may not be accused by her allies. If you really wish for an agreement, you must accept this point....

HB The application of obligations resulting from a treaty is obvious. Why should therefore special emphasis be

²⁰ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 65, Situation report from Cyprus to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12th January, 1956.

²¹ CSA, SA1/1087/1956, Telegram 2747 from Cyprus to Turkish Party Chairman Kütcük to Governor Harding, 11th January, 1956.

²² TNA, CO 926/416, Telegram No. 110 from MIDEAST Main to War Office, 14th January, 1956.

²³ TNA, FO 371/123865, Telegram No. 31 from Peake to Harding, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of HB Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, on January 13th, 1956, 16th January 1956.

attached to them in the particular case of the self-determination of the people of Cyprus?

Gov In order that Great Britain may persuade her allies and make her intentions clear to them... I fear that HMG will not accept the amendment and it would indeed be most regrettable if the formula were to be rejected for these reasons.

HB As I have already said I discussed the subject with my advisors and I say that this phrase is completely unacceptable...

Gov If we fail to find a solution this will be due to the unwillingness of Y[our] B[eatitude] to understand the obligations of Great Britain in this part of the world.

HB I am sorry to give such an impression...

Gov Would H[is] B[eatitude] [sic] accept the formula if these two points were omitted?

HB Yes. I would accept if there were to be omitted from the first sentence "the" and "political" and from the second "the existing treaty obligations". The same arguments apply to both these points.

Gov I am afraid this will cause misunderstanding between our allies to whom we must be clear. HB We and myself are also among those to whom Great Britain must be clear.

Gov Yes, but not only you²⁴.

To Harding's mounting frustration, the crux of the dispute remains Makarios's unwillingness to accept Turkish interests or Britain's need to account for Turkey's interests in a solution for Cyprus. Harding could not budge on this point because of the importance of the Turkish alliance to Britain's position in the Middle East and the Cold War. Makarios's final quoted sentence voiced the Greek-Cypriot desire to be the primary, if not the sole, consideration for the British policymakers. Harding's response was equally telling and demonstrated the gap between the two parties.

Significantly, there was no direct reference to Turkey. There is no evidence as to whether direct mention of Turkey was avoided intentionally to remove further divisiveness, or because Makarios did not wish to legitimize Turkish claims. Leaders in London realized both the extent of the Turkish factor and how assiduously Makarios was trying to avoid it. A personal note from the deputy under-secretary of state, J. G. Ward, at the Foreign Office encapsulated the situation:

[Makarios] now seems to have established pretty definitely that the Ethnarchy will not agree to a formula containing any reservations covering our "treaty obligations or any reference which implies that Greco-Turkish relations must be taken into account in considering the possibility and timing of self-determination". Our view in the Foreign Office is that we cannot possibly drop these reservations — quite apart from the inherent unwisdom of doing so, there is no doubt that the Turks will blow up. We therefore feel that a break in the negotiations for a settlement cannot be long avoided, despite the grim implications²⁵.

A Foreign Office minute codified Ward's informal letter and highlighted the difficulties posed by Turkey if the British government were to accept Makarios's modifications.

Both amendments proposed by the Archbishop are aimed at excluding any Turkish interest in Cyprus. Despite the fact that we have repeatedly told the Archbishop and the Greek Government that there is no question of a Turkish veto

²⁴ TNA, FO 371/123865, Telegram No. 31 from Peake to Harding, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of HB Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, on January 13th, 1956, 16th January 1956.

²⁵ TNA, FO 371/123865, Telegram No. 31 from Peake to Harding, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of HB Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, on January 13th, 1956, 16th January 1956.

and the decisions about Cyprus rest solely with Her Majesty's Government, the Governor has concluded that the Archbishop will refuse the formula if political considerations affecting Turkey could be taken into account in coming to a solution.

As for the Turks, they "would resent our accepting either of the Archbishop's amendments. To them the amendments would seem to remove all the safeguards in the formula which we have assured them we would maintain. If we propose further amendments to these passages the Turks will be convinced that we are giving in to the Archbishop."²⁶

The Foreign Office argued that any formula along the lines Makarios requested, "would be unrealistic". Their quite correct conclusion was that since the problems in Cyprus were mainly political, "all relevant political considerations" needed to be taken into account. This included the "genuine and strong" interest of the Turkish government. The minute closed with a statement that mixed frustration and disbelief, positing that "there can be no possible gain to anyone, including the Archbishop, from neglecting a fundamental factor [Turkey] in the situation"²⁷. In January 1956, as during the plebiscite in January 1950, the United Nations overtures of 1954, and the decision to launch a campaign of violence in 1955, the *enosis* forces in Cyprus, spearheaded by the Orthodox Church, were ignoring Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot minority. Whether blinded by prejudice or by their commitment to *enosis*, they could not come to grips with Turkey's "genuine and strong" interest in Cyprus. Greek-Cypriot nationalists could not acknowledge the existence of a distinct Turkish-Cypriot community who remained directly opposed to *enosis*.

Makarios's intransigence caused great frustration in London and prompted attempts to shift him through Greek intervention. A Foreign Office telegram to Sir Roger Allen, the British Ambassador in Athens, made both points quite clearly. "If you have not already done so you should see the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. . . . You should say that the Archbishop's reactions are most disappointing. His only answer to our attempt to meet his criticisms was to raise further difficulties and to be highly evasive about his attitudes toward terrorism."²⁸ Second, Allen was encouraged to "invite the Greek Government to consider urgently what they can now do, in their own interest, to make the Archbishop see reason"²⁹. British policymakers felt that a reasonable compromise was being offered along the lines laid out in the newly revised formula put to Makarios on 18th January. Slight adjustments of language attempted to address the Archbishop's critiques while maintaining good faith with Turkey. The operative paragraphs now read:

It is not therefore their position that the principle of self-determination can never be applicable to Cyprus. It is their position that it is not now a practical proposition on account of the present strategic and political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. Her Majesty's Government have offered a wide measure of self-government now.

If the people of Cyprus will participate in the constitutional development, it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to work for a final solution consistent with the existing treaty obligations and strategic interests of Her Majesty's Government and their allies which will satisfy the wishes of the people of Cyprus. Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the future of the island with representatives of the people of Cyprus when

²⁶ TNA, FO 371/123865, Telegram No. 31 from Peake to Harding, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of HB Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, on January 13th, 1956, 16th January 1956.

²⁷ TNA, FO 371/123865, Telegram No. 31 from Peake to Harding, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of HB Archbishop Makarios and the Governor of Cyprus, Sir John Harding, on January 13th, 1956, 16th January 1956.

²⁸ TNA, FO 371/123865, Personal Letter from J. G. Ward to Sir Gladwyn Jebb (British Ambassador, Paris), 18th January, 1956.

²⁹ TNA, FO 371/123865, Foreign Office Minute, 18th January 1956.

self-government has proved itself capable of safeguarding the interests of all sections of the community³⁰.

The changes accounted for two of Makarios's original three objections. Gone was the reference to NATO along with the words "a workable proposition". "Strategic and political" remained along with the mentions of "treaty obligations" and "allies". For Makarios, it was not enough. Oblivious to the concessions that had been made the Archbishop pressed his previous objections. Reference to "treaty obligations" and "allies" had to be removed along with the words "political situation" in reference to the Eastern Mediterranean. Harding did not budge. The two men met again on 27th January. Harding had just returned from a trip to London where he discussed the Archbishop's reservations with Britain's political leadership. He reported to Lennox-Boyd that the meeting had lasted two and half hours and that Makarios "was on the defensive throughout practically the whole discussion and clearly did not like it much."³¹ Harding's conclusion was that Makarios had found "himself in the difficult position of having to accept an agreement on our latest terms or of taking the blame for refusing a good offer"³². This time the disagreement centred on the nature of the constitution that would codify Cyprus's development towards self-government. Makarios argued that the formula under discussion "could not be considered separately from the constitution. For they might agree on the formula and yet disagree on important terms of the constitution which would stop cooperation". Harding countered that an agreement on the formula needed to precede discussion of a constitution and that the decisions on the framing of the constitution would have to be taken "not only with the Archbishop but also with all sections of the community". Makarios hoped for another meeting, but Harding's patience was running out. The field marshal replied that "he would only consent to meet the Archbishop again if the latter wished to have an elucidation of some point in the documents which he would be sending him on the following day"³³.

Makarios seems to have taken Harding's warming temper into consideration and called a meeting of the Ethnarchy Council on 30th January to discuss the governor's new proposals and wording. The Bishop of Kyrenia led the attack on compromise: "I consider the Governor's proposal unacceptable and we must turn it down. Had the Governor accepted a predetermined time limit of 3 to 5 years [before self-determination], we would accept. But if we accept this it would be tantamount to an affront. I insist on the historical slogan '*Enosis* and only *Enosis*'" (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 28). Makarios admitted that the differences between his plan and the governor's plan were great. While the Bishop of Kyrenia regarded anything more than a 3-5 year time limit as a colonialist insult, Makarios held a more elaborate view. He disagreed with pressing for a predetermined time limit, even one as modest as 3-5 years, because they would not be able to predict the political situation in either Cyprus or Greece. Besides, by avoiding any particular time-frame, "we would be in a position to put forward our demand for self-determination immediately" (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 28). Makarios was confident that the high morale among pro-*enosis* advocates in Cyprus would sustain his rigid stance. Another member of the council, the lawyer, Socrates Tornaritis, agreed that armed resistance had brought results: "I also am a follower of the intransigent policy which has given results such as the right to self-determination in Cyprus. I am confident that the morale of the people will remain high" (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 28). The new formula would not be accepted. This rejection was communicated to Harding by letter on 2nd

³⁰ TNA, FO 371/123865, Foreign Office Minute, 18th January 1956.

³¹ TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 59 from Foreign Office to Ambassador Allen, Athens, 15th January 1956.

³² TNA, FO 371/123864, Telegram No. 59 from Foreign Office to Ambassador Allen, Athens, 15th January 1956.

³³ TNA, FO 371/123865, Revised Cyprus Formula, Foreign Office Minute, 18th January 1956.

February. "The text in question", Makarios wrote,

recognizes indirectly the principle of self-determination and states that its application, however, is made dependent on conditions so general and vague, subject to so many interpretations and presenting so many difficulties as to the objective ascertainment of their fulfilment, as to create reasonable doubt about the positive nature of the promise which is given regarding the final solution of the question in accordance with the wish of the people of Cyprus (Correspondence, 1956, p. 6).

Immediately following the meeting with Makarios, Harding took the British formula (newly re-worded in an attempt to address Makarios's concerns) to Cyprus's Turkish consul general. They met on 31st January. Their exchange confirmed the fears of the Foreign Office that Turkey's interest in Cyprus was diametrically opposed to the concessions sought by Makarios. The consul made two points. First, he emphasized to Harding that, in spite of their recent quiet, the Turkish people maintained very strong feelings on Cyprus. Second, he argued "that any system of self-government for Cyprus based on majority rule by the Greek-Cypriots could never be acceptable to the Turkish minority and would inevitably lead to civil war or something approaching it"³⁴.

While Harding tried to soothe the concerns of Turkish-Cypriots, the Foreign Office was encouraging Ambassador Bowker to work on reducing the hostility of the Turkish government in Ankara. "You must try to persuade the Turkish Government that we are not presenting them with a fait accompli on the constitution questions. As the rejoinder to the Archbishop makes very clear, the form of the eventual constitution can only be determined after full consultation and discussion with all sections of the population of Cyprus."³⁵

In light of these realities, Harding was reluctant to make specific promises on the constitution to Makarios. He was not a constitutional expert nor was he qualified to put forward the arguments for the Turkish-Cypriot side. As he wrote to Makarios on 14th February: "You will understand that Her Majesty's Government could not enter into commitments about the position of separate communities under the constitution before discussions have taken place at which representatives of those communities have expressed their views" (Correspondence, 1956, p. 8). Harding's letter continued: "It must be recognized that persistent violence and disorder have increased the difficulties of introducing constitutional government. Fear of intimidation has stifled free expression of opinion. The minorities are more concerned than before about the possible consequences for them of the advent of self-government" (Correspondence, 1956, p. 9).

To overcome the constitutional hurdles, British policymakers began discussions of tasking someone with legal qualifications to draft a new Cypriot constitution. This would provide for self-government (under British sovereignty), increased powers for the Greek-Cypriot community, and minority protections for Turkish-Cypriots. Proceeding with a new constitution was a major concession to the Greek-Cypriots. The British were willing to make significant efforts to win over the Turks to the constitutional exercise even though their own foreign ministry had warned that there was "practically no hope" of securing Turkish acquiescence to introducing a constitution in Cyprus³⁶.

While the British government's move towards a new constitution was cautiously optimistic, the editorial board of *The Times of Cyprus* were positively hopeful. The cover of the edition for 15th February 1956 ran the

³⁴ TNA, FO 371/123867, Telegram No. 191 from Cyprus (Harding) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28th January, 1956.

³⁵ TNA, FO 371/123867, Telegram No. 191 from Cyprus (Harding) to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28th January, 1956.

³⁶ TNA, FO 371/123867, Telegram No. 192 from Cyprus (Harding) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28th January, 1956.

headline: “All the Archbishop’s main terms find acceptance. Governor Agrees: Peace is in Sight at Last.” The story promised that “from the day when agreement on the broad outlines is announced — and that surely is very near — Cyprus can hope for an ending of the violence which it has endured too long and to move into a period of full self-rule” (Times of Cyprus, 1956b).

Getting the constitutional debate started, however, was proving extremely difficult because the formula had still not been agreed to. Makarios would not accept Harding’s vagaries on the nature of the new constitution and was anxious to prevent concessions to Turkish interests, even though those concessions were vital to making the constitutional process work. Makarios and his advisors debated these issues again at a meeting of the Ethnarchy Council on 21st February. One representative insisted that the inclusion of Turks in the cabinet would have to “be avoided at all costs”. Makarios was sympathetic to the principle. “Perhaps you are right”, he said, “but in practice this would be unattainable”. Even Bishop Kyprianos was cautious but cynical about appearing to be openly anti-Turkish. “We must not appear to be against the Turks, on the contrary, we must succeed in gaining their confidence so that we may attain *Enosis*.” On the constitution, however, Kyprianos held nothing back: “I reject the constitution and insist on immediate self-determination” (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 32). In this attitude, even among the pro-*enosis* Ethnarchy Council, he was alone. The other members, including Makarios, pressured him to reconsider his position, but Kyprianos remained adamant: “I have my opinion”, he replied, “and you may proscribe me” (Ethnarchy, 1956, p. 33). Kyprianos, alone among the 26 councilors, refused to approve of Makarios’s draft reply. *The Times of Cyprus* reported that the “portly firebrand”, finding “himself in defiant isolation”, stormed out of the meeting in Nicosia and drove back to Kyrenia alone (Times of Cyprus, 1956a). Makarios would not press for immediate self-determination, but his differences with the formula proposed by Harding meant that the two sides were still a long way off.

Makarios conveyed his concerns to Harding in a letter on 25th February. The Archbishop’s cooperation “in the framing and operation of self-government” could be achieved if this phrase was openly acknowledged “as a transitional stage towards self-determination, which ever remains our sole and final aim”. Moreover, such cooperation was only possible “in so far as the fundamental democratic principles . . . described in our previous letter were clearly established now as a basis of the constitution which is offered” (Correspondence, 1956, p. 11).

These democratic principles involved an assembly elected to reflect the demographic advantage of the Greek-Cypriot community, the control of that body over the cabinet of ministers (which would exclude Turkish-Cypriots from the cabinet), and guarantees that executive responsibility for public security would revert to (Greek) Cypriots once order was restored (Correspondence, 1956, p. 11). As a result of a consultation with Grivas on 28th January 1956 he demanded “the granting of an amnesty for all political offences” as “indispensable” to any agreement (Holland, 1998, pp. 109–110). Furthermore, Makarios insisted on an “early repeal” of the emergency laws. These terms, wrote the Archbishop constituted “every possible concession beyond which our national conscience and natural dignity do not permit us to go” (Correspondence, 1956, p. 12). In London, it seemed that Makarios was moving the goal posts, pushing for new and impossible concessions just as an agreement approached. As concluded in Cabinet: “[a]t this final stage, however, the Archbishop had put the agreement in jeopardy by asking for an amnesty for all political offenders in Cyprus.”³⁷ Furthermore, by continuing to hammer the line that self-determination (meaning *enosis*) remained

³⁷ Although the governor and the archbishop would not meet in person for a month, they continued their negotiations through

the “sole and final aim” of the Greek-Cypriot people, Makarios continued to ignore the reality that such a claim was impossible because of the Turkish factor.

It appears that Makarios’s further demands were a negotiating tactic designed to squeeze a few more concessions from the British. In early February, he again met with Grivas and explained to the colonel that “the people were getting tired” and that the high financial cost of the struggle meant that they should come to some solution. Makarios was concerned about EOKA’s military capabilities, but Grivas reassured him that they were a match for the British forces on the island. Grivas had his own concerns. The colonel wanted to know when Cypriots would be able “to exercise self-determination” and whether this period would “be defined by an international organization or an international committee”. At the end of their discussion, Makarios told Grivas that they “must accept this plan and give a written reply”. Nevertheless, the Archbishop still expected disagreements with Harding over the constitution. On 15th February, Grivas received a letter from Makarios telling him “to avoid any actions against the British because in all likelihood an agreement would be reached with Harding”³⁸.

The Archbishop’s new requests were a true display of Makarios’ characteristic brinksmanship. In 1959, he related to Governor Sir Hugh Foot how he had refused to grow a beard while a novice at Kykko Monastery. The Abbot had beaten him, but he refused. Finally, Makarios was threatened with expulsion from the holy order. Makarios packed his bags and a taxi was called. As Makarios put his foot on the step of the taxi the Abbot relented and asked him to stay (Foot, 1964, p. 184). In Foot’s view, Makarios was a man of “political skill... [with] confidence in his own opinion. But I sometimes think that he enjoys to gamble, to go right up to the edge, to pit his wits against everyone else” (1964, p. 185).

Harding developed a similar assessment of the man. Any agreement reached with Makarios would not “mark the end of the conflict but the beginning of another phase”³⁹. While the Abbot of Kykko backed down, Harding did not. The gambling style that cost Makarios little as a novice in the monastery carried a high cost for Cyprus in 1956. The British offer came off the table and the prospect for a peaceful resolution evaporated.

On 28th February, Lennox-Boyd arrived in Cyprus with hopes of clinching a deal. The next day he met with representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot community and with Makarios. Before their meeting, some ten explosions were reported in various parts of Nicosia. *The Times of Cyprus* accused the communists of planting the bombs in order to prevent an agreement (Times of Cyprus, 1956c), but the bombs did not prove decisive in scuttling a solution (Assos, 2009, p. 138). Lennox-Boyd informed Makarios that the British government would take a number of actions in return for the Archbishop’s condemnation of violence and his aid in restoring peace on Cyprus. These undertakings on the part of the British government would consist of an amnesty for all detainees “except those involving violence against the person or the illegal possession of arms, ammunition or explosives”, the repeal of the Emergency Regulations “at a pace commensurate with that of the reestablishment of law and order”, and the drafting of “a liberal and democratic constitution in consultation with representatives of all sections of opinion in the Island” (Hansard, 1956, pp. 1717–1718). Lennox-Boyd’s statement demonstrated the British government’s willingness to compromise even on Makarios’s new demands. The two sides were still unable to reach an agreement. Makarios was not prepared to accept Lennox-Boyd’s

a series of letters.

³⁸ TNA, FO 371/123867, Telegram No. 235 from Cyrus (Harding) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 31th January, 1956.

³⁹ TNA, FO/123869, Telegram No. 267 from Foreign Office to Ankara, 13th February 1956.

statement “as a basis for cooperation”, and “could not accept the exclusion of those carrying arms, ammunition and explosives from the amnesty or the reservation of public security to the Governor “for as long as he thought necessary”. In addition, Makarios insisted that “the composition of the elected majority be defined to this satisfaction in advance of the recommendations of the Constitutional Commissioner” (Hansard, 1956, p. 1718).

London took Makarios’s rejection as the final straw. Lennox-Boyd returned to England the next day and plans were put into motion to remove Makarios from the scene if he did not perform a *volte face* and agree to the offer. In Harding’s opinion, after five months of talks, “[t]he time for decision had arrived”⁴⁰. The governor followed up Lennox-Boyd’s arguments and “emphasized to the Archbishop the generosity of the offer of amnesty in its present form and urged that relatively unimportant doubts and uncertainties about its operation should not be allowed to obstruct an agreement”. Harding argued that the issue of an elected majority in the future Cypriot assembly was “for the Constitutional Commissioner”. But it was his interest “to see the constitutional talks started I earnestly asked the Archbishop, therefore, not to make an issue of this point such as to obstruct our getting the talks started and to disappoint our hopes of bringing the Emergency to an end”⁴¹.

The day after Lennox-Boyd’s departure, Harding confronted Makarios with the reality of the situation; the Archbishop faced agreeing to the British proposals or a continuation of violence. Harding found Makarios’ response “illuminating”. In spite of the Archbishop’s professed desire for a solution he did not feel that Harding’s statement provided a “basis on which he would like to see an agreement concluded”. Makarios blamed his predicament on the attitude of the people “a large section” of whom “did not wish to follow his lead in reaching an agreement. If he accepted, without having a wide measure of popular support, he would become an object of severe attack and criticism”⁴².

Makarios’s prevarication was open to criticism on two counts. First, he portrayed himself as a prisoner of the will of the Cypriot people. This argument diminishes his agency as a leader capable of taking important decisions and shaping public opinion rather than simply relying on public opinion. One reason why Makarios was reluctant to appear too much in control of the *enosis* movement was his desire to distance himself from EOKA. It was important for Makarios to conceal his deep connections with the organisation⁴³.

The Archbishop had also been at the forefront of shaping and radicalizing that opinion which he now claimed prevented him from agreeing to Harding’s terms. Makarios had preached the gospel of “*enosis* and only *enosis*” since 1950. He had organized the plebiscite of 1950 and, upon his elevation to the archepiscopal throne, had undertaken to canvass support for *enosis* across the globe. It was disingenuous for him now to claim that public opinion prevented him from agreeing to measures of compromise when he had been instrumental in shaping public opinion. Confronted with disagreements on major points and with Makarios still unwilling to condemn terrorism, the field marshal finally secured agreement from the government in London for his deportation. Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia would be deported as well.

On 9th March, Makarios was taken into custody as he attempted to board a plane to Athens from Nicosia Airport. Kyprianos was arrested at his home in Kyrenia. Polykarpos Ioannides, Kyprianos’s diocesan secretary, was arrested on the street in Kyrenia and Stavros Papagathangelou, the priest of Phaneromeni Church and a

⁴⁰ TNA, CO 926/277, Telegram No. 835 Steward to Foreign Office, 13th October 1956.

⁴¹ TNA, CAB 128/30, CM (56) 16th Conclusions, 22nd February 1956.

⁴² SIMAE, P 405/7/11, Description by Grivas of discussion with Makarios about Harding Negotiations, February 1956.

⁴³ TNA, FO 371/117678, Harding to Lennox-Boyd 15th December 1955.

leading recruiter for EOKA youth groups, was taken at his home in Nicosia. The four would be sent into exile in the Seychelles. The move was greeted by riots and violence in Cyprus, by attacks from the opposition in parliament, and by international condemnation. It was a calculated risk reflecting Harding's frustration at the failure to contain violence in Cyprus and at the failure of the talks.

These sentiments were apparent in a letter written on 4 March by Harding to his son. "[I]t was very disappointing that after such long and tedious negotiations we were unable to get an agreement", wrote the governor. "At the beginning of the meeting we had on Monday night — the Colonial Secretary and myself with the Archbishop — I thought it might take a different form from all my previous meetings with him, but it was soon apparent that he was determined to shield the terrorists and to [illegible] our bargaining. Looking back I cannot think of anything more we could have done to secure an agreement." The negotiations, "of the past five months", he confided, "have done a good deal to clarify the problem and to put it into perspective. Apart from that it was an essential political exercise to exhaust all possibilities of reaching a basis for cooperation by negotiation before resorting to other methods — rather like the amnesty proposition in Malaya — and it might have come off — it probably would have if it had been tried a year or two earlier." What remained clear to the field marshal was that: "By his persistent refusal to denounce violence the Archbishop forces us to the conclusion that he believes in violence as a political weapon and would not hesitate to use it again — a curious attitude for a so-called Christian leader."⁴⁴

With Makarios and Kyprianos removed from the picture, Harding hoped to enjoy greater freedom of action in the fight against EOKA and to undercut some of the organization's strength. Confined in exile, Makarios would not be able to rally support for *enosis* internationally, nor would he be in an effective position to denounce British policy in Cyprus and stir up the population against British rule. However, with Makarios removed, there was no prospect for a negotiated solution.

The decision to deport Makarios was a heavy one, heavy in responsibility, risk, and potential reward. Harding was now eager to make the most of the opportunity he saw to crush EOKA militarily without having to work simultaneously along the tortuous path of negotiation with the pedantic and uncompromising cleric. As he wrote to his son:

Up to date I have had to pursue two divergent policies — appeasement by negotiation and restoration of law and order — which has compelled me to refrain from some security measures while negotiations were still in progress. Now I can give the restoration of law and order, and the elimination of the terrorists overriding priority — so in that result my task will be simplified but it may involve doing some pretty unpleasant things, and the next phase may be a bit grim — we shall see⁴⁵.

A new phase in the struggle was about to begin: one which not only saw the escalation of violence between EOKA and the British, but also witnessed a campaign by the British government against Makarios *in absentia* and against the Cypriot Church. In many ways, the last of these was retaliation for years of violent abuse hurled down on the British from pulpits across Cyprus. Politically, the war against the church would prove every bit as grim as that against Grivas and his insurgents. Harding now had the chance to destroy EOKA, but an escalation in violence also provided an opening for attacks by the British government's opponents against what they characterized as unacceptably draconian methods.

⁴⁴ TNA, FO 371/123873, Telegram No. 470 from Cyprus (Harding) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1st March, 1956.

⁴⁵ TNA, FO 371/123873, Telegram No. 470 from Cyprus (Harding) to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1st March, 1956.

Conclusion

For Cyprus, the failure to achieve a negotiated settlement in 1956 was a costly, missed opportunity. The Greek-Cypriot side had had the most at stake. The responsibility of their leader, Makarios, was most acute for the failure, and the cost of that failure, would prove greatest for their side. Violence on the island would worsen, claiming hundreds of lives and hardening the division between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots. The key divides which proved unbridgeable for Makarios and Harding in 1956 remain the fault lines of Cyprus today: Turkish involvement, the division of power, and the political rights of the Greek majority. An approach which was at once naively optimistic and exploitatively maximalist on the part of Makarios exhausted the patience of Harding and triggered the collapse of the talks. The failure was costly to Makarios, but more damaging to Cyprus itself.

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Russia: Looking for Prominence in the Global System

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Over the past 75 years, the United States and the United Kingdom have built the deepest intelligence alliance in the world. Despite decades of cooperation, however, there exists today a significant misalignment between the strategic prioritization of this “special relationship” and the regulations, policies, organizational cultures, and technologies that facilitate its day-to-day activities. This report’s recommendations are designed to encourage the adoption of policies, procedures, and tools that will enable the United States and the United Kingdom to achieve the deep level of collaboration they have repeatedly committed to in bilateral agreements, national security strategies, and intelligence guidance. If allies and partners are an indispensable pillar of both nations’ strategies to challenge rising and revanchist authoritarianism and other threats, then the U.S. and UK intelligence communities should jointly pursue robust interoperability that appropriately balances risk with opportunity. World War II posed a significant intelligence challenge to the Western allies. The German government used assorted models of a specific cipher device, that would come to be known in the West as “Enigma”. The cryptographic effort against this system, led by the British, was known as ULTRA. The Japanese used its own version of this device; the cryptographic effort against this system, run by the Americans, was known as MAGIC. As the war, and the astounding effects of cryptographic success, progressed, both the Americans and British found it in their best interests to collaborate and share expertise.

Keywords: eyes alliance, western allies, necessity

Introduction

After decades of dominance by one hegemonic power, Russia welcomes a less Western, more multipolar chapter of globalization. However, Moscow’s expectations of inclusivity are tampered by the pull of a U.S.-Chinese duopoly.

The nature of globalization is changing primarily as a result of the shift of the global center of gravity away from the West and toward Asia. Globalization as, essentially, Westernization is coming to an end. In its place, other economic and political systems and cultural patterns are coming to the fore. Global capitalism is no longer Western capitalism writ large but a more diverse, global phenomenon. Russian officials criticize the ideology behind globalization — that real power is concentrated in the hands of transnational companies, predominantly with U.S. roots, at the expense of national governments. The Kremlin sees globalization in the form of unification on the basis of Western standards as a threat to national identities and Indigenous cultures.

What the world is witnessing now is not deglobalization but a new stage in the globalization process, with more players joining. Globalization is being reformed as the number of active participants proliferates. Each

new major player comes with its own interests, ideas, and patterns of behavior. The result is more diversity in the world. There will be no going back to a Western-led process. Instead, the world will see the rise of a more interactive culture of striking a balance of multiple interests in the name of universal public good.

For Russian foreign policy, this transition is a chance for the emergence of a less Western-dominated, more multipolar world. The Russian expert community and wider public largely welcome this seminal trend. From Moscow's perspective, while globalization is a generally positive phenomenon, it should not be tantamount to the Westernization of the entire world¹. After the unprecedented dominance of one hegemonic power whose values, norms, principles, and interests mostly drove globalization, the next stage should be a more inclusive process that involves many non-Western powers. The new set of universally recognized values and norms should be developed jointly by several leading powers from all over the world, including Russia.

To achieve this goal, Russia collaborates with non-Western powers such as Brazil, India, China, and South Africa bilaterally and within the BRICS context; with several members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; with other non-Western groups, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the African Union; and with individual countries from its post-Soviet neighbors to regional powers, such as Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Reforming International Trade

Russia joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2012 after exceptionally lengthy negotiations. WTO membership has not, however, significantly affected the Russian economy. Russia's main exports are hydrocarbons, metals, chemicals, agricultural products, arms, and military equipment. This structure makes the country less dependent on the rules and norms that govern global trade because those rules do not apply to commodities, which still form the bulk of Russia's foreign trade, as they do to manufactured products.

Russia's official position on the international trading order is closely linked to the prevailing Russian view of global geoeconomics, which, in turn, is aligned with the country's stance on geopolitics. Moscow's principal complaints are about the many restrictions that continue to be imposed on Russia by the United States and many of its allies with the aim of changing the Kremlin's foreign and domestic policies².

With regard to the future of the global trading order, the Russian view is that regional economic blocs are the building blocks. The European Union (EU) is a great example and a model, although Russia will not emulate it all the way. Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are more responsive to the needs of modern trade than WTO agreements, which require more time to conclude. RTAs are also ahead of WTO agreements on other issues, including investment rights, environmental standards, and protection of workers. Some regional accords, for instance the Chile-New Zealand-Singapore Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, already cover e-commerce and intellectual property.

Russian experts point out that the agendas of RTAs often diverge from the more universal agenda set by the WTO. Yet, membership in regional agreements allows participating countries to more effectively lobby their interests in the WTO framework because they can rely on the support of fellow RTA members. However, Russia and its partner countries in the Eurasian Economic Union are less involved in RTAs than other nations.

¹ "Session of Davos Agenda 2021 Online Forum," President of Russia, January 27, 2021, available online at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64938>.

² "Foreign Ministry statement on measures in response to hostile US actions", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, April 16, 2021, available online at: https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4689067?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB.

The agreements concluded by Russia are less important than most other RTAs in terms of their share of the global market and the scope and depth of their commitments.

New global trading standards will have to emerge amid ruthless competition and dialogue among the key regional players: North America, the EU, China, India, and others. Even relatively small economic players, like the Eurasian Economic Union, will seek to play some role in the creation of new international norms. More importantly, future global standards will not be Western standards accepted by or imposed on the rest of the world.

Complaints and Criticisms

On reform of the international trading system, complaints about unfair trade are mostly raised by developing countries that are used to benefiting from special treatment under various differentiated regimes. Sometimes, developing nations complain that developed countries are asking for overly beneficial conditions given their level of development. Russia is somewhere between these two positions. Despite being able to claim a developing-country status on the basis of several international qualifications, status-conscious Russia joined the WTO as a developed country. Russia's problem is that it acceded to the organization late and assumed several obligations that countries that had joined earlier never undertook. Here lie the roots of what Russians regard as unfair trade practices.

Another area of criticism relates to the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. Specifically, the agreement's article 66.2 regulates the transfer of technology and obliges developed countries to provide incentives for such transfers. Least developed countries, in particular, wanted this requirement to be made more effective. Meanwhile, some countries, like China, are involved in forced technology transfers. These can happen under the pretext of national security interests, for instance if software companies are forced to reveal their source codes. Russia's position is ambivalent: on the one hand, Moscow is also known to engage in forced technology transfers; on the other hand, Russia is an exporter of high-technology products, including software, and its companies are exposed to such demands in other markets.

Russia has joined U.S.-led criticism of the WTO's dispute settlement provisions. This criticism has essentially focused on claims that the WTO's Appellate Body (AB) interprets provisions of agreements too loosely, abuses its authority, and delivers advisory rulings on noncore issues. The AB ignores the set appeal period of ninety days; there are too many appeals; the arbiters are overwhelmed by their workload; and the body does not honor stated norms. Russia believes that measures are necessary to ensure that all stages of the arbitration process and the AB function properly³. Moscow has also proposed that arbiters should examine claims methodically and that the requirements on their work should be stricter⁴. An EU-led interim arbitration system, which includes over twenty countries, merits discussion in Russia's view, but Moscow would prefer all arbitration to be handled on a multilateral basis (Terence P. Stewart, 2020).

Governance of Technology and Data

³ "Максим Медведков: в ВТО есть негласное понимание, что политические санкции на рассмотрение не выносятся (Maxim Medvedkov: There Is a Tacit Understanding in the WTO That Political Sanctions Are Not Submitted for Consideration)", Interfax, August 22, 2018, available online at: <https://www.interfax.ru/interview/626154>.

⁴ "Максим Медведков: в ВТО есть негласное понимание, что политические санкции на рассмотрение не выносятся (Maxim Medvedkov: There Is a Tacit Understanding in the WTO That Political Sanctions Are Not Submitted for Consideration)", Interfax, August 22, 2018, available online at: <https://www.interfax.ru/interview/626154>.

Different developing countries have different priorities when it comes to data governance. The more ambitious governments — usually authoritarian or semiauthoritarian ones with distinct nationalist agendas — seek to engage in data governance in their own jurisdictions to strengthen internal control and protect their publics from malign influences from abroad. Other developing countries essentially follow current Western trends, with few means at their disposal to change the situation.

In Russia, data governance issues have been marked by the government's pursuit of more control over information flows and the Kremlin's push for digital sovereignty. While these ambitions are not unique to Russia and have been observed in many other regions, the situation in Russia is complicated by the ongoing confrontation with the United States. This has resulted in near-total distrust of multinational tech companies by the Russian security apparatus, which clearly dominates the other parts of the Russian government. The Kremlin's ultimate aim is to be able to take down all information from the internet or digital platforms that it deems dangerous for internal stability and national security while allowing the digital economy to serve as an economic engine. When Russia faces a choice between these two contradictory goals, security always trumps the economy.

Russia has put forward various initiatives on internet governance since 2005. The country's most successful move so far has been the introduction of internet domains in Cyrillic. However, Western countries have rejected Russian proposals to change the structure of web governance to ensure equal participation of the international community in the process. Moscow sees the internet as a political resource and seeks to make it less dependent on the U.S. government. Looking ahead, Russia foresees further segmentation of the internet.

On the global scene, Russia works closely with China to promote a more inclusive, non-Western model of internet governance. Moscow and Beijing have come up with joint proposals that diverge in key points from the ideas supported by the United States and its European and other allies (Alexander Gabuev & Leonid Kovachich, 2021). In recent years, this trend has been strengthening, as demonstrated by Russia's domestic policies on data governance and data localization.

Internet Laws and Control of Social Media

Russia amended its data governance rules in 2019 with the adoption of a package of laws on the so-called sovereign internet (BBC, 2019). The legislation ostensibly sought to ensure the continued operation of the Russian segment of the internet if it ever becomes disconnected from the global network. To this end, the Russian authorities created a register of traffic exchange points between Russian and global networks. By law, all traffic now passes only through these points.

Moreover, the laws on the sovereign internet allow for the use of new technologies to block sites and accounts, and the legislation appears to have significantly increased the Russian government's technical abilities. The laws required all internet operators to install special equipment using deep packet inspection (DPI) technology, which allows Roskomnadzor — the Russian federal agency responsible for regulating Russian media — to analyze all passing traffic, allocate specific packages, and slow down or block internet protocol addresses. In 2020, more than 80 percent of telecommunications operators in Russia were equipped with DPI technology, and Roskomnadzor deployed the technology in March 2021 to throttle Twitter traffic (Meduza, 2021).

A key component of Russia's data governance regime consists of rules related to data localization. In July 2014, President Vladimir Putin signed a data localization law, the implementation of which has become the top

priority for Russian regulators (RKP, 2014). Under the law, since September 1, 2015, all personal data of Russian nationals must be stored and processed in data centers that are physically located in Russia. However, the implementation process differs from one company to another, and most foreign players have not followed the letter of the law—although this has not yet resulted in any penalties. In 2015-2017, a tactic that helped many global players to mitigate the challenges presented by the law was to maintain dialogue with Roskomnadzor while stating that they were taking the regulator's concerns seriously and looking at ways to address them. Initially, the major problem for international firms was cost, not politics.

A company's failure to communicate with Roskomnadzor would result in the blockage of its service, as exemplified by LinkedIn, which was blocked in Russia in November 2016. Firms that did maintain regular channels of communication managed to postpone the implementation of the data localization law. However, Roskomnadzor's push for compliance has been increasing since the 2018 Russian presidential election. Many companies have since found technical means to meet minimal government criteria for storing data locally, including through various cloud solutions.

In 2019-2020, the Russian government adopted a policy of pressuring foreign companies through increased fines to store data in Russia (Vyacheslav Khayryuzov, 2020). The enforcement problem that the Russian government has with the data localization law is that some global companies, like Twitter, have no offices or staff in Russia, so there is no effective way to collect fines. Thus, Roskomnadzor is increasingly using its newly acquired technical capabilities to constrict traffic to certain foreign platforms — or ban them completely, as in the case of LinkedIn.

Toward the end of 2020, the Russian government began a campaign against Western social media companies for blocking access to Kremlin propaganda outlets. Russia quickly adopted legislation to protect the country's media and bloggers from such alleged discrimination. The Russian authorities gained the ability to restrict access to platforms that the Prosecutor General's Office considers to be in violation of the rights and freedoms of Russian media and individuals (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2020).

After the January 2021 arrest of anticorruption campaigner Alexei Navalny and ensuing street demonstrations across Russia, the government tried to choke foreign social media platforms by claiming that they had spread information that encouraged illegal activity by minors. In March 2021, Roskomnadzor sought to fine Meta (formerly Facebook), Google, Telegram, TikTok, and Twitter for their refusal to remove information about the protests (Madeline Roache, 2021).

Soon afterward, the Russian authorities launched a targeted offensive against Twitter for its failure to remove content about suicide, child sexual exploitation, and drug abuse (Daria Litvinova, 2021). Roskomnadzor threatened to block the social network entirely within thirty days if it did not delete the material and demonstrate a more cooperative attitude toward takedown requests from the Russian authorities (Daria Litvinova, 2021). While the authorities presented their moves as aimed at protecting children and the general public, such requests routinely include material generated by Russian political opposition groups and other avowed foes of the Russian government.

The throttling of Twitter provided the Russian authorities with a test case for the use of DPI technology to improve state control over the internet. Several unrelated sites were knocked offline on the day the offensive was launched, creating embarrassment for Roskomnadzor. The necessary technical adjustments were quickly implemented, and between March and May 2021, Twitter users in Russia experienced reduced speeds for downloads of posts containing photos and videos (Moscow Times, 2021).

Roskomnadzor and prominent Russian government officials make no secret about their desire to use Twitter as an illustration of what awaits other firms that do not comply with their requests. Given the social network's relatively small user base in Russia, the Kremlin clearly thinks it has a free hand to operate without risking a wide public backlash. The government has so far acted with greater restraint against certain platforms, such as YouTube, that lack popular Russia-based equivalents.

Essentially, the Russian government's position has hardened significantly to make U.S.-based transnational tech giants obey Russian laws and regulations. In the information age, this is a critical element of national sovereignty. The fact that the U.S. Congress has criticized and scrutinized some tech companies, such as Facebook, has strengthened the Russian argument that in a globalized world, national governments cannot afford to leave internet governance to the tech majors and need to exercise more oversight.

Regulating Foreign Tech Companies

As the Russian authorities pursue further moves to regulate foreign social networks and tech companies, they appear to be looking to Turkish internet legislation as a model. The regulation of social networks in Turkey also requires the storage of all customer data on servers in the country and the removal of any content the authorities deem offensive or defamatory. In July 2020, the Turkish parliament passed legislation that obliged all social networks with more than 1 million active users per day to open an official representative office in Turkey, and many companies have chosen to comply (Marc Santora, 2020).

The Russian parliament adopted a law in 2021 imposing taxes on foreign tech companies. The legislation requires such firms with over 500,000 users to register subsidiaries or representative offices in Russia and pay taxes there. There is widespread support for the law among the Russian tech community, whose members claim that they pay value-added tax and other taxes while foreigners continue to make a lot of money in Russia and pay nothing (Yulia Stepanova, 2021). It is unclear, however, whether the Russian government will be as successful as Turkey's in persuading foreign companies to comply with this new legislation.

Financial Governance

Russia joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1992 as a borrower but soon became a creditor. A key issue in Russia's relations with the fund has been a redistribution of the quotas on which members' voting rights are based. The need for this redistribution comes from the changing balance in the global economy and the rise in developing countries' share in global gross domestic product (GDP), which increased from 36.1 percent in 1990 to 58.1 percent in 2016 (International Monetary Fund, 2016). Yet, Group of Seven (G7) countries still make the major decisions, and the impact of the emerging economies is small. Developed countries also increasingly ask the IMF for financial assistance, while emerging economies contribute to the global financial recovery.

Russia, along with other BRICS members, sees reform of the international financial architecture as a priority. All of the BRICS countries except South Africa are among the ten IMF members with the greatest quota shares, and their combined quota share has risen from 11.5 percent in 2008 to 14.7 percent in 2016 — still short of the 15 percent needed to block decisions on major issues (RT, 2016). If the BRICS countries manage to get support from several other members, they could exert a considerable impact on the IMF's decisions. However, the fund's members are still debating the quota formula.

Russia is a member of the New Development Bank (NDB), which was developed by the BRICS countries.

Moscow sees the bank as a complement to the Bretton Woods international financial institutions and a means to focus on infrastructure and sustainable development projects. As Russia is going through a process of de-dollarization, it promotes the use of national currencies in international trade. Thus, it supports the NDB in using national currencies in lending to developing countries.

After joining the World Bank Group in 1992, Russia soon became a partner and now participates in various regional World Bank initiatives. Russia promotes reform of the bank with the aims of creating a more democratic governance structure, widening the bank's financial possibilities, and reviewing its share capital. Increasing the World Bank's capital has been one of the thornier issues. Russia supports developing countries that demand additional capitalization to increase the volume of credits. Moscow understands developing countries' complaint about the deficit of financial resources allocated to infrastructure projects. From Russia's own perspective, a major problem in its interaction with the World Bank has been anti-Russian sanctions, which have led to the suspension of the bank's activities in Russia.

For many years, Russia has promoted reform of the global system of reserve currencies. That agenda includes expansion of the basket of currencies that determine the value of the IMF's special drawing rights (SDRs)—an international reserve asset that supplements members' official reserves. Over a decade ago, Russia proposed diversifying the list of reserve currencies on the basis of a set of measures to stimulate the development of major regional financial centers. Specifically, Russia proposed including BRICS currencies in the SDR currency basket (Reuters, 2009). The IMF, however, rejected the notion of conferring the status of reserve currency onto the Russian ruble. Experts pointed to the modest scale of the ruble's emission and its inability to satisfy enormous demand (Yakov Mirkin, 2022).

Since then, Western skepticism about the potential internationalization of the ruble has only grown. Russia's economy has not been doing well in the past decade, and the country's relations with the West were undermined by the 2014 Ukraine crisis. The ruble's share of global trade, which stood at 1.6 percent in 2013, had sunk to 1.1 percent by 2016 (Bank for International Settlements, 2016). By contrast, the IMF's 2015 decision to add the Chinese renminbi to the SDR basket resulted in the Chinese currency accounting for 10.9 percent of the basket in 2016 (Robert Kahn, 2015).

Russia is a founding member of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system. Russia's central bank uses FSB recommendations to improve banking regulation in the country. Moscow also uses FSB norms and standards to bring itself to the global level in various fields, such as mechanisms to regulate bank insolvency and fintech development.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia assumed responsibility for Soviet foreign debt, which stood at more than \$100 billion (David Robinson & David Edwin Wynn Owen, 2003). Moscow fully repaid all of that debt in the 2000s and has since maintained a low debt-to-GDP ratio. From 1992 to 2017, Russia wrote off \$130 billion of debt owed to it, including by Cuba, Iraq, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Syria, and several other countries (Fincan, 2020). As a member of the Group of Eight (G8) from 1998 to 2014, Russia took part in joint action to restructure African countries' debt burden, but Moscow wrote off almost all of the developing countries' debt unilaterally.

According to the World Bank, Russia is currently the fifth-largest sovereign creditor of developing countries — after China, Japan, Germany, and France — and lent \$22.9 billion to thirty countries in 2019 (RBC, 2021). Moscow's principal debtors are Belarus, Bangladesh, and Venezuela. Essentially, globalization has worked to bring Russia's lending terms and practices more in line with current international models.

Reforming Global Taxation

International tax regulation is needed for economic activity that transcends borders. This pertains to tech companies that can operate in a country's cyberspace while being physically absent from that country. International taxation is based on compromise among tax jurisdictions. Such compromise, in turn, is based on the norms of treaties on avoiding double taxation.

As tax-regulating bodies imply a partial loss of control over tax flows, Russia opposes the creation of a supranational fiscal regulator. Russia is open to cooperation, however, and the Eurasian Economic Union interacts with the International Fiscal Association, the International Tax and Investment Center, the Intra-European Organization of Tax Administrations, and other bodies.

In the mid-2010s, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) raised the issue of the unfair distribution of the taxes of transnational corporations. Developing new approaches to international taxation became the number one priority of the action plan on base erosion and profit shifting — the practice of aggressive tax avoidance — led by the OECD and the Group of Twenty (G20). According to the 2023 priorities for Russia's fiscal policy, Moscow strongly supports new approaches to taxing digital companies so that tax on profits is paid in the jurisdictions where those profits are generated (Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 2020).

Russia is considering imposing a new digital tax on companies that use data on Russians to shape their advertising policies in the country, such as advertising tailored to individuals. The taxes collected in this way would be directed to support Russia's tech industry.

In addition, Russia is taking steps to counter aggressive tax planning by multinational corporations and, more broadly, reduce the parts of the country's economy that are based offshore — a process known as de-offshorization. Companies sometimes misuse agreements on double taxation to avoid paying tax altogether. Also, some multinationals use international agreements such that profit generated in the countries where they operate is declared in the countries with the lowest tax rates. The Russian government is therefore taking measures to stop the use of offshore entities to escape taxation in Russia. Moscow has introduced a rule of insufficient capitalization, which limits accounting for the interest on loan agreements and reduces exemptions under international accords in cases of cross-border financial transactions (Kommersant, 2015).

The Climate Change Agenda

In the area of climate change, Russia's policy mix cannot be categorized as that of either an advanced or a less developed country. Russia is a major global emitter: fourth in overall volume, and sixth if its vast forests are taken into account (Kommersant Ekologiya, 2012). The Soviet Union used to have the world's second-largest carbon emissions (Adnan Vatansever & Anna Korppoo, 2012). Since then, Russia has halved its emissions from 3.1 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent in 1990 to 1.6 billion tons in 2020 (A. Ignat'eva, 2021). There is no risk of Russia not living up to its national commitment to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 70 percent relative to 1990 levels by 2030. The country will play a significant role in the future as a global exporter of hydrocarbons, and decarbonization will have a major impact on Russia.

Not being a rich country, Russia is in no hurry to dramatically cut its emissions because of the high cost that doing so would entail for the national economy. Russia is yet to recognize the need to cut emissions now to reduce future damage. The expectation still lingers that global warming will turn out to be a net positive for the

country, such as by expanding agricultural activity toward the country's north and making the Northern Sea Route commercially navigable. That is despite very clear risks to the infrastructure that rests on permafrost, which covers almost two-thirds of Russia's territory. Moscow is prepared to be criticized but is unlikely to change its attitude as a result. Other states also need to recognize that Russian emissions are part of a process of producing goods that are then imported by low-emitting Western European countries. Thus, international efforts are needed to properly deal with the problem.

Indeed, there is a limit to what any one country can do on its own territory. Of key importance is to ensure a proper match between Western money and emissions-cutting projects in less developed countries. This linkage can be seen as a form of compensation for industrialized countries' historical emissions. Russia is not expected to be a large financial donor in this regard. Nevertheless, Moscow has declared its readiness to transfer a modest amount of money to the climate fund established in the framework of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, with the purpose of using that money for projects in Central Asia (Green Climate Fund, 2020). From the Russian perspective, it would be fair if Western Europe were to fund projects in Russia that are aimed at lowering emissions while producing goods — such as metals, petrochemicals, and fertilizers — that are intended for the EU market.

A Differentiated Approach to Adaptation

In return, adaptation should become a priority for Russia, as it is for developing countries. Moscow is likely to join the developing world in emphasizing this goal but does not expect significant international assistance to meet it. Rather, Russia should actively adapt to climate change, particularly in those parts of the country that are most affected, such as the agricultural territories of Krasnodar and Stavropol in southern Russia and the vast northern regions of Siberia that rest on permafrost.

At the end of 2019, the Russian government approved a national plan of adaptation to climate change (Moscow Times, 2021). However, this was only the beginning of a long process for Russia. Moscow needs to organize proper monitoring of climate developments, raise the competence of those dealing with the topic, and draw up specific adaptation plans for its many regions. There are also bureaucratic issues. Responsibility for adapting to climate change and cutting emissions is vested in the Ministry of Economic Development. However, since most emissions result from the burning of fossil fuels, the relevant technologies are the preserve of the Ministry of Energy. Other government departments should also be involved, from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Defense, which is largely responsible for the Arctic.

The core problem is that sustainability and growth cannot be reconciled at all stages of economic development. In the long term, fostering economic growth and solving environmental problems such as emissions can go in parallel, but poorer nations at certain stages of their development cannot achieve both, particularly without external assistance. Resource-rich countries such as Russia face their own problems. To reconcile growth and ecological sustainability, Russia must completely transform its economy: not only oil and gas production but also the manufacture of metals, fertilizers, pulp and paper, and so on. The complete transformation of a national economy is a mammoth task and a hyperexpensive enterprise. Moreover, someone still has to engage in dirty production for the benefit of the global economy.

On carbon pricing, the view in Moscow is that there should be different mechanisms for different countries (Climate Action Tracker, 2022). It would be a huge mistake for Russia to introduce the types of systems that operate in the EU, such as trade in quotas. Russia needs a different form of carbon pricing, for example a

replacement for energy taxes. Russia has high energy taxes that are imposed exclusively on companies' excess profits. These taxes could be recalibrated on the basis of how dirty relevant production is, thus stimulating the generation of cleaner energy. Potentially, Russia can greatly raise the energy efficiency of its economy. In the same vein, Moscow should also spur the replacement of coal with natural gas. This is effectively another form of carbon pricing built into the energy system.

Misplaced European Efforts

In general, developed countries should pay more than developing nations to address climate change. It would also make sense to encourage European companies to carry out green projects in the developing world. Emissions cuts produced in this way should then count toward European countries' commitments to emissions reductions. It is cheaper to cut emissions in Russia — not to mention China and India — than in the EU. Money would buy far more emissions cuts in the developing world than in developed countries.

Yet, the EU seeks to reduce greenhouse gas emissions on its territory to zero, which makes little sense in terms of dealing with climate change. The EU accounted for only 8 percent of global emissions in 2018, and money spent on bringing that figure to zero could be used much more efficiently to reduce emissions in other parts of the world (European Environment Agency, May 29, 2020). It is true that reducing emissions in Europe would stimulate the European economy and support European producers, but this has little to do with climate change.

The EU's European Green Deal, a set of policy initiatives that aim to make Europe climate neutral by 2050 — in conjunction with similar decarbonization plans announced by China and Japan and the policies of U.S. President Joe Biden — presents Russia with a serious challenge. The EU's introduction of a transborder carbon tax, to be imposed from 2023 on companies that export certain goods to the union, will affect Russia. Transforming the Russian economy in the short term is impossible, so Moscow will immediately try to offset the EU tax by seeking areas where its losses will be compensated, if only partly. However, in the longer term, global trends will push Russia toward structural changes in its economy that make the country less vulnerable to these trends. In the energy field, such changes would include a focus on hydrogen energy.

Conclusion

The third decade of the twenty-first century could be a decisive period for Russia as it looks for a prominent and influential place in the global system. The multipolar world that Russians long spoke about has, in essence, arrived. The United States is still the preeminent power but no longer the hegemon. China has risen fast and high. Beijing is not merely just another center of power but a formidable challenger to Washington for global primacy. A U.S.-Chinese duopoly is already in place, and it puts Russia and several other countries in an uncomfortable position as they seek to avoid a hard bloc division of the world. Despite its confrontation with the United States and its close relationship with China, which one might call an entente, Russia does not want to become part of a Pax Sinica.

Russia not only has to deal with the two superpowers and try to maintain some sort of equilibrium, if not equidistance, between them. It also has to manage other ambitious powers, such as Turkey; pursue parallel partnerships with the two rival Asian giants, China and India; and work on a *modus vivendi* with its geographically closest and uniquely complex neighbor, the EU, with which relations have severely deteriorated. For Russia, finding its way in this complicated environment without losing balance will not be easy.

In terms of urgency and scale, Russia's biggest challenge will be to organize an orderly energy transition away from the post-Soviet reliance on hydrocarbons as the biggest source of revenues for the state budget. To meet this challenge, Moscow will have to bring climate- and environment-related issues to the center of its policy agenda; devise and implement a strategy of energy transition, including the transformation of the energy industry; and, last but not least, develop effective climate diplomacy to negotiate with Russia's economic partners, who are way ahead of it in terms of adapting to a carbon-free economy.

It is unlikely that Russia's confrontation with the West will significantly subside soon. The realistic objective there is to manage that confrontation well, so that it does not lead to an inadvertent collision. As Russia's U.S. adversaries will continue to largely control the global financial system, Moscow needs to develop alternatives that permit it to lower its dependence on dollar-denominated transactions. An even bigger challenge is to reduce technological dependence on the West without becoming overly reliant on Russia's big partner, China — as is the case in international finance. Russia cannot meet this challenge without a major effort that requires transitioning from a rent-based economy to one that encourages innovation.

Finally, while doing all of the above, Russia has to avoid the danger of sliding into autarky economically and a besieged fortress politically. Engagement with all other parties in the globalized system, including one's political adversaries, is a must for any player who does not want to be left behind and become irrelevant. The 2020s may well be the time for a major political transition in Russia. The outcome of that transition — and the policies adopted as a result — will probably shape Russia's place and role in the world for much of the twenty-first century.

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Five-Eyes Intelligence Education: A Conversation with Stakeholders from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States

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The Five-Eyes Intelligence Education was established in 2018 to explore innovative and collaborative educational and research opportunities, with the goal of developing a cadre of “highly educated, skilled and effective” members in each nation's intelligence enterprise. Five Eyes Intelligence Education will place students in a safe environment that encourages creative thinking to work in scenarios at the national and defense levels. The challenges are ultimately divided into policy-based and pragmatic-based. The Five-Eyes Intelligence Education can help the U.S. better understand the analytical space between different worldviews. There are three fundamental pillars to success: experience, exposure and education.

Keywords: Five-Eyes Intelligence Education, Major General Howard, stakeholders

“Necessity is the mother of Invention.”

World War II posed a significant intelligence challenge to the Western allies. The German government used assorted models of a specific cipher device, that would come to be known in the West as “Enigma”. The cryptographic effort against this system, led by the British, was known as ULTRA. The Japanese used its own version of this device; the cryptographic effort against this system, run by the Americans, was known as MAGIC. As the war, and the astounding effects of cryptographic success, progressed, both the Americans and British found it in their best interests to collaborate and share expertise. Personnel and data exchanges took place; the British Empire provided multiple locations from which signals interception operations could take place.

After the war's conclusion, both London and Washington agreed that continuing the wartime relationship made sense, and in 1946 both parties signed the BRUSA Agreement. Known today as the UKUSA Agreement, this pact is widely viewed as the beginning of the Five-Eyes intelligence community. This agreement would later expand to include Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Marr-Johnson & Vandenberg, 1946; RAND, 2017).

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In 2018, a Five-Eyes joint planning effort was formed for the purpose of exploring innovative and collaborative education and research opportunities, with the ultimate goal of developing a cadre of “highly educated, skilled, and effective” members within each country’s intelligence enterprise (Department of Defense, 2018).

Interviewers: What are the existing intelligence education programs in your country, including current arrangements with civilian and government academic institutions as it applies to intelligence education?

Five-Eyes Partners: Dean Hammersen quickly pointed out that the United States has two distinct classes of “intelligence education.” The first, and by far the largest, are the programs offered by public universities and colleges that teach *about* intelligence, referencing both conventional institutions like Mercyhurst University, as well as online offerings found at American Military University and others. The second class of intelligence education is unique, conducted by NIU. The National Intelligence University is the only education and research institution in the country that is authorized to teach intelligence, in a classified environment, using actual classified material. All faculty, staff and students require security clearances.

Dr. Kennedy reported that the Australian National University’s (ANU) National Security College can also conduct classified lectures and research. The program is a joint initiative with the government. ANU’s Canberra location draws senior government officials that teach on a rotational basis and give students unique access to learning about high-level national security and policymaking issues. Dr. Kennedy went on to mention that the Australian Defence Force Academy complements the government’s approach to national security education matters through a unique partnership between the Department of Defence and the University of New South Wales. This relationship is designed to prepare future military officers for global challenges. Finally, Dr. Kennedy highlighted the importance of non-government institutions, such as Macquarie University. These types of higher education establishments focus on law enforcement intelligence and further support the nation’s intelligence and law enforcement apparatus.

Mr. Glascott described the United Kingdom’s approach, that uses a mix of education and training. King’s College London’s Intelligence and International Security program is uniquely positioned at the intersection of intelligence education, broadly defined. This is augmented by training done at the Joint Intelligence Training Group and Defence College of Intelligence located in Chicksands, Bedfordshire. Mr. Glascott was also keen on the possibility of an Intelligence Academy, if approved by Parliament, that would be run by the Cabinet Office’s National Security and Intelligence group, projected for mid-2019. The Academy is expected to have an estimated 50 faculty members and 400 students built with Five-Eyes collaboration in mind.

In Ottawa, the Centre for Security, Intelligence and Defence Studies (CSIDS) is situated within Carleton University’s Norman Patterson School of International Affairs. Mr. Cheliak cites CSIDS as a foundational element of Canada’s intelligence, security, and defence education. CSIDS also provides continuing education and training to the broader community of intelligence professionals. Additionally, the Privy Council Office conducts education and training for Canada’s intelligence members as well. Lt Col Stephens (NZ) referenced a standing arrangement with at least one tertiary institution in New Zealand, Victoria University of

Wellington’s Centre for Strategic Studies. The Centre provides a pathway for education on New Zealand’s security interests, and regional and global security challenges.

Interviewers: What do you see as the opportunities for students by creating a Five-Eyes intelligence education program?

Five-Eyes Partners: Dr. Kennedy summed it up best by saying, “It would be an excellent opportunity for

collaboration!” And the collaboration theme rang true with the other Five-Eye partners, as well. Lt Col Stephens looked at it from a historical perspective, referencing Five-Eyes interagency operational efforts that have proven successful in recent decades that can only be enriched. Additionally, Lt Col Stephens believed that improved person-to-person connections across the breadth of the Five-Eyes intelligence enterprise may allow for a more diverse set of foundational experiences and perspectives for everyone’s intelligence professionals. Mr. Cheliak agreed, stating that the educational experience could bridge cultural differences versus studying solely in isolation in Canada.

Messrs. Glascott and Cheliak pointed to the need to establish tradecraft norms and a common vocabulary. Mr. Glascott’s contention is that through an established joint intelligence education program, over time policymakers can be assured that Five-Eyes partners are functioning with a higher level of consistency across the enterprise. He went on further to say that Five-Eyes training is already happening and that bringing education into the conversation is long overdue. In his words, “Five-Eyes intelligence education would place students in a safe environment that encourages creative thinking to work through national-level and defence-based scenarios.”

Dean Hammersen offered a practical viewpoint on the opportunities presented by the program. First, a Five-Eye intelligence education program would be great preparation for a Five-Eye duty assignment, in which the graduate would serve on the intelligence staff of a sister Five-Eye nation. Another opportunity would be preparation for assignment to a Joint or Coalition staff, in both the headquarters and the deployed environments. Finally, a Five-Eye intelligence education program would be of value to a graduate who never had an exchange assignment, by affording the graduate the ability to understand how partner nations’ intelligence systems function.

Interviewers: What do you see as the challenges to making a Five-Eyes intelligence education program work?

Five-Eyes Partners: Mr. Glascott’s advice is that a releasable-mindset must exist from the beginning. He posits that those involved should not try to take existing courses and make them releasable. The curriculum should be created with Five-Eyes partners in mind and not be overclassified. Dr. Kennedy also pointed to classification issues, asking if the program even needed to be classified. The question he put forward was, “Does studying in a classified environment constrain thinking?” Mr. Cheliak looked at the question of challenges through a fiscal lens. He doesn’t see any major challenges to making the idea of Five-Eyes intelligence education work. He thinks that the wealth of the Five-Eyes partners is an upside and the program won’t be resource constrained.

Lt Col Stephens’ concern is that those in command or management may be overcome by short-term thinking. He said that the “investment versus reward” dilemma may come into play; there may be unwise attempts to measure the return on Five-Eye intelligence education investment whilst the person is still matriculating through the program or shortly upon arrival at their next posting. He called for those in leadership positions to have patience and to understand that investing time and resources into our collective workforce is for the greater good of the entire Enterprise and will benefit us all long-term.

By Dean Hammersen’s account, the challenges are legion, but ultimately divided into two classes: the policy-based, and the pragmatic-based. At the policy level, he saw any Five-Eyes intelligence education program as requiring a common level of long-term commitment to the concept. Since all nations will ultimately act in their own self-interests, any long-term commitment would be vulnerable to changes in those self-interests. That vulnerability would affect the potential stability and viability of a Five-Eye program. This sentiment was echoed by Dr. Kennedy, who said Australia’s intelligence related areas of study tend to be regionally focused and may not be shared by the other partners.

Dean Hammersen further made the case for policy by illustrating that today's challenges have led to the preponderance of intelligence relationships being bilateral. As a rule, the greater the number of participants, the lower the level of "common denominator" topics. The inverse is also true: the fewer the number of participants, the higher the level of "common denominator" topics. The pragmatic-based challenges are all surmountable, once the policy challenges have been conquered. Access to secure workspaces, access to computers, access to data, all topics that today require a case-by-case decision would be simplified and streamlined by a policy commitment from each of the Five-Eye nations to support common intelligence education.

Interviewers: Do you see a possibility for academic collaboration with like-minded civilian and government universities in your country?

Five-Eyes Partners: Mr. Cheliak emphatically answered, "Yes", and that academic collaboration is already being done in Canada on the national and international levels. Mr. Glascott concurred, affirming King's College London's prominent role in intelligence education. He also reiterated the impact that the United Kingdom's Intelligence Academy will have on

Five-Eye education, if it comes to fruition. Lt Col Stephens said that there is room for collaboration in New Zealand, and that it is essential to work with "like-minded" as well as "non-aligned" institutions to push people out of their comfort zones and afford them an opportunity to grow intellectually.

Macquarie University in Australia was put forward by Dr. Kennedy as an excellent example for possible academic collaboration based on a curriculum that already examines the role of intelligence in a national and international context. Dr. Kennedy also indicated that Australia has hosted academics from the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, and other countries participated. Dean Hammersen submitted that the graduate certificates NIU currently offers Five-Eyes partners on Strategic Warning and East Asian Studies as an example that works. Dr. Kennedy called NIU's certificates the gold standard!

Interviewers: What do you see as Five-Eyes research opportunities going forward?

Five-Eyes Partner: Dr. Markin is excited about the possibilities that Five-Eyes research could offer. His apprehension was based in the question of how to do it in a classified environment. He said NIU's physical space makes it difficult to have non-U.S. persons on-site every day but if NIU had an unclassified satellite campus nearby, Five-Eyes researchers could work between the two locations. What thrilled Dr. Markin most was the perspectives that the Five-Eyes partners would bring, because they approach things differently. He opined that the United States oftentimes views itself as a steady constant but that other countries view America as dynamic.

His thinking is that the Five-Eyes partners could help the United States better understand the analytical space between differing world views.

Dr. Markin was enthusiastic when he said, "Imagine the possibilities. Imagine Australian and New Zealand research fellows working with us on issues related to mainland Southeast Asia. Archipelagic Southeast Asia also becomes a possibility now because they are really the subject matter experts." He went on further to say the unique perspective the United Kingdom would offer on Europe would be one of a kind and he acknowledged the United States could benefit from Canada's knowledge of the Arctic, which is a national security issue for both countries.

Interviewers: Do you have any closing thoughts on Five-Eyes intelligence education?

Five-Eyes Partners: Dr. Kennedy posited that an important first step in the joint planning process is getting a common understanding of what the Five-Eyes partners want to achieve. What is important to each country? He asked will studying East Asia be as important to the other partners as it is to Australia and will it be part of the

academic curriculum? Lt Col Stephens questioned if the curriculum would only support the “warfighter”? He feels that it is time to register the importance of the “peace-makers” who also operate at the strategic level. This could be a shift in the intelligence community’s mindset. In closing, Dean Hammersen stated, “Five-Eyes intelligence education will likely be an evolutionary process, as the participants become more comfortable with the concept and the resulting relationships.”

Interviewers: Major General Howard, where do you see the Five-Eyes intelligence education joint planning effort now and where do you see it going in the future?

Major General Howard Remarks: After hearing the question put forward to him, Major General Howard paused and responded, “The Five-Eyes intelligence education joint planning effort is nowhere near perfect but nowhere near stationary either. The train is on the way but not sure we’ve agreed on the destination. I think somewhere in the middle is the right answer.” He then began discussing the challenges of classification issues, citing the example of a currently-serving FVEY intelligence officer who, years earlier, had been a fully-integrated intelligence analyst in an American intelligence agency, with full access to US systems and data. Today, such an assignment would not be possible. He went on to state “We are in retrograde. The Five-Eyes partners have been working together since WW II sharing intelligence and flying on Lancaster bombers together, and many other endeavors since then. What happened? Education could be what brings us back together.”

Major General Howard said there are three fundamental pillars to success: Experience, Exposure, and Education. Experience is gained with time as a practitioner. Exposure allows someone to appreciate multiple perspectives. This can be achieved by taking assignments in other countries or organizations. Exposure complements experience. However, he concluded by saying education is essential and brings it all together. He believes that’s where NIU can help.

The National Intelligence University can ensure the analytical rigor required shows up in the classroom and put the Five-Eye partners on a path to a common vocabulary in the intelligence profession, but he insisted it must be an agile and adaptive approach.

Major General Howard strongly believes in cross-pollinating the workforce, using his own experience as a Pathfinder platoon commander in both NZ and the UK as an example. He offered up the idea that future students could possibly receive “Five-Eyes joint duty assignment” credit like the joint duty assignment credit NIU full-time students currently receive. He ended by saying, “There are opportunities, but it may require deep cultural changes. Education is how we diversify analytical thoughts and mindsets and build the next generation of intelligence professionals.”

Interviewers: Major General Howard is invested in NIU and the Five-Eyes intelligence education joint planning effort. He has lectured students in the certificate and degree granting programs since taking over as the Defense Intelligence Agency’s second Deputy Director for Commonwealth Integration on January 20, 2018.

Speaking via video to a conference in San Diego, Dr. Scott Cameron, president of the National Intelligence University, stated “One of my main themes...was that delivering a truly joint, Five-Eye approach to accredited, intelligence-based higher education [requires] us to build the full breadth of partnerships with you that reflect your perspectives, your investments, and subject matter expertise in intelligence and national security based education, research and scholarship as well as the academic and public/private partnerships that strengthen our ability to educate and develop our next generation of leaders. Given that intelligence-based education is one of the priorities of our Five-Eye strategic plan, I’m pleased to say that the process of building out the foundations of our broader academic partnerships is already well underway thanks to the efforts of the Joint Planning Group, which is

aggressively pursuing an inventory of the relevant assets, programs, and resources in each of our nations. By having that collective understanding of the best minds among us — the academics, subject matter experts, researchers, and thought leaders — across our five nations, we can proceed to use those assets as building blocks in a truly joint educational endeavor.”

There are some who hold that Five-Eyes intelligence education is already happening, pointing to NIU’s Strategic Warning and East Asia certificate programs. Others believe that integrated Five Eye students, and faculty, into the degree granting programs and research fellow opportunities are the ultimate gauge of success. Both positions illustrate that Five-Eyes intelligence education could serve as a critical piece to meeting the 2019 National Intelligence Strategy’s Enterprise Objective 6 which “seeks to enhance intelligence through partnerships.”

To date, only one Five-Eyes student has graduated with a degree from the National Intelligence University. Major General Steve Meekin, AM (Retd), was an Australian officer assigned to DIA over 30 years ago. He took classes on a part-time basis and was awarded a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) degree on December 16, 1987. Meekin would later retire as Australia’s Deputy Secretary of Defence in July 2016.

To the participants in this important endeavor, on behalf of the entire Five-Eyes intelligence community, as well as government and non-government academics everywhere that are eager to assist, thank you for your time and for sharing your thoughts and ideas. We wish you all the best as you continue your work on the Five-Eyes intelligence education joint planning effort.

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Cooperation of BRICS and Institutional investors in Russia: Problems and Prospects

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The subject of this study is the legal and financial features of the BRICS trade and economic cooperation and the practice of their application in modern conditions. The purpose of this article is to identify problems that impede the effective development of economic relations and put forward proposals for their improvement. The study showed that the BRICS countries have significant reserves for multilateral cooperation and support of trade and economic relations. In this regard, harmonization of trade and economic relations of partner countries is necessary, in order to solve strategic problems and improve the living standards of the population. It is shown that simplifying the access of entrepreneurs to credit, tax incentives for exporters of industrial goods, flexible conditions for direct and indirect financing of projects and programs, expanding the participation of BRICS development banks and institutional investors contributes to the progressive development of national economies and improving trade and economic relations of BRICS. For research purposes, IBOV INDEX (Brazil), CRTX INDEX (Russia), SENSEX INDEX (India), SHCOMP INDEX (China), JALSH INDEX (South Africa) and Bloomberg platform (WEI, DES, GP, XLTP XCIT, MEMB) materials were used. Evaluation of data in key sectors of the BRICS economies showed the existence of interconnectedness and interdependence of the BRICS trading floor indices-sources of direct financing for trade and economic cooperation of partner countries. Correlation analysis and cointegration of time series confirmed a solid foundation for stimulating multilateral cooperation of the BRICS, including on the basis of interstate support for business entities and expanding the participation of institutional investors in ensuring sustainable development of the BRICS. It is concluded that the results of the study can be used in developing measures of interstate support for trade and economic cooperation of BRICS in modern conditions.

Keywords: BRICS, trade and economic cooperation, interstate support, institutional investors, stock market, indices

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Introduction

Trade and economic cooperation of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is one of the priority areas of the Economic Partnership Strategy of member countries. In the list of key objectives of this Strategy, an important place is played by promoting trade cooperation, expanding access to the stock markets of member countries and diversifying investment cooperation. It was noted that active trade cooperation, along with other areas, is designed to strengthen balanced and inclusive economic growth, as well as increase the level of international competitiveness of the BRICS economies, which account for 17.3% of world trade in goods, 12.7% of world trade in services, 21% of global gross domestic product (GDP).

Currently, the process of the development of trade-economic relations and expansion of use of national currencies of BRICS countries in ensuring economic relations, which of the following reasons: the output of the currency outside the country, which is the result of the development of trade-economic contacts of the partner countries; important sectors of the circulation of the national currency, in countries outside of their vehicles, are trade, financial services and tourism; some national currencies of partner countries are able to perform the functions of money abroad, and to ensure the implementation of international cooperation; use of national currencies of the BRICS affect the development of trade and cross-border regions and neighboring “third countries”: Mongolia, Vietnam, the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union, etc. increased use of national currencies in international economic relations of the countries — participants of world economic relations — is largely due to the development of trade cooperation, which plays an important role in ensuring interaction between the parties. Areas of interactions are energy, oil products, wood processing, agriculture, machinery and equipment, production of construction materials. Good prospects for the use of national currencies remain in the sphere of export-import operations, development of infrastructure, transport, medicine, new technologies, environmental protection. From our perspective, the use of national currencies is associated with the state of trade and economic cooperation, which depends on the conditions of economic cooperation and political will. In this regard, the development of mechanism of public-private partnerships, and the creation of joint enterprises, with participation of business entities of the BRICS, play an important role. State support for commercial, industrial centers, aimed at expanding trade ties, can open up broad prospects, including in the framework of implementation of investment projects, joint ventures, the activities of small and medium enterprises. The basis of the interaction of the parties is the legal framework of BRICS and the agreement between the central banks of partner countries (reached in 2007) on the increasing use of national currencies, including in the service sector. The infrastructure of the central banks of member countries, stock markets, development banks, with the participation of BRICS, is currently operating. It is important to note the positive dynamics of the interaction of the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) with the participants in the trade and economic relations of BRICS. In order to implement the agreements, it is important to use the levers of agreed benefits and preferences, as the main incentive for entrepreneurs is “profitable business”.

Fundamentals of BRICS Economic Cooperation in Trade

The purposeful desire to expand and strengthen ties in the field of trade and investment is gaining more and more clear guidelines and is reflected in the main BRICS documents. On July 9th 2015, the BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy up to 2020 (project of the Ministry of Economic Development) was adopted at the initiative of Russia, which is aimed at expanding multilateral business cooperation, in order to accelerate

social and economic development and increase the competitiveness of BRICS participants in the world economy in key areas of world economic relations: trade and investment, manufacturing and mining, energy, cooperation in agriculture, science, technology, innovation, finance, tourism and etc. The project is currently being implemented on the basis of the existing ministries in the member countries: a system of interaction and agencies listed in the Strategy for Economic Partnership areas. Representatives of BRICS make proposals on the areas of cooperation specified in the Strategy for Economic Partnership for the purpose of discussion within the Working Groups and decision-making at the annual BRICS Summits.

The actual task of development of multilateral trade cooperation in the BRICS format provided in the Declaration of October 16th, 2016, adopted at the VIII summit of the BRICS in Goa, India. The leaders expressed confidence in the need to further stimulate the growth of regional integration, with the strict observance of the principles of openness and equality, in order to ensure the development of investment, trade and commercial ties. The Declaration of Goa emphasizes the importance of public and private infrastructure investment, the strengthening of multilateral and non-discriminatory, multilateral trading system, consistent implementation of key economic initiatives, including the development of cross-border e-Commerce and support to small and medium-sized businesses. It is also noted the importance of strengthening cooperation between the customs agencies of the BRICS on the basis of the agreed positions of the countries. With the development of trade-economic cooperation between the partner countries and the implementation of the tasks set in the Strategy of Economic Partnership of the BRICS in October 2016, India hosted the First exhibition-fair of BRICS TRADE FAIR. The Russian exposition was attended by 43 companies, including: JSC “Russian Export Center”, JSC “RVC”, FMBA, JSC “Sberbank”, the “Russian Helicopters” holding company, JSC “Russian Railways” and others. The company DNBD Interactive Forums, India was also created by the information coordinator of the Russian exposition in New Delhi. The exhibition-fair has created new opportunities for the BRICS cooperation in trade, investment, defense industry, finance, agriculture, which was further developed in the investment program of the NDB BRICS. The exhibition was held at the meeting of the Business Council of member countries of BRICS. It seems appropriate to keep the format of business contacts between economic entities of the BRICS in the framework of exhibitions, forums, business meetings.

In turn, in the BRICS Amoy Declaration of September 4th, 2017, the attention of countries is focused on the formation of the BRICS Working Group of countries in the field of electronic commerce, the creation of the BRICS Electronic Ports Network, the phased implementation of cooperation framework programs, roadmaps and the basic principles of trade and investment facilitation. It is important to note that partner countries have taken a course towards enhancing cooperation in the field of public-private partnership (PPP). The necessity of developing the potential of BRICS interbank cooperation, jointly resolving issues of lending in national currency and cooperation, in the field of sharing credit-rating data, is emphasized. At the 2017 summit, the BRICS leaders agreed to maintain close ties, in order to develop cooperation in the monetary and financial sphere, in accordance with the mandate of the central banks of each country, including through currency swap transactions, settlements in the national currency and direct investments in the national currency, as well as to study other modalities of cooperation in the field of facilitating the establishment of links between markets, infrastructure and financial integration, in the interests of ensuring interconnected development.

The Johannesburg Declaration of the Tenth BRICS Summit, adopted on July 26th, 2018, emphasizes the importance of forming and actively using the specialized BRICS agricultural research platform, the development of industrial coastal zones, improving the predictability and security of foreign trade relations, the

need to ensure industrial development, and solving infrastructure problems, including expanding financing for infrastructure development. The indicated areas of cooperation are directly related to the expansion of interstate support for trade and economic ties of the BRICS. The Johannesburg Declaration also emphasized the prospect of introducing block chain technologies (distributed registry) and noted their role in adapting to the rapidly-developing Internet economy. In accordance with the declaration in question, the countries commit themselves to further expand their strategic partnership for the benefit of the BRICS people through a more equitable international order. In this regard, it is important to note the initiative to create PartNIR (BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution) and, in particular, the establishment of the BRICS Partnership Advisory Group. In December 2018, the first meeting of the BRICS PartNIR advisory group was held in South Africa, during which the parties approved a concept that envisages expanding the interaction of the parties, including in the field of trade, in order to help solve key tasks of the development of national economies.

In addition, the BRICS countries expressed their intention to contribute to the development and search for solutions to key tasks in the framework of the Brazilian Declaration of 2019. In September 2019, the second meeting of the PartNIR advisory group was held in Brasilia, in which the Work Plan for Further Actions was approved. In October 2019, the Ministry of Economic Development presented the concept of an updated BRICS Economic Partnership Strategy until 2025, and in February 2020, draft Memorandum of Cooperation and an updated PartNIR Work Plan were prepared, which are to be approved in the year of the Russian BRICS chairmanship. Currently, BRICS countries do not have PartNIR obligations. However, work is underway to coordinate the interaction of the parties, within the framework of the Russian chairmanship of the BRICS, in 2020.

Issues related to the goals and objectives, incentives and obstacles in the field of trade and economic cooperation of the BRICS are also discussed at meetings of ministers and senior officials, as part of meetings of working groups and experts. For example, on the basis of the eighth meeting of the BRICS economics and foreign trade ministers in Magaliburg (South Africa) on July 5th, 2018, priority areas for multilateral cooperation are outlined: prospects for trade in value-added goods, features of electronic commerce, a unified approach to the development of trade in services by countries. Promotion of the use of national currencies in ensuring trade cooperation between countries is reflected in the materials of the meetings of the finance ministers and the managers of the central banks of BRICS.

The presented initiatives contribute to the expansion of multilateral cooperation of the countries:

— members of the interstate association. Modern statistics from international organizations, and also materials from BRICS publications, confirm the existence of significant achievements in the field of trade. According to the BRICS Business Council, for the period 2001-2019, there was a significant increase in the share of trade within the BRICS (intra-group), in the total foreign trade turnover of member countries, from 6.2% to 11.2%. From 1990-2019, the BRICS share in world production increased from 5.4% to 22.8%. However, the growth of the BRICS share, excluding China, was less significant (from 3.7% to 7.9%) [UNCTAD, 2019]. It should be noted also that an important role in the development of BRICS trade and economic relations belongs to institutional investors and their economic activities backed by the strategic interests of member-states.

Institutional Investors as a Factor of Development of BRICS Trade and Economic Cooperation

Practice has shown that sovereign investors play an important role in the development of trade-economic cooperation, contributing to the objectives of domestic and foreign policy of the countries — participants of world economic relations. Currently, when competing for sovereign investors, the BRICS face stiff competition and high economic and political risks. It should be noted that sanctions pressure, as a method of competitive struggle for markets and spheres of influence, remains, which is not conducive to the extension of access to Western loans, direct investment and technology. In addition, the result of a complex epidemiological situation of a global pandemic is slowing the progressive development of strategic sectors of the economies of partner countries. In these circumstances, an important role, in the optimization of trade and economic cooperation, the BRICS must play is development of institutions. It seems appropriate to note that their participation in the business processes stimulates the development of innovative industries, contributes to the re-engineering of production processes and the development of multilateral trade, by mobilizing sources of credit and financing of development programs in the interests of economic entities. Overall, the national economies (at the BRICS summit) provided a historic opportunity to modernize basic industries and the transition to new management principles, including international economic relations, in the conditions of overcoming the consequences of the epidemiological challenges and inter-support among the BRICS economies. In this situation, it is important to “take a course” on full volume development of production and processing of products, the formation of production chains and flexible promotion of trade and economic cooperation between partner countries. It should be noted that long-term binding of the state budget, to the price of the hydrocarbon feedstock, contributes to the formation of a new technological mode of operation of the new industrial revolution. The market price of hydrocarbons’, as is known, depends not only on the market and the demands of the global economy and political risk. The price of oil becomes a tool of “big politics” pressure on the sovereign interests of the countries, which affects the state of the oil industry and its exports, the financial sector and national currency. The high level of lending rates is not aimed at credit expansion of production facilities, trade financing and is primarily associated with “inflation expectations” in the economy.

In this regard, in order to optimize the lending programs of trade and economic development of key sectors of the BRICS economies, it seems appropriate to follow the path of substitution of foreign borrowing for domestic investment resources of institutional investors, the BRICS. Important supplements to state support of economic development are resources of specialized funds and reserves, formed to promote the development of BRICS. Use of funds development funds identified the legal framework of BRICS and the legislation of each member country. For example, in the Russian Federation, the Reserve Fund provides a balanced budget and National Welfare Fund (NWF) of Russia contributes to the implementation of sustainable projects and the development of the banking sector. In addition, the Russian Federation formed other Federal funds and agencies, the purpose of which is to promote economic development and investment programs.

The Investment Fund of the Russian Federation, the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), the Fund of Housing and Communal Services, investment funds of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI), the Deposit Insurance Agency (DIA), the Federal Center for Project Finance (FCPF), etc. The activities of these funds are directed to the realization of strategic projects. It would also be appropriate to strengthen the role of private investment funds, including large corporations and banks, especially

development banks, to enhance financing of trade cooperation and modernization of the economies of the BRICS. A special role in this context are to invite participation of an insurance companies, private pension funds. It is important to note that the pension assets, and the funds accumulated in insurance companies' long-term, life insurance contracts are key to long-term investment resources. In particular, Russia's Finance Minister, Anton Siluanov, noted that, in modern conditions, the issue of fundraising should be solved not from the state savings and budget: it is necessary to rely on private sources of investment.

Effective use of funds of institutional investors contributes to the attractiveness of investment in the economy and trade relations of BRICS. In this regard, an important direction, of work of public and private institutions, is improving the legal framework for the functioning of institutional investors, in the territories of the partner countries and the targeted use of resources within agreed initiatives, based on state guarantees of projects and development programs aimed at the development of trade-economic cooperation of the countries-partners.

In modern conditions of development of trade-economic cooperation of the BRICS, it seems appropriate to take into account the world experience of implementation of state programs on the basis of public-private partnerships (PPPs), as a key mechanism for modernization of strategic sectors, among the BRICS economies. There is a need for new forms of interaction between state and business, based on new technologies, transfer of competencies to address the important challenges of sustainable development. In this regard, there is an active role to play for a New Development Bank BRICS and other development banks, with the participation of BRICS as key competence centers for the development of PPP market projects. In Russia, for example, "Vnesheconombank" and its subsidiary — Federal Center for Project Finance (FCPF) — are also able to provide effective administration of the programs of development of trade-economic cooperation of the BRICS with the participation of institutional investors, in the partner countries. For the development of capital-intensive social infrastructure projects, it is necessary to apply the tools of PPPs. Insistence of the government to the government of the Russian Federation — study best domestic and foreign experience, the need to make the PPP the most important tool in the implementation of social policy of the Russian Federation, deserved the understanding and comprehensive support for development. In this regard, it seems appropriate to use the mechanisms of direct and indirect financing of trade and economic cooperation of BRICS.

Practice has proved that in the development of market relations, direct financing plays an important role, which can provide replenishment of financial resources of business entities without participation of financial intermediaries.

Stock Markets as a Source of Direct Financing for BRICS: Analytical Approach

Stock markets play an important role in providing the needs of business entities with the necessary resources and perform the function of direct financing (from the market) of development projects and programs. It seems appropriate to determine the characteristics of the interaction of the BRICS stock markets, in order to develop proposals aimed at optimizing the financial resources of trade and the economies of member countries. The information base of the research is the BRICS stock indices: IBOV INDEX (Brazil), CRTX INDEX (Russia), SENSEX INDEX (India), SHCOMP INDEX (China), JALSH INDEX (South Africa) and analytical platforms WEI, DES, GP, XLTP XCIT, MEMB (Bloomberg). The choice of the listed-indices for analysis is due to several reasons. The IBOV Index (IBovespa) is Brazil's main stock index, which accurately reflects the general condition of the Brazilian stock market and Latin America as a whole (liquid, densely-populated,

emerging markets). Similarly, for example, the SENSEX index is the underlying index of the Bombay Stock Exchange in India. Thus, the most representative indices were selected from the point of view of industry representation (in the context of the national economies of the BRICS countries), the dynamics of macroeconomic processes and the construction of investment strategies. The selected indices show quite accurately that the focus of investment by companies, in a number of emerging markets, is manufacturing and high-tech industries, which correlates with trends in the development of trade relations. In order to solve the tasks, the key tools and functions of Bloomberg were used: WEI, DES, GP, XLTP XCIT, MEMB.

It is important to note that evaluating and comparing the structure of BRICS stock market indices, by sector of economy, in different time parameters and taking into account the sectoral “weights” of BRICS national economies, based on Global Industry Standards and their Classification (GICS) showed the relationship of BRICS stock indices and features their dynamics.

The data obtained also indicate that in the structure of the IBOV index (Brazil) by sectors of the economy, the Finance sector is the most important (32.64%), the least — information technology (IT – 0.9%). In the sectoral composition of the index, among the dominant financing sectors are Materials — 13% and Energy — 12.6% (Figure 1).




Figure 1 IBOV Stock Index Structure (Brazil)

In the structure of the FTSE/JSE AFRICA IND 25 index, the Telecommunication technologies sector is the most significant — 43.78%, and the lowest — Information Technologies — 0.27% (Figure 2). In addition, Energy and Utilities account for 13.12% and 10.35% of the stock market, respectively.

In the structure of the CRTX index (Russia), there is a pronounced dominance of the Energy sector — 61.94%, followed by Finance by 21.98% and the lowest weights in the following sectors: Telecommunication Services — 2.44% and Consumer Goods — 1.94% (Figure 3).




Figure 2 The Structure of the FTSE/JSE AFRICA IND 25 Index (South Africa)




Figure 3 Structure of the CRTX Index (Russia)

Comparison of the structures of the indices of Brazil, Russia and South Africa showed the presence of structural differences, which determines the trend of diversification of the BRICS economies and creates conditions for supporting the development of production chains, taking into account the identified indicators. Thus, the Brazilian index is characterized by the dominance of the financial sector, the Russian one by the energy sector, and the African one by telecommunication technologies. It is also possible to note some structural similarities of the IBOV and CRTX indices, in which the first three positions are occupied by the Finance, Materials and Energy sectors, but in a different order and in different proportions in relation to other

sectors. The CRTX index includes 5 sectors, which are also represented in the IBOV index. Comparison of the stock market indices IBOV and FTSE/JSE AFRICA IND 25 revealed the diversification of their structure, in contrast to the structure of the stock index CRTX (Russia). In addition, many of the sector names in the structure of the IBOV (Brazil) and FTSE/JSE AFRICA IND 25 (South Africa) indices are the same, but are in different positions, which does not exclude the possibility of interaction of partner countries in these sectors of the economy.

In turn, in the structure of the SHCOMP index (China) by sectors of the economy, the largest sector is the Finance Sector — 31.8%, the smallest one — Communication Services — 2%, and in the industrial composition of the index, among the dominant sectors of the stock market — Industry — 15% and Materials — 8.8% (Figure 4).

In the structure of the NBEES stock index (India), the Finance Sector has the greatest weight — 41.59%, the Healthcare — the smallest — 2.16%, and Information Technology and Energy account for 13.29% and 12.14% of the stock market shares, respectively (Figure 5).

When comparing the structures of the stock indices of China and India, it seems possible to draw a conclusion about their similarity. So, for both indices, the dominance of the financial sector is characteristic. However, some structural differences are noted. For example, in the Indian stock index, Information Technology and Energy occupy a leading position among all sectors of the economy, while in the Chinese — the same industries have a much smaller share.




Figure 4 Structure of the SHCOMP Index (China)




Figure 5 Structure of the NBEES Index (India)

Analysis of the structure of the BRICS financial market indices showed the presence of direct financing (from the market) of the economic activity of BRICS economic entities, in key sectors of the economies of the member countries. The harmonization of direct financing and preferences, provided to BRICS business entities, helps to accumulate financial resources, expand the use of national currencies in ensuring the economic ties of partner countries and create favorable conditions for optimizing the process of sustainable development of national economies.

In turn, a comparison of the dynamics and correlation of the BRICS stock market indices revealed their interconnection and interdependence for individual time periods. For example, in the considered five-year period of time (2015–2020), the presence of a positive correlation of the stock indices IBOV (Brazil) and CRTX (Russia) (Figure 6) was revealed. The correlation coefficient is 0.58, which indicates the presence of a direct relationship of medium strength. It is also important to note the manifestation of a trend of some cyclicity in the dynamics of indicators and a change in the correlation relationship, which increases over individual medium-term periods. So, for example, in the period 2015–2016, an almost complete coincidence and synchronism of the dynamics of stock indices was recorded, which indicates their high correlation.

Since 2014, there has been a significant decrease in the indices of Brazil and Russia. For the Brazilian index, such dynamics is due to the recession of the Brazilian economy (in 2015, the maximum decline in 35 years), the deepening political crisis in the country, the corruption situation around the state-owned oil company Petrobras, and an increase in the budget deficit. A significant decrease in the cost of hydrocarbons also negatively affected the dynamics. The fall of the Russian stock index over a similar period of time is due, in particular, to a decrease in world oil prices, simultaneously with the currency crisis, as well as sanctions pressure. However, an overall upward trend was then observed.



Figure 6 Comparison of the Dynamics of the IBOV and CRTX Indices

At the same time, when choosing an annual, rather than a weekly, breakdown and increasing the analyzed time period to 10 years (2010–2020), the IBOV and CRTX stock indices showed a decrease in the correlation coefficient to 0.54, while a direct relationship is still observed medium strength indices (Figure 7).

In turn, a comparative analysis of the dynamics of the stock indices IBOV and IND125 showed the following result (Figure 8).



Figure 7 Comparison of the Dynamics of the IBOV and CRTX Indices (Annually, 10 Years)



Figure 8 Dynamics of IBOV and IND25 Indices

In the considered five-year period of time (2015–2020) with lag 2 ($LAG = 2$) for the IBOV (Brazil) and IND25 (South Africa) indices, there is practically no correlation dependence (the correlation coefficient is 0.10), their relationship is extremely weak, insignificant, while in separate parameters — the opposite (Figure 9). IND25 is an oscillator of the 25 most expensive industrial stocks in South Africa. The slowdown in the dynamics of the stock index and macroeconomic indicators in Africa in 2015–2016, in particular, took place against the background of a general slowdown in the growth rate of the world economy, a further fall in prices for raw materials and fuel products.




Figure 9 Dynamics of the IBOV and IND25 Indices

According to the results of the analysis, periodicity in the correlation dynamics of stock indices was also revealed. For example, in the period 2015–2016, communication increased (and also in 2016–2017), dependence was weakening and, after 2017, the discrepancy increased significantly, which coincides with the tightening of financial market regulation in the BRICS countries under consideration.

With a decrease in the lag value from 2 to 0 ($LAG = 0$) for the IBOV (Brazil), and INDI25 (South Africa) indices, the correlation coefficient increases to 0.41; moreover, in almost the entire considered time interval, the relationship is direct, with narrowness being below average.

Comparison of the stock market indices of Russia and South Africa revealed the following trend (Figure 10).



Figure 10 Dynamics of CRTX and INDI25 Indices

In the considered five-year time period (2015–2020) with a lag of 0 ($LAG = 0$) for the indices CRTX (Russia) and INDI25 (South Africa), there is a direct relationship, the tightness of communication is slightly below average (the correlation coefficient is 0.43). The discrepancy in dynamics most significantly increased in the period 2018–2019, which was the result of intergovernmental measures to support the business entities of Russia and South Africa in the indicated period of time.

In turn, with an increase in the lag value from 0 to 2 ($LAG = 2$) for the CRTX and INDI25 indices, a decrease in the correlation coefficient is noted, with the transition of its value to the region of negative values (-0.14), and there are alternating periods of increase and decrease interdependence (Figure 11).

By comparing the dynamics of the stock indices IBOV (Brazil), FTSE/JSE AFRICA IND 25 (South Africa) and CRTX (Russia) and comparing the pairwise correlation, a generally pronounced decrease in the interdependence was found. The most closely-related are the IBOV (Brazil) and CRTX (Russia) indices, which is a consequence of the similarity of their product structure by economic sectors and the dynamics of world energy prices, as the Materials and Energy sectors, which occupy the leading structural positions of the indices of the financial markets of these countries, are the most sensitive in the face of changing market conditions.

The structural proportions of economic sectors, implemented in the stock indices under consideration, are presumably related to the cyclical nature of the relationships. However, when using weekly breakdowns over a 5-year period, the stability of the correlation interdependence was observed over the medium term. Over the course of the 5-year period under review, a positive correlation is observed, at which the average coefficient is 0.51. The most synchronized dynamics of the indices was in the 2015–2017 period, which generally coincides with the results obtained earlier for the IBOV index and INDI25 indices: at the beginning of the analyzed period, there is an average correlation, or above the average, and then there are discrepancies.



Figure 11 Comparison of CRTX Index With INDI25 Index Dynamics (LAG = 2)




Figure 12 Comparison of the IBOV Index and SENSEX Index

Evaluation of the data also showed the presence of a direct (positive) correlation of stock indices, with a maximum value of the coefficient above 0.5 (Figure 13). India's economy has become the fastest growing in the world, ahead of China in 2015 and 2018. India has managed to become a major exporter of IT services, an important center of technology outsourcing for multinational corporations and a supplier of relevant specialists to leading countries of the world. This is reflected both in the structure of the Indian stock index and in its dynamics over the period under review. In some cases, there is a relationship between stock indices at the beginning of the period under review, followed by a long-term decrease in the relationship between the considered pairs of BRICS stock exchange indices (Figure 14, Figure 15). Among Asian stock indices, the Shanghai Stock Exchange's SSE index showed the most volatility. This is the result, in particular, of the formation, in 2015, of a financial bubble in the market and its subsequent liquidation.



Figure 13 Comparison of CRTX Index and SENSEX Index



Figure 14 Comparison of CRTX and SHCOMP Indices




Figure 15 Comparison of the Dynamics of SHCOMP and NBEES Indices

In the considered five-year period of time (2015–2020), the presence of a positive correlation was revealed.

Additional analysis using the (XCIT) function showed that there is a direct relationship between the IBOVE Index and CRTX Index (Brazil-Russia), IBOVE Index and INDI25 Index (Brazil-South Africa), with the determination coefficient averaging 0.55, which is a consequence of the implementation of financial policies in the BRICS member countries.

The results allow us to conclude that it is necessary to optimize the interstate support of BRICS projects and programs of trade and economic cooperation, in the difficult period of overcoming the consequences of the global epidemiological threat. Flexible conditions for interaction between the parties, the provision of preferences for BRICS business entities in the implementation of business processes will create conditions for expanding instruments for direct and indirect financing of key sectors of the BRICS economies and the development of trade.

Conclusion

The conducted analysis confirmed the need for the formation of short-and long-term strategies for BRICS economic partnership in trade and investment. It is noted that the priorities of long-term strategy for BRICS is strengthening the position of countries in the global economy. Evaluation of indices of stock markets of the BRICS showed that the absence of a coherent long-term strategy for BRICS economic partnership contributes to the accumulation of the resources necessary to address important strategic objectives, in order to achieve sustainable, inclusive development. In turn, the short-term strategy promotes the implementation of mechanisms of joint action in the agreed period of time. Short-term strategy takes into account the volatility of

the world economy and finance, the strategic interests of partner countries in the near future. The proposed approach: inter-state support of business entities of the BRICS, creates favorable conditions for the effective solution of problems and adaptation of the BRICS to changes in the global economic and trade landscape.

Exhibitions, trade fairs involving BRICS on a regular basis contribute to the strengthening of partnerships in promoting development, transfer of competences and broadening of cooperation between the parties through dialogue and exchange of experience in issues of multilateral cooperation. It seems reasonable to increase the participation of development banks with the participation of BRICS and institutional investors of all forms of ownership in the processes of stimulation of the partnerships of the member countries of the interstate association.

Harmonization of trade and economic contacts between economic entities of the BRICS will expand cooperation between the parties, both in traditional fields and areas due to the peculiarities of the world economic development in the short and longer term.

The results of the analysis, of the stock markets of the BRICS, contribute to the formation of the main principles and priorities for funding projects and development programs of strategic interest to member countries.

In order to expand the resource base of economic and trade cooperation of economic entities of the BRICS, it is advisable to increase the interaction of the New Development Bank, BRICS development banks with the participation of BRICS, which perform the function of financial intermediaries (indirect financing) and are participants of the stock markets of the BRICS (direct funding).

In order to minimize the risk of trade-economic contacts, economic actors of the BRICS, it seems appropriate to speed up the process of harmonization of regulation of financial relations of member countries.

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Institutional Investors in Russia: Problems and Prospects

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There are several trends in the activity of institutional investors in the financial markets. Such as increasingly fierce competition; Passive portfolio management strategies, which are dominated by active strategies and require new investment vehicles to form securities portfolios. There are also some specific challenges for each type of institutional investors that are determined by market activity of insurance companies, non-state pension funds, and collective investment institutions. In fact, the activity of institutional investors in the Russian financial market is insignificant. Based on the analysis of investment strategies and market behavior of key players, we can conclude about passive investment strategies in the Russian financial market. We need to create a unified code of responsible investments; promote cooperation between insurance and management companies; clarify the rights of depositors and participants in non-state investment funds while using corporate pension programs to support national programs for sustainable economic development and environmental protection.

Keywords: institutional investors; Russia; investment strategies

Introduction

Modern institutional investors are defined as special financial institutions that manage savings in the interests of private investors, maintain an acceptable level of risk, with the intent of obtaining the maximum investment return, backed by the terms and conditions of an agreement.

Institutional investors comprise collective investment institutions, pension funds, and insurance companies.

Institutional investors participate in the process of direct (on their name) and indirect (as agents) financing and perform the following economic functions:

- they are responsible for the efficient distribution of financial resources among economic entities;
- accumulate savings of the population and reduce transaction costs;
- diversify risks and participate in the environment protection.

The term “institutional investors” is interpreted in the Russian economic literature relatively broadly, and includes both non-deposit and deposit intermediaries. Some authors limit themselves in listing most financial intermediaries as institutional investors. At the same time experts of the Bank for International settlements define insurance companies, pension funds and various collective investment schemes as institutional investors. In a

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number of studies of Russian economists the institutional investors are considered as non-bank financial intermediaries who invest funds, accumulated in course of their activity, in financial market instruments in order to gain profit.

We believe that retail banks cannot be classified as classic institutional investors, since their activity is related to attracting deposits and placing them in loans, while institutional investors are mostly focused on long-term investments.

It is worthwhile mentioning that the term “collective investment” is also widely used in the Russian Federation and related to non-state pension funds and specialized companies. Sometimes, so called collective investors are involved in raising funds from a large number of individuals for their subsequent investment as institutional investors.

Thus, to define prospects and problems of institutional investors, it is important to clear up the issue of identity of the institutional investor and the institution of collective investment

Methodology

The research used the methods of comparative analysis, content analysis and complex analysis. The method of comparative analysis is used to determine the influence of institutional investors on contemporary economy and identify the role of institutional investors as participants of financial markets.

The content analysis method made it possible to assess the role of institutional investors as participants of the financial market and forecast trends of developments within the framework of implementing various projects. In general, the collected data allows us to understand the trends of economic and financial situation and form evaluative judgment about the problems and prospects for institutional investors (II) activity in contemporary environment. The complex analysis method is used to systematize a set of factors and threats that affect the prospects of II participation in financial markets. The complex analysis methodology involves considering the object of assessment from the standpoint of the influence on it of a set of factors, subdivided into internal and external. Internal environment factors include the national market conditions. External factors reflect the long-term impact of a potentially adverse or favorable impact on the course of projects implementation on the basis of institutional investors facility in spite of market turbulence, political sanctions or pandemic conditions.

Results and Discussion

International practice often use the term “asset management industry”. It is known that the subject of asset management can be property owners as well as professional managers. Moreover, the management object is private and clients funds. Thus, institutional investors as financial intermediaries, operate in the asset management industry. As a result, we can distinguish the following essential features of institutional investors:

- accumulation of funds of individual and corporate investors;
- accumulated resources management as a single portfolio;
- long-term portfolio investments in securities;

Taking into consideration the mentioned features we come to conclusion, that insurance companies, pension funds (PF) and collective investment institutions (collective investments), endowment funds can be defined as Institutional investors.

Actually, we define the trends of slowing down the process of globalization of financial markets and growing cyber activity of the market.

Globalization was the key factor of the financial markets development for a definite period. Actually, we confess the new stage of its development — economic partnership of globalized environment, manifested in integration of financial instruments, market participants, regulatory authorities, securities trading mechanisms, and unification of rules and regulations.

Having a wide range of investment options, institutional investors, actually, do not limit themselves to financial assets available on domestic markets. The increasing efficiency of information technologies and the easing of regulatory restrictions have contributed to their global activity. The trend towards formation of a global investment environment and integration of national capital markets to the global context has accelerated investments in foreign assets and usually purchase securities, depositary receipts, shares of investment funds, derivative financial instruments.

It is worthwhile mentioning that PF operate in the national and international markets and invest up to 30% of their assets in international instruments and markets. Thus, we come to conclusion, that contemporary stage of market development accelerates the cross-border supply of services by institutional investors and gives way to life insurers and pension funds to attract funds and contribute to the sustainable economic development on the national and supranational level.

Actually, we consider, that the main trend manifest itself in developing the resource base of green projects requests improvement of production and environment protection base. For example, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that prevention of major climate changes by reducing carbon emission, additional \$500 billion is required to be invested annually, in addition to the \$10.5 trillion of investments in 2010–2030. At the same time BP experts consider, that in the nearest future approximately two thousand hydroelectric powerplants will operate worldwide. It is important for strategic development and planning.

Actually, institutional investors have accumulated a significant amount of capital and the variety of instruments, well known to financial professionals that can help to smooth out the consequences of a significant slowdown in global economic growth. Acceleration of II activity will be a positive trend that will contribute to sustainable development of the global economy.

Due to the flexibility and mobility (along with huge assets and other advantages), institutional investors play a significant role in the global financial architecture, that is confirmed by their cooperation with supranational structures, changes in the composition and direction of global capital flows and environmental policy measures which change the role of institutional investors in global economy, turning them into systemic financial institutions. Analysis has proved that institutional investors control more than 80 percent of the US stock market capitalization. At the same time, private investors, implementing a policy of strategic investment of company assets, control only 10 percent of the UK market. The consequence of such kind of II participation in the market is a trend of their significant control over business and its financing.

We consider it both positive and negative. On the one hand, institutional investors provide companies with broad access to financing, which plays a huge role in modern economy. On the other hand, there is a trend of market monopolization and formation of unofficial cartel agreements due to operational control of different players in the same segment of the market by one group of investors.




Figure 1 Institutional Investors Ownership of the Largest US Stock Indexes

Source: 80% of equity marketcap held by institutions, Pensions and Investment Magazine, 2019.

It should also be noted that according to Bloomberg, different kind of institutions own more than 80 percent of the shares of the ten largest US companies.

Actually, investment funds control assets totaling more than \$ 18 trillion, which on average is about 24% of the GDP of the organization's member countries.

Pension funds and insurance companies control assets with a total value of 21.4 and 7 trillion US dollars (37% and 15% of GDP, respectively).

Table 1 indicates the very little involvement of institutional investors in the economy of the Russian Federation. It seems appropriate to expand activity of pension funds, endowment funds and other specialized financial institutions — players in the financial market in order to use resources in solving strategic tasks.

Table 1 Investment Funds Assets in Relation to GDP

Volume of assets in relation to GDP	2009	2019
Austria	44%	45%
Belgium	24%	38%
Canada	43%	103%
Chie	0%	0%
Czech Republic	3%	8%
Danmark	0%	110%
Estoni	3%	4%
Finland	23%	54%
France	69%	73%
USA	69%	116%
Russia	1%	3%

Calculated based on OECD data // <https://stats.oecd.org/>.

As can be seen from the table above, the share of investment funds during 2009–2019 significantly increased in many countries. The share of their assets greatly exceeds the GDP of some countries. Thus, we can conclude that the financial sector prevails in the economies of these countries.

The best value of this indicator is observed in the United States, which is due to the level of development of the stock market and the well-established tradition of personal savings for individuals.

The most popular investment tools for institutional investors are shares and units of various investment funds. It is important to note that in the period of 2009–2019, the volume of assets placed in the mentioned tools exceeded the share of debt instruments such as corporate bonds and Federal loan bonds. Another important trend is the refusal of investors to increase placement of their funds with banks (deposits), caused by the difference of the interest rates of the banks and global financial market.

Table 2 Value of Assets of Institutional Investors in Million US Dollars

Asset value	2009	2019
Deposits	4 181 116	4 450 829
Debt instruments	22 329 853	23 234 58
Loans	3 378 084	3 375 834
Shares and units of investment funds	21 289 707	24 863 143

Calculated based on OECD data // <https://stats.oecd.org/>.

The most attractive areas of investments is the infrastructure development. The most popular type of projects are the following.

Roads. The volume of investments amounted to more than 10 billion US dollars. The main forms of participation were concession agreements and investments through market infrastructure funds.

Airports. The volume of investments is about 1 billion US dollars with participation through infrastructure funds.

Gas transportation infrastructure in the United States, Mexico, and Australia. The volume of investments amounted to more than 20 billion US dollars. The main form of participation is investment through market infrastructure funds.

Investment in energy assets. The total volume of this category is about 1.5 billion US dollars. Participation is carried out by using debt financing, direct investments, as well as participation in market infrastructure funds.

Actually, we can distinguish the following classification of mutual funds in infrastructure financial market, depending on the structure (accumulation) of their assets, such as money market funds, bond funds, equity funds, mixed investment funds private equity funds, high-risk (venture) investment funds, fund of funds, rental funds, estate funds, mortgage funds, index funds (with index indication), credit funds, foundations of the commodity markets, hedge funds, foundations of artistic values, environment protection funds.

The UN set benchmarks in 2015 for achieving the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, stating that they must “meet the requirements of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs. For this, it is important to reconcile three pillars: economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection. These elements are interrelated and critical to the well-being of individuals and society”¹.

Deterioration of the environment directly affects the quality of life of the population. Therefore, consumers

¹ Available online at: <https://www.un.org/>.

began to vote with money in favor of goods that are produced in accordance with the principles of sustainable development. A March 2020 poll by the Capgemini Research Institute found that 79% of consumers change their shopping habits to reflect the impact of their purchases on social or environmental issues (K. Jacobs, J. Robey, K. van Beaumont, C. Lago, M. Rietra, S. Hewett, J. Buvat, N. Manchanda, & S. Cherian, 2020).

This kind of demand is converted into indicators that are significant for companies. Standard & Poor's notes that from January 2010 to December 2019, the average monthly growth in the shares of companies with the lowest carbon dioxide emissions and accounting for 20% of the total number of companies in the MSCI World Index (developed markets) was 25 basis points higher than the 20% of companies in this Index with the worst such emission (R. Falk, K. Wang, T. Morris, E. Chan, 2020). Bank of America Merrill Lynch found that firms with better ESG (environmental, social and governance) performance than their peers were more likely to turn into high-quality stocks, less likely to have significant price declines, and less likely to go bankrupt (S. Subramanian, M. Kabra, S. Chopra, P. Strzelinska, L. Huang, 2019). In addition, socially responsible companies have the opportunity to raise borrowed funds from banks at lower interest rates compared to companies with similar financial reliability that do not take ESG risks into account in their activities (O. Kordsachia, 2020). The cost of capital for companies that adhere to ESG principles is about 10% lower than for other companies, due to the fact that investors believe that they have lower risks in terms of non-compliance with environmental legislation (S. Bernow, R. Nuttall, S. Brown, 2020).

The potential benefits of investing in projects implementing environmental protection programs are clear. Therefore, the analysis of possible risks associated with environmental pollution is very important, especially for large investment projects that provide for long payback periods and are typical for institutional investors, including portfolio investments of pension funds, national wealth funds, etc.

The topic of climate risks for portfolio and institutional investors, including sovereign funds, has become relevant only in the last 10-15 years. Moreover, in different parts of the world they are perceived differently. If earlier the main topic of the pre-project study was the financial analysis of the investment object, then in 2019 in Europe just over 50% of investments were made taking into account the factors of sustainable development, and in the USA the share of such investments in stocks was about 25% (R. Eccles, 2019).

Currently, the only generally accepted quantitative objectively verifiable indicator of environmental risk is the price of a ton of carbon dioxide emitted by an enterprise. Wherein, investors take into account in the financial analysis the possible costs of greenhouse emissions, regardless of whether such costs are incurred at the national level or not, because the regulatory rules can change quickly. When the project's products are exported, it is very likely that it will be additionally charged with a carbon tax, as already planned in the EU. The market estimates the cost of environmental pollution very high: for example, in the EU, where CO₂ trading has been developing since 2005, the price per metric ton of CO₂ in the European Emissions Trading System was above 60 euros at the beginning of September 2021². At the same time, hopes for taking into account the high absorptive capacity of the environment at the national level in the exporting country are not entirely justified, since the calculation of the future carbon tax in the EU will be carried out only taking into account the carbon neutrality measures of the enterprise exporting its products.

As you can see, measures to improve the climate significantly affect the efficiency of investments. On the other hand, as the Boston Consulting Group and the Global Financial Markets Association in their fundamental

² Available online at: <https://ember-climate.org/data/carbon-price-viewer/>.

research on climate finance in December 2020 noted that while the need for financing climate projects around the world is 100-150 trillion US dollars, the role of institutional investors is very important: in the equity investments they provide it accounts for 35% of the total funding requirement, and in bonds - 21% [11].

High economic and political risks associated with sanctions pressure, the Russian Federation is on the path of economic development through substitution of European and American sources of financing, as well as optimization of domestic financial resources (R. Brayley, S. Myers, 2016). An important role in this regard is played by institutional investors who can participate effectively in the implementation of development programs.

According to our calculations, the public and private sectors invested about 5.7 trillion rubles (2019) in infrastructure development, which is 200 billion rubles (3.6%) more than a year earlier. However, insurance companies and pension funds have no experience of participating in big projects, as a result, their share in capital investments is insignificant.

Investments in infrastructure remain attractive for private funds, but their money is getting into the industry too slowly. We consider, that the main reason is the lack of projects structured under bonds.

At the end of 2019, the share of corporate bonds in the investment portfolio of national private funds (NPF) decreased by 6 percentage points, to 45% (1.2 trillion rubles), while the share of Federal loan bonds (OFZ) increased sharply to 28% (0.7 trillion rubles), from 10% in the first half of the year. In monetary terms, NPF investments in Russian OFZs more than tripled, from 235 billion rubles to 739 billion rubles. Thus we can conclude, that the activity of private investment funds should be supported by public authorities, if the invest in social or industrial sector.

VEB (Vnesheconombank of the Russian Federation) since 2003 has been a state management company for the trust management of pension savings and since 2012 VEB performs the functions of a state management company for the funds of the payment reserve.

VEB's activity is carried out in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, regulatory legal acts of the President and Government of the Russian Federation, regulatory documents of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, and other Federal Executive authorities. Observing the absolute priority of the interests of insured citizens, VEB invests pension savings in order to ensure their growth with a minimum level of risk.

Up to date VEB manages the funds of about 39 million future pensioners. A state-owned management company invests in government securities, international bonds, deposits, etc.

Isn't it limited? We consider infrastructure bonds to be of an interest to public authorities in contemporary economic environment.

Currently, there are about 58 non-state pension funds operating in Russia: 36 funds carry out mandatory pension insurance and 18 funds (2.6 trillion rubles).

The allocation of pension reserves and investment of pension savings are based on the following principles:

- ensuring the safety of the funds;
- ensuring profitability, diversification and liquidity of investment portfolios;
- defining an investment strategy based on objective criteria that can be quantified;
- accounting for the reliability of securities;
- information openness of the process
- professional management of the investment process and their control.

We consider that pension funds can contribute greatly to the implementation of the environment protection

policy by developing financial instruments for sustainable development.

In a contrast to developed countries pension savings legislation in Russia strictly defines the procedure of investment.

Russian clients usually choose conservative strategies, the yield of which is less volatile. More than half of investments are accumulated in Russian bonds (E. I. Shokhin, 2017). However, over the past two years, shareholders' appetite for risk has increased — the shares of equity and mixed investment funds assets have increased significantly due to net inflows, as well as outperforming returns from investing in shares.

A significant amount of investment by pension funds is concentrated in the Russian oil and gas sector. For example, last year two large associations of private funds were completed: in the middle of the year, three NPFs that fell within the perimeter of the Bank "FC OTKRITIE" merged on the basis of "LUKOIL-Garant" (now NPF "OTKRITIE"), and at the end of the year "Consent OPS" and "Neftegarant NGO" joined the Fund "Neftegarant". OTKRITIE NPF with assets at the beginning of this year of 565 billion rubles occupied the second place, but in the first quarter it fell to the third place (market assets decreased to 556 billion rubles), losing to Gazfond Pension savings (563.7 billion rubles). NPF Neftegarant took the ninth place (205.6 billion rubles).

The Association of private funds has also continued its activity. In the first quarter, NPF Safmar was joined by the Trust Fund. As a result, the unified Fund (264.7 billion rubles of assets) in the first three months of the year came in sixth place, ahead of NPF "Future" (256.5 billion rubles). As a result the concentration of the top 10 Russian private funds exceeded 90% of the reserves and savings market. The Russian financial market has long been living in a phase of oligopoly. At the beginning of last year, the top 10 players had more than 92.4% of all pension savings. Actually, this figure is 2.6 percentage points higher. The non-state pension provision (NGO) market is more diversified, but it is also approaching an oligopolistic one. At the beginning of the year, the ten largest players concentrated 89.5% of all pension reserves.

These examples vividly depict volatility of the Russian financial market and the tendency of oligopolistic accumulation economic capital of institutional investors as participants of financial markets in strategic sectors of the national economy. At the same time, there is a variety of types of II and their instruments which can contribute to the sustainable development of the national economy. International experience in this regard is presented above.

Conclusions

The results obtained allowed us to draw the following conclusions. There are several trends for institutional investors activity in the financial market. Such as growing competition; passive portfolio management strategies with the predominance of active strategies and demand for new investment instruments to form securities portfolio.

The trend of growing competition is supported by increasing regulation requirements for the volume of funds and structure of assets, as well as the constant growth in the number of mutual funds, offering similar services to the population. At the same time the development of passive strategies is a logical result of continuation.

There are also some specific challenges for each type of institutional investors that are determined by market activity of insurance companies, non-state pension funds, and collective investment institutions. Main challenge for the insurance companies is the reduction of insurance schemes (tax optimization) and non-state pension funds activity. As one of the elements of scientific foresight, forecasting allows you to display possible scenarios for the development of institutional investors in Russia. Current market environment has proved, that the authorities

are not interested in the development of domestic non-bank financial intermediaries, that prevents from transforming savings to investments.

Actually, the activity of institutional investors in the Russian financial market is insignificant. The main share of investments is accumulated by the Federal loan bonds and deposits in leading Russian banks. At the same time, based on the analysis of investment strategies and market behavior of key players, we can conclude about passive investment strategies in the Russian financial market. All of the above do not contribute to increasing the role of indirect financing.

It is important to take the following measures, which contribute to sustainable economic growth:

- improve taxation of insurance companies, requirements for the structure of the insurance company's investment portfolio and legislation by creating a unified code of responsible investments;
- promote cooperation between insurance and management companies, as well as increase information transparency of non-state investment funds.
- clarify the rights of depositors and participants in non-state investment funds while using corporate pension programs.

The above mentioned measures contribute to the resources to support national programs for sustainable economic development and environment protection.

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Ukrainian Crisis: Who Has the Upper Hand or Russia-West Possible to Lift the Sanctions?

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In the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the EU shouldered the heavy burden of breaking trade and economic ties with Russia and dealing with the problem of Ukrainian refugees; The losses in the United States are significantly lower than those in the European Union. But Moscow's confrontation with the West has brought NATO a rare unity and prompted European countries to increase spending on security. China has benefited from the crisis, mainly in the form of reduced military and political pressure on it by the United States, increasing its influence in Central Asia, and at the same time gaining access to most of the Russian market and cheaper access to Russian resources because of Western sanctions. Japan's prospects for a peace treaty with Russia over the crisis have become extremely murky, and India has been minimally affected by the crisis, with other beneficiaries including other countries that have been severely sanctioned by the United States. However, even if a compromise is reached between Russia and Ukraine, sanctions may be partially or fully retained for political reasons. It is likely that the West will show flexibility in easing sanctions based on its own economic interests. The main problem is the stability of the decisions made. The sanctions regime could be reinstated at any time.

Keywords: Ukrainian Crisis, Russia, sanctions

The military operation in Ukraine raises the question of the balance of losses and gains of key participants, as well as global players. Such a balance has yet to be struck for Russia and Ukraine. Hostilities continue and a political settlement has not been reached, which means that it is still difficult to say to what extent each of the parties will be able to achieve the political goals for which a huge price has already been paid, both in human lives and in terms of enormous damage to the economy. The contours of the balance for global and regional players — the EU, the US, China, Japan, Iran and others are more clearly visible.

The European Union bears the most serious losses and costs. They are associated with the rupture of numerous trade and economic ties with Russia. The main challenge is the replacement of Russian oil, gas, metals and a number of other commodities on the European market. This process will require a serious concentration of resources and political will. In the next few years, it will affect the economic growth of the EU and the competitiveness of European industry. At the same time, the displacement of Russian raw materials, painful in itself, is a feasible task. For oil, this process can go faster, for gas, slower. Within the EU, there will be differences between the member states, as dependence on Russian raw materials is heterogeneous. However, the replacement

of Russian goods in most areas, apparently, can be carried out over the course of several years. Regardless of how the Ukrainian crisis develops and what Russia's foreign policy is, ousting the latter from EU trade will be a rather long-term process.

The EU today also bears the heaviest burden of dealing with Ukrainian refugees. The calculation is still difficult given the rapidly changing situation, but it is already clear that the number is in the millions. The EU countries are faced with the task of receiving, providing for, adapting, and possibly integrating migrants. Social spending in many countries of the Union will increase. However, here the European Union turns out to be a beneficiary in the medium term. The EU countries, especially Germany, have accumulated vast experience in working with migrant labour. Ukrainian migrants are culturally close to most, if not all, EU countries, in contrast to previous waves of migration from Islamic countries. They are more educated. They are less inclined to form closed diasporas, and they adapt and integrate more quickly. The EU economy is getting a rich demographic injection.

Most EU countries will actively increase defence spending. Such growth will not necessarily be proportional to the political subjectivity of the European Union. The EU remains a junior partner of NATO. However, the military-political role of individual member countries will grow significantly. Here again, Germany should be noted, as it has a high potential for increasing defence spending, modernizing the army and developing its defence industry. The highly developed military-industrial complex of the EU countries receives a long-term gain.

You can also talk about how the European project itself wins, so to speak. In the face of Russia, it now receives a powerful consolidating factor that enhances internal discipline, nourishes identity and holds together the Eastern European flank.

The United States, at first glance, incurs significantly lower costs than the EU, although the rejection of Russian oil may lead to local difficulties and an increase in fuel prices. The main problems for Washington lie in other areas. The sharp escalation of confrontation with Russia is again diverting resources from the Asia-Pacific theatre. The United States will have to increase its military presence in Europe, which means that the concentration of resources on containing China is now declining. The United States is also anxious about the prospect of the Ukrainian crisis escalating into a war between NATO and Russia. This at the very least is fraught with the danger of nuclear escalation. Washington will have to simultaneously contain Moscow, but at the same time act within certain boundaries, fearing an escalation from now on. Controlling the intensity of the conflict and preventing it from escalating uncontrollably seems to be a key priority.

In other areas, the US is more likely to win.

The new quality of confrontation with Moscow makes it possible to significantly increase NATO's internal discipline and achieve a more significant contribution of European countries to common security. Neither Trump, nor Obama, nor G. W. Bush could complete such a task before. Now it has been solved without a great amount of debate. Moreover, the further expansion of NATO is possible.

While membership in the organization of neutral Sweden and Finland is not predetermined, the number of supporters of such a move within both countries has grown significantly. The possible accession of Finland to NATO will mean the projection of power on the entire Russian North-West border.

The need to divert resources to Europe, in theory, can also be used by the United States to its advantage. Washington and its allies have received *carte blanche* to deliver an unprecedentedly powerful blow to Russia's economic and technological potential. There is no doubt that Russia will remain the most important military challenge for the US and the West. However, the economic base of the military potential is likely to be

undermined by the prospect of further concentration on Asia.

The US energy sector wins. In the near future, it will receive a significant part of the European market. In addition, it will now be more convenient for the Americans to oust Russia from the world arms markets. China and India will remain major buyers, but competition for other markets will be more difficult for Moscow due to stronger US opposition.

The United States has accumulated a set of internal problems. The Russian factor once again makes it possible to at least partially consolidate Congress and society. However, the impact of the crisis on the 2024 elections is still highly uncertain.

China gets a lot of room for manoeuvre. Unlike the EU and the US, current costs for China will be minimal. Military and political pressure from Washington is declining. Given the large-scale anti-Russian sanctions, China can claim a significant part of the vacating Russian market. Russian energy resources will now be more accessible to China, and their price is likely to be much lower than before. However, there may be difficulties in the infrastructure plan for their delivery to the Chinese market. China is also becoming Russia's most important financial partner, and such a partnership will asymmetrically favour China. Beijing is further strengthening stability on its northern and north-eastern borders.

Russia's partnership with China is becoming uncontested. China has new opportunities for influence in Central Asia.

Based on the experience of sanctions against Russia, China will do significant work to improve its own economic security in the event of similar complications with the West. At the same time, the ongoing processes are still unlikely to lead to the emergence of a full-fledged Russian-Chinese military-political union. By all appearances, China will keep its distance and free hand.

For Japan, the balance of gains and losses in the short term is rather negative. The prospect of a peace treaty with Russia is becoming extremely vague. Even before the new phase of confrontation, it was clear that the negotiations had reached an impasse. There was not even a hint of any advancement, but the very theoretical possibility of such advancement remained. Since 2014, Tokyo has pursued a balanced and pragmatic policy, imposing symbolic sanctions, but maintaining the Russian market and constructive relations with the Russian leadership. After February 24, 2022, this concept gave way to solidarity with the actions of the US and the EU. Japan will suffer losses due to the loss of the Russian market and the replacement of Russian raw materials. However, they are not critical for Tokyo. The most important thing is that the aggravation of relations with Russia, as in the case with Germany, will become a significant incentive for the final revision of the post-war paradigm of the use of the armed forces. Japan will more confidently follow the path of regaining the status of a full-fledged military-political power. The solution to the problem of the "northern territories" will also increasingly be considered in a military manner.

India is the least affected by the current crisis. Delhi maintains a dialogue with Moscow and will resist attempts by third countries to influence military-technical cooperation. However, the position of lobbyists for Western arms manufacturers in the country may be strengthened. The rise of China against the background of the crisis is a problem for India. However, the changes can hardly be called fundamental.

The beneficiaries of the new phase of the Ukrainian crisis will also include a number of countries that are currently under heavy US sanctions. First and foremost, these include Venezuela and Iran. Washington may very well pursue at least a partial reduction in sanctions pressure in order to compensate for losses in the market resulting from the ban on Russian oil imports. With regard to Venezuela, the easing of sanctions is politically

easier, compared to Iran. Ultimately, only the internal structure of the country is problematic, and the United States can temporarily turn a blind eye. Venezuelan heavy oil may well replace Russian oil in the US market. The Maduro government in this case will receive some respite and a breath of fresh air in the form of foreign exchange earnings.

With Iran, the situation is more complicated, since there we are talking about a military nuclear programme and a new version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), that is, a multilateral process, of which Russia is also a participant. At the same time, technically, the United States may well allow Iranian oil into the world market without a new JCPOA. As an option, the Biden administration has the ability to allow a number of countries in Europe and Asia to purchase Iranian oil reinstating the exemptions Trump cancelled. The problem for the US will be that Iran will also get a breather and strengthen its negotiating position. In the future, this will cause pressure from the Republicans, who are opposed to deals with Tehran. However, amid Russian opposition, these differences may fade into the background. In any case, Iran has a chance to take advantage of the situation. Such a development of events precludes the formation of a coalition among countries under sanctions, which theoretically could include China, Russia, Iran and Venezuela. China will cooperate with all three, but not to the detriment of relations with the West.

All in all, the new stage of the Ukrainian crisis will have global consequences. For some, it will bring short and medium-term costs, and very significant ones. For many, however, it will create opportunities to increase their influence over the long term.

Russia-West: Is It Possible to Lift the Sanctions?

Diplomatic manoeuvring by Russia and Ukraine on the issue of a peace agreement, or at least a ceasefire, naturally raise the question of a possible lifting of Western sanctions against Russia. American officials have already made it clear that Washington will lift the previously-imposed sanctions if the current military operation is ceased.

The US is trying to use sanctions as an incentive to push Moscow to engage in negotiations. The logic here is simple: the continuation of the conflict means the escalation of sanctions, whereas the end of the conflict would lead to the abolition or mitigation of restrictive measures. However, this simple and logical model does not work in practice. Moscow most likely does not believe sanctions will be lifted or suspects that they could be re-imposed alongside a new set of political demands. Recent historical experience confirms such fears. Is it possible in this case to put sanctions on the negotiating agenda at all? Yes, it's possible. But such a formulation of the question requires a discussion on the specific parameters of sanctions de-escalation, rather than abstract promises or positions of requests. In turn, the specifics imply the segmentation of the introduced restrictions into separate components. Their cancellation can proceed either sequentially or simultaneously.

The key segments of restrictive measures against Russia include the following:

First. Sanctions against the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance and the National Welfare Fund. Among other things, we are talking about the freezing of Russian reserves in the EU. There is the prospect of these funds being transferred to Ukraine for the restoration of the armed forces and infrastructure. It should also be noted here that the freezing and risk of confiscation affects Russian state property, as well as the assets of blocked Russian individuals and organizations, from bank accounts and real estate, to yachts and football clubs. In fact, we are talking about forced seizure. Given Russia's high involvement in the world economy, such a process could turn into an unprecedented expropriation of the state and private property of Russia and its citizens abroad

Second. Financial sanctions against Russian banks, infrastructure, energy and other companies. Blocking sanctions (that is, a ban on transactions and blocking assets) of a number of banks and companies, bans on making settlements in dollars (restriction on the use of correspondent accounts in US banks), and restrictions on lending stand out here. The financial sanctions include a ban on the transmission of financial messages in the interests of a number of Russian financial institutions.

Third. Blocking sanctions against major Russian businessmen (in Western terminology — “oligarchs”). Similar sanctions against political figures—high-ranking politicians and members of their families.

Fourth. Airspace closure, along with the denial of leasing contracts and maintenance of civil aircraft. Here, a number of countries have closed their seaports to Russian ships.

Fifth. Bans on imports of Russian fossil fuels, iron and steel products, seafood and other goods that have already been introduced or are only planned.

Sixth. Bans on investments in the Russian energy sector and other sectors of the economy.

Seventh. Restrictions on the export to Russia of a wide range of goods, including oil refining equipment, lasers, navigation equipment, certain categories of cars, computers, marine engines, and many other categories of industrial and consumer goods. Separately, it is worth highlighting the export control of dual-use goods, although they existed before.

Eighth. A ban on the import of cash dollars and euros into Russia, as well as restrictions on opening deposits above certain amounts in some initiating countries.

Ninth. The exit from normal trade relations with Russia.

Tenth. Tightening visa restrictions.

These measures differ in detail from country to country. For example, a ban on the supply of Russian fuel has already been introduced in the US, but is still under discussion in the EU. At the same time, they can be considered broad standards of sanctions policy for all key initiating countries.

From an institutional point of view, the lifting of new sanctions still seems to be an achievable task. In the United States, they are enshrined in the form of presidential executive orders and the directives of relevant departments. Despite the abundance of bills on sanctions against Russia in the US Congress, none of them has become law. However, two bills have already passed in the House of Representatives. H.R. 6968 suggests the legislative suspension of Russian fossil fuel supplies to the US, and H.R. 7108 suggests the freezing of normal trade relations. If these norms are enshrined in US law, their repeal will become practically impossible. At best, these norms could later be suspended by presidential decree. As far as the EU is concerned, the lifting or easing of sanctions will require a unanimous decision of the EU Council. Differences may arise here, but it is easier to overcome them than in the US Congress. In the UK, the executive branch has considerable manoeuvre in modifying the sanctions regime. Therefore, technically, their significant reduction is quite possible. Bottom line, the lifting of sanctions is largely feasible without unnecessary delay.

At the same time, even if a compromise is reached between Russia and Ukraine, the sanctions may remain partially or in their entirety for political reasons. There are two key factors which would result in their possible conservation. The first is the political capital of the national leaders of the initiating countries. Imposing sanctions tends to raise political capital, while lifting them often draws criticism from the opposition. In other words, the application of sanctions unites elites, but their lifting does not. Russophobia today is so pervasive that any steps back are fraught with the loss of political points. The second, and more important factor, is a possible attempt to squeeze the maximum concessions out of Russia. For example, a ceasefire may be subject to additional conditions

for compensating Ukraine for damages, the failure to comply with which will be a reason for maintaining sanctions. The agreements themselves may imply a certain transitional period in which the parties will be required to fulfil their obligations. The experience of the Minsk agreements showed that such obligations may simply not be fulfilled, freezing sanctions for a long period.

Scepticism regarding the lifting of sanctions is also connected with the existing historical experience. For example, the United States easily violated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concluded in 2015. It implied the lifting of sanctions against Iran in exchange for the abandonment of the military nuclear programme. The “nuclear deal” was confirmed by a UN Security Council resolution, that is, from the point of view of international law, it received the highest degree of legitimacy. At the same time, in 2018, Donald Trump decided to withdraw from the deal and resumed the sanctions. A new cancellation condition, the so-called “13 points” were put forward, implying significant concessions on many other issues not related to the nuclear programme. Given the risk of secondary sanctions and coercive measures by the US authorities, many other companies were forced to leave Iran. There are no guarantees that after the lifting or easing of sanctions against Moscow, a new “13 points” will not appear. Historical experience has crushed the overall level of trust between Russia and the West, which now can be considered almost zero.

At the same time, the West may well show flexibility in easing sanctions, based on its own economic interests. Some measures have caused significant damage to the initiators themselves. Most likely, the moves towards ousting Russia from raw materials markets, as well as its technological isolation, will not change. However, the mitigation of the economic costs of such transit, especially in the short term, is quite capable of leading to some progress.

In the event of a cessation of hostilities agreement, one can realistically expect changes in the import of Russian steel to the EU, the easing or lifting of restrictions on civil aviation services, the partial or complete opening of airspace, the partial abolition of export controls on “luxury goods”, and the easing of visa restrictions for business to reflect the status quo as of February 24, while maintaining those for civil servants, some relaxations on non-dual-use industrial goods, the lifting of restrictions for banks on financial messages (SWIFT), the lifting of sectoral and blocking sanctions on some (but not all) banks and companies, the removal of blocking sanctions against some businessmen, and a reduction of investment barriers. In the US, such waivers may take the form of general licenses (i.e., exemptions from the sanctions regime) rather than delisting per se. Depending on relations with Iran and Venezuela, whose oil may enter the world market due to relaxations of sanctions against those countries, a partial return to purchases of Russian oil in the US and the UK can be allowed (although this practice is likely to be temporary).

Much more doubtful is the prospect of deblocking Russia’s financial reserves, as well as the numerous assets of Russian citizens arrested, frozen or already confiscated abroad. It is likely that they will be used to finance military and civilian aid to Ukraine from the West. Blocking sanctions against a significant number of government officials will most likely not be lifted. The same is to be expected with respect to export controls on dual-use goods and high-tech products. The partial or even complete abolition of restrictions on the purchase of Russian raw materials will not cancel the long-term course towards their replacement.

The main problem is the stability of the decisions made. The resumption of sanctions regimes is possible at any time. Whereas a military response to such decisions will require much more serious political will and resources. The inclusion of sanctions in the formula for a compromise on Ukraine is quite possible. Total pessimism is hardly desirable here, if only because the initiators themselves incur serious costs and may be ready

to reduce them. However, the complete lifting of the new sanctions and a return to the status quo on February 21, 2022 also appears to be an unlikely, if not unfeasible alternative.

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Addressing Challenges to the Conduct of Intelligence Operations in an Age of Ambiguity

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Since Krulak's "Three Block War" theories on the complexity of modern battlespaces, there has been a growing recognition of the nature of "Ambiguous Warfare" or "Gray Zones" in the understanding of the contemporary spectrum of conflict. However, little consideration has been given to the implications for the Intelligence Community regarding these highly complex and uncertain environments in terms of oversight and ensuring conduct remains legal, ethical and within the bounds of necessity and proportionality. The employment of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning along with increasing reliance on local actors and collaborative approaches with allies and partners will likely further complicate the situation. In this context, this paper will provide an analysis of this landscape in order to identify areas where future activities are likely to prove controversial and problematic. It will go on to propose a framework that would ensure they remain within the normative boundaries demanded by policy makers and their electorates.

Keywords: Three Block War, Gray Zone, intelligence

Introduction

Within the ongoing discussions as to the nature of the contemporary spectrum of conflict it some would contend that "Hybrid Warfare" best describes activities occurring in many of the troubled areas of the world. Others would claim that this view offers little that is new. After briefly exploring ideas of hybrid war and hybrid threats this paper will focus on the emerging concept of "gray zone" conflict, which would appear to be increasingly recognized as the methodology of choice within contemporary strategic competition.

To date there has been a general lack of discourse as to the challenges faced regarding the multiple challenges to the conduct of intelligence operations and activities within the highly complex ambiguous and uncertain environments created by these phenomena. Therefore, there is a requirement to examine what if any factors are different from other types of conflict, and how these will impact on the intelligence processes.

The aim will be to draw on contemporary literature regarding intelligence problems in more broad and general terms and contextualize those that relate to addressing ambiguity and uncertainty that will be critical in understanding this evolving problem set.

Finally, it will propose a framework that would ensure that intelligence operations can become more effective whilst remaining within the normative boundaries demanded by policy makers and their electorates.

Hybrid War, Hybrid Threats and the Emergence of the “Gray Zone”

Since the publication of Krulak’s “Three Block War” theories on the complexity of modern battlespaces (Krulack, 1999) much consideration has been given as to the nature and the character of contemporary and future warfare. In the post-Cold War era, the strategic shock of 9/11 has led to narrowly focused CT and COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and against both al-Qaeda and latterly the Islamic State. A resurgent Russia, and Chinese activities such as the “belt and Road Initiative” have signaled a return to Great Power competition with the Russians making concerted efforts seeking to neutralize and make redundant the military strengths and economic might of the west.

This has generated much new impetus on the subject of hybrid warfare and hybrid threat with many conflicting interpretations. Hoffman (2014, 2016, 2018) has contributed significantly to this academic debate on evolving understanding of this area. Hoffman and US military thinkers originally spoke of “hybrid threats”, with hybrid war being the preferred descriptor in academic circles (Similiaenu, 2018). Similiaenu himself utilising an epistemological approach describes it as a non-linear multimodal asymmetric form of conflict. (2018, p. 266). Difficulties in framing this problem set continue, and a belief that there was “not so much the problem of defining the term as how to clarify the concept so to make it useful. (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Cullen, 2016). There have also been “multiple and different meanings of the term that complicate a consensus understanding of the problem” (Cullen, 2018, p. 4). Hoffman (2018) has recently offered that hybrid war is:

“The purposeful and tailored violent application of advanced conventional military capabilities with irregular tactics, with terrorism and criminal activities, or combination of regular and irregular forces, operating as part of a common design in the same battlespace”.

Arguably there is nothing novel here and many conflicts have featured all or many of the elements listed above, which present few unfamiliar challenges. There is also no questioning Van Puyvelde’s view that “any threat can be hybrid as long as it is not limited to a single form and dimension of warfare” (2015) and assertion that the use of this terminology causes confusion. Glenn (2009) believes that due to its multi-faceted nature no formal doctrine is required. Chambers (2016) admits that although the concept is hardly new a definition is required in order to achieve a “shared understanding in order to employ correct responses and reduce risk”.

The key issue here is that although much of the concept is not new, it has certainly gained more attention due to recent developments. Russian activities in Ukraine and elsewhere have been a significant driver for this arising from awareness of what is described as “Russian New Generation Warfare (RNGW).” This is often referred to as the “Gerasimov Doctrine” (AWG, 2016), although Hoffman (2016) believes rather than a formal doctrine it better describes the character of modern warfare from the Russian perspective. Giles noted that “The erosion of the distinction between war and peace, and the emergence of a gray zone” has been one of the most striking developments in the Russian approach to warfare (Giles, 2016).

As with the concept of hybrid war, the nebulous “gray zone” has proved equally challenging to define although there is consensus that it is “the element of ambiguity” that makes this different from other areas of the conflict spectrum. (Hicks et al., 2018). Hoffman (2018) once again offers a useful explanation when he defines gray zone activities as:

“Those covert or illegal activities of non-traditional statecraft that are below the threshold of armed organized violence; including disruption of order, political subversion of government or non-governmental organizations, psychological operations, abuse of legal processes, and financial corruption as part of an integrated design to achieve

strategic advantage”.

What Is Different About Gray Zone Conflict?

Many aspects of Hybrid War described above may not differ from those of previous conflicts, but the growing recognition of threats emerging from gray zones suggests that the dynamic has indeed changed, and it is therefore the latter that warrants the closest examination. There does appear to have been a convergence of the two concepts in current discourse. A recent speech by the head of MI6 in the UK appears to reflect this when he said “You might think that countering terrorism was challenging enough. But now we face the additional complexity of the threats posed by nation states operating in the grey spaces of the hybrid era, which is a wholly separate problem” (Younger, 2018). A similar view is held in the US where a recent military report identified that “Gray zone competition and conflict present fundamental challenges to U.S. and partner security and, consequently, should be important pacers for U.S. defense strategy” (Freier et al., 2018).

The blend of strategies and tactics used will be unique to each conflict and reflect local geographical and political variations, be shaped by the different actors involved and focus the appropriate strategies and techniques on perceived areas of weakness where asymmetric methodologies can achieve greater success. This can lead to some serious difficulty in identifying what does and does not constitute an emerging threat. High levels of deception and denial used to conceal intent and create “ambiguity, complexity, and paralysis for those actors who might try to interfere or oppose” (Freier et al., 2018). Russian actions in Ukraine and Crimea demonstrated an “integrated use of capabilities including rapid deployment, electronic warfare, information operations, special-forces capabilities and cyberspace communications, targeted at both domestic and foreign audiences” (Parameswaran, 2015). Further examples have been identified during Russian operations in Syria with a drive to create “superiority of management” through unifying non-military and military activities across the strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to accelerate the decision-making process and adapt to the increasing pace of modern operations (Harris & Clarke, 2018).

High reliance on asymmetry, both of those involved and the methodologies used may result in threats manifesting and multiplying in varied ways that may or may not relate to each other thus making it extremely difficult to identify an overall plan or strategy. Sequencing across the entire tactical to strategic spectrum will not necessarily follow any form of doctrinal time-line, with constant modification occurring in reaction to success or failure of individual lines of effort or attempts to counter them. Adversaries will continually seek to obscure and blur the lines separating war and peace by increasing complexity within a rapidly changing operating environment, utilizing evolving technologies (TRADOC, 2017, p. 5).

By its very nature gray zone conflict is highly politicized as it straddles the blurred areas between war and peace. What is becoming apparent after a period of US hegemony in the post-Cold war era is an emergence of adversaries “who now regard themselves as being in a state of perpetual confrontation” (Younger, 2018). Galleoti also refers to this as “non-linear war” exhibiting the employment of “political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures” which can set the conditions for last resort military operations (2014). In order to counter this there will be a heavy reliance on intelligence, which will be critical to support a coordinated/parallel use of diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of national power to prevent gray zone conflict from manifesting in the first place. Continuing to address existing threats will likely stretch the capacity to do so (Miller, 2015).

The broad nature of actions utilized indicates that the threats posed are more than military alone. Based on Hizbollah actions in southern Lebanon in 2006, Glenn (2009) suggests the inclusion of “nongovernmental and intergovernmental agencies, relevant commercial enterprises, and other pertinent parties” in addition to the military. He advocates a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ requiring broader involvement in addition to military activity. When announcing the new national security strategy for the US President acknowledged this requirement indicating that whilst the military have an important role, a “whole-of-government approach” encompassing trade policy and utilizing economic power is necessary (Garamone, 2017).

Increased connectivity and the rapid transmission of messaging across the global commons has also altered the dynamic. In addition to main stream journalism, citizen commentators and the rise of the social media phenomenon all contribute to “Framing the Narrative” which can be heavily influenced and manipulated. The phenomenon of “Fake News” has also impacted on the way both domestic and foreign populations consider the information they are receiving. This has also involved the rapidly evolving Cyber domain which has been utilized extensively and continued to empower novel threat vectors. Within their operations in Ukraine, the Russians have utilized highly integrated methodologies to blend information warfare and cyber activities to increase complexity and the “fog of war” aimed at gaining advantage at both the tactical level and seeding uncertainty outside of the operational theatre. In order to gain clarity and counter such activities there will be a requirement to continuously evolve and adapt effective means of addressing them (Brantley & Collins, 2008).

What Are the Challenges to Intelligence Operations Posed by Grey Zone Conflict?

Whilst today’s great power, near-peer competition will most likely not manifest in outright open conflict, the utilization of gray zone activities certainly appears to be the new normal and is shaping current discourse about contemporary and future conflict. This would suggest there is a need to examine the ability for intelligence operations to address the additional challenges such activities will pose. As outlined, the grey zone construct can include multiple adversarial state and non-state actors, proxy forces and other malign actors such as warlords and criminals. As Mumford (2017) indicates “Not knowing exactly *who* the enemy is presents the most fundamental of challenges to strategic formulation”.

Intent and preferred outcomes may overlap but can often be separate and conflicting. One only needs to consider the example of how the situation in Syria has developed since the opposition to the Government of Bashar al-Assad began in 2011. Identifying who is doing what, and to who can be difficult, exemplified by the use of “the little green men” seen in the Ukraine. Undoubtedly the most significant issue, particularly in the early stages, will be the ability to identify the overall aim and desired end state of the adversaries. That said, getting after the “why” is “ultimately more critical to counter-strategies and conflict resolution” (Hoffman, 2018).

The dynamic and evolutionary nature of gray zone environments can result in situations that change rapidly in space and time, and the second and third order effects can be extremely difficult to identify. Given the changing character of threats, it is understandable that maintaining pace with contemporary demands will be no simple task. It is also important to consider the many existing limitations inherent to the intelligence process that have already been recognized and commented on. These numerous issues and inconsistencies can be magnified when facing new challenges in dynamic and complex environments such as those encountered in gray zone conflict.

Intelligence doctrine has faced constant modifications to enable the application of efficient and applicable frameworks. This has been particularly challenging in the light of evolving threats and the pace of change driven by globalization. Betts made some useful observations in this regard and in the light of the adversarial use of highly technical and sophisticated technology his view that the requirement for ongoing modernization and adaptation will be a constant (Betts, 2002, p. 54). Perhaps more importantly this must be central, as without continuing progress as “whatever capabilities are achieved intelligence capabilities and efforts alone will never be sufficient”, to deal with either contemporary or emerging threats (Cilluffo et al., 2016, p. 72).

The idea of building understanding by piecing together a jigsaw or “connecting the dots” is simply insufficient to address the mysteries and wicked problems that epitomise highly complex gray zone environments. Whilst it is agreed that increasing the availability of data can improve granularity and knowledge building, it can equally make it more difficult, particularly when misinformation and deception are at play. Mysteries are evaluative and estimative in character (Pythian, 2012, p. 203) and are the every-day challenge for intelligence analysts attempting to contextualize the available intelligence and to evaluate and connect in a coherent manner. This will significantly impact on their ability to realize the actual narrative. Attempts to inject ambiguity and intentionally sow confusion to conceal ultimate adversarial intent make this task harder still. It is this level of complexity that Cullen explains makes gray zone threats wicked problems by “strategic design” (2018, p. 4) making them not only difficult to detect, but they create highly unpredictable situations which are problematic to assess until desired adversarial outcomes are in progress.

Of course, one must utilize the right tool set to address such challenging problems, which is made fundamentally difficult if there is a lack of understanding of the environment in the first place. Hulnick (2006) and many others have been highly critical of the weakness of linear processes such as the traditional intelligence cycle claiming that this normative model is outdated and overly simplistic. There have been numerous suggestions as to alternatives, but the use of a modernized version such as an “intelligence web” as suggested by Gill & Pythian (2013) would certainly be far more useful to address highly complex and ambiguous environments and the wicked problems they contain. Despite a recognition that the greatest challenges may emanate from strategic adversaries, traditional “over the horizon scanning” for indicators and warnings may be insufficient. Areas where potential vulnerabilities could occur will need to be closely monitored to identify the nuanced changes that occur at the tactical level. Early detection of such activities that could signal the potential onset of gray zone activities will be needed to enable the swift decision-making required to counter them. Gentry (2008) offered some extremely useful insights into this when describing a seven-step process directly linking decision-makers directly to the strategic planning that will be required to drive the process.

There has been a constant drive to improve and increase collection capabilities in both the technical and HUMINT domains as suggested by Williamson who indicated that “the nation must be able to collect and fuse information from a wider variety of sources and establish systems to share intelligence across services, the government, and with partners (Williamson, 2009, p. 27). The intervening period has seen an exponential increase in space-based technologies for GEOINT and SIGINT, the expanding use of unmanned aerial systems deployed across the globe and increasing numbers of collection systems of all types down to the lowest tactical military echelons.

Many of the operational areas where these activities are faced are likely to be geographically distant where the footprint of allied assets on the ground is likely to be minimal. Most of the collection and processing will be conducted via ‘reach’ involving the use of out-of-theatre, centralized nodes for processing and dissemination.

US commanders have certainly recognized the constraints this imposes. Providing context to activity observed by unmanned aerial systems (which will also apply to space-based systems) is significantly more difficult without HUMINT or forces on the ground (Weisberger, 2014). In addition, the combination of readily available end-to-end encryption and use of anonymization techniques used to obscure activities will pose substantial challenges in the electronic spectrum.

According to Kamal Alam of the Royal United Services Institute, a failing of the US-led coalition counter-ISIS campaign in Syria was the lack of human intelligence. (Majumdar, 2015). This reflects the high value placed on HUMINT and is commensurate with the findings of Johnson (2012) who identified the weight that US policy makers place on this collection method. In order to gain greater understanding of wicked problem challenges, identification of strategic intent would be key. However, the capability to penetrate the inner circle of countries such as Russia and China continue to be an area of concern (Harris, 2016) and capabilities at this level will have been impacted due to focus on the more pressing CT fight. Gaining insight across all levels will be equally important, and despite efforts to improve tactical level HUMINT this will also face numerous difficulties. Auster hostile environments will be hard to penetrate, particularly with a small footprint in the region. The introduction of collectors with little experience of the environment will hamper effectiveness as Johnson (2012) also mentions. The option of using allies and partners to recruit “trusted locals” will be necessary, but HUMINT by proxy can be problematic and issues of trust and will inevitably arise. The recruitment and management of covert human sources will also be legally challenging.

Deliberate attempts to increase ambiguity and uncertainty into gray zone conflict will also inevitably result in significant broader legal issues. Sauri (2015) highlights the concept of lawfare and that there has been an increase in legal regulation which plays a greater role in modern conflict. Wittes (2015) contends that given that many aspects of contemporary conflict are not new, existing legislation would encompass most of its elements but acknowledges the cyber domain as a new area that may be more problematic. Difficulties encountered in attributing activities conducted in the gray zone and identifying actors involved may complicate the utilization of the correct legal authorities ensuring responses remain within the boundaries of legality, necessity and proportionality.

More specifically, maintaining effective oversight of the methods of collection and the subsequent usage of intelligence in both non-kinetic and kinetic operations will be extremely difficult given the rapidity of usage. Similiaenu highlights the “irregular militarized organizations” (2018, p. 266) one may encounter as being particularly problematic in this regard. Further issues surround the policies of sharing intelligence with allies and partners both in terms of the methodologies used to obtain it, and how it is ultimately utilized. These challenges will almost certainly increase as the distance between originator and analyst grows, the speed of the processes increases and the rising levels of automation.

Revelations of questionable collection methods have confirmed many suspicions that “The intelligence process is vulnerable at every point to the abuse of rights” (Gill, 2009, p. 89), therefore requiring a continued increase in intelligence oversight and scrutiny. This suggests that further investigation and study of the legal and ethical issues addressing the complexities of gray zone conflict will be required to ensure that these do not inhibit or obstruct collection and other intelligence activities. There is an obvious need to address emerging issues such as the increasing usage of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning which is still developing along with the Cyber domain as Wittes has mentioned.

New Problems Will Need New Approaches

There is a view that countering gray zone conflict “may not be doable with the current national security organizations and processes” (Dubick & Vincent, 2017, p. 29). The previously identified challenges they pose to intelligence operations clearly indicate that despite addressing previous shortfalls in the post-9/11 environment there continues to be numerous areas for development and improvement. The latest generation of analysts have become effective in network analysis, the targeting process and the necessary skills to prosecute operations against fleeting targets in remote locations across the globe. But with al-Qaeda on the wane and Islamic State suffering defeats on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria the intelligence community requires a reset to respond to these emerging threats.

As mentioned earlier there have been numerous studies into the numerous limiting factors that contribute to knowledge gaps and inaccurate or misleading analysis. However, it would be useful to examine some of the lessons identified from recent operational experiences such as those in Afghanistan. The understanding gained in such highly complex environments can provide insights into the more adaptive ways of thinking required to approach contemporary and future problems. The greatest challenges in that particular theater were “attitudinal, cultural and human” (Flynn et al., 2010, p. 9). Amongst the many recommendations made to address the shortfalls of the intelligence community was the need to adopt a more holistic, less enemy-centric approach and recognize the blurred lines between the strategic and tactical levels. It is also identified that “the context that provides the best understanding comes from the bottom up, not from the top down (Flynn et al., 2010, p. 23). This has been reflected and iterated in subsequent British defence concepts (UK MOD, 2012, pp. 3-10).

Commenting on the insights provided by Flynn et al. (2009) it has been suggested that improvements to the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPOE) process would address many of the issues raised (DeGennaro, 2018). Acknowledging the inability of intelligence organizations alone to create understanding within the ambiguity of such environments Degenarro advocated that other branches of the military should have greater involvement. This is particularly relevant given the broad range of non-military activities potentially faced. It would also facilitate access to more relevant data, therefore enabling improved knowledge generation. Creating enhanced granularity of the operating environment should lead to improved discovery of the subtle and nuanced changes indicating the onset and development of grey zone activity.

Through understanding of such historical studies and the resulting academic discourse Governments and military organizations do appear to have recognized and understand the need to widen the scope and to synchronize and coordinate with other levers of national power in a more coherent way. Williamson stresses the need to develop “enhanced interagency and multinational capabilities and coordination” and calls for improvements to diplomacy and statecraft in addition to improvements to military capabilities (2009, p. 30). Many of the lessons identified in Iraq and Afghanistan have created an understanding that in order to counter these emerging threats the application of military power alone will be insufficient (Hoffman, 2018). In the UK, recognition of the interdependency between organizations has led to the creation of a “Fusion Doctrine” aimed at harnessing capabilities required to “detect, deter and counter hybrid attacks and other threats” The value of leveraging foreign partnerships in addition to domestic ones is also recognized as being of high importance (Younger, 2018).

One thing above all that must be understood by analysts and policy makers alike is that in addition to improvements to the system, is the requirement to embrace alternative approaches. Central to this is an

understanding that “more than just the ontology of threats has changed, that in fact it is in the epistemological area that the most meaningful changes have taken place” (Dunn Cavelty & Mauer, 2009, p. 123). This requires the adoption of a postmodern conceptual approach to address the management of high levels of uncertainty and ambiguity. It must be clearly embraced by both analysts and policy makers that “trying to eliminate or reduce uncertainty ... is often impossible or infeasible” (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2012, p. 824). This will be fundamental in understanding “multiple possibilities that have meaningfully different implications for policy. (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2012, p. 825). They also suggest that the goal of intelligence is to describe the uncertainty that surrounds a specific question, and not to eliminate or to reduce this uncertainty per se (Friedman & Zeckhauser, 2012, p. 826).

Pythian provides some valuable insights that could assist in understanding how to approach the highly complex mix of knowns and unknowns necessary to drive effective judgements when addressing gray zone activities. Given the dynamic and evolving nature, it is key to understand the relationship between ignorance, uncertainty, risk and threat (2012, p. 195). In situations where high degrees of uncertainty are involved, and judgements based on partially understood events “carry with them high degrees of uncertainty as to outcomes”. Pythian (2012, p. 199) underlining the reflexive role that intelligence plays in supporting the decision-making process. Due to this reflexive rationality “an awareness of both complexity sciences and postmodernism might increase understanding of the limitations of knowledge and lead to the establishment of a political discourse of uncertainty” (Dunn Cavelty & Mauer, 2009, p. 125). This will be critical in order to counter “the vicious circle that uncertainty has created for organizations built for the creation of actionable knowledge” (Dunn Cavelty & Mauer, 2009, p. 139).

Analysts must recognize that when knowledge gaps do occur there is a responsibility to understand and manage the “consequences of the missing information” (Canton, 2008, p. 487). Embracing such concepts will lead to improved capacity for the early identification of emerging and developing threats that enable greater focus to be placed on the problem set. In the light of threats of the nature occurring in gray zone conflict critical thinking methods will contribute immensely to deal with the core challenges to reasoning in intelligence identified as “insufficiency, irrelevancy, indeterminacy and instrumentality” by Hendrickson (2008, p. 689).

The use of alternative analytical techniques can be enhanced through the utilization of evolving technology such as Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) programs which will increase speed and processing power. In order to take full advantage of this intelligence organizations will need to review structures and manpower requirements to include analysts “who understand algorithms and coding” (Horowitz, 2018). It will be important to understand how this technology will impact on both the intelligence community, its methodologies, and on the decision-making process that it supports. Adversaries will also be seeking to harness such advanced technologies themselves in order to target vulnerabilities and it has been recognized that “the United States and Europe are ill-equipped to respond to Russian AI-driven asymmetric warfare (ADAW) in the information space” (Polyakova, 2018).

There have been significant efforts to close this technological gap with projects such as the COMPASS program in the US which aims to identify “an adversary’s intentions and provide decision makers high-fidelity intelligence on how to respond — with positive and negative trade-offs for each course of action” (DARPA, 2018). From the US military perspective, modernization is also occurring with the planned employment of the Machine-Assisted Analysis Rapid-Repository System (MARS) as discussed by the DIA Director recently (CSIS, 2018). Despite such technologically advanced systems however, Karlin suggests that uncertainty will

remain a constant and U.S. policymakers will nevertheless have to make decisions about dynamic conflict based on incomplete information (Karlin, 2018).

Which raises the final and arguably most critical aspect regarding the responses and actions taken against activity within gray zones. As with all discussions on intelligence operations, the most fundamental issue will inevitably lie with the ultimate utility of its products. Therefore, one needs to examine what new challenges the emergence of gray zone conflict will have on the policy and decision-making process. Firstly, it is key to ensure that those involved are cognizant of the impacts that these activities are having on the current and future character of competition. As previously referenced, there is now a solid body of academic and other writings on the subject, and senior military and civilian leaders are certainly becoming increasingly aware. That said, numerous studies have identified multiple examples where policy makers have consistently failed to act upon the intelligence provided to them. Marrin (2017) amongst others questions the level of influence that intelligence really has on national-level decision making, and there is certainly validity to his suggestion of the further study required in this key area. As Gentry (2018) also indicates, the actions taken by decision makers will determine the success of an intelligence operation. His suggestion that priority be given to increasing understanding of the capabilities of intelligence is particularly relevant when dealing with such levels of uncertainty.

If the issue was not complex enough, adversaries will constantly be pushing the envelope in testing the tolerances of their opposing decision makers, as Chipman (2018) contends in his discussion mentioned earlier. They will also deliberately attempt to obfuscate involvement seeking to limit the ability to deter or defeat their efforts and impeding the ability for a response within a time frame to alter the outcomes. Mumford (2017) explains the dilemma this will create where “over-reaction looks pre-emptive and disproportionate if clear responsibility for an attack has not been established; but the lack of a response leaves a state open to death by a thousand cuts”.

At any stage of the process, given the high levels of uncertainty there is always the risk that one or other of the protagonists can misread the situation leading to incorrect or inappropriate decisions which will increase chances of adversarial success, or perhaps even escalate the situation in a direction that neither side desires. According to Pillar (2009, p. 9) the “inherent indeterminacy of complex events” can and will change depending on decisions that have yet to be made. There is also a danger that any politicization of the intelligence provided can further complicate the issues when decision makers have little understanding as to the outcomes of using the intelligence for their own political purposes. Gill & Pythian (2012) also offer significant insights into this phenomenon.

Freier sums up the essence of the conundrum that adversaries seek to achieve when outlining concepts of “Risk Confusion” & “Hyper Risk” in which he sees “gray zone hybridity and menace combine in strategic decision-making to paralyze effective counter-gray zone approaches”. He adds that “risk confusion emerges when the hazards associated with action and inaction against gray zone rivals appear equally unpleasant” (Freier, 2018). These issues appear to have driven a new approach to the formulation of national strategies in the United Kingdom. This has led to the creation of the “Fusion Doctrine” previously mentioned by the Head of the Intelligence Service to create a more holistic approach to improve national level decision making and “enable earlier identification of emergent shocks” (McKeran, 2019). It is of course perhaps too early to tell after less than one year in existence, but McKeran is cautious but positive with the progress achieved thus far and it will be worthy of consideration as a model for others.

Conclusion and Recommendations

There has been discord as to the validity to the concept of Hybrid war, with increasing focus placed on the emerging “gray zone”. Many of the elements of hybrid environments present few unrecognized challenges. It is the nebulous “gray zone”, rapidly generating ambiguity, uncertainty and complexity that will be the most problematic to intelligence operations. There will certainly be enormous strain placed on the intelligence community by the need to identify and monitor simultaneous, dynamic multiple activities in addition to existing responsibilities. It is concluded that in order to be better placed to address the wicked problems encountered when dealing with such highly complex environments will only be achievable through the adoption of new conceptual and methodological approaches. Therefore, the following should be considered:

A Holistic Approach — The scope must be broadened beyond the military domain and encompass and leverage all aspects of power and the information space. The UK’s Fusion Doctrine may provide a useful benchmark how this may be achieved.

Historical Perspectives — Learning from historical perspectives, particularly those involving highly complex environments and multiple adversaries such as experienced during recent operations in Afghanistan. Equally useful will be studies of conflicts where asymmetric strategies and tactics predominated.

Knowledge Creation — Improved understanding of the creation of knowledge through the adoption of improved collection and data management utilizing technical innovation.

The Management of Uncertainty — Education for intelligence practitioners stressing postmodern ideas regarding the fallibility of intelligence. The incorporation of new analytical techniques addressing the management of uncertainty and improving critical thinking will be necessary.

Producer/Consumer Interface — Improvements to the relationships between analysts and the policy makers they support, and education about the extreme challenges faced. This should include for both constituencies a far greater understanding of the reflexive nature of intelligence judgements in risk formulation.

Such modifications will be essential in order to deliver the appropriate responses to counter activities in the gray zone and ensure they remain within the normative boundaries demanded by policy makers and their electorates.

Finally, it needs to be remembered that our own complexity may be as challenging as the complexity we face.

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Economic Interdependence and Interstate Conflict

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In this article, we review three publications regarding trade and interstate conflict and aim to further delineate the debate of whether economic interdependence is a cause of war or peace. The recent U.S.-China trade tensions under the Trump administration have warranted a renewed interest in the qualification of the veracity of either peace or conflict in an age of increasing interdependence. In this analysis, we aim to contribute to the base of knowledge of interdependence and interstate conflict and argue that three strategies merit additional attention. First, research should turn to previously neglected secondary and tertiary boundary conditions under which trade can have an influence on the likelihood of conflict. Second, additional effort should be made towards revealing and delineating causal mechanisms instead of taking for granted the most prevalent frameworks of major paradigms. Third, it would be prudent to reconceptualize key concepts and assumptions when trying to understand the effects of economic exchange on belligerence.

Keywords: economic interdependence, interstate conflict, security externality, intra-industry trade, relative gain

Introduction

Political scientists and economists have long been interested in whether economic interdependence is a cause of war or peace. Although considerable progress has been made over the past decades, the field has not moved beyond preliminary analyses of the causal mechanisms, and, thus, narrow and static applications of the grand theories are common. Consequently, scholars have found no consensus regarding the link between interstate commerce and conflict. While the literature partially qualifies the assertion that extensive commercial bonds between nations create a deterrent to conflict, it has been daunting at times to find empirical support for such peace-through-globalization hypotheses.

Earlier Studies of Economic Interdependence and Interstate Conflict

Liberalism

Many scholars align with traditional liberalism and conclude that economic openness should have a pacifying effect on armed conflicts. These optimists draw on the work of classical liberals such as Kant to stress the importance of interdependence as a key casual factor to reduce the chance of military conflict between states

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(Polachek, 1980; Oneal & Russett, 1997, 1999). In this camp, scholars identified three possible pathways that lead trading partners to peace: the welfare gains of trade, state preferences and increased inter-state information flow and communication.

The first claim of the liberals is what scholars have labeled “liberal commercialism”.¹ Such a liberal commercialism argument focuses on the absolute mutual welfare gains that trade promotes, and its ultimate pacifying effect. Based on this logic, states are deterred from initiating conflict against a trading partner for fear of losing the welfare gains associated with the trading relationship (Polachek, 1980). Following the same deductive reasoning, liberal institutionalists further articulated the increased opportunity cost among trading partners that hinders the possibility of war: the opportunity costs of waging war are high when trade levels are high, and this serves to restrain actors who might otherwise have an incentive for war (Keohane & Nye, 1972; Copeland, 2015).

Another thread of the liberal argument focusing on state preferences pointed to economic exchange as substitute means of military conquest to acquire resources for promoting political security and economic growth. As trade and foreign investment increase, there are fewer incentives to meet these needs through territorial expansion, imperialism and foreign conquest (Rosecrance, 1986).

The third liberal argument — cast primarily at the level of country dyad — is that economic exchange increases information flow and promotes communication between private actors in different countries as well as between governments. Increased contact and communication, in turn, are expected to foster cooperative political relations (Doyle, 1997; Hirschman, 1977, p. 61; Stein, 1993; Viner, 1951, p. 261). To this point, the notion of trans-nationalism highlights diminished role of the military, which are substituted by multiple channels of communication (Keohane & Nye, 1972).

Realism

Realists, on the other hand, suggest that high levels of trade might provide states with more reasons to fight (Waltz, 1970). Realists’ arguments focus on two dimensions: state interests; and how trade might change the distribution of power in the anarchic system. Consequently, realists identified two logics that link interstate commerce and war: dependency asymmetry and thus vulnerability, and disproportionate distribution of gains.

The causal mechanism that incentivizes dependent great powers to war lies in the dependency asymmetry and vulnerability thereof, generated by “opening-up” trading relationships. Treating states as self-help unitary actors in the anarchic system, pessimistic scholarly accounts argued that it is within states’ interests to be concerned with relative gains and thus the fear of being cut-off from vital goods and markets.² As Waltz put it, while actors in domestic politics have little reason to fear specialization, the anarchic structure of international

¹ In a collective volume, *Globalization and Armed Conflict* (2003), Scheneider et al. introduce four possible arguments regarding the effect of trade on interstate conflict: Liberal commercialism argues that trade promotes peace due to absolute mutual welfare gains. The Marxist/dependency theorists indicate that trade leads to conflict due to negative consequence of asymmetrical dependence. The neorealism supposes trade causes the distributional conflict because of states’ relative gains concerns. Trade is irrelevant to conflict. Copeland, on the other hand, identified three causal claims: the liberalism, realism and neo-Marxism. The commercial liberalism is what Copeland identified as the opportunity cost model.

² Offensive realists have focused on the relative gain concerns, which may advantage trading partners. These critics of commercial liberalism asserted that the disproportionate gains of economic relations may lead to tension and conflict. The economic dependence tends to disproportionately benefit some states, which implies disproportionate costs for the more dependent state. Mearsheimer (1992, p. 223) observes that states requiring vital goods, fearing cut off, will seek “to expand political control to the sources of supply, giving rise to conflict with the source or with its other customers.”

politics forces states to worry about vulnerability, compelling them “to control what they depend on or to lessen the extent of their dependency.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 106). Scholars such as Gilpin and Krasner also emphasized that states have political reasons to minimize their dependence on foreign commerce, and thus the fear of cut-offs which might lead powerful states to war (Gilpin, 1977, 1981, and 1987). Hence, as trade flows and the extent of interdependence increases, so do incentives to take military action to reduce their economic vulnerability (Gilpin 1981, pp. 140–141; Liberman, 1996).

Other realist scholars focused on the distributional effects of economic gains among states that could change power dynamics in the system. Realists have pointed out that the distributional consequences of the disproportional gains from trade will shift power dynamics among the great powers and thus affect interstate power relations. Shifting power relations, in turn, are widely regarded as a potential source of military conflict (Gilpin, 1981; Levy, 1989; Mearsheimer, 1990).

The Bargaining Literature

The bargaining literature that addresses the relationship between trade and conflict has largely been constructed by realist scholars. Grieco’s strategic choice approach utilizes trade gains and its security externality to explain how trading relationship flourish among allies. According to Grieco, the increase in real income frees more economic resources for military use, and therefore create potential security gains for trading partners and threats to enemies.³ Using tariff game models between allies and adversaries, Gowa showed that free trade is more likely to flourish within political military alliances. Assuming polarity is the root cause of the international behavior, Gowa further suggested that an international bipolar system facilitates more free trade due to stronger alliance stability. It is worth noting that for Gowa, the impact of trade on conflict is an epiphenomenon, and caused by other factors (Gowa, 1994).

Other formal theory scholars utilize the liberal argument that globalization facilitates information flow and communication to arrive at the liberal prediction that trade should be associated with peace. For example, Gartzke and Li suggested that globalization reduces the uses of bluff and deception, makes communications among states more credible and therefore facilitates agreements without resorting to militarized violence (Gartzke & Li, 2003).

A Summary of the Publications

Studies selected in this review essay represent the latest efforts in the literature to reconcile the marked disparate views regarding the link between trade and armed conflict. These publications — by Copeland, Kleinberg et al., and Peterson and Thies — seek to further advance the literature and attempt to solve the debate by isolating boundary conditions that facilitate either a pacifying or hostile effect of economic ties. These authors point to several previously neglected areas of considerations: conditions posited are the variables of time, concentration of extradyadic trade relationships, and the products being traded. Together, they move toward filling a void in the scholarship of interdependence and conflict.

Trade Expectations Theory

Dale C. Copeland’s book *Economic Interdependence and War*, is a carefully crafted contribution to the

³ Grieco further invoked the relative-gains argument to assess the possibility of cooperation between trading partners. According to this hypothesis, the fear of feeding a potential enemy through an intensification of trade is the major impediment to any attempt at creating lasting institutions and trade relationships between non-allied states (Grieco, 1988).

literature on economic interdependence and interstate conflict (Copeland, 2014). The book proposes an alternative trade expectations theory: for any expected value of conflict, negative expectations of future trade prospect increase the incentive and likelihood of a dependent state's choice of hardline policies or war. Conversely, a positive outlook on future trade and investments increases the security confidence of a country and therefore reduces the incentives to go to war.

Utilizing both the realism paradigm and the bargaining literature, Copeland focuses on the time dimension to explain that it is not the current trading relationship of dependency asymmetry, but it is the future that political leaders are truly concerned with. While liberal theory would typically focus exclusively on the opportunity-cost calculated at the current level of interdependence, the realist theory focuses on the concern of the current dependency asymmetry and vulnerability. Copeland's main concern with the literature is not that it is wrong but rather that it is under-specified: When two countries are highly interdependent today but one of them feels vulnerable in the future due to negative future shocks, the war incentives may exist (p. 16).

By introducing a secondary condition to solve the debate in the literature, the contributions of Copeland's book are manifold. First, by treating such a relationship in a more progressive way, the confounding variable of time that Copeland points out is a plausible one. In a dynamic trading relationship that involves power struggle, it is likely that states' conditions change over time; therefore, it is the future, not the present or the past, that leaders of a country are truly concerned with. Therefore, Copeland's approach, in short, is a basic reorientation of the thinking about interdependence and war away from theories of comparative statics and toward dynamic theories that incorporate the future within their core deductive logic (p. 17). Second, while empirical evidence supports both views, Copeland further asks when, and under what conditions, will trade and investment ties between nations lead to either peace or military conflict.

Note that commercial factors are not only far more important to the outbreak of war than realists and liberals have previously thought, but that their impact can cut both ways. The real puzzle to be solved thus becomes this: when and under what conditions will the trade and investment ties between nations lead to either peace or military conflict (Copeland, 2014, p. 1).

Copeland correctly notes that while understanding that the primary conditions of the relationship between trade and war are necessary, the lack of census on this topic has likely resulted from the inadequacy of understanding the sufficient conditions of the relationship. In this sense, Copeland's argument fuses the liberal and the realist insight that commercial ties can give actors a large material incentive to avoid war with the realist insight that such ties also create vulnerabilities that can push leaders into war (p. 2).

Extradynamic Trade

Kleinberg et al. share a common objective as Copeland: to introduce secondary variables to identify previously neglected boundary conditions. Kleinberg et al. study the extradynamic environment to understand the relationship between trade concentration and interstate conflict (Katja B. Kleinberg, Gregory Robinson & Stewart L. French, 2012). According to the authors, greater concentration of extradynamic trade implies less outside trading partners and therefore makes dyadic conflict less likely as it affords potentially belligerent states fewer substitutes for dyadic trades (p. 532). By measuring opportunity costs by means of the size of trade as well as a state's ability to replace it, they argue that when states have fewer alternatives to their existing trades, risk of violent conflict declines.

Unlike Copeland focusing on the time dimension, Kleinberg et al. utilize the relationship among constituent states. The contribution of Kleinberg's argument is to understand how the outside environment affects the dynamics within a dyadic. Their argument is a plausible one, as there are often many trading partners for each state in the international system: states often maintain ties with numerous suppliers and markets to satisfy their needs. The extent of trade outside the dyad should have an impact on possible armed conflict within the dyad. Over time, they also adjust their trade relations with any partner, sometimes gradually in response to changes in supply and demand, sometimes abruptly in response to political developments (p. 533).

Additionally, their piece advances the current literature by introducing a more holistic view on opportunity costs — which is not only measured by the volume of trade but also the potential substitutes available outside a trading relationship. To this point, it can be argued that trade substitution also serves as one of the determinants in a leader's trade expectations. Therefore, Copeland's piece can be strengthened by Kleinberg et al.'s argument.

Intra-industry Trade

The reconceptualization of trade composition using new trade theory — intra-industry trade — has been the focus of Peterson and Thies's publication, *Beyond Ricardo: The Link Between Intra-Industry Trade and Peace* (Timothy M. Peterson & Cameron G. Thies, 2012). Their approach represents another front in the trade-conflict debate over how to conceptualize and measure the main concepts of interest — conflict and economic interdependence (Barbieri, 1996; Gartzke & Li, 2003; Hegre, 2000).

Peterson and Thies argue that intra-industry trade is particularly pacifying because it promotes similarity of interests and preferences among trade partners without evoking vulnerability, contrary to inter-industry trade. Intra-industrial trade serves to reduce conflict because the pacifying elements of trade remain such as trade gains that function either as an opportunity cost, or to facilitate information flow, communication and intercultural exchange (pp. 752–753). Meanwhile, the potentially aggravating impacts are diminished, such as the incentive to use trade as leverage in bargaining and potential resentment in which primary commodity exporting countries are vulnerable to exporters of manufactured goods (pp. 752–773).

Peterson and Thies further point out that development itself and overall trade have ambiguous effects on conflict, whereas intra-industry trade should be uniformly pacifying. Their statistical analyses demonstrate that higher proportions of dyadic intra-industry trade significantly reduce militarized conflict; overall trade interaction typically has no effect on the likelihood of dyadic conflict when controlling for intra-industry trade; and finally, development alone has no effect on the likelihood of dyadic conflict in the absence of intra-industry trade (pp. 755–756).

Peterson and Thies shared the same notions as the other two sets of authors that trade is not everywhere nor at all times pacifying. All three sets of authors correctly contend that the pacifying impact of liberalization may itself be a conditional phenomenon. By using the new trade theory, the strength of Peterson & Thies is two-fold. On the one hand, it explores a previously uncharted territory by arguing that the type of product traded likely has an impact on the probability of peace or conflict. Using the intra-industry trade model to understand the trade composition is a novel insight that makes up for the omitted variable bias in most of the literature including those of Copeland and Kleinberg et al.'s.

On the other hand, the new trade theory and intra-industry trade can realistically explain what is happening in today's trading market, when countries largely trade intermediary goods that is part of the value chain. The

composition of trade has changed markedly since the pre-World War I era.⁴ And yet, trade composition used to measure inter-industry specialization are still in accordance with the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models (p. 748). In fact, states today often exchange similar commodities following intra-industry specialization (Krugman, 1979, 1981). While most scholars still use the classical economic models of trade, such a novel approach provides a fresh breeze in the study of trade and war.

The Causal Mechanisms

While Kleinberg et al., Peterson and Thies advance the liberal literature, Copeland attempts to build a defensive realism theory focusing on the trade-security dilemma. However, Copeland's causal path towards such a theory and his characterization of offensive realism beg more clarification.

Copeland characterizes structural offensive realism as “economic realism” and criticizes their focus on belligerence. According to Copeland, economic realism claimed that the states will always “assume the worst” in economic competition and endorses expansionist strategies against geopolitical rivals (p. 7). Throughout his analysis, it seems that Copeland mainly takes issue with opportunism and thus the rebuttal of “aggression” remains the focus of his theory. His theory, therefore, accords with most of the other aspects of the offensive realism theory, except for the belligerent tendency of dependent states.⁵ This is somewhat a narrow refutation of offensive realism. In fact, Mearsheimer's offensive realism at least encompasses two dimensions: security power maximization and relative gain concerns.⁶ However, while Copeland claims his theory is fundamentally realist due to its concern of long-term security (p. 27), little effort has been made to disqualify the underlying logic of belligerence — the relative-gains considerations.

In building his trade-security dilemma theory, Copeland at times claims the primacy of commercial power while at other times declares his position should not retreat to the “welfare-maximization” logic.⁷ However, the primacy of commercial power itself implies states concern about absolute gains. In his analysis of the trade-security dilemma, he certainly shows a preference towards the primacy of commercial power. As a result, it is not clear where he draws the boundaries between his theory, the offensive realism and the liberal theory. To understand his position, it will be helpful to further elaborate on the possible causal logics that link trade and potential conflict. In the sections below, we will first analyze three publications' positions on how interdependence could be a crucial variable by showing that powerful states do trade with each other. Then, we will move on to the discussion of the direct and indirect causal relationships.

Dual Nature of Trade: Why Do Powerful States Trade With Each Other?

Copeland claims that offensive realism argued for a possible spurious relationship between trade and conflict:

⁴ According to Milner (1999), Intra-industry trade has expanded considerably in the period since the second world war and now accounts for the majority of total international trade — between 55 percent and 75 percent (Peterson & Thies, 2012, p. 748).

⁵ According to Copeland, dependent states do not initiate war; instead, they respond to the restrictive actions by reducing benefits and imposing costs of adjustment. Furthermore, a bargaining model shaped a self-reinforcing feedback loop of mistrust and hostility that ultimately lead a dependent state to initiate war (Copeland, 2014, pp. 47–48).

⁶ In fact, Mearsheimer's offensive realism begins with the assertion that great powers “emphasize on relative power and security maximization as motivations of states' behavior” (Mearsheimer, 2001). Also see Glenn H. Snyder's review on “Mearsheimer's world — offensive realism and the struggle for security”, 2002.

⁷ According to Copeland, the trade-security dilemma involves the implication of actions that states take to improve the certainty of future access to resources, investments and markets over the long term. This is not a security maximization concern; it is more of a commercial power maximization concern.

economic interdependence is usually not as salient a variable precisely because great powers have clear reasons not to trade with one another in the first place.⁸ Should trade be an independent variable of interest? Is the relationship between trade and war epiphenomenal? To this point, all three sets of authors depart from offensive realism in the sense that they all share a common belief that the relationship between economic interdependence and interstate conflict is not epiphenomenal: they are indeed causal.

Why do powerful states trade in the first place? Such a question is best related to the dual nature of trade. Hirschman states the dual nature of trade gains, which captures the trade dilemma. Great powers need to trade with each other and yet, they are afraid of becoming over-dependent:

The influence which country A acquires in country B by foreign trade depends in the first place upon the total gain which B derives from that trade; the total gain from trade for any country is indeed nothing but another expression for the total impoverishment which would be inflicted upon it by a stoppage of trade. In this sense the classical concept, gain from trade, and the power concept, dependence on trade, now being studied, are seen to be merely two aspects of the same phenomenon (Hirschman, 1945, p. 73; quoted in Baldwin, 1980, p. 478).

Two prominently identified causal mechanisms in the literature that relate to the dual nature of trade gains are opportunity costs and vulnerability. Using the logic of increased opportunity costs among trading partners, Kleinberg et al. align with the liberal camp. Copeland has advanced a defensive realism argument while focusing on leaders' future expectations towards dependency and future vulnerability. Both sets of authors refute the possibility that fears of dependency may prevent great powers from trading with each other in the first place.

According to Copeland, the reason why great powers engage in a trading relationship lies in "economic realities": economies of scale, diminishing marginal returns, and the proliferation of raw material inputs (pp. 30-32). Although the concerns of dependency and vulnerability are very much relevant, they are within leaders' future calculations, not the present or the past. War may break out when "the dependent power no longer believes that the system is working for it and has reason to think that a preventive war, or increasingly coercive politics, might be able to reestablish secure access to the resources, investments and markets that are being denied to it or will be denied in the near future" (p. 7). Thus, fear of dependency may be in the future while the trade gains are at present. Using this logic, the incentives that drive great powers to trade in the first place may very well be the prospect of a current symmetrical trading relationship — a balance between gains and dependence. Conveniently, the dual nature of trade misses each other in the dimension of time, and, thus, the conflict is resolved.

Copeland's argument, however, does not directly address the role of future opportunity costs and the potential pacifying effect of trade ties. To this point, Copeland's analysis of why great powers trade in the first place may not be a holistic one. His argument can be strengthened by Kleinberg et al.'s and Peterson and Thies's arguments.

Kleinberg et al. advance the commercial liberalism literature of opportunity costs by pointing to the structural impact of the level of extradyadic relationship on potential belligerent states' behaviors. For Kleinberg et al., states are deterred from initiating a conflict for fear of losing welfare gains. As Kleinberg et al. see it, if a state can shift quickly and cheaply from one trading partner to equally beneficial trade with another partner, the opportunity costs of dyadic conflict will be low and the associated constraints on belligerent actions will be small (p. 531). In other words, the availability of substitutes for dyadic trade will affect the size of the prospective

⁸ Scholars have argued that great powers both have a relative gain concern and a fear of vulnerability (Grieco, 1988, 1993; Mearsheimer, 1994, 2001; Buzan, 1984; Copeland, 2014).

opportunity costs of belligerence toward a trading partner and the likelihood of interstate conflict.

To Peterson and Thies, the dilemma between opportunity costs and dependency asymmetry is resolved by the pacifying effect of intra-industry trade. In fact, great powers are mainly engaged in intra-industry trade, in which the opportunity cost of losing the absolute trade gain is highlighted, while the concerns of dependency and vulnerability are eliminated.

Overall, these three publications together may answer the question as to why great powers may engage in trading relationships — they are controlling for the possibility of becoming vulnerable. The present trade gains versus a future dependency on trade, the opening of multilateral trading relationships at the same time and the combined character of intra-industry trade may very well fog a leader's judgement about the outcome of the dual nature of their trade. Therefore, it may not be surprising that great powers engage in trading despite the potential vulnerability and future adjustment costs, combined with their current concern of trade gains.

Nevertheless, the possibility that trade could be an independent variable is one thing; to establish a causal relationship is yet another that involves solving the endogeneity problem. Three publications, to varying degrees, assume causal relationships between trade and conflict can be established by the mechanisms of opportunity cost or trade dependency without considering the underlying debate of absolute or relative gain concerns. This is a bold assumption. In fact, absolute and relative gain concerns may help to define the paradigmatic divide. As one will see in the following analysis, using these two separate logics, there are two possible causal pathways pushing trade to either conflict or peace: direct and indirect pathways.

The Direct Causal Path: Military Power Versus Commercial Power

One of Copeland's contributions in his book is to advance a possible direct causal link between trade and security. It has to do with the reorientation of states' primary concern from security maximization to commercial power. It thus stands to reason that either opportunity costs or dependency will make a direct impact on peace or conflict as states pursue their primary commercial interests. Copeland makes a convincing argument on the precedence of commercial power and how it affects international relations.⁹

Earlier realist scholars such as Waltz and Gilpin recognized the importance of commercial power: without a strong and vibrant economy, great powers cannot sustain their positions in the system (Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981). Copeland goes one step further and claims that military power rests ultimately on economic power. According to Copeland, liberalism cannot explain the economic concerns of Adolf Hitler prior to the collapse of the global economic system, or his strategic worries in the 1930s about Germany's future dependence on raw materials and food (p. 6). Indeed, the realist focus on military power may be misleading; security studies should focus on commercial power dynamics. If history shows that a great power's security is very much a function of its position in the global commercial system, the entire field of "security studies" will need to be reoriented away from its traditional focus on military matters and reconnected with the insights of international political economy (p. 3). Copeland also points out economic efficiency in modern times depends on participation in an international division of labor, which permits scale economies in production (pp. 30–32).

If economic gains are states' ultimate concerns, then the dependent variable of security studies will be commercial power, while military power itself will turn to an intervening variable or even an independent variable.

⁹ Thus far, no clear consensus has emerged in the literature about the causal precedence between trade and conflict (Keshk, Pollins, & Reuveny 2004; Hegre, Oneal, & Russett, 2010).

In other words, military power is a means, not an end. Yet, such a premise of primacy of commercial power itself may be a daring claim. Such a reorientation will clearly require reconceptualization of the definition of power: are states ultimately concerned with inherent power, relational power, or structural power? Does globalization (interdependence) as a structural variable change a state's interests in the kind of power it seeks? A better understanding of the primacy of commercial power as a state's primary concern will require a thorough inquiry into reconceptualizing and operationalizing 'power' in international relations. Until then, such a direct causal link between interdependence and armed conflict may remain elusive in the literature.

Additionally, such a reorientation to commercial power and welfare invariably implies that states do concern about absolute gains. Although not explicitly stated, Copeland and the other two publications shared this implicit logic that all states who engage in peaceful relations and trade can expand their wealth. The absolute gain argument focuses on maximization of gains in general regardless of the gains of others, which is to say, a non-zero-sum game (Powell, 1991). One possible causal path where Copeland's theory could work is through the primacy of commercial power, and thus the concern of absolute gains, combined with dependency asymmetry. One could argue such a position is realist in the sense that it focuses on power; one could also argue that such a position is more liberal because it is clearly predicated upon absolute welfare gains.

The Indirect Causal Path: Security Externality

While the primary concern of commercial power, to some extent, can work through dependency vulnerability and thereby the impetus to war, such a path may not be the dominant one. An indirect offensive logic could very well be at play here. As discussed, the offensive logic claims the primacy of security maximization and concerns of relative gains. Using such a logic, in order for trade to have an impact on security outcomes, it will require a translation of trade gains to security gains. Mearsheimer claimed that states should still worry about relative gains because gaps in gains can be translated into a military advantage that can be used for coercion or aggression (Mearsheimer, 1994).

This indirect causal path is achieved through what is known as 'security externality'. Although not explicitly stated, both Copeland and Peterson and Thies's logic of dependency vulnerability could very well work through the concept of 'security externality'. According to Grieco and Gowa, the security externality of trade results from the increase in real income due to efficient uses of resources accomplished by trade. Gowa assumed that trade along the line of comparative advantage has net economic benefit: mutual gains, revenue, and income earned in the form of money will increase a country's resources and spending power. Trade increases the potential militant power of any country that engages in it because an increase in real income contributes to military resources, which can be an important means to wield power and produces security gains (D. Baldwin, 1985, p. 216; Hirschman, [1945] 1980, p. 14; McKeown, 1982; Root, 1984; Srinivasan, 1987, p. 352; Gowa, 1994).

Security externalities can work defensively or offensively. In an offensive world, with the intention to reduce vulnerability, security externality incentivizes potential dependent powerful states to war. This logic is what currently dominates the literature in realism. Copeland departs from this logic by considering the defensive tendencies of such dependent states: dependent states simply respond to the restrictions of trade and investment flows of less dependent states.

However, security externality may also work defensively through another causal mechanism of the distributional consequences of such security gains. According to Copeland, it is always the dependent states that gain relatively in a trading relationship (p. 9). Following this logic, dependent states may advance their positions

in the international system due to security power gained through trade. A changed power dynamic, in turn, may send a dependent state X to a spiraling situation initiated by states that feel threatened by state X's newly gained security power through externality. This could be one of the reasons that motivated less-dependent states to restrict trade in Copeland's case. However, none of the authors seem to consider such a possible indirect causal path.

One may question whether such a scenario could exist without the reality of relative gains. This is a valid concern since the changing power dynamic can only be achieved by relative gains. The same logic applies to the direct causal path that links commercial power primacy, dependency asymmetry and war. One could similarly question whether such possibilities really exist without an inherent belligerent tendency and especially a relative-gains concern. The relative-gains considerations will be discussed in the following sections.

Structural Constraints of Economic Interdependence and War

Anarchy and Relative Gains

Copeland has correctly pointed out that the existing literature is missing a defensive realism perspective on economic interdependence and war. To realists, the concern of relative gains permeates in two dimensions: they determine state interests; they change the distribution of power in the anarchic system. In the latter argument, economic interdependence tends to disproportionately benefit the most powerful states and entails unequal costs on others: this inequality leads to tensions and conflict. Therefore, both realist arguments — dependency asymmetry and the disproportionate distributional consequence — are predicated upon the concerns of relative gains.

Both Copeland and Kleinberg et al. implicitly reject the offensive realism argument that relative gains are the main concerns of a state. However, they have failed to properly address how the overall structure in the international system creates incentives for trade or military conflict. In fact, as much as Copeland tries to design a defensive realism theory, his focus on leader expectations in an uncertain future hardly make such theories structural.¹⁰

Kleinberg et al.'s analysis is largely based on the opportunity cost model; however, it is unclear whether the realist rational could be at work for the perceived pacifism among belligerent states. The analysis completely ignores how dependency asymmetry and hence vulnerability may be altered due to the concentration of extradyadic trade. One could argue that the dependency asymmetry logic may very well be the cause of reduced conflict within the dyad. If greater concentrations of extradyadic trade mean less trading contraction within a dyad, then a state faces less risk of dependency and vulnerability. Therefore, it is unclear if it is the increased opportunity costs or the reduced vulnerability within the dyadic relationship that is causing the dampening effect on the potential belligerent states.

Copeland rejects the offensive realism pessimism on the basis of two premises. First, offensive realism failed to explain why great powers trade with each other and hence get into a dependency asymmetry and vulnerable position in the first place. Second, offensive realism cannot explain why great powers remain confident about their interdependent relationship for long stretches of time. The rebuttal of these premises was discussed in the

¹⁰ Copeland claimed that his deductive logic has a strong neorealist root. It recognizes the states in anarchic systems — that is, those systems lacking a central authority — always have reason to worry about not just future military attack but also a cutoff from the sources of future economic power (Copeland, 2014, pp. 429–432).

previous section: clearly, states have good reasons to establish trading relationships even under the constraints of relative gain concerns. In this section, I will propose possible arguments about when the relative-gains considerations are slight.

The first condition likely lies in the systemic changes of anarchy. The offensive realist position is nested in the international anarchic assumption. Recently, such an assumption and its implications have been fundamentally challenged by scholars like Lake. In “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics”, Lake pointed out that there has always been a wide variety of hierarchical relationships within the international system, and relationships in which the sovereignty of the subordinate polity is ceded in whole or in part to a dominant state (Lake, 2007). The advent of unipolarity, Lake noted, once again revived a hierarchy between states.

This newly redeemed wisdom may shed light on our understanding of relative gain concerns. Does hierarchy under the American unipolar system change a state’s incentive for relative-gains considerations? It is likely. States may have less relative gain concerns in a hierarchic system; instead, they may focus on absolute economic gains achieved through economic development. On the one hand, with hegemony facilitating order and stability in the system, states are not self-helped, and, thus, may have more impetus for cooperation. On the other hand, hegemony may facilitate information flow, and, thus, states are not insulated from communication. Such structures may indeed motivate states for cooperation.

Secondly, the concentration of power as Mansfield elaborated in the 90s will likely have an impact on the relative gain concerns, when taking both future and extradyadic circumstances into consideration. In *Power, Trade and War*, Mansfield advanced an inverse relationship between commerce and conflict, subject to the system structure of power concentration. According to Mansfield, the distribution of power has a non-monotonic influence on trade and war. Instead of measuring polarity, he argued, measure of concentration takes into account both the number of great powers and the relative distribution of power. Mansfield found that concentration of power exerts an inverted U-shape relationship on war and a U-shape on trade (Mansfield, 1994). Mansfield’s model of the high concentrations of power associated with a lower likelihood of war is compatible with the hegemonic stability theory. In such power dynamics, one could argue that a state’s relative gain concern may very well be removed due to hegemonic mechanisms such as stable alliances.

Furthermore, Mansfield’s low concentration of power being equally conducive to peace is echoed by Snidal. Snidal maintained that in a multipolar system where more than a small number of states have roughly equal power results in states that will not worry much about relative gains (Snidal, 1994). Consequently, increasing the number of states in the system decreases concerns for relative gains because more actors enhance the possibility of protecting oneself through forming coalitions (Mearsheimer, 1994, p. 32).

The third possibility is what Grocio and Gowa advanced in the bargaining literature regarding whom to trade with. In the international anarchy where every state ensures its security either by itself or allies, trading with its allies strengthen its security. Therefore, as long as great powers trade with allies, there will be positive security externalities due to strengthened alliances. Strong alliance stability, in turn, alleviates relative gain concerns (Joanne Gowa, 1994, pp. 38–52).

In short, both Copeland and Kleinberg have not made a convincing argument that justifies their quick dismissal of the offensive realism argument. They failed to address constraints that may affect a state’s relative economic gain concern. As we can see, reconceptualization of some of the key fundamental principles and concepts will likely shed light on our understanding of the primacy of relative gains or absolute gains and the

theoretical precedence of liberalism, and offensive or defensive realism.

Distributional Consequences of Globalization

Three publications lopsidedly expanded on the more prevailing literature of opportunity costs and dependency asymmetry. However, they all miss an important causal mechanism of the distributional consequences of globalization. The distributional consequences of economic gains can be domestic and international. As discussed previously, internationally, it may shift the power dynamic and thus qualify the realism logic that interdependence serves as a source of military conflict.

Another aspect of the distributional consequence that is largely missing in the reviewed publications is at the domestic level: how globalization shapes state preferences. Such a mechanism works through a liberal logic; however, it captures the essence of what Gourevitch coined as “the second image reverse” — how systemic variables may affect and work through domestic forces (Gourevitch, 1978). In this case, globalization as a structural variable may make an impact on conflict or peace through domestic interests, either directly or through a mediating variable of “development”. In this vein, scholars have suggested that development has altered state preferences away from conquest and towards trade, since modern production processes “de-emphasize land, minerals, and rooted labor in favor of intellectual and financial capital” (Rosecrance, 1986; Hegre, 2000; Gartzke, 2007, p. 172).

Kirshner in his book *“Appeasing Bankers: financial caution on the road to war”* asserted that open international financial flow as a structural variable turned bankers into an influential vested interest group, and it resulted in bankers being almost invariably seeking peace instead of war (Jonathan Kirshner, 2007; Copeland 2015). Similarly, Stephen G. Brooks posited that among the advanced states, there are no longer any economic actors lobbying the government for war. In particular, FDI conquest substitution theory shows that the current structure of the global economy now makes it feasible for foreign direct investment to serve as an effective substitute for conquest in a way that was not possible in previous eras (Brooks, 2013). Therefore, it has become unnecessary for economic actors to directly lobby the government as the structural changes have clear incentives for peace.

In short, while Kleinberg et al. and Peterson and Thies focus on the lineage of the liberal argument, Copeland focuses on subjective determinants at the individual level. However, advancement in the structural theory is not only possible but also desirable. Neglected attention at the structural level reduces the theoretical leverages of the publications selected in this essay.

Implications of the Liberal Theory

All three publications lopsidedly and conveniently focus on the “opportunity cost model” of the liberal argument.¹¹ However, the opportunity cost model invariably emphasizes a state’s interests in absolute gains and thus implies states are unitary actors. In fact, the prevailing theoretical divide sees a scholarly reservation to characterize such neo-liberal institutionalism as liberal. The opportunity cost model, at its core, is a modified structural realism argument.¹² The authors’ characterization of liberal theories, therefore, begs a discussion of

¹¹ Copeland attacks this model while the other authors support such a model.

¹² Outside the literature of political economy, liberal institutionalism is considered “modified structural realism”. For example, Mearsheimer claimed that liberal institutionalism can hardly be called a heretical alternative to realism, but instead should be seen as subordinate to it (Mearsheimer, 1995).

other liberal causal mechanisms. Liberal theory, instead, focuses on state preferences, interest formation, primacy of social actors, and the logic of appropriateness (Moravcsik, 1997; March & Olsen, 1998). In this section, I will discuss the implications of interstate commerce and interstate conflict based on these neglected aspects of the liberal theory.

Primacy of States Versus Economic Actors

The discussions of the distributional consequences of globalization have to do with the impact of the changes in the system on domestic interest groups. In this section, the purpose of the discussion is in opening the black box: how might domestic politics shape a state's preferences and their leader's calculations (Katzenstein, 1978, 1985; De Mesquita et al., 1999).

Copeland has indeed noted that the liberal perspective that unit-level factors such as authoritarianism, ideology, and internal social conflict are the ultimate causes of war (p. 34). However, Copeland seems to imply that all unit-level variables, such as welfare or profit-maximization drives, pressure group politics, and desires for reelection - are all assumed to have no effect whatsoever on a state's decision-making or behavior (p. 27). As a result, domestic variables can only be shown to be occasionally determinative. Such an assumption of domestic autonomy of leaders may be too vast to assume. In fact, domestic interests may be essentially endogenous to a leader's calculations and such an assumption does not violate the assumption of rational security maximization.

Interest formation and domestic politics have been the focus of Narizny's study: *The political economy of grand strategy*. Narizny has clearly constructed such micro-foundations of the "Grand strategy" as a general guideline of national security and diplomacy (Narizny, 2007). Specifically, different interest groups separate into opposing coalitions and conflicts among party lines. Parties select leaders who share the priorities of their electoral and financial supporters. The selection process ensures that executive decision-makers will represent their coalition interests. In Copeland's case, leaders may not solely calculate inter-state conflict but also domestic conflict, and therefore, the future expectations should not be restricted to inter-state calculations. In states where powerful economic actors exist, a leader's future expectations may be largely swayed by domestic factors favoring peace or war, and, thus, the role of leaders is, at best, limited.

The liberal lineage of the literature in interdependence and conflict shall thus focus on identifying the winners and losers of globalization. Krugman has pointed out that it is firms, not states, that are the trading entities (Krugman, 1979, 1981). Such a claim also implies that the literature shall orient away from a state centric view and towards a deeper understanding of social economic actors. Economic actors can be domestic or transnational.

In "New Trade, New Politics: Intra-Industry Trade and Domestic Political Coalitions", Madeira argued that the winners of intra-industry trade are likely to be big companies (Madeira, 2016). Peterson and Thies, on the other hand, largely treat states as unitary actors and thus fail to consider multinational companies as independent actors. Such a consideration is important because, as the causal mechanism expands, the argument could go both ways. Economic actors — such as bankers — may no longer lobby for war; however, big international arms dealers and weapon producers can be powerful confounders to international peace. When these companies seek higher profit by "making money, making war", we haven't seen such the peaceful trend predicted by Peterson and Thies.

Regime Type

One of the most prominent liberal theories — the democratic peace — is largely missing in the discussion of all three publications. There is little discussion about regime type and how it may affect the likelihood of interstate conflict within the framework of globalization. According to liberals, coherent democracies are less likely to go to war with one another (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002). Regime type is likely to have an effect beyond a leader's calculations and states as unitary actors.

Copeland has downplayed the significance of the regime type on security outcomes by simplifying it to a “capitalist peace”.¹³ However, such a narrow reading fails to recognize the other causal mechanisms behind the democratic peace, including identities, norms and values, as well as the logic of appropriateness (Levy, 1988; Moravcsik, 1997; March & Olsen, 1998). Consequently, there may very well be an interaction between regime type and the variables discussed in the three publications. It is likely that the relationship between these variables in democracies may be different than those in autocracies.

Spillover of Civil Conflict

Another source of interstate conflict has to do with the spillover of civil conflict. One plausible indirect causal pathway that is completely missing in all three publications is the possible spillover effect of civil conflict to international conflict. Liberal theories such as the diversionary theory of war or the scapegoat hypothesis speaks directly to such a possibility. The tendency of people in a wide range of circumstances to support assertive national politics which appear to enhance the power and prestige of the state may lead decision-makers, under certain conditions, to embark on aggressive foreign politics and even war as a means of increasing or maintaining their domestic support (Levy, 1988).

In this vein, Schneider et al. in a collective work *Globalization and armed conflict*, have suggested that the next generation of studies analyzes the impact of economic integration on domestic stability (Schneider et al., 2003). Many possible causal paths that link globalization and civil conflict or peace have been studied extensively. Among them, how globalization affects civil conflict through economic development, inequality, information flow and communication are well established (Barbieri & Reuveny, 2005). Thus, an indirect relationship working through domestic distributional consequences to interstate conflict is likely and plausible.

Determinants of Leaders' Trade Expectations

In his trade expectations theory, Copeland specifies what kind of actors are likely to play important roles in shaping estimates of the future, and how these factors are logically likely to act — either alone or in conjunction with others — to driver a leader's belief about the future security of their state (p. 17). In fact, all three authors implicitly warrant the importance of leadership in shaping the relationship of trade and conflict. However, a few of the concepts in their discussions need further clarification.

Leadership Time Horizon

Copeland assumes that leaders of states are primarily concerned with protecting their long-term security

¹³ Democracies, because of their liberal economic structures and ideologies, are generally more oriented to free trade — or at least freer trade — than authoritarian states, which makes them “likely to feel confident about the long-term prospects for open commerce”.

(p.27). However, a leader's future expectations can vary by leadership time horizon. For example, Steinberg and Malhotra pointed out that different authoritarian regime types may imply different leadership time horizons (Steinberg & Malhotra, 2014). A longer guarantee of leadership, such as in a monarchy or one-party system, may prompt leaders to be more concerned about long-term economic growth, while short-term leadership stability, such as in a military autocracy, may sway leaders to be primarily concerned with staying in power and is likely to be influenced greatly by current power dynamics. Therefore, short-term trade expectations and long-term trade expectations likely have different implications.

Decision-Making Process

Theorizing the decision-making process can be a challenge itself. Cognitive challenges such as misperception and group-think can certainly hinder the validity of a theory on a leader's expectations.¹⁴ Additionally, there is little discussion oriented towards the opaque decision-making processes of autocratic leaders. Overlooking authoritarian leaders' trade expectations poses external validity threat to Copeland's trade expectations theory, as well as the other two publications. One might question whether it is the *post hoc* analysis or the ultimate structural constraints that have shaped the decision-making outcome of the leaders. To circumvent these challenges, more refined methodological tools may be adopted. Nelson and Katzenstein, for example, used elite interviews with open questions to study risk and uncertainty during the 2008 financial crisis (Nelson & Katzenstein, 2014). Such methods prove to be one of the more powerful tools in exploring parameters and understanding opaque decision-making mechanisms.

Furthermore, how institutional path dependence affects the decision making is largely missing in their arguments. For example, how a country ends its colonialism — violence, such as the U.S. or peace, such as Canada — might affect their future choices when facing a security decision prompted by trading relationships. Future research could seek to understand how historical institutionalism, critical junctures, and sequencing affect the decision-making process of leaders.

Conclusions

Three publications reviewed in this essay have advanced our understanding of economic interdependence and interstate conflict by further identifying previously neglected boundary conditions. While the urgency to continue this effort prevails, revisiting and refining causal mechanisms identified by the grand theory is of equal importance. As one can see in this analysis, some key questions beg more clarification, such as the primacy of commercial power or military power and the conditions under which absolute-gain or relative-gain concerns take precedence. Consequently, new research efforts should emphasize reconceptualization of the key concepts, such as trade compositions, power and anarchy. These theoretical debates may continue through the lens of the "levels of analysis". Additionally, departing from the narrow focus of the dual nature of trade, but addressing state preferences, the primacy of social economic actors and the distributional consequences of globalization, may yield useful findings. Moreover, all three studies focus on great powers, which provide relatively few observations and leads to low external validity of their arguments.

It is important that the insights of these publications stimulate continued dialogues and debates on the study

¹⁴ Jervis laid out the challenges of misperception during the decision-making process. Janis focused on the pathology of group think and its ineffectiveness in decision-making process (Jervis, 1976; Janis, 1972).

of globalization and the probability of war. Only a combined effort may produce the leverage necessary to adequately explain and further predict dynamic outcomes of great power politics in an age of increasing economic interdependence.

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West/Non-West: Funhouse Mirror of World Politics

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The Crimean crisis rekindled the discourse of civilizational differences between Russia and the West, and this international political conflict began to be interpreted as a clash between the Western territorial image and Russia/Eurasia/East, thus becoming constructive geopolitics. Russia became an image from “not the West” to “against the West”. The Western/non-Western system is a revival of the land/sea dichotomy, but the re-emerging Western/non-Western antagonism is nothing more than a revival of the old analytical model that reaffirms the dominance of the West over non-Western countries.

Keywords: world politics, west, non-west, cooperations

The territorial aspect of politics is determined not only by objective factors but also by subjective notions about territory constructed by people. International relations model interpreting modern international relations as the conflict between geographic West and East is a vivid example of such a phenomenon. Let us discover the origins of such an approach and its variations.

People’s consciousness has dialectical character hence world political space is structured through separation. At the highest level, such separation is represented by binary geopolitical systems under which the world is defined through the competition between the two antagonistic parts. This model has had many variations. “Civilization vs. Barbarhood” seems to be the most ancient embodiment of the model. The “Civilization vs Barbarhood” type of model, within which there exists disengagement between those who accept some common achievements, values, rules and those who do not, nowadays is considered to be politically incorrect, however it is still applied in public discourse.

The second variation is represented by the dichotomy between the Old World and the New World — so as the opposition between the regions known by Europeans before the Age of Discovery (Europe, Asia, Africa) and the regions opened by them during the Age of Discovery (America and Australia).

In fact the two above mentioned models replicate at their core the most resilient geopolitical binary system, “West vs. East”. The mental commonality of global West (Europe, America, Australia) was constructed via its contrasting to the global East (Asia and Africa), first of all, to Arabs, Turks, and Russians. For this purpose, the West artificially attributed to the East antagonistic traits, such as tyranny, mysticism, collectivism. This process called orientalism was challenged by the opposite one known as occidentalism characterized by the East’s describing the West in terms opposite to its self-description (exceptionalism, expansionism, and mercantilism).

Critical geopolitics claims that the West/non-West opposition is nothing more than a socially constructed

model which should be used with extreme caution due to its contradictory nature. The non-West will never become the West in any sense of this word as long as it agrees with such division, recognizes the existence of a certain West and its attempts to evolve into it.

The territorial aspect of politics is determined not only by objective factors but also by subjective notions about territory constructed by people. International relations model interpreting modern international relations as the conflict between geographic West and East is a vivid example of such a phenomenon. Let us discover the origins of such an approach and its variations.

The Crimean crisis has revived the discourse standing that there are civilizational differences between Russia and the West, which can be expressed by the thesis “Russia is not the West” and vice versa. Thus, this international political conflict started to be interpreted as a clash between territorial images of the West and Russia/Eurasia/East, consequently becoming constructively geopolitical. The discourse mentioned above seems to stem back to the middle of the XV century, when Christian post roman identity (which used to encompass the Kievan Rus) was supplemented by a territorial characteristic, hence creating the boundaries of modern European civilization. In this time to understand themselves, Europeans adopted the Greek picture of the world that is defined via opposition between the European Aegean civilization and Asian Persia. This phenomenon at the end of the Middle Ages is related to almost simultaneous success of the Reconquista in the Pyrenean and the fall of Constantinople in the Balkans, which led to the situation when the boundaries of Christian World began to overlap more with the continental boundaries. Such territorial image demanded the formation of European civilization mental boundaries in the East. The Horde’s yoke in Rus and the Moscow kingdom’s attempts to create a national idea based on the premise that Moscow is the descendant of Byzantium were the reasons for drawing eastern mental boundaries of European civilization in a way that excludes Orthodox Russia with construction of a buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia including Slavic, Baltic and Finno-Ugric nations. This discourse imported in Russian in the XVIII century embodied a key dichotomy of Russian foreign policy orientation, which is expressed in constant disputes between Slavophil’s and Westerners. Lately, the discourse has gone under rethinking and reduction from “Russia is not the West” to “Russia is anti-West,” which has led to the conflict escalation along the border of Europe and Russia, first of all, in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. The civil war in Ukraine caused the construction of a myth according to which the Ancient Rus gave birth to two states, — European democratic Ukrainian state and the oriental despotic Russian state. The antagonism between the two entities has led to the reinterpretation of European identity among Ukrainians as anti-Russian. This dispute generated similar discourses of Moldova’s, Belorussia’s, Georgia’s, Armenia’s being European nations in contrast with Asian Russia. In fact, we observe the reactualisation of the most ancient and sustained geopolitical concepts presenting the world as a confrontation between two antagonistic concepts of white and black.

Antagonistic Geopolitical System West/Non-West

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During Bipolarism the West vs. East system was reduced to the Western vs. Eastern block model. In the course of the Cold War the East/West system was also used to describe the ideological divide between capitalist and socialist countries. The western block was comprised of the USA and other NATO-members while the eastern one led by the USSR consisted mainly from the nations members to the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon.

Today West/East model is layered by another model with the similar internal logic — North vs. South model. It reflects the separation of the world between the developed countries (Europe, North America, Australia) and developing (Asia, Africa, South America). In the more archaic interpretation, it represents the division between the exploiting and exploited nations. The model portrays disproportions of global development: the Global North accounts for 1/3 world population and 4/5 of income whereas the Global South makes up 2/3 of population and 1/5 of income. The border between the North and South, which passes approximately along the 30th parallel of north latitude, is called Brandt’s line in the name of German Chancellor who suggested such a description of the border.

Table 1 shows the continent’s conformity to the existing binary geopolitical systems. Binary geopolitical systems may exist at the national level as well, for example Western Germany vs. Eastern Germany, North vs. South in the USA or Italy. Binary geopolitical systems are close to a physical-geographic term hemispheres of the Earth. There are northern and southern (the equator is the border), western and eastern (a more conditional border, which is marked by the Greenwich meridian), mainland and oceanic hemispheres. The fact that precisely the Greenwich meridian was chosen as the Prime meridian among other candidates such as the Paris meridian and the Pulkovo one in Saint Petersburg demonstrates how important subjective human perception is when it comes to establishing global dichotomies. Arbitrary character of the notions West and East and their detachment from geography are also proved by the fact that geographically eastern- and south-located Australia from political perspective is a part of the West and North.

Table 1 Binary Geopolitical Systems

Part of World	Old vs. New World	West vs. East	North vs. South
Europe	Old World	West	North
Asia	Old World	East	South
Africa	Old World	East	South
North America	New World	West	North
South America	New World	West	South
Australia and Oceania	New World	West	North

In the academic science along with binary geopolitical systems, trinary systems are often defined. They consist of three basic elements and present the result of binary systems' natural development. Trinary systems are also based on the world dialectic principle, according to which the world is divided into two antagonistic parts; however, they add an interim layer to these two poles, which separates and balances the extreme models. The most widely known trinary geopolitical system models are the following.

First of all, it is the "First vs. Second vs. Third World" model that is a developed type of Cold War binary system, which used to divide the world into the First World capitalist states and Second World socialist ones. In the 1950s as a counterbalance to the two ideological blocks, the Non-Aligned Movement emerged. This Movement was aimed at nations' development without joining either of the existing politico-military blocks (mainly the NATO and Warsaw Pact) and widely speaking without strict orientation on any from conflicting ideologies. Yugoslavia, Egypt, and India became the leaders of the Movement. Because the majority of Movement member states were post-colonial developing countries, the term "Third World" started to denote countries falling behind economically.

Another more academic scheme "Center vs. Semi-periphery stems from the world-systems perspective (I. Wallerstein, A. Frank) that sees the world as an integrated politically-economic system within which there exist the exploiting and highly developed core, the underdeveloped and exploited by the center-periphery and semi-periphery, whose objective is to soften the antagonistic interests of the center and the periphery and shift potential pressure on the center coming from the periphery. The semi-periphery in this system seeks to join the core and avoid becoming the periphery. The existence of periphery and semi-periphery, which constrains it, is an essential condition and direct effect of core's domination and it is in the core's interest that this artificial "ladder" of development remains.

Mao Zedong's "Three worlds" system is another vivid example of trinary scheme. According to this system there exist the First world of superpowers (the USA, the USSR), the Second world of "interim countries" (Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia) and the Third world that comprises the rest. As you can see this model rests on the binary opposition between the exploiting North and developing exploited South. Nevertheless, the third group of countries is formed not from the countries of the South but from the northern countries, which are separated into political leaders and their developed satellites. The widely used term "Third World countries" applied to denote states falling short in terms of economic development is closer to Zedong's Three worlds perspective rather than the western one.

The West/non-West System as the Resurgence of the Land/Sea Dichotomy

There exists another dichotomy that has taken roots in western geopolitics, namely Land vs Sea. In fact, it represents a continuation of the same opposition between colonial Empires of the West and continental powers of the East. This distinction implies the world division into maritime-based powers (Thalassocracy which domination is ensured by the Navy and merchant fleets) and land-based powers (Tellurocracy that relies upon the army and control over land-locked resources). Although there exist pure types like 1) pure Thalassocracy (British Empire) and 2) pure Tellurocracy (Mongolian Empire), most countries fall into the category of mixed types such as 3) Thalassocracy-leaning (the USA), 4) Tellurocracy-leaning (Russia) and 5) fluctuating between Thalassocracy and Tellurocracy (France during the Napoleonic Wars as a colonial empire).

Such scholars of the Anglo-American school of geopolitics as A. Mahan, John Mackinder, and N. Spykman have provided a valid physical-geographical explanation of world political processes by means of the analysis of

the characteristics typical of the maritime or continental position of the leading powers. And it's exactly what later evolved into concepts of the Heartland, Lenaland, and Rimland.

Since the Earth's surface is a combination of unevenly and inconsistently located land and sea spaces, extensive growth of any nation was determined by its geographical location. Located on an island or in the coastal area this nation drew upon its naval forces evolving therefore into a Sea power while Continental powers were formed in the continent inland areas where nations had to rely on its land forces giving rise to Continental powers. This leads us to conclude that the structure of the world spatiality made it impossible for world hegemon to appear as the strongest Navy is almost powerless against the best land army and Vice versa.

Since the use of only one type of force has numerous constraints, Sea and Continental powers seek to possess the other type of force. Indeed, Continental powers try to obtain a lasting access to the world's oceans while Sea powers endeavor to lay hands on the resources within the continent using rivers and road, stretching from the coastal ports deep into the continent. However, there exists a region inaccessible to a Sea power called the Heartland. This region situated in the middle of Eurasia is protected by deserts and large mountain systems and what is more important the rivers running there like the Volga, Ural, Angara, Syr Darya, Amu Darya don't flow into any ocean. Thus, together with the Lenaland, in the North-Eastern part of Eurasia, there is a vast expanse which is completely out of reach of any Sea power. And whoever controls this region will turn into the most powerful State in the world.

Building on this theory, H. Mackinder considered the Heartland along with the Lenaland "the geographical pivot of history", that is an area which enabled a State possessing it to determine international politics. The British scholar claimed therefore that in the 20th century Central Asia and Afghanistan in particular would be a region many States would struggle to possess. However, the First and Second World Wars fought over Eastern Europe made Mackinder reexamine his views. Committed to his theory, he argued that the best way to reach the Heartland was now through the Intermarium region located between two East European seas which have a dual structure. This means if the Danish and Turkish Straits are blocked then they become lakes, thereby cutting off the power of the Heartland from the World Ocean. Mackinder also developed the strategy of Atlanticism which was based on the premise that the coastal States of the North Atlantic should cooperate as it was as crucial part of the Ocean as the Heartland is of the Land. It is worth noting that this strategy laid the groundwork for the creation of NATO.

Famous American geopolitician Nicholas Spykman developed the theory of H. Mackinder introducing the concept of the Rimland, land areas encircling the Heartland. Unlike Mackinder, Spykman sought to understand how to prevent the domination of the country that possessed the Heartland rather than how to reach and control it. Thus, he can be considered as the founder of the revisionist geopolitics that focused on securing rather than expanding. Indeed, to deal with the Soviet Union Spykman suggested that the Heartland should be surrounded by countries disloyal to the USSR that are torn apart by internal conflicts such as North Korea, China, Afghanistan, Iran, the Middle East, Turkey, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Germany.

Although often criticized for being obsolete in the era of globalized economy, transcontinental aviation, and nuclear weapons, concentric geopolitical models had a significant impact on the development of Russian geopolitics, primarily on Eurasianism which sought to strengthen the position of Russia in the Heartland. Another interpretation of the Heartland theory was the model of the Intermediate Region designed by D. Kitsikis who argued that the pivotal part of the planet had shifted from Central Asia to the Middle East where Europe, Asia, and Africa come together.

Orientalism and Occidentalism

As can be seen, the re-emerging West/non-West opposition represents nothing more than a revival of old analytical models reaffirming the dominance of the West over non-Western countries. E. Said in his book called "Orientalism" argues that the identity of the post-colonial Orient didn't develop in an autochthonous manner but was imposed by the West. The author goes on to state that in the Middle ages the West was trying to form its shared civilizational identity by contrasting itself with the Muslim East. So, given marginal interaction between these two civilizations, the Western countries attached to the Orient characteristics opposite to European ones. Thus, with the colonization of the East, Europe imposed on it those stereotypes, which the Orient eventually embraced and started to develop. As a result, in the post-colonial era, the East continues to reproduce stereotypical ideas about itself imposed by the West in order to form its own civilizational identity. This leads us to the conclusion that the adoption of such stereotypes by the East came along with its subordinate position towards Western culture.

National liberation movements studied by F. Fanon, A. Memmi and other scholars represent another example of the post-colonial heritage. In their struggle against dependency on the West African and Asian countries used the narrative of national liberation movements in Europe. As African and Asian countries followed the pattern of European nation-States in their process of state-building, it still hinders the stabilization of many political systems in Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, in the process of state-building, the decolonization leaders having Western education and expertise in colonial administrations used approaches tailored for the metropolises.

In the 1960s and 1970s G. Spivak developed a new trend in post-colonial studies called subalternism which can be seen as one of the forms of post-colonial dependency characterized by the analysis of literature, narratives and symbolic systems borrowed from the metropolises.

By the end of the twentieth century, the geopolitics was disappointed with the classical concepts involving the confrontation of Sea and Land powers, of the West and the East, the North and the South, the struggle for Heartland and Rimland etc., as each of which had at least two significant analytical constraints. First of all, those concepts explained only the relevant at that time international situation (for example, Rimland could help to understand the balance of power during the Cold War, but failed to explain the post-bipolar geopolitical balance). Secondly, they were susceptible to ideological impact and depended heavily on the positions of the concept's founder.

In the 1990s appeared so-called critical geopolitics illustrating the shift towards a post-positivist approach in studying geopolitics. Critical geopolitics says that geopolitical strategy of the State has nothing to do with fundamental laws of nature and spatial structures, it draws rather upon geographical imagination and spatial myths, in other words, upon the image of the ideal world. The history of critical geopolitics dates back to 1992 when Gerald O'Tuathail and John Agnew published their article "Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy" where they state that it is geography that determines all geopolitical models, which classical geopolitics did not take into account at all. However, critical geopolitics may have originated in the French school of geopolitics, in particular, in the works of Yves Lacoste and Michel Foucher or even in the iconography of Jean Gottmann and geographic possibilism of Paul Vidal de La Blache.

Critical geopolitics claims that the West/non-West opposition is nothing more than a socially constructed model which should be used with extreme caution due to its contradictory nature. The non-West will never become the West in any sense of this word as long as it agrees with such division, recognizes the existence of a certain West and its attempts to evolve into it.

Artificial Intelligence and Authoritarian Regimes

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While generally the advancement and development of artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructures is lauded as having the potential to open up a brave new world of positive cyber capacity, there is a decidedly darker underbelly to this potential currently underway. States like China aggressively market the transfer of advanced AI technology around the globe, particularly to allies across the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. Far from just being about participating in the global economy or developing the cyber infrastructure of developing nations, China is also sharing its censorship, disinformation, and public opinion-shaping technologies that could be the future of regime protection and could undermine grassroots democratic activism. Rather than seeing cyber power as a doorway to a new era of openness and information exchange, China views the true power of cyber as a tool built for traditional safeguarding of national security and domestic political interests. More impressively, most studies show that China should at first catch up to the United States and then surpass it as the AI global leader by 2030. Might this signal a paradigm shift for the potential of AI from cyber peacebuilder to de facto cyber colonist?

Keywords: cybersecurity, China, technology transfer, geopolitics, artificial intelligence, surveillance

Introduction

While in general terms, the advancement and development of artificial intelligence (AI) infrastructures is lauded as possibly opening up a brave new world of positive cyber capacity and being a forceful driver of new international economic development, there is a decidedly darker underbelly to this potential currently underway. States like China aggressively market the transfer of advanced AI technology around the globe, particularly to allies across the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. Far from just being about participating in the global economy or developing the cyber infrastructure of developing nations, countries like the United States worry that a more strategic transfer is also happening. Will these countries also become enamored with not just the technological improvements but also with China's approach to domestic governance, where censorship, disinformation, and public opinion-shaping technologies push regime protection and undermine grassroots democratic activism? Is China de facto creating a future of tech-driven authoritarianism as a competing model against emerging democracy?

Rather than seeing cyber power in all its positive diverse and developing evolutions as a doorway to a new era of openness and information exchange, China may also be maximizing a hidden strategic-diplomatic power of cyber as a tool for the traditional safeguarding of national security and domestic political interests. More impressively (or disturbingly?), many are speculating that China will likely first catch up to the United States

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and then surpass it as the AI global leader by 2030. Might this signal a paradigm shift for AI and cyber potential in general from cyber peacebuilder to de facto cyber colonist? Specifically, this paper will examine these possibilities by looking in-depth at the project known as “Made in China 2025” (MIC). First announced in 2015 as a fairly non-controversial economic development project intended to shift China from being a low-end manufacturer to a high-end producer of technology, MIC has rather quickly become embroiled in multiple levels of global controversy, marked by tense diplomacy, foreign policy criticism, and rumors of economic trade war. This is, of course, intriguing because China has always emphasized that MIC is mainly a domestic initiative (Germany had a similar one after which the Chinese somewhat modeled theirs) with almost no explicit references to China exporting technologies to the world but rather to adopting and improving the ones that it can get its hands on through investments, mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and local developments. What this paper intends to examine in terms of the foundation of MIC, however, is quite different from how it has been focused on to date. Instead of examining how it has become an economic bone of contention between the United States and China, the focus here is more about the potential strategic and political leverage of MIC if China ultimately succeeds in the aforementioned desired shift. If China no longer depends on the United States for technology transfers and instead becomes its own greatest producer of new technology, then how will this manifest itself in its dealings with other countries when it comes to economic investment and increased political capital? In other words, if MIC is a success, does it help fuel China’s rise as a global technology influencer according to its own standards and political norms of behavior?

It is no secret that the United States has for decades succeeded in dominating the diplomatic influence by also being the de facto underpinning for the entire global economy. With development in the twenty-first century being largely tied to a country’s ability to transform its local economy into a high-end technological base, would MIC make China a global technological “smart” power, able to wield tremendous diplomatic, strategic, and foreign policy influence in ways that would run counter to American interests and values? Could MIC be the spur to making China’s political regime a true model for other countries to emulate, discarding the leadership model pushed for nearly a century by the United States? Although it officially denies any such secret purpose, is this how China might finally realize the “Chinese model of development,” which many have argued China is trying to subtly export to the developing world — capitalism with “Chinese characteristics” — generally meaning no liberal democracy, limitations on a fully liberalized market, and significant constraints on domestic civil liberties. It is the back-end consequences that occupy the main considerations of this study. If anything, this study will show how the potential connection between a successful MIC and China forging a lead in global technology innovation is being dangerously ignored. This is a misstep, as the much-publicized “trade war” initiated by US president Trump has held an undercurrent of concerns about global leadership on tech innovation but has been very much focused on the Chinese domestic market and not about foreign policy extrapolations to other critical world regions.

This article in the end does not aim to tackle the deeper philosophical questions embedded in this new reality, but it does relate to the main thesis about the future of Chinese global technology leadership: If China proves that innovation, drive, and emerging technological genius do not, in fact, rely on the nurturing presence of democratic freedom and the full portfolio of civil liberties, then why would authoritarian countries bother with the United States for its future tech acquisitions. Perhaps even more importantly, why should they listen to mature democracies telling them that economic progress can only happen via democracy and their proper alliance to democratic principles?

Made in China 2025: What Is It and Why Should Anyone Care?

When first examining the original thinking behind the MIC 2025 project, it is somewhat difficult to even find fault with Chinese thinking. Without trying to get too lost in the micro-weeds of the project, some of its major goals have focused on China's raising the domestic core content of its technological components and materials in order to ultimately render China not only self-sufficient for its own domestic technological needs but to also transform it into a major participant and leading competitor within global technology markets (Dezan Shira and Associates, 2018). Specifically, MIC seeks to command 40 percent of the global innovation technology market by 2020, 70 percent by 2025, and, ideally, by 2049 — the one-hundredth anniversary of the People's Republic of China — a self-sustaining dominance on the global technology stage, bar none. Inspired by Germany's own "Industry 4.0 Development Plan," China is attempting with MIC to join the so-called fourth industrial revolution, which is, in a nutshell, the successful integration of cloud computing, big data, and other advanced emerging technologies with global manufacturing supply chains. For China, the industries potentially impacted are quite extensive, and it includes not just IT and AI writ large but also advanced robotics, aerospace engineering, materials science, biomedicine, and the lynchpins of its other great into-the-future project, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), high-end infrastructure, and maritime engineering (James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, 2019).

Given that many of these goals seem entirely logical for a state power seeking sustainability and maximized leverage, why is MIC deemed so "controversial" by other countries, particularly the United States? After all, the United States has, off and on, been pushing its own campaign of "Made in America" and "Buy American" for at least fifty years. The key to the controversy, at its core, is more an issue of politics than economics. If MIC achieves its goals, it does not simply strengthen domestic Chinese companies. The worry (mainly for the United States and the European Union) is that since China is not a liberal market that plays "by the rules" of free trade, its global champions will be backed by the state in terms of subsidies, easy-access loans from state-owned banks, and significant political backing when it comes to competition in the domestic Chinese market (Dezan Shira and Associates, 2018). The thinking is expressed most efficiently by President Trump and his manufactured trade war with China during his first term. He has emphasized how MIC is basically a modern-day shakedown: In return for these "forced" technology transfers to China from US companies, China will grant greater (but still limited and constrained) domestic market access to American companies. The uneven playing field becomes concretized: Since China has either direct or semi-direct state control in its major domestic industries, it removes certain natural market fears and risks from its companies that other foreign entities must deal with. The larger point being made here is not that these initial MIC criticisms are irrelevant; rather, they are the lesser criticisms: If China succeeds in securing a sustainable position of global dominance in technological innovation, the biggest problem will not be whether American companies can compete with China but rather whether China will politically influence countries on the global stage.

While the Trump trade war strives to weaken this domestic advantage and at least rhetorically argues that the United States is trying to convince China to make structural reforms so it will be more similar to a liberal economy than what is termed "state capitalism". It is, nonetheless, missing the deeper long-term strategic consequence: If China can trade all this attention on short-term domestic market access for long-term self-sufficiency and future global dominance in technology innovation (with all its commensurate strategic

advantages), then it will likely do so unhesitatingly. It is still not entirely clear why the United States fails to emphasize how damaging this consequence would be to its global strategy. The emphasis on the progress of domestic market access hurts not just American global economic leadership but actual US security interests across the globe.

China clearly slowed down some of the more grand statements about MIC in the afterburn of Trump's criticism (including it not even being mentioned for the first time since being introduced in 2015 at the opening session of the 2019 National People's Congress (McBride & Chatzky, 2019)), but very few believe this gesture represents anything other than a strategic rebranding of the project so as to attract less attention while still moving toward its ultimate goals (Dezan Shira and Associates, 2018). After all, some studies go deeper than describing MIC as simply China's effort to go from making toys and t-shirts to manufacturing leading-edge technology: It is a program that relies on "discriminatory treatment of foreign investment, forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft, and cyber espionage." (McBride & Chatzky, 2019). Copying the German approach to an anticipated fourth industrial revolution, MIC clearly refers to the integration of big data, cloud computing, and many more emerging technologies. Uncoincidentally, China has often used these fields in the present-day to power AI programs of a political nature: tracking, surveillance, and monitoring technology; self-interpreting facial recognition; political hacking technology; and the facilitation of disinformation campaigns. The problem, of course, is one of believability: China may be intent on framing MIC as merely aspirational and unofficial, but its economic model has always integrated state control over market success, and political domination over individualized entrepreneurship. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that China would not maximize the political and strategic leverage it could gain from a leading global technology position. And that political/strategic leverage will be in China's interests and resembling China's model. It will not be a spur transforming China into something more "American-like." It will be an engine to promote China's vision of economic development at the expense of true political diversification and maturation across the globe. In chess terms, this apparent early downplaying by China is nothing but sacrificing a pawn in order to better position the queen for later. It is completely in line with traditional Chinese foreign policy positioning and, perhaps more satisfyingly, is playing the current American president's penchant for "media victories" that have little major impact. So, while the White House seems presently short-sighted on the true threat potential of MIC, this is not to say reputable media and think-tank organizations are necessarily doing any better on the foreign strategic consequences. The worry is that this creates a negative analysis feedback loop in America that will only institutionalize long-term short-sightedness.

Critiquing MIC: On Point or Way Off Track?

In the most basic of arguments, the debate over MIC boils down into two very distinct camps. Where one falls within these camps determines the overall position taken about MIC. The competing sides can be summed up as follows: MIC aims to use government subsidies, mobilize state-owned enterprises, and pursue intellectual property acquisition to catch up — and surpass — Western technological prowess in advanced industries versus the view that MIC can only succeed by relying on Chinese policy that discriminates against foreign investment, pushes forced technology transfers that are akin to de facto blackmail, and encourages intellectual property theft, backboned by cyber espionage (McBride & Chatzky, 2019).

What matters most in this study is how the dominant camps are still structurally set up to be concerned

about present-day goals and how they would impact the competitive success of American companies. At best, there is a little bit of long-term concern about China striving to replace the United States as the economic leader in these high-tech targeted industries and — even more crucially — in international standardization, where cyber truly comes into play and is a sneaky, efficient way to engineer subtle dominance. But what has been shoved to the backburner by too many so far is the concern of the US intelligence community of MIC as potentially being a fairly efficient “soft” war, which may be technically illegal but not so egregiously as to warrant a true military retaliatory action. In this undervalued camp, the focus is on China’s recruitment of foreign scientists, its continued brazen theft as a matter of its formal policy of intellectual property, and direct investments that can potentially lead to ultimate M&As in critical technologies and strategic infrastructure (for example, such Chinese efforts in 2016 alone amounted to an astounding \$45 billion USD) (McBride & Chatzky, 2019).

When the US intelligence community makes special note of an economic plan that likely does not have any real chance of coming to fruition until, at the earliest, 2050, this attention deserves greater scrutiny. The reality is, in its most dangerous formation, MIC could be the strategic initiative that finally and conclusively brings a real fusion of national security and international political economy as global threat. For example, given China’s persistent and intensive investment engagement over the last decade throughout Africa, when applied to MIC, it is not entirely far-fetched to envision a China that controls the global cobalt market (McBride & Chatzky, 2019). This control would de facto deliver to China influence over most of the world’s high-tech modern electronics. This one industry alone carries stark consequences for the United States when considering the ambiguous dual-use (civilian and military) technology market. Since the emergence of this market, it has been, by and large, the sole domain of American control and dominance. Shifting this control over to China would have cascading effects on national security and intelligence that are almost impossible to underestimate and extremely difficult to predict and counter.

To a certain degree, the longevity aspect of MIC’s ultimate danger is working against the warnings of the US intelligence community. While no one is outright dismissing these worries per se, the tendency to push them to the back of the line is currently winning the day. To be sure, a swath of competing and contradictory data coming out of China itself gives the more dominant camps the ammunition they need to stay focused on the here and now. As a result, the battle cry of “MIC is nothing a paper tiger” carries quite a bit of weight in American corridors of power when it comes to its long-term national security damage potential (Anjani Trivedi, 2018). To be sure, some of that data is quite tempting:

- China itself has openly commented on how it might “delay” certain MIC target goals and some reports discuss whether it might be better to replace MIC ultimately with other plans.
- China’s research and development expenditures, which are crucial to any real success of MIC, remain far below advanced economies like those of the United States and Japan. This data point is commonly used as an overall indicator of how efficiently and wisely a country spends its money.
- Many of the top CEOs in machine making around the globe have commented that while China has risen to the third or perhaps even second tier, it still has a very long way to go before it can compete in the top tier with the globe’s leading countries.
- Even specific industry targets, like new energy vehicles, illustrate the mediocre capabilities of China. Long striving to hype itself as a future “Tesla killer”, the reality is that China not only has been unable to create a domestic electric car champion, but it ultimately called in Tesla engineers to try to

help right its own ship — a humbling maneuver for sure (Anjani Trivedi, 2018).

Further pushing this MIC-pessimist camp forward are classical economic arguments underpinned by skepticism over the ability of autocracies to ever be adaptive and innovative enough to counter natural demographic hurdles. While China aims to become a global tech producer-leader by the second half of the twenty-first century, that same time period is when the negative consequences of its one-child policy could go into effect. Because of this radical policy, the working-age population in China during the last fifty years of this century will likely be halved. Additionally, and more disconcerting, the share of the population over the age of seventy will effectively triple, which is why the rigidity of the one-child policy was quietly but decidedly softened (Keith Balmer, 2019).

Classic economists scoff at the idea that MIC is the plan that can help remedy these problems, especially given MIC's ambitious strategies to engage a global free-market capitalist system is entwined within what is still, to them, a repressive autocracy that lives more often on falsified economic data to prop up its global position. This skepticism is built upon the fact that while China is no stranger to government economic intervention, it is unfamiliar with creating endogenous growth through innovation. From this angle, MIC comes off as nothing but a giant centrally-planned exercise in modern industrialization with a tech edge ((Keith Balmer, 2019). If MIC is, in fact, nothing but that, then this camp argues the nature of autocracy will actually undermine its success rather than power it. While China may be able to provide nearly unlimited sources of funding for its goals, it is not funding that creates human capital. And human capital is still something that China severely lags behind in, mainly because authoritarian regimes have a rightful fear of encouraging innovative human capital in general.

Backing up that premise is a simple but probing look at China and its applications for new patents. Because more patents are filed in China than anywhere else in the world, the general impression China is trying to push is that it is home to a vibrant, ambitious, and inventive people. But the reality seems to be quite different: The vast majority of those patent filings apply only to the domestic environment and do not have international reach and scope at all (Lulu Yilin Chen, 2018). Because of that, the skeptics' camp feels confident in labeling China, and all of its subsequent projects like MIC, as nothing but innovation fools' gold. Generally encapsulated by the economic dilemma known as escaping the middle-income trap, if MIC can empower China to do just that, it will be the first repressive authoritarian state to achieve such a success in history (Keith Balmer, 2019).

It is entirely possible that, in the end, the skeptics' camp will prove to be right, and MIC amounts to yet another authoritarian "revolution" that is a great and mighty wind signifying nothing. The one small but significant red flag remaining is the simple idea that China is equally aware of this and is not developing a plan to address present-day issues with present-day solutions. Not needing to remedy problems right now means that the development of long-term plans can take priority. The foundation of most criticisms of MIC currently seems to rely exclusively on where China is today, not where it aims to get to tomorrow. If China has the mindset, framework, and intention to slowly evolve and progress toward the goals of MIC, then it is entirely plausible that its current contemporary hurdles are not nearly as devastating as Western skeptics seem to think.

A perfect example of this is the fact that all formal mentions of MIC were dropped from the opening session of the National People's Congress in 2019, as mentioned earlier. Skeptics were all too quick to jump on this fact as immediate proof that MIC was an overreach and is already suffering under the weight of its projections matched against contemporary obstacles. However, while Chinese premier Li Keqiang may not

have formally uttered the letters “MIC,” the detailed content and essence of his opening speech was literally framed by its goals and objectives (Issaku Harada, 2019). This is a very subtle tactic that tends to run through Chinese foreign policy in general. When facing harsh criticism or upsetting strategic partners like the United States, it will give the United States what it wants to hear while having no real intention of slowing down its objectives. The question should not be if this means MIC is already losing credence within China’s Communist Party. The true question is whether this rather simplistic strategic move — talking sweet words over steel actions — might have a convincing impact on American observers within the corridors of power. If it does, it may be because of the American tendency to continually lean on the presumption of its own technological and innovation preeminence.

Could MIC End American Dominance?

As mentioned earlier, it is not entirely surprising that the intelligence and defense communities view China’s ultimate goals through a more skeptical lens. Perhaps more than anyone, the US defense community has been wary of how “societal improvement projects” on a global scale could allow China to morph into a “digital authoritarian state” (Nicholas Eftimiades, 2019). So, on the one hand, it is fascinating to see certain groups aware of and vocal against the potential national security consequences of strategic economic initiatives. But, on the other hand, this long-sighted prescience breaks down when it comes to actual advice given on how to deter the problem. China’s becoming the new global leader to other countries when it comes to dangerous artificial intelligence technology transfers, especially to those not maintaining an alliance relationship with the United States, is crucial.

One such area that shows both the future strategic capacity of MIC while simultaneously revealing the economic misfocus of America is the progressive creation of China’s own version of GPS. Since 2017, China has aggressively built and deployed a series of navigation satellites. The deployment schedule has been so assertive that China can already offer willing partners a mostly functioning alternative to America’s GPS capabilities. The American complaints so far have focused merely on how China should not be trying to leverage new commercial partners away from the American GPS system. They should be more concerned about how this leverage could be strategically used: access to the Chinese GPS alternative in exchange for partnering with Chinese firms exclusively to accelerate AI tech transfer, digital infrastructure, and equipment gains (Alex Capri, 2018). The potentiality for this in terms of surveillance and monitoring is almost limitless when governed under high-tech state control.

Another example is the future battle for 5G supremacy. If MIC can succeed in propelling China into the leadership position for not just developing but transferring 5G technology across the globe, the strategic power dynamic of this eventuality is immense. Unlike the United States, China has 650 million active internet users in desperate demand for 5G speed, and it has a mutual infrastructure improvement project in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is a road and maritime linking initiative that has already worried enough Western observers about the future reach and influence of Chinese power, from the South China Sea to Western Europe. If MIC allows China to meld 5G dominance into the BRI, then it may have a one-two punch that signals not just economic self-sufficiency but strategic power influence across a vast landscape that America currently does not dominate. It means a Chinese model of state political control and internet semi-freedom could be traded for greater speed/access and the monitoring of digital histories. Ultimately, what this shows is that China has deftly learned over the past two decades something that was once the exclusive domain of the United States:


“civil-military fusion” (Alex Capri, 2018).

To date, no country has ever come close to copying this American success. The gradual advancement of the Chinese economy over the past four decades, however, has produced a unique state capability to enact initiatives like BRI and MIC, both of which have huge dual-use, civil-military fusion aspects embedded within. China is now potentially showing how economic success can lead to military/defense power expansion. Unfortunately, Western focus seems stubbornly intent on preventing an economic success train that has already left the station, focusing instead on present-day economic access strategies that may ultimately backfire, while underplaying the long-term military-strategic potentiality of plans like MIC.

The American analyses are founded upon a world view in which the China-America relationship is immutably a first priority (C. H. Tung, 2018). But what if the end goal is instead about how China can be positioned in South Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa? It seems clear that China was at least partially successful in developing programs like MIC by relying on American short-sighted arrogance that only saw China as a “copycat” nation incapable of competing with American innovation and by not seeing the full threat-complex embedded within when it concerns national security and intelligence. This leaves a critical flank exposed and vulnerable: Leverage and influence-peddling technology innovation — completely uncoupled from concerns about democratic principles, human rights, and civil liberties in countries not very friendly to the United States — is a brand new doom for American strategic interests (Robert D. Atkinson & Caleb Foote, 2019).


Now, caught somewhat unprepared and unfocused on the long-term goals, it is the United States being advised to pursue activities like “shielding” and “stifling” in order to prevent continued Chinese acquisitions and advantage-building (Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes, & Victor Ferguson, 2019). As mentioned earlier, these efforts are not just too little, too late but also erroneously emphasized as the United States still likes to think of itself as the main point of focus for long-term Chinese strategies. As long as that remains the case, not only will the United States be unlikely to reverse the current trends in favor of Chinese cyber technology gains, it will remain blind to the long-term processes that will see American strategic supremacy usurped in critical global regions by Chinese diplomatic pragmatism.

Once dominant in emerging AI, America has seen its global share drop over the last five years, as shown below.




MIC was always formulated to be an outward-in economic model for Chinese development and an

inward-out investment/engagement model for Chinese power.



Finally, if there were any remaining skeptics about the full strategic capacity of MIC far beyond economic development, one only need see how China has behaved the past five years when it comes to facial recognition technology¹.



From the very beginning, Chinese economic development was made to progress in a manner that kept the Chinese state whole and intact (Esther Pan, 2006). Consequently, projects like MIC should have always been seen as a dual-use project not exclusively focused on economic sustainability. Some impressive Global South scholarship is being done on this angle, making the important connections between China, AI, MIC, cyber, and strategic influence. Unfortunately, todate, much of that research has been little noticed:

China is spending vast sums on research related to AI technologies, as cyberpower sits at the intersection of a number of its national domestic and foreign policy priorities. China's international cyber ambitions are closely paired with its existing and growing use of AI technologies for surveillance and social control at home. This is evident from the intrusive AI-driven surveillance infrastructures being employed in Xinjiang state and that of the Great Fire Wall (GFW). Although American companies took an early lead in AI, for example, as measured by the application of machine learning and number of AI patents registration, China is closing the gap with the U.S. At the current technological advancement rate, it is predicted that by 2025 China will surpass the U.S. and by 2030 it will dominate the industries of AI. This poses significant implications to the economic, political, security, cultural, and human rights

¹ "China is Starting to Edge Out the US in AI Investment", *CBInsights*, February 12, 2019, available online at: <https://www.cbinsights.com/research/china-artificial-intelligence-investment-startups-tech/>.

global order (Arthur Gwagwa, 2019).

Interesting how the supposedly distinct Chinese AI goals and strategic foreign influence gains perfectly coincide with the MIC timeline. For China, there is no point in separating economic development from national security from global influence. They are three sides of the Chinese triangle. This is why literature searches can find equal numbers on AI start-ups with facial recognition companies as technology transfer deals with advanced surveillance tech². Just how technologically diverse and strategically expansive could Chinese influence become if the maximum utility of MIC comes to fruition?

Is China the First Multipolar Power Influencer?

It is important to recall that China has proposed MIC while already actively engaged in technology transfer around the world. Its supposed “low-end manufacturer” status has not made it any less attractive as a commerce partner to many countries that often find themselves somewhat limited, even ignored, by traditional Western economic powers. One of the biggest areas China has achieved leadership status is in the transfer of surveillance technology. In many ways, it was a natural outcropping of domestic economic success: China’s political system employs what are considered heavy-handed repressive measures to ensure greater control over public activism and opinion making. Is it any wonder that other countries around the world, equally concerned about opposition voices and grassroots activism, might suddenly become interested in learning at the feet of the global leader and ultimately become equipped by it? A quick survey on financial deals concluded over the past five years shows how China has aggressively marketed and transferred surveillance technology to countries like Ecuador, Zimbabwe, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kenya, and the United Arab Emirates, with replicas of the official network (also Chinese made and marketed) already sold to the likes of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Angola (Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel, & Melissa Chan, 2019).

Critics worry that such activity is not simply global free-market capitalism filling a niche. It is not the proper application of surveillance technology to help necessary initiatives like counter-terrorism and battling home-grown extremism and criminal activity. Rather, the worry is based on the fear that China is de facto creating a future of tech-driven authoritarianism, where its technology transfers are purposely being deployed so as to limit the organic expression and development of nascent democratic movements. Obviously, massive infrastructure and global development initiatives like MIC and BRI will only intensify and expand opportunities for this kind of technology-transfer initiative.

The difference in how China views global engagement vis-à-vis countries like the United States is significant. China has been adamant for a long time that it is only concerned by productive and fruitful economic transactions. Huawei, the Chinese technology giant often at the heart of most of these international worries, unintentionally summed up the overall Chinese foreign engagement philosophy in a single sentence: “Huawei provides technology to support smart city and safe city programs across the world. In each case, Huawei does not get involved in setting public policy in terms of how that technology is used.” (Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel, & Melissa Chan, 2019). First, it would not be an exaggeration to replace the word “Huawei” with the words “People’s Republic of China” (Keith Johnson & Elias Groll, 2019). Second, recall the aforementioned “dual-use” technology so prevalent in today’s global market: It is fairly simple to convert

² “China is Starting to Edge Out the US in AI Investment”, *CBInsights*, February 12, 2019, available online at: <https://www.cbinsights.com/research/china-artificial-intelligence-investment-startups-tech/>.

technology sold under commercial purposes so that it suddenly becomes extremely effective in carrying multiple purposes, including military and intelligence. Keeping these two parameters in mind, Huawei's statement is a *de facto* admission to potential buyers that they will know all of the potential uses of the technology transfer. All China demands is that it has plausible deniability down the road if the technology ends up being used for primarily non-commercial uses.

In the past, China faced some criticism about how its initial massive foray into the global economy was to target natural resource nations that might help feed its insatiable energy needs. Over the past half decade, for example, many countries across Africa have started to ask if China's purchasing of natural resources is really creating any positive economic development for the African back end (Eleanor Albert, 2017). China's new initiatives like MIC, however, clearly carry the potential to snuff out such criticism before it begins in greater earnest. MIC could sell technology transfers not just as today's economic progress but as *de facto* future of governance capabilities (Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel, & Melissa Chan, 2019). For American critics, that message means the future of governance as envisioned by China: the use of AI technology to control the masses and limit challenges to state power, hindering grassroots activism. Perhaps worse still, the way that China seals the deal on such transfers increases its continuing global influence leadership position. Namely, it offers loans to countries that in the past would have never been able to afford such technology. Also, the nature of China's domestic political system means the world market has almost no capacity to follow transparency or accountability for such transfers (Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel, & Melissa Chan, 2019).

Another reason to keep concern high is the reality that China has, plain and simple, out-strategized and out-witted the United States on a number of issues across the diplomatic, legal, and commercial levels of AI technology transfer. As a result, America finds itself in the awkward position of protesting Chinese strategy innovation even while needing to admit that by and large China is accomplishing its goals without breaking any laws. Economic espionage and IP theft accusations notwithstanding, China has leveraged US free-market principles and laws to naturally increase its sizable leverage. For example, a major element of American innovation and ingenuity is the ability to attract private foreign investment and backing (Michael Brown & Pavneet Singh, 2018). This simple rule perfectly aligns with the Chinese strategy of dumping hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars into American tech start-ups not so much as to encourage American innovation as to simply get access to early-stage technology. It then can pursue its decades-long classic art of reverse engineering so as to produce a Chinese equivalent capable of being marketed to second- and third-world countries not typically on the radars of major industrial/tech nations. The data shows, in fact, that the facilitation of technology transfers from the United States to China (the first step in China's long-term strategy to achieve its future global influence position) is barely powered by cyber espionage and theft. Instead, the key success strategies have been foreign direct investment, venture capital investments, joint ventures, licensing agreements, and talent acquisitions, all of which comply with American law (Sean O'Connor, 2019). Additionally, it has been China, not the United States, that has been committed to a long-term strategy that is holistic and focused on all of the major emerging technologies likely to become the dominant driving force of a future global economic market. America has simply chosen to not dedicate as much time, focus, and money into this approach as China has. Worse still, the United States has been cavalier in thinking reverse engineering is a poor, distant cousin to innovation that can never morph into genuine original technical genius. That seems to be a grave miscalculation. Given that China by 2050 may be 150 percent the economic size of the United States, this short-sightedness is almost unforgivable (Michael Brown & Pavneet Singh, 2018).

This background makes all of the current media hype over Chinese intellectual property theft and economic espionage somewhat suspect. It is not that China should be openly allowed to exploit such illegalities, but it is an inaccurate distraction to try to depict Chinese progress in technology as merely a result of it being successful in “stealing and copying” from the Americans. To believe that might indeed make American corporations feel better, but it does not truly address the strategy innovation with which China has rapidly advanced itself. It also is an example of not learning from history: There is ample evidence that both South Korea and Japan employed an imitation to innovation strategy that now makes them both stable and significant players on the global economic market (Robert D. Atkinson & Caleb Foote, 2019). China may not be an ally in the mode of South Korea and Japan today, but the behavioral lessons learned are still remarkable.

And before anyone can think these plans are nothing more than just keeping up with the United States or, again, basing Chinese positioning only through Americo-centric eyes, all of these initiatives have caught the attention of Western Europe with perhaps even more shocking concern. The reality is that most EU defense analysts feel the timetable for China to catch up to and surpass European technology capabilities is much, much shorter than the American timetable. Unfortunately, the strategies that have worked so effectively in catching the Americans off-guard are even more invasive across the European Union. It admits that China simply jumped more quickly on investment into dual-use technology that would power a future civil-military integration, largely through the familiar-sounding “whole-of-government” investment and protective regulatory framework and getting early-stage access to the best of the European technology innovation organizations (Meia Nouwens & Helena Legarda, 2018).

Ironically, some of the criticism in Europe is not so much the American complaint about theft and espionage but is founded more on the unfair advantages that an authoritarian system has over a mature democracy. Since economic innovation in a democracy tends to mostly be a bottom-up, independent process, it creates a much smaller intersectional alignment between the three aspects usually powering innovation: industry, government, and academia. Since China employs a top-down authoritarian model for economic innovation, it naturally creates a much wider, deeper, and broader “middle” where the three aspects intersect (think Venn diagram with three interlocked circles of industry, government, and academia) (Meia Nouwens & Helena Legarda, 2018).

Interestingly, and perhaps disconcertingly to the United States, there are at least some nationalistic cracks in the EU façade when it comes to countering or joining Chinese progress. Germany — more than any other European nation — has clearly decided its own future economic tech development is achieved more efficiently by being a reliable partner in conjunction with China. In fact, China has even created specific new characters in Mandarin to directly relate to both “smart manufacturing” and “Industry 4.0”, terms that really only come into play with explicit Sino-German negotiations. This is not just China-driven and initiated either: Germany created its own implementation partner/development agency (GIZ) so as to “create a better framework condition for German and Chinese companies in the field of Industry 4.0 and Made in China 2025” (Meia Nouwens & Helena Legarda, 2018). It begs to be asked if there is not even a united Western front when it comes to countering projects like MIC, then how likely will there be resistance from non-US aligned countries that have always felt somewhat lectured to by the United States?

Conclusion

When looking closer to home, China's economic growth morphing into geopolitical leverage is already in model form: Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, even South Korea and the Philippines are all closely intertwined with the People's Republic, but in a relatively one-way street deal. China maximizes that leverage and over the past decade or so has pushed its thumb lightly down upon its regional neighbors when they pursued initiatives that were not favorable to long-term Chinese objectives (Meia Nouwens & Helena Legarda, 2018).

But even given this reality, Western analysis tends to replace objective and dispassionate conclusions with something more akin to wishful diplomatic thinking. The idea that East Asian countries can offer lessons to other countries more far afield on how to engage China economically but not fall under its political leveraging is not really keeping reality front and center. The mere fact that China has not occupied or taken over its neighbors is not so much a testimony to these neighbors' continued strategic strength to keep China at bay as it is giving witness that China is not obsessed with power expressed in the traditional militaristic ways so favored by the United States. China's preferred model is clearly the one discussed earlier with Germany. Rather than being seen as a geostrategic threat that must be nullified, Germany has thrown its weight behind a mutually beneficial economic alliance and basically has turned a blind eye to strategic/diplomatic concerns. The ultimate consequences of this strategy, played out through the twenty-first century, could significantly rewrite the current global order founded upon American leadership that is equally weighted to economic might and geo-diplomatic pressuring.

Ultimately, the United States needs to be concerned about one day waking up and suddenly realizing its global leadership dominance has been replaced by many other countries that have basically adopted the "Huawei" model of foreign policy. As noted, Huawei is not just an incredibly successful and prosperous Chinese conglomerate based in and operating from an authoritarian state that balks at the idea of embracing a full set of American democratic values. It has, in fact, prospered largely because of how much it has been able to function within the rules and restrictive processes of that regime (Priscilla Moriuchi, 2019). For Americans, it might seem like Huawei was given a Faustian bargain: You will only be successful if you acquiesce to Chinese values about power and hierarchy; if you do not accept, you will not be allowed to exist. But this is an American conceit not truly reflective of the situation in China. A Faustian bargain implies reluctance and discomfort in making a compromised decision. Huawei had no dilemma: Its goal was to become a major global economic player, thereby increasing the influence and power of the Chinese state. It has no goals to usurp or replace that power. That is just what American power wishes Huawei would do.

It is entirely plausible that countries throughout South Asia, Africa, and Latin America will be particularly enamored by this Huawei model of foreign policy that can de facto end up creating a Chinese cyber colonization system but powers their own domestic growth and prosperity at home. Thus, protest over such colonization will be minor. To America, it would be anathema seeing a transnational string of countries following ideas like requiring citizens, companies, and organizations to assist state intelligence agencies; not availing citizens or companies with a legal mechanism to not comply with a request given by state intelligence or national security organs; or leveraging civilian entities to conduct intelligence gathering as China does (Priscilla Moriuchi, 2019). If those intermittent requirements, however, are offset by rapid technological advances and increased economic development and progress, then it is highly likely other countries will jump

at the chance and start to look with great displeasure at the American tendency to tie economic partnership and aid with progress on the democratic freedoms/civil liberties front.

America does not see itself as the one offering difficult Faustian bargains of its own to places like Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East/South Asia. But, at the local level in these places, it is often characterized this way (Stephanie Savell, 2019). It is far easier for America to see itself as the cowboy in the white hat and all the others not going along with it as the villains in the black hats. Post-Cold War, when the United States was the sole superpower, it was simple to get away with. But in the twenty-first century, with projects like MIC and long-term strategic Chinese interests offering up a completely different type of engagement model, maintaining sole dominance of global leadership is no longer an automatic guarantee for America. China's focus on fusing the economic now with a geostrategic later and the unity between dual-use civil-military technology transfers across numerous countries not aligned with the United States is brilliant strategy, even if also utterly Machiavellian (Priscilla Moriuchi, 2019). Current American focus is basically missing the boat on this potentiality. If it continues, the real culprit in creating a global AI network of Chinese cyber colonization, a high technology system of cyber authoritarianism, might be the strategic hubris of the American commercial, national security, and diplomatic communities.

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Reflection on the Political Philosophy of American Populism

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In order to better explore and reflect on the predicament of American populism today, it is particularly important to reflect on American populism at the level of political philosophy. The political thought of American populism first comes from various political ideas of populism. However, such political ideas all originate from thinking of political philosophy. If we reflect on American populism in the field of political philosophy, we have to return to the classical democratic political philosophy and its ideas of ancient Greece. However, the return does not mean that we stick to the classical political philosophy. Therefore, this paper intends to divide and discuss in a historical way, pointing to different stages of populist political thoughts and focusing on different political philosophical thoughts: In the aspect of classical political philosophy, it focuses on political philosopher Leo Strauss' related thoughts about the ideal of western classical democracy and the distortion of modern democracy, and analyzes the concept of "political system" in detail. In aspect of recent political philosophy, it focuses on Jean-Jacques Rousseau's popular sovereignty theory, his "public will" thought and "square political theory", and expounds the "anti-theater theory" and its "anti-representative system" thought. In the aspect of modern political philosophy, it focuses on Isaiah Berlin's "liberal pluralism" and "value theory", and analyzes the multiculturalism in which the chaos of modern American politics originated.

Keywords: reflection, American populism, political philosophy

Introduction

Populism is not a special phenomenon in the United States in the modern sense, but a common phenomenon rooted in the founding of the United States and repeated throughout American history. In the history of American politics and political thought, since the founding of the United States in 1776, populism has been reflected in its founding text — *the Declaration of Independence*. The concept of "equality" stated by it under liberalism, namely "all men are created equal", has a kind of radical color which is easy to trigger populism because of its natural "absolutism". In the 21st century, American populism reached its peak in the "Capitol Hill Incident" supported by "Trumpism". Admittedly, although the scale of the "Capitol Hill Incident" was not as large as that of previous populist movements, it was more serious than that of previous populism — it posed a serious threat to the stability of the traditional American political ecology under the leadership of a previous populist president. Therefore, in order to better explore and reflect on the predicament of American populism, it is particularly important to reflect on American populism at the level of political philosophy.

Return to Classical Political Philosophy: The Ideological Root of American Populism

It is well known that American populism grew out of Western democracy itself. Therefore, we need to return to the beginning of western democratic politics — the political philosophy of ancient Greece on democratic political system and thoughts, to think about the source of populism. Although populism emerged from western democratic politics, it's in a symbiotic and co-existent relationship with democracy. The ancient Greek classical political philosophers did not directly explain the phenomenon of populism in their initial assumptions. According to the investigation of political philosopher Leo Strauss, the original ideal of classical democracy was very different from the actual early Athenian democracy and modern western liberal democracy. The original classical democracy, which was supposed to be the politics of a few people with political virtues and wisdom, was a kind of politics dependent on virtue — “virtuous politics” or “aristocracy”. In fact, even the practice of the original democratic politics is difficult to realize democracy, and resulted in the classical case — “*Death of Socrates*”. Moreover, modern liberal democracy has been far from the virtuous politics, it has become a kind of “popular rule” manifested as “popular culture”, and the political system does not depend on virtue. This was the beginning of the populism disease that accompanies Western democracy.

The Assumption of the classical Democratic System

Political philosopher Leo Strauss said, “One cannot know the true state of any political system without knowing the good and bad of every one.” (Leo Strauss, 2019, p. 43). Therefore, the “political system” is the guiding theme of political philosophy. In “*What is political philosophy*,” Strauss used the opening of Plato’s “Justice” to talk about legislators, as governing bodies, its character is determined by “the best political order of the whole society”, and this order is “political system” (Leo Strauss, 2003, p. 58). Since “political system” has become the guiding theme of political philosophy and human social life, “What is the best political system” is the guiding topic that classical political philosophy is always concerned with. Strauss said in the *Three Waves of Modernity*: “People must remind themselves of the fact that classical political philosophy seeks the best political order, or the best political system.” (Liu Xiaofeng, 2018, p. 39). Strauss wrote at length about the best political system in “*Natural Right and History*”. According to classical political philosophy, the best political system is “aristocracy” or “mixed political system” (Leo Strauss, 2003, p. 143).

The Ideological Root of American Populism: Aristocracy (Virtuous Political System)

The political system concerned by Strauss is the best or highest political system, and this political system is aristocracy. Aristocracy is also called “virtuous political system”, where a gentleman is an elite nobleman with noble virtues, and a “virtuous political system” is a government in which the virtuous man’s lifestyle is guaranteed. Since the political system discussed in classical political philosophy was based on this view, the aristocracy (virtuous political system) with the virtuous men as the main body becomes the ideal best system. Because of this, the design of the original democratic system was based on a “universal meritocracy”, a universal popular rule in which all or most of the adults were virtuous and wise. Therefore, the people who designed this political system naturally believed that “all or most adults have both virtue and wisdom” in this kind of political system. They are not only “virtuous” and “wise”, but also “rational”.

However, the original virtuous political system was not a “just” political system, which contained the tendency of populist thought from the beginning. First of all, how did the virtuous man get imperium? The

self-breeding of the virtuous man is not naturally higher than the vulgar. It's just birth that determines who is a virtuous man. In other words, if people are brought up in the same environment, they can all have the same upbringing. Therefore, according to the principle of "justice requires equal treatment of all people", or more precisely, according to the principle of "equality" of democracy, the "justice" of virtuous political system is not just, and it can only be regarded as an ideal city-state system. Secondly, the "freedom" on which virtuous political system depends — the freedom of virtue, which can only be possessed by a few people, belonging to a highly elite minority. It will certainly cause social antagonism and stimulate the majority of people's populist thoughts. Finally, even if the democracy of "universal virtuous government" — the democracy formed and ruled by the majority of the society, it also has to suppress the democracy of the minority in the society and become a kind of ironic populist thought. In other words, when the rights of the minority conflict with the rights of the majority, populism will coerce the values and interests of the minority.

The Ideological Root of American Populism: Mixed Political System

Even if the real virtuous political system is the best or the most "mean" political system in reality, the probability of making it come true is very small. The classical political philosophers had no illusions about this either. Strauss also said that aristocracy is the best political system in theory, but it lacks "reality" in practice. The classical philosophers were never under any illusion about the probability that a truly virtuous political system would come true one day (Liu Xiaofeng, 2018, p. 331).

To the classical philosophers, the achievement of the best political system was regarded as extremely improbable. Therefore, from the perspective of practice, the classical political philosophers proposed a kind of "mixed political system" in which "the wise men" and "the people" shared power. The political system works by electing government officials and members of parliament from a group of wise men, who are required to report their duties to the people at the end of their terms. This idea evolved directly into a "mixed political system". In this system, the "Senate" was in a kind of "intermediate" position, composed of wise men.

The difference between the mixed political system and the virtuous political system is the ruling group. The main body of the mixed political system is the commercial and industrial elite, while the main body of the virtuous political system is the sage. In terms of economic sources, the ruling group of mixed political system mainly reflects the commercial interest, while the sage made a living by occupying land, the management of wealth does not consumed much of his time. In fact, the sage was the virtuous person living in the city, far from the kind of entrepreneur who consumed a lot of his time in pursuit of money. Therefore, the elite of business and industry, which occupies the Senate, is different from the virtuous political system because it is not necessarily virtuous.

Professor Liu Xiaofeng said in the article "*Strauss on Moral Education and American Political System*" that the key difference between modern republic and classical republic is the classical republic is dominated by aristocratic political elements, and the purpose of the city-state is dominated by the pursuit of virtue. The modern republic is dominated by the elements of democratic government, which defines the purpose of the state is to satisfy everyone's natural desires (Liu Xiaofeng, 2017, p. 5). The modern American political system is a mixed political system based on modern republicanism. Taking this as a benchmark, in the political system of modern America, although neoliberalism has been advocating the importance of virtue in recent years, but it still has little effect. If it does not take virtue as its purpose or direction, it will not only deviate from the original virtuous political system, but also produce populist politics and social chaos.

In short, whether it is “virtuous political system” or “mixed political system”, the Western classical political philosophers’ design of the original democratic government are too idealized. The political practice of “*Death of Socrates*” has killed the political idea of the original democratic government in its cradle. Therefore, the western democratic system was in the fissure at its beginning, and populism was born in this fissure, and gradually became a disease of the western democratic system. From this point of view, both the “virtuous political system” and the “mixed political system” have been in a state of being born and accompanied by populism.

Continuation of Recent Political Philosophy: The Boost of Democracy to Populism

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was the forerunner of western democratic thought, and his thought undoubtedly promoted the democratic process of Western civilization. However, many scholars in history regarded Rousseau as the ancestor of populism. The famous philosopher Bertrand Arthur William Russell even wrote in his *History of Western Philosophy* that Hitler came from Rousseau (Russell, Bertrand, 2013, p. 439). Although the above comments on Rousseau have been always full of controversy in the academic circle, it is not unreasonable to criticize Rousseau as the “originator of populism”, because Rousseau’s political philosophy is full of paradoxes to some extent, and even promotes the progress of populism in the West.

The Thought of “General Will”

Rousseau’s democratic thought and popular sovereignty theory are mainly embodied in his thought of “General Will”. General will is not only the core concept in Rousseau’s political philosophy, but also an important part of modern populist political philosophy. However, although Rousseau mentioned general will a lot in *The Social Contract*, he did not make a complete definition of it, which also caused the continuous debate on this concept in later generations.¹ Generally speaking, “general will” is the “common will”, which refers to the common wishes or interests of all people. But from its depth of thought, the general will is close to the status of Plato’s Idea (Talmon, 1952 (2004), p. 44). In terms of the main idea of this article, the general will has the following characteristics, which are highly compatible and sustains the generation of populism.

Firstly, people and sovereignty. The subject and object of the implementation of Rousseau’s “general will” are the people, and the people which occupy the majority in number, are also the objects that populism relies on and emphasizes all the time. In Rousseau’s time, the majority of people in quantity were peasants. In *A Letter to D’Alembert on Appreciation*, Rousseau pointed out the importance of farmers. He believed that agriculture was the oldest and noblest human occupation, and farmers were the most honest and useful people (Rousseau, 1994, p. 23). Rousseau warned that the influence of parties representing special interests would impede the public discussion, such public discussion might lead to a consensus on the well-being of all. Each person must fully surrender his or her own interests to society as a whole and pursue the welfare of the whole society (Zhu Xueqin, 1994, p. 84). **Secondly, universality and compulsiveness.** Rousseau argued that in order to achieve true general will, it must come from and apply to all people. There were both substantive and formal aspects to this idea. Formally, Rousseau believed that the application of law must be common and general, and its scope must be universal. Although the law cannot name an individual by name, it must apply to everyone. Rousseau’s hope was that while citizens are constantly thinking about what is good for their private interests,

¹ There are several schools of thought about Rousseau’s “general will”. For details, see: Joseph Reiser (2010). “General Will”. In Bevir, Mark (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Political Theory*, pp. 551-553.

they have a larger general will at work. In this way, citizens can support or protect the common and private interests impartially, guided by the general will, without burdelling or interfering with the law. **Thirdly, nationality and monism.** Rousseau, in one of his letters, made it very clear that the general will is the will of a particular nation rather than the general will of the whole human race (Rousseau, 1994, p. 34). In this sense, Rousseau's general will belongs to a particular political or national community which emphasizes the importance of insisting on national particularity, and further emphasizes that national character should not be absorbed in "cosmopolitan universalism" (Rousseau, 1994, p. 133). In fact, it also strengthened the generation of populism based on nationalism, the national general will has natural rationality and legitimacy which further promoted the generation of a series of populist behaviors in the form of xenophobia. **Fourthly, equality and morality.** Rousseau's thought of people's equality, to be specific, is a kind of collective equality thought that sacrifices individual freedom. Rousseau's collectivism was reflected in the discussion of the general will in his landmark work — *The Social Contract*, and also in *Emile*. In *The Social Contract*, he said, "human beings are united and cooperate together through social contract, and all the rights of each individual are all transferred to the whole collective." (Rousseau, 1980, p. 23). In another work, *Emile*, he also noted that the general will "always leans towards equality" (Rousseau, 1978, p. 414). The culmination of this egalitarian thinking is today's "multiculturalism" and populism in the United States. "Morality" here refers to Rousseau's concept of "moral citizenship". "General will" refers to the people or citizens as the subject, and this kind of citizen, Rousseau called "moral citizen". Rousseau believed that the masses at the bottom were the group with virtue, and distinguished mass civilization from urban civilization. This surely fits the "moral homogeneity" of populism. Populists believe that the people they represent are morally homogenous and pure, and they are naturally weak, while the elites they oppose are morally flawed. As a result, populists believe that their populist movements have a natural "moral legitimacy".

The above mentioned "people and sovereignty", "universality and compulsiveness", "nationality and monism" and "equality and morality" of the general will, and briefly elaborated the conceptual part of the convergence of the general will and populism. However, the populist color of the general will is also directly expressed in the form and implementation, namely the "square politics" advocated by Rousseau, the "anti-theater theory" and "anti-representative government theory" contained therein.

"Square Politics": Rousseau's Anti-Representative Politics

Square politics has been reflected in ancient Greece. In Plato's relevant writings, people gathered in the square for political discussion or assembly. However, since modern times, square politics has further evolved into people's demonstrations and gatherings. But no matter what changes, square politics has always been a highly democratic form of citizens' direct participation in politics. This is because what square politics opposes is "theater politics", that is a politics of institutionalization, organization, and hierarchy. Rousseau's theory of "square politics" begins with his "anti-theatre theory", which directly points to the western representative political system.

"Anti-Theatre Theory" and "Square Politics"

"Anti-theater theory" is also known as "theater effect theory" in academic circles. Rousseau did not actually put forward this concept, it was refined by later scholars. This important political philosophical issue hidden in "*Letter to M. D'Alembert on Spectacles*", Rousseau and his friends exploring the issue — "Should a

theater should be built in Geneva” (Rousseau, 1994, p. 126). Therefore, this letter constituted an important part of Rousseau’s political philosophy. In Rousseau’s opinion, performance in a theater needs actors and audiences, this kind of exchange of roles in theater is actually a reflection of the exchange of positions in political life. Theater is a place of performance, but also a place of distortion of human nature, because the performance of drama itself is full of falseness. In addition, the majority of civic morality was shaped by imitation, but the form of drama has a bad impact on the moral imitation of citizens, which has extremely bad consequences on the moral atmosphere of the society, and directly threatens the order of the political community. Therefore, Rousseau actually held this view of “opposing the construction of a theater in Geneva”. In fact, Rousseau was not only against the construction of the theatre as a practical place, but also against the form of drama which undermines humanity, morality and the general will.²

Rousseau’s “anti-theater theory” was actually aimed at the representative system of the West, leading him to directly put forward the “square politics theory”. Rousseau believed that square politics, due to its directness, openness and transparency, is conducive to the direct expression of political views and tendencies so that the theory of people’s democracy and sovereignty could be truly expressed. Square politics suggests “some possible meeting between heart and will, emotion and reason, passion and virtue, in which freedom is experienced again as something spontaneous” (Daniel E. Cullen, 1993, p. 124). In the square, the representative (actors) and the represented (audience) become one, and the system of representative, political party and separation of powers is integrated into one. For Rousseau, square politics showed democracy incisively and vividly.

Anti-Representative Politics and Anti-Representative Government Theory

Rousseau’s thought of “square politics” directly deconstructed modern western democratic politics, which was embodied in the deconstruction of the institutional structure that Western democratic politics depended on, such as “representative system”, “separation of powers” and “party system”. In Rousseau’s opinion, representative system is actually people’s theater in the field of political practice. In the theatre of a representative house, the representative (MP) and the represented (citizen) are actors and audiences of each other, just as the audience watches the actors performing on the stage, the representative (MP) and the represented (citizen) constantly stimulate and provoke the tear of the general will, moral and political community. Therefore, Rousseau opposed representative system and representative government, believing that representative system is a symbol of regression of democracy, morality and freedom. Representative government is contrary to the will of the people, freedom and democracy.

After criticizing representative politics, Rousseau strongly criticized representative government and separation of powers at that time. We can see it from *The Social Contract* — However, our political commentators, unable to distinguish sovereignty in principle, have divided it in object: they have divided it into force and will, into legislative and executive powers, into taxation, judicial and war powers, and into internal and diplomatic powers. Sometimes they lump these parts together and sometimes they take them apart. They make a patchwork monster of the sovereignty, as if they had made one man out with different eyes, arms, and feet, and nothing more, and nothing more (Rousseau, 1980, p. 25).

Here we actually touch the core of Rousseau’s political philosophy — the division of power. Due to

² On Rousseau’s “Anti-Theater Theory”, Domestic scholars’ Comments and research Reference: He Fangying, *Rousseau’s Mask: On Theater and Enlightenment Drama*, Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 2020.

sovereignty belongs to the people and the general will, the government represented by representative system was criticized by Rousseau. At this time, we have to analyze the relationship and difference between popular sovereignty and government in Rousseau's political philosophy, in order to clarify the origin of populism in his theory.

Table 1 The Relationship and Difference Between Rousseau's Popular Sovereignty and Government

Types of Authority	Subject of authority	Time and form	Authority level	Procedures and organization
Popular Sovereignty	The people	Regular or irregular gatherings	high	low
Government	Government and its heads	Continuous existence	Middle	Middle

We can see from the table, the people and their regular assemblies (square politics) are superior to the government in the hierarchy of authority, but inferior to the government in time and form, procedure, and organization. From this point of analysis, the populist color in Rousseau's political philosophy is emerging once again--populism refers to elevating people to a level of unmatched authority, but the relevant organizations of populism are aggregated in a non-professional or non-organizational way.

In short, Rousseau's theory of "square politics" undoubtedly endows populists' violent rallies without political legal procedures with theoretical rationality and legitimacy. Rousseau believed that whether representative government or other governments, they are all temporary and need to be affirmed and supported by the people. Representative legislatures cannot determine the general will because the social contract depends on the unanimous consent of all the Ruled. Since sovereignty is not concentrated in one person or an elite, it is concentrated in all the people of the state, the general will of sovereignty can only be fully determined politically in the square — the assembly of all the people.

Reexamining Modern Political Philosophy: The Promotion of Modern Liberalism to Populism

To some extent, modern political philosophy is constructed by criticizing Rousseau's political philosophy. Isaiah Berlin succeeded Rousseau's thought of freedom and value with his "Two Kinds of Freedom" and his "Theory of Value". In short, Berlin's contribution to the field of political philosophy was its development of important theories such as "the division of two concepts of freedom" and "value pluralism", and summed up the above thoughts into "Liberal Pluralism", a uniquely representative theory of liberalism (Isaiah Berlin, 2003, pp. 186-246).

Two Types of Freedom and Definitions

Berlin's most famous idea of political philosophy is its distinction between "positive liberty" and "negative liberty". Although Berlin's distinction between the two types of freedom has small deviation in different writings, in general, he defined positive liberty as the ability to pursue and achieve goals, and can also be defined as autonomy rather than depend on others. Negative freedom is defined as the ability to act without coercion or interference from external political institutions (Isaiah Berlin, 2003, pp. 36, 46). As a matter of fact, the division of the two concepts of freedom made by Berlin is not rooted in itself, it can be traced back to the source of the history of political philosophy. He traced positive freedom back to Rousseau's theory of freedom, which focuses on individuals autonomy or the ability of self-rule. In Berlin's view, Rousseau equated freedom

with autonomy and further equated autonomy with submission to the so-called “general will”, and this conceptual equivalence and conversion was particularly dangerous, because the general will is quite independent and guided, and often contradicts individual’s private will. Therefore, Berlin argued that Rousseau’s theory of freedom is concerned with the best interests of citizens, but it ultimately pointed to the best interests of “common or public”. Berlin asserted that Rousseau’s accusation of the selfish will of the individual is an illusion, an attempt to elevate the absolute meaning of freedom that ultimately leads to its absolute sanctification or religitization. Berlin defined Rousseau as “freedom’s most insidious and dangerous enemy” (Isaiah Berlin, 2005, p. 31). Berlin believed that Rousseau’s theory of freedom was a theory of positive freedom, while Berlin himself held more criticism of positive freedom, believing that the interpretation of positive freedom represented by Rousseau ultimately led to absolutism and totalitarianism (Yu Wanhui, 2010, pp. 39-45).

As for negative freedom, in *Conversations with Isaiah Berlin*, a book by Ramin Jahanberru, Berlin admitted that he actually favored negative freedom over positive freedom (Ramin Jahanberru, 2011, p. 133). Berlin’s definition of negative freedom comes from Hobbes’ definition of freedom, which he related negative freedom to the liberal tradition that emerged and developed in England and France from the 17th to early 19th centuries. In this period, the freedom in the social context of these two countries is freedom of resistance — negative freedom without interference by others.

From the above analysis of Berlin’s “division of the two concepts of freedom”, to some extent, it can be seen that Berlin actually transformed or equated freedom with a kind of ability (Zhao Tingyang, 2008, p. 9). Positive freedom is the ability to control authority, while negative freedom is the ability to get rid of authority. However, if freedom is regarded as an ability, then this ability is very likely to lurk in the tendency of “power” and “authoritarianism”. We can find that both the pro-positive and pro-negative freedom groups have one thing in common, that is, each side equates its own concept of freedom with the real concept of freedom, and regards the other side as a false or incomplete one, negative freedom and positive freedom are all likely to reduce “true freedom”. This further indicates that although Berlin’s “distinction between two freedoms” is a purely intellectual analysis of the concept of freedom, it may evolve into a tool of party or power, and further lead to the propagation of liberalism (Putterman Theodore L., 2006, pp. 416-446). Nowadays, American populists often carry out populist activities under the banner of “freedom”, and this freedom is reflected in both positive and negative freedom. For example, during the epidemic, many Americans held a series of populist demonstrations, demonstrating with the negative freedom slogans of “against vaccination” or “against daily mask wearing”, or believing that they had the positive freedom of “breathing freely” or “going out freely”, which further resulted in the large-scale generation of populism in the United States.

Value Pluralism

Berlin’s two general theories of freedom introduce the concept of “pluralism” into the elaboration of liberalism, and the prominent manifestation of pluralism in liberalism is his “value theory”. In exploring the philosophers who participated in the Enlightenment or held Enlightenment ideas, Berlin found a common feature in their thoughts, that is, they all held a deep “monism” belief in the interpretation of their theories. Based on this belief, there must be a single answer to all social and philosophical questions. Berlin was deeply suspicious of this Platonic idea. The reason is that the value of the plural form is not incommensurable, and often cause the conflict of human society. Berlin believed that we do have multiple values, and the denial of

these internal value conflicts will only lead to conflicts between individuals and political communities, and further lead to the tragedy of totalitarianism in human life again. Therefore, Berlin called for strong resistance to the temptation of monism and shift to the open and inclusive dimension of “value pluralism” (Isaiah Berlin, 2003, pp. 241-255).

According to Berlin, value pluralism is humane and does not “deprive people of their lives in the name of distant and inconsistent ideals” (Isaiah Berlin, 2003, p. 245). Moreover, values are human creations, not natural products waiting to be discovered. Berlin held a view of value pluralism and argued that moral values may be equal, to be precise, they are incommensurable, valid and incompatible. Thus, without reference in a particular decision, moral values may conflict with each other in an insoluble way. Moral conflict is “an inherent and irreducible element of human life”. “The collision of these values is human nature.” (Berlin, Isaiah, 1997, p. 238). From the above analysis, it can be seen that there are inherent contradictions and tensions in Berlin’s value pluralism. But in fact, Berlin’s construction of the self-consistency of its theory, to some extent, is trapped in a strange circle. In order to insist on value pluralism, so as to exclude “positive freedom”, instead, its rejection of positive freedom depends on the insistence of “negative freedom”. Therefore, Berlin had a strong monistic tendency in his discourse, which was actually rejected by himself. The contradictions within Berlin’s theory have led to the increasingly intense contradictions between political reality and practice. The pluralism tendency behind value pluralism further leads to the emergence of the new trend of American populism. In fact, today’s American populism is divided into two different populist forces.

The Origins of Populism Under Multiculturalism

In *Unfinished Dialogue*, Berlin pointed to a factual link between liberalism and pluralism (Isaiah Berlin, 2014, pp. 305-306). At the moment, multiculturalism in America leads directly to two extremes of populism: the populism of multiculturalism and the populism of Anti-multiculturalism.

The Populism That Adheres to Multiculturalism

Despite the outbreak of multiculturalism in various fields in the United States in the 1970s, it is difficult still to define “multiculturalism” precisely (Donald H. Roy, 1996, p. 217). Scholar Han Jiabing pointed out that although the so-called “multiculturalism” contains cultural content, it goes beyond the traditional cultural field and directs to related demands in the political field (Han Jiabing, 2006, p. 4). This insight is undoubtedly quite accurate, because “multiculturalism” is developed in the form of political and social practice.

In fact, nowadays, American multiculturalism has evolved into a pursuit of diversity at the expense of national and social integrity, as well as the identity of the nation and mainstream culture. The loss of these foundations further harms the continuous appeal for individual rights and freedoms, indicating the continuous impact and decline of traditional American culture. It also shows that pluralism is the soil for populism in today’s United States. Scholar Cong Riyun listed four basic principles of Western populism under multiculturalism, namely, “The more equality, the better. The more free, the better. The more democratic, the better. The more pluralistic, the better.” (Cong Riyun, 2020, pp. 118-137). These four basic principles are fairly in line with the basic status quo of American populism today. More specifically, today’s American multiculturalism will lead to the increasing generalization of equality and the pursuit of radical egalitarianism, and freedom is breaking boundaries and becoming more powerful. Democracy evolved from a minority democracy in ancient Greece to a mass democracy and then to a populist democracy. The pursuit of infinite

pluralism and endow it with morality, it is called "political correctness" in today's popular phrase. These four basic principles eventually produce an American populism that insisted on multiculturalism. It should be noted that this form of populism does not constitute the whole of American populism, only accounts for its mainstream status.

Anti-Multiculturalist Populism

Anti-multiculturalism populists believe that multiculturalism puts cultures on an equal footing, argues that culture is plural rather than singular, and there is no distinction between advanced and backward, good and bad, beautiful and ugly. Multiculturalism overemphasizes the value of cultural diversity, and believes that diversity itself is worth pursuing. As a result, multiculturalism tries to depress mainstream culture and constantly elevates and praises various cultures of ethnic minorities (including non-mainstream political groups such as black equality groups, feminist groups and sexual minorities) as well as those of socially disadvantaged and marginalized groups. Finally, the mainstream culture of the United States has been seriously eroded, deconstructed and weakened, resulting in the crisis and decline of the foundation of American civilization.

The typical representative for the anti-multiculturalist populists is Donald Trump, the 45th president of the United States. As we all know, Trump is often characterized by scholars as a right-wing populist. Right-wing populism focuses on its own nationality and traditional culture, and has a strong "xenophobic" feature. Right-wing populism values people's ethnic and blood identity, the so-called localism — those who are "born and bred" (Liu Yong, 2009, p. 52). Anti-multiculturalist populists see these minorities or political groups as contrary to the traditional culture or ideas that populism upholds. In fact, by analyzing the first form of American populism, we already knew that those minorities or political groups that adhere to multiculturalism were also likely to evolve into populism. Thus, when anti-multiculturalist populists come into conflict with multiculturalist populists, populists of different positions will adopt the same strategy of using values, morals, and violence to coerce the other side.

In this analysis, another feature of American populism has emerged — identity politics. Driven by cultural pluralism, the identity politics of populism focuses on the identity "group" rather than the "individual", which itself has the tendency of anti-individualism. Regardless of race, gender, religion, or emerging political or social minorities such as LGBT, various groups "participate" in the existing political agenda in different capacities, and these groups do not care much about whether they should "participate" in legal ways. However, Anti-multiculturalism populists have mostly fought in vain against this pluralism. In today's America, "political correctness" has become the "norm", and "identity" has indeed spreading to the field of political practice and exists objectively in two sides of the political spectrum.

Conclusion

Through the longitudinal analysis of the vein of American populism in Western political philosophy and the investigation of American populism in political philosophy, we can find that populism is not only the "democracy's shadow", but also the "bane of democracy" rooted in western democratic politics since ancient Greece. In other words, Western populism and democratic politics were in a state of "twin" at the beginning of Western civilization, and then continued in a state of "concomitancy". The reason why the above philosophers and their political philosophy are selected is that Strauss's debate on the ancient and modern democratic political system reveals the origin of the classical democratic political system of populism from the side, while

the thoughts of the other two political philosophers have contributed to the generation of populism in the modern sense to varying degrees. In short, by reflecting on the political philosophy of American populism, it can be seen that American populism, which has evolved so far, has a long history in the source of western political philosophy, which is also an ideological resource for us to reflect on political philosophy. In addition, in the course of western political civilization, populism has its corresponding political thought stage, and the political philosophy thought involved in it is not the same. Through the analysis of the “history of ideas” from the emergence of American political society, and then the reflection of western democratic thought to the “history of ideas”, we push the reflection of American populism to a deeper stage of political philosophy. In the real world politics, today’s American populism is sweeping in with the universal slogan of “freedom and democracy”, which makes non-western countries face a tense state of survival, so that we have to reflect on the political philosophy of American populism, in order to maintain due vigilance.

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For Whom the Bell Tolls: A Note on John J. Mearsheimer's Article on the Collapse of the Liberal International Order

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The integration of China and Russia into the liberal order is particularly important for the success of the liberal order itself, because they are the most powerful countries in the world after the United States. NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe demonstrates the desire of the United States and its allies to establish a liberal international order. U.S. policy toward China is based on the same liberal logic. But from 2005, the liberal order began to run into serious problems. As a modern political project, liberalism does not really exist and has never been fully realized. Today's world is a pluralistic world, not a multipolar one. It's more complex than it was during the period of the U.S.-led liberal hegemonic order. A pluralistic world is an interconnected and interdependent world, a synthesis of intersectiona. The contemporary world order is in a state of precarious transition, fraught with global and regional conflicts.

Keywords: liberalism; liberal international order; pluralistic world

In the second decade of the 21st century, the mood of publications by Western (primarily American) political scientists has slipped into pessimistic assessments of the crisis of the liberal world order. One of the champions of the liberal order, Joseph Nye, doubts that the "liberal order" will survive the current crisis. In a recently published article entitled "Bound to Fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order", American political scientist and neo-realist John J. Mearsheimer aims to determine the causes of the decline of the contemporary world order and define the type of order that could replace the current "liberal" version. Mearsheimer urges, above all the ruling elites, to recognize that the liberal international order was a failed enterprise with no future and says they should resist any temptation to continue trying to forcefully spread democracy across the planet via regime change. Mearsheimer concludes that the "overarching international order" that is taking shape will be based on realist principles of managing the global economy and dealing with issues of arms control and global problems such as climate change rather than focusing on an ideal of creating like-minded democratic states.

In 1984, Robert Keohane acknowledged the possibility of one of the world's superpowers achieving global hegemony (Keohane R. O., 1984), and the concept of establishing a unipolar liberal world order led by the United States has dominated scientific and political circles since the collapse of the USSR.

However, in the second decade of the 21st century, the mood of publications by Western (primarily American) political scientists has slipped into pessimistic assessments of the crisis of the liberal world order. One of the

champions of the liberal order, Joseph Nye, doubts that the “liberal order” will survive the current crisis. In his opinion, the crisis was caused by the fact that the liberal order “was largely limited to a group of like-minded states centered on the Atlantic littoral,” and that “it did not include many large countries such as China, India, and the Soviet bloc states” (Nye J. S., 2017). It's clear that the topic of the crisis of the “liberal” international order has firmly entered the scientific discourse of Russian and foreign analysts.

On October 11, 2017, *The New York Times* drew attention to the so-called “Trans-Atlantic manifesto” prepared by a team of German foreign policy experts stating that the actions of President Donald Trump have put the “liberal world order” in danger. According to the experts, Trump's victory dealt a heavy blow to the normative foundations of Western liberalism. The “manifesto” notes the importance of liberal values and institutes for Germany's prosperity and insists on aligning the country's participation in transatlantic relations against the European context.

In his critical analysis of the “German manifesto”, Josh Busby calls for looking the truth in the eye. The crisis of the “liberal world order” began before Donald Trump came into power, which means that Trump is a product of it himself. “The liberal order is imploding,” he writes, “and the liberal community idea has proven to have been a myth.” Busby continues to note that fundamental changes are taking place in today's world — changes that are characterized by the growth of non-state actors, the fragmentation of global governance, the emergence of new ideas and norms (many of which are not liberal) and the expansion of global and functional interdependence. A return to the old liberal order is impossible, and, as the analysis concludes, we need to accept this fact. Europe and the United States need to adapt to the new realities of global politics, which will combine liberal functions with other features. The future of the world lies in the development of a more universal community and an order that is more consistent with the diversity and pluralism in its norms, means of communication and leadership. The narrow focus on the liberal order led to the neglect of many other voices in global politics.

The article of the American neo-realist John J. Mearsheimer, who expressed his views on the transformation of the contemporary world order in his typically harsh and pragmatic manner, fit perfectly in the heated discussion on the crisis of the world order today.

In a recently published article entitled “Bound to Fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order”, Mearsheimer aims to determine the causes of the decline of the contemporary world order and define the type of order that could replace the current “liberal” version (John J. Mearsheimer, 2019, pp. 7-50).

Let us start with determining what the author means when he says “world order”. Mearsheimer believes that the “global distribution of power” is the dominant factor in defining the world order. This much is clear from his assessment of the evolution of the world order following World War II.

The American political scientist identifies three main differences between “orders”. The first difference he establishes is between “international orders” and “bounded orders”. For an order to be international, it must include all of the world's great powers.

“Bounded orders” are intended primarily to enable great powers to compete with each other. Mearsheimer identifies the following “international orders” that great powers can organize: realist, agnostic and ideological (including liberal). The choice of order depends primarily on the distribution of power among the great powers. The key issue is whether the system is bipolar, multipolar or unipolar.

After World War II, the system transitioned from a multipolar to a bipolar world order (1945-1989). As the main protagonists of the post-War world, the United States and the Soviet Union formed an “overarching

international order” that was neither liberal nor communist in nature, but one that “was fully consistent with the security interests of both sides”.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. administration, starting with that of George H. W. Bush, set about organizing the liberal international order and spreading it across the globe. The United States used existing international institutes (the United Nations, the arms control regimes, etc.) to achieve this end.

The creation of the liberal world order involved dealing with three main tasks. First, it was necessary to expand the presence of the adherents of the liberal order within those international institutions. Second, an open and inclusive international economy that would ensure maximum free trade and help free up capital markets had to be created. It was assumed that this hyper-globalized global economy would become more ambitious in scale than the economic order of the Cold War period. Third, it was important to actively export liberal democracy throughout the whole world.

The execution of these three tasks fit in with the main liberal theories, such as liberal institutionalism, economic interdependence and the theory of a democratic world. Thus, in the minds of its architects, the construction of a strong, sustainable and liberal world order was synonymous with the creation of a peace-loving world.

The integration of China and Russia into the liberal order was particularly important for the order itself to succeed, as they were the most powerful countries in the world behind the United States. The goal was to incorporate them into as many institutions as possible and fully integrate them into an open international economy, which would thus help transform them into liberal democracies.

The expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe was an indication of the desire of the United States and its allies to create a liberal international order. NATO's movement towards the east was not a part of the classic strategy of containing Russia. The goal was different — to integrate the countries of Eastern Europe, and perhaps Russia, into the liberal “security community” that had formed in Western Europe during the Cold War.

The United States based its policy towards China on the same liberal logic. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright claimed that engagement would lead to China's active membership in major global institutions and help integrate it into the U.S.-led economic order. In this case, China would become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system, highly motivated to maintain peaceful relations with other countries. Engagement would help turn China into a liberal democracy.

Mearsheimer believes that the Bush Doctrine, which was developed over the course of 2002 and used to justify the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, is an example of the global U.S. policy aimed at building a liberal international order. According to the U.S. administration, the best way to combat nuclear proliferation and terrorism was to turn all the countries of the Greater Middle East into liberal democracies that would transform the region into a giant zone of peace, thereby eliminating the twin problems of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Mearsheimer goes on to quote George W. Bush directly: “The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values [...] because stable and free nations do not breed the ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life” (John J. Mearsheimer, 2019, p. 23).

In the early 1990s, many observers believed that the United States was in a good position to build a liberal international order. There was a widespread belief in the West that political changes had reached a point where there was no viable alternative to liberal democracy. China was in the early stages of its rise, and Russia was in a state of weakness throughout the 1990s. At the time, it was widely believed in the West that eventually almost every country in the world would become a liberal democracy. This point of view was put forward very

convincingly by Francis Fukuyama in his book *The End of History*. During the 1990s and the early 2000s, the United States and its close allies were moving ever closer to the creation of a full-scale liberal international order.

Mearsheimer calls the period from 1990 to 2004 the “Golden Years” for the successful implementation of the liberal project. According to *Freedom House*, 34 per cent of the countries in the world were democracies in 1986, growing to 41 percent by 1996 and 47 percent by 2006. Few people expected that it would begin to crumble a few years into the 2000s.

Mearsheimer makes an important clarification to explain the attitude of realist thinkers to the concept of the “liberal” world order. “One might think that NATO expansion, U.S. efforts to turn China into a liberal democracy, and the Bush Doctrine are all evidence of untethered realism that unipolarity made possible. This conclusion would be wrong, however. It is clear from the discourse in policymaking circles and within the foreign policy establishment that these policies were motivated by liberal theories and that the United States and its allies in the West were firmly committed to building a liberal international order that would transcend balance of power politics. Almost all realists, it is worth noting, opposed NATO expansion, the Iraq War, and the Bush Doctrine. Moreover, they favored emphasizing containment over engagement in dealing with China. If the United States had been guided by realist logic in the aftermath of the Cold War, it would have sought to create an agnostic international order and pursued the policies advocated by realist thinkers” (John J. Mearsheimer, 2019).

From 2005 onwards, the liberal order started to encounter such serious problems that it began to collapse. Mearsheimer lists the blunders of the United States and its NATO allies in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Libya and Yemen among the failures of the plan to create a “liberal world order”. The United States and its allies “inadvertently played a central role in spreading illiberal disorder” in these regions. The rejection of the proposed Treaty for Establishing a Constitution for Europe in 2005 was followed by a crisis in the Eurozone, a souring of relations between Germany and Greece, Brexit, the spread of right-wing extremist xenophobia, and the emergence of illiberal positions among the leaders of several Eastern European states.

Mearsheimer predicts that relations between Russia and the West will worsen still. The reason for this, he believes, is the expansion of the European Union and NATO towards the East, the Ukrainian crisis, and the West's efforts to promote democracy in countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, and even Russia itself. Given this state of affairs, Moscow is looking for opportunities to sow discord in the West and weaken the European Union and NATO.

Mearsheimer believes that the cracks in the transatlantic relationship have deepened as a result of the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. Trump is suspicious of almost all the institutions that make up the liberal international order, including the European Union and NATO, which he sees as being obsolete. On this platform, there is a deep distrust between Trump and European leaders.

Mearsheimer then talks about the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, which not only did enormous damage to many peoples' lives, but also called into question the competence of the elites who manage the liberal international order.

In addition to the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West, there are worrying signs of potential conflict with China, which is determined to change the status quo regarding the East China Sea, the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the China-India border. Right now, the United States is more interested in containing China than integrating it into global structures. In fact, the Trump administration recently said that admitting China into the WTO was a mistake, as Beijing's protectionist policies clearly show that it is unwilling to play by that institution's rules.

Finally, the number of liberal democracies has been on the decline since 2006, reversing a trend that once looked unstoppable. It would seem that soft authoritarianism has become an attractive alternative to liberal democracy. Liberal democracy has lost some of its appeal in recent years, especially because the U.S. political system often looks dysfunctional. Even serious scholars worry about the future of American democracy. "In sum, the liberal international order is crumbling," notes Mearsheimer (John J. Mearsheimer, 2019, p. 28).

What went wrong? Mearsheimer posits that the liberal international order contained three fatal flaws. First is the fact that attempting such an ambitious social engineering project was doomed to failure from the outset. As the neo-realists assumed, the attempts to implement the project lead to the exact opposite results, primarily a retaliation from nationalists. The project was also hampered by changes in the balance of power politics. States that are against the attempts of the United States to force regime changes banded together. For example, Syria and Iran provided assistance to the enemies of the United States in Iraq, and Russia and China backed each other on a number of issues at the UN Security Council.

Second, the architects of the liberal order underestimated the desire of the peoples of individual states to justify their national identity and sovereignty. The liberal international order creates serious political problems regarding sovereignty and national identity within the liberal democracies themselves, all the more so when efforts to change a regime fail and lead to large-scale flows of refugees into liberal countries.

Third, hyper-globalization has produced significant economic and social costs for large numbers of people inside the liberal democracies, and this further undermines the liberal international order. Moreover, the open international economy helped fuel the rise of China, which, along with Russia's revival, ultimately led to shifts in the global balance of powers and undermined unipolarity, which is a condition for the creation of a liberal international order.

The attempts of the United States to advance democracy through military means led to it losing a number of wars. The United States has fought seven wars since the end of the Cold War, that is, it has been at war for two out of every three years during that period. However, these wars failed to achieve their goals.

U.S. politicians have never seriously considered invading China or Russia in the years following the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the United States was committed to turning China and Russia into liberal democracies and integrating them into the U.S.-dominated liberal world order. U.S. leaders have not only made their intentions clear, but they have also relied on nongovernmental organizations and various sophisticated strategies to push Beijing and Moscow towards becoming liberal democracies. Their aim is essentially to bring about peaceful regime change. Predictably, China and Russia have resisted the efforts of the unipolar world for the same reason that the Americans opposes Russia's intervention in U.S. politics.

Nationalism is the most powerful political ideology, and self-determination and sovereignty are of great importance to all countries. China and Russia resist the spread of the liberal order for realist reasons, as it would allow the United States to dominate the international system economically, militarily and politically. It is not surprising that China seeks to oust the U.S. military from the Western Pacific and that Russia has long been deeply opposed to EU and NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. According to Mearsheimer, moving these institutions closer to Russia eventually led to the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. Thus, nationalist and realist reasons forced the two major powers to challenge the efforts of the United States to create a robust liberal international order. However, we are also witnessing a push-back against the liberal international order within the liberal democracies themselves. This is due primarily to the fact that liberal countries delegate more and more authority to supranational institutions, which gives countries the impression that they are surrendering their sovereignty.

Mearsheimer references the work of Jeff Colgan and Robert Keohane here, who note that such activities “give people the sense that foreign forces are controlling their lives”. One of the reasons why the United Kingdom voted in favor of Brexit is because they thought that their country had surrendered too much authority to Brussels and had lost control over its own economy. Concerns about losing sovereignty have played an important role in the United States. Donald Trump ran for president under the slogan “America First”. In his campaign speeches, he harshly criticized all the key institutions that make up the liberal international order.

In terms of its values, liberalism is an individualistic ideology that attaches great importance to the concept of inalienable rights. This universalistic ideology is based on the idea that every individual on Earth has the same set of basic rights. This universalistic or transnational perspective stands in marked contrast to the profound particularism of nationalism, which is built on the belief that the world is divided into discrete nations, each with its own culture. Preserving that culture is best served by having one's own state, so that the nation can survive in the face of threats from the “other”. One example of this policy is the European Union's Schengen Agreement, which has largely eliminated borders among most of that institution's member states. Furthermore, the European Union is deeply committed to the principle of opening its doors to refugees fleeing problems at home.

According to Mearsheimer, modern hyper-globalization, which began gaining traction in the 1980s and accelerated after the Cold War, effectively overturned the Bretton Woods consensus, which meant moderate globalization worked well for four decades. The Bretton Woods consensus promoted an open international economy while at the same time protecting national markets. For example, there were serious restrictions on capital flows across state borders and governments were afforded significant opportunities to adopt protectionist measures in the interests of sovereign states.

The new order, created largely by Western policymakers, was designed to greatly reduce regulation of global markets by removing controls on capital flows and replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the World Trade Organization (WTO). In essence, Mearsheimer stresses, almost any kind of government interference in the workings of the world economy was considered harmful to the liberal international order.

Mearsheimer believes that hyper-globalization has caused a number of major economic problems that have worked to undermine the legitimacy of the liberal world order in the states that form the core of that system. An increasing number of people are left without work. The traditional economic base of numerous regions has been destroyed. The dynamism inherent in the world economy not only threatens jobs, but also fosters an acute sense of uncertainty about the future among people around the world. In addition, hyper-globalization has done little to raise the real income levels of the lower and middle classes in the liberal West.

These festering problems have led to widespread dissatisfaction with the liberal international order and growing sentiment for governments to adopt protectionist economic policies, which would undermine the present system. Trump capitalized on this hostility toward the existing order in the 2016 presidential campaign not only by railing against international institutions, but also by making the case for pursuing protectionist economic policies.

In addition, Mearsheimer notes, the ease with which capital flows across borders and the weakening of the regulatory role of national governments provokes large-scale economic crises. He is referring primarily to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. Mearsheimer predicts crises in the Eurozone and the weakening of the euro as the European Union made little progress in establishing a fiscal and political union.

Mearsheimer dedicates a separate section of his paper to the engagement of China in globalization processes.

Until D. Trump came to power in 2017, Western elites, in keeping with their policy of engaging, and not containing, China, were deeply committed to integrating China into the world economy, including all of its key economic institutions. They assumed that an increasingly prosperous and wealthy China would eventually become a liberal democracy and an upstanding member of the liberal international order. What the architects of that policy did not realize, however, is that by helping accelerate Chinese growth, they were actually helping undermine the liberal order, as China has rapidly grown into an economic powerhouse with significant military capability. In effect, they have helped China become a great power, thus undercutting unipolarity, which is essential for maintaining a liberal world order.

This problem has been compounded by the resurgence of Russia, which is once again a great power, although clearly a weak one economically. With the rise of China and Russia's comeback, the international system has become multipolar, which is a death knell for the liberal international order. Neither China nor Russia has become a liberal democracy. With or without China, the liberal international order was destined to fail, because it was fatally flawed at birth. Even if the international system had remained unipolar, the liberal world order would have devolved into an agnostic order under President Trump. In actual fact, D. Trump is seemingly bent on wrecking it.

Summing up his research, Mearsheimer concludes that the various causal processes described in his paper have all played an important role in subverting the liberal international order. Although each one has a distinct logic, they have often operated synergistically. For example, the negative effects of hyper-globalization on the lower and middle classes have combined with the nationalist resentment over immigration and the sense of lost sovereignty to fuel a strong populist backlash against the principles and practices of the liberal order. Indeed, that anger has often been directed at the liberal elites who have benefited from the order and who vigorously defend it. Because the unipolar period is over, argues Mearsheimer, "there is no chance of maintaining any kind of liberal international order for the foreseeable future" (John J. Mearsheimer, 2019, p. 40). Various types of realist orders will dominate the new multipolar world.

There are likely to be three different realist orders in the foreseeable future: a thin international order and two thick bounded orders — one led by China, the other by the United States. The emerging thin international order will be concerned mainly with overseeing arms control agreements, making the global economy work efficiently and climate change. The institutions that make up the international order will focus on facilitating interstate cooperation. In contrast, the two bounded orders will be concerned principally with waging security competition against each other. There will be significant economic and military competition between these two orders.

The relationship between the "thick bounded" orders led by the United States and China will resemble the bipolar world order of the Cold War period. Issues of arms control will also involve Russia. Washington, Beijing and Moscow will have to negotiate new treaties limiting their arsenals, as the superpowers did during the Cold War.

Nevertheless, the U.S.- and Chinese-led bounded orders will be largely responsible for dealing with core security matters. The international economic situation will differ significantly from the one that existed during the Cold War. Because the world economy will remain highly interdependent, the emerging international order will play a pivotal role in managing economic relations among countries across the globe. Mearsheimer predicts that the interweaving and interaction of international economic ties between the United States and China will continue. Nevertheless, China will seek to increase its economic power. In this regard, it will attempt to rewrite

the rules in the current economic institutions and will create new institutions that reflect its growing power.

As an example of China's actions to establish economic domination, Mearsheimer points to the "Made in China 2025" plan announced by Beijing in 2015. China's highly ambitious "One Belt, One Road" initiative, which was launched in 2013, is designed not just to help China sustain its impressive economic growth, but also to project Chinese military and political power around the globe. In this case, Mearsheimer argues, China's strategy is to give large government subsidies to state-owned companies and supplement their research with technology stolen from American and other Western companies. China is also using its growing economic power to coerce its neighbors in East Asia to side with Beijing. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which the United States refused to join, is the main financial instrument in the creation of China's thick bounded order.

The Trump administration's harsh economic policies toward China are just the start of what promises to be a long-running and intense rivalry between the U.S.- and Chinese-led orders. The United States is sure to try to limit the transfer of dual-use technologies to China.

In short, the rivalry between the China- and U.S.-led bounded orders will involve both full-throated economic and military competition, as was the case with the bipolar system. The difference this time is that the international order will be deeply involved in managing the cooperative aspects of the global economy, which was not the case during the Cold War.

As for Russia, Mearsheimer notes that it is certainly a great power and an important actor in the multipolar world, although it is weak compared to China and the United States. The key question regarding Russia is: Which side, if any, will it take in the U.S.-China rivalry?

Mearsheimer does not exclude the possibility of Russia switching to the side of the United States in the future. An increasingly powerful China is the greater threat to Russia, given their geographical proximity. In this case, Russia will be loosely integrated into the U.S.-led bounded order. If Moscow chooses Beijing, then Russia's integration into the China-led bounded order will also be insignificant. It is possible that Russia will try to avoid joining U.S. and Chinese projects and will attempt to create its own order on the basis of regional institutions under its influence.

As for Europe (the European Union), Mearsheimer assigns it a place in the U.S.-led thick bounded order. He is skeptical about the military might of the European Union in deterring China. However, he lauds its economic potential and scientific and technical infrastructure. The United States does not want Europe to sell its technologies, particularly dual-use technologies, to China. Europe is interested in the American military "umbrella" in its territory, and the United States could use this as a lever to encourage European countries to cooperate on the economic front against China.

Summing up, Mearsheimer urges, above all the ruling elites, to recognize that the liberal international order was a failed enterprise with no future and says they should resist any temptation to continue trying to forcefully spread democracy across the planet via regime change. Further, the United States should seek to maximize its influence in economic institutions. This is important for maintaining as favorable a position as possible in the evolving global distribution of power. It is imperative that the United States not allow China to dominate these institutions. Finally, U.S. politicians should endeavor to create a formidable bounded order that can contain Chinese expansion. This means that it is necessary to continue efforts to create a Trans-Pacific Partnership and a military alliance in Asia that is similar to NATO during the Cold War. The United States should go to great lengths to pull Russia out of China's orbit and integrate it into the U.S.-led order.

Thus, Mearsheimer concludes, the "overarching international order" that is taking shape will be based on

realist principles of managing the global economy and dealing with issues of arms control and global problems such as climate change. The American political scientist believes that the world became multipolar and realist in 2016 ((John J. Mearsheimer, 2019, p. 43).

When Mearsheimer equates the American order of the 1990s with a liberal order, he is talking primarily about its ideology. It does not even occur to him to extend the theme of the crisis of the liberal world order to ideological liberalism and liberalism as a state form of government.

Incidentally, if we take a scientifically balanced position, then, as a modern political project, liberalism does not really exist and was never fully realized. Nowhere was the liberal program envisioned by theorists "ever completely carried out". The liberal economist Ludwig von Mises stated as much in 1962: "Only with some exaggeration can one say that the world once lived through a liberal era" (Ludwig von Mises, 2001, p. 7). He further notes that, "In England the term 'liberal' is mostly used to signify a program that only in details differs from the totalitarianism of the socialists. In the United States 'liberal' means today a set of ideas and political postulates that in every regard are the opposite of all that liberalism meant to the preceding generations" (Ludwig von Mises, 2001, pp. 5, 7).

Classical liberalism, as defined by the well-known "night-watchman state" model, did not withstand the collision with the "rebel" masses and the "leviathan state" and left the political scene without so much as a "goodbye," giving way to the confrontation between "direct" and "representative" democracy. In both cases, they operate on similar concepts. And other the hierarchy of the "personality-society-(communitarian) state" triad makes it possible to establish significant differences between them in terms of the type of political regime.

At no point were the supporters of "direct" democracy able to bring the theoretical and alluring ideal model to its perfect incarnation. The concepts of the "communist", "third" and "fourth" paths have inevitably butted up against human weaknesses and shortcomings, typically devolving towards authoritarian despotism or violent totalitarianism.

As for the description of "representative" democracy, there is little to add following the laconic words of Winston Churchill, who noted that "democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time".

It would be enlightening to sit in on discussions between the "liberals," "socialists" and "conservatives" about who better observes the values of freedom, democracy, equality, human rights, patriotism and statehood. What those at the Yalta Conference (in which the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom were equally involved) gave to the world was a system of international regimes and institutions to disseminate and maintain universal democratic values. Seven decades later, they continue to be the benchmark of morality, ethics and behavior in the international space.

The conclusion drawn by Amitav Acharya that today's "rising powers" are not in a position to overturn the current order completely, and in fact may wish to preserve some elements of it in the near and medium term, is convincing. In this regard, Acharya defines the modern world as a "multiplex world" in which "elements of the liberal order survive, but are subsumed in a complex of multiple, crosscutting international orders." Acharya stresses that we are talking about a multiplex, rather than a multipolar, world and believes that the world today is more complicated than it was during the American-led liberal hegemonic order. Acharya notes that this "is a world of multiple modernities, where Western liberal modernity (and its preferred pathways to economic development and governance) is only a part of what is on offer. A multiplex world is like a multiplex cinema — one that gives its audience a choice of various movies, actors, directors, and plots all under the same roof. Trump

and Brexit have shown that there are serious variations and differences in the script of world order even within the West — not just between the West and the rest, as is commonly assumed. At the same time, a multiplex world is a world of interconnectedness and interdependence. It is not a singular global order, liberal or otherwise, but a complex of crosscutting, if not competing, international orders and globalisms.”

The contemporary world order is in an unstable state of transition that is fraught with global and regional conflicts. Following the disappearance of the bipolar system, which, like a hoop, connected regional spaces, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which played the role of sheriff in its own sphere of influence, a number of countries disintegrated (Yugoslavia, Libya, Iraq and Syria) and the regions that were formed under the Versailles and Yalta systems started to undergo a period of transformation.

Joseph Nye believes that, in the absence of international government, integrated regional organizations should take responsibility for and regulate the security of peoples, their wellbeing and prosperity and environmental protection under the auspices of the great powers.

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DoD Manipulates Media in the US Wars: From Information Warfare to Cyber Operation

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Media, as a source of information, plays a crucial role in opinion-making and perception building. In the wars the United States had waged, the media's role was to shape the images of war while propagating specific ideas to influence the people. As a result, the world perceived propagandistic messages that appeared to take the form of fake news. Comparing the Gulf War and the Iraq War, it is found that the US government and military have continuously strengthened the wartime news censorship system and used their official background as a media source to provide false information. With this insight, this paper attempts to comprehend the role of media propaganda which promoted the agenda of a media spectacle of the US military victory by transforming into a presentation of anarchy that destabilizes the rationale behind the invasion. It also provides an overview of the development of the Gulf War and Iraq War through the lens of the Herman Chomsky Propaganda model. This model elucidates the role of propaganda in manipulating the opinion of the U.S. people and how it was used to achieve economic, social, and political advantages.

Keywords: information warfare, propaganda, disinformation

Background

From World War I to present day international conflicts, media has played a large part in bringing information to the public, influencing their perceptions of wars that the United States plays a part in, and conducting propaganda and psychological warfare against the enemy, thus making a direct contribution to the war. U.S. television coverage during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War was often written, and sometimes produced, by the U.S. defense agencies. The Soviet Union was also a player in intelligence warfare during World War II and the Cold War, with Russia spreading disinformation in its conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 and 2014, respectively, including the use of "little green men" (armed men) to cover up the actions of the Russian military. The development of this state-influenced media is critical to gaining public support for state action. Even private Western media has an obligation to defend the country's economic and military interests, and the media can successfully provide public support for government actions against foreign enemies.

As the former US secretary of defense Jim Mattis says that U.S. is emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding (Jim Mattis, 2018). U.S. is facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international

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order—creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any U.S. has experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.

Catherine A. Theohary, specialist in National Security Policy, Cyber and Information Operations thinks that in terms of U.S. government bureaucracy, there are debates in the United States about where the IW center of gravity should be. During the Cold War, the epicenter in the U.S. government was the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency (Catherine A. Theohary, 2018, p. 2). Since 9/11, much of the current doctrine and capability resides with the military, leading some to posit that the epicenter should be the Pentagon. But others worry that the military should not be involved in the production of propaganda.

The U.S. Government is the “Gatekeeper” of the Mainstream Media in Wartime

Star Wars-era Misleading Propaganda

Space exploration served as another dramatic arena for Cold War competition. On March 23, 1983, former U.S. President Ronald Reagan gave a passionate televised speech on the television screen. He said: “Tonight...we are taking an important step... This is where we begin a program of defensive measures against the daunting Soviet missile threat... I call on the American scientific community to put them Our ingenuity turns to the cause of human and world peace: to create a way to render nuclear weapons useless... The effort we embark on tonight promises to change the course of human history.” In October of the same year, the US Department of Defense proposed a “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI) research program based on a new concept based on Reagan’s suggestion. American society at the time was showing an entertaining fictional feature film, “Star Wars”. Not only did the overwhelming media coverage feed the Kremlin half-truths and lies about the project, but also helped persuade the Soviets to spend tens of billions of dollars to counter the American effort to develop a space-based shield against nuclear attack proposed by former President Ronald Reagan. Besides the information originally intended for consumption in the Kremlin also seeped into closed briefings that helped persuade Congress to spend more money on strategic defense. The American public’s attention was captivated by the space race, and the various developments by the Soviet and U.S. space programs were heavily covered in the national media. This frenzy of interest was further encouraged by the new medium of television. Astronauts came to be seen as the ultimate American heroes, and earth-bound men and women seemed to enjoy living vicariously through them. Soviets, in turn, were pictured as the ultimate villains, with their massive, relentless efforts to surpass America and prove the power of the communist system.

However, a decade later, officials in the “Star Wars” project rigged a crucial 1984 test and faked other data in a program of deception that misled Congress as well as the intended target, the Soviet Union, four former Reagan Administration officials said. The test also deceived news organizations, which reported it widely. All would speak only on the condition that they not be named, and several was still holding sensitive military and intelligence posts. One military officer who described the deception program said it had overstepped its boundaries. “It wasn’t designed to deceive Congress,” he said, “It was used improperly.”

The deception program was also approved by Caspar W. Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense from 1981 to 1987. Mr. Weinberger said that Congress was not deceived and that deceiving one’s enemies is natural and necessary to any major military initiative. “You always work on deception,” he said in an interview from his home in Maine. “You’re always trying to practice deception. You are obviously trying to mislead your

opponents and to make sure that they don't know the actual facts."¹ The use of deception should be seen in the context of the cold war, when disinformation was a weapon used by both sides. It is undeniable that the propaganda of traditional media has an important influence on information warfare.

Disintegrated News Reports

There is considerable reason to believe that external and internal conflicts are an important driving force behind the tides of public opinion. In fact, internal and external conflict tend to have diametrically opposite effects on social dynamics. Ultimately, the dynamics of social forces affect the composition of public opinion (Lewis A. Coser, 1956, p. 32).

The Civil War established the framework that would characterize the media-military relationship to the present day. The two institutions have always shared a tense but symbiotic relationship. During times of war, the military depends on the media to defuse enemy propaganda, to serve as an information conduit to the people, and to rally domestic support (Phillip Knightley, 1975, p. 206; Joseph S. Nye Jr., 2003, pp. 60, 67). A war that lasts more than a few days requires the consent of the public, and that consent is not forthcoming without at least some favorable information on the war's progress.² Consequently, the military has sought to mold that coverage to serve its own ends, frequently relying on prepublication review of reporters' stories and restricting their access to the battlefield and politically damaging information.

Until the Mexican War that US officials censored journalists over reporting war information, and closed newspapers that officers claimed could undermine US operations, including the American-owned *Genius of Liberty*. The Gulf War saw the return of mandatory censorship through a review system. On 14 January 1991, days before US operations began, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued the Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules and Supplementary Guidelines, which banned disclosing several types of information from past wars, including future military operations/military plans; troop movements; statistics on critical war supplies (e.g., numbers of tanks and amounts of fuel); effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the enemy's camouflage, cover, deception, targeting, direct and indirect fire, intelligence collection, or security measures; aerial photos/views of sites of military importance (e.g., fixed military installations), troop locations, and the number/size of troops. Correspondents had to submit all articles, video, and photos to the DOD's public affairs officers who checked for security information the Operation Desert Shield Ground Rules and Supplementary Guidelines listed, including rules against reporting intelligence collection activities and rules of engagement (Matthew Jacobs, 1992, pp. 686-687). If correspondents objected to any censorship by public affairs officers, it could take days for final decisions, which technically belonged to correspondents' respective news organizations.

In another restriction of media coverage, the military used a media pool system in which a select number of US journalists embedded with military units had to share their articles, photos, and videos with other news organizations. When US operations began, the military had placed about 14 per cent (192/1,400) of available

¹ See "Interview with Caspar Weinberger" on the series programs "War and Peace in the Nuclear Age", Dec 11, 1987, available online at: https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_68874174EEBB4E4396FFD194DF0EE934.

² Arthur Lubow, *Read Some About It*, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar 18, 1991, at 23, 25. The Department of Defense acknowledged its dependence on the media in the ground rules issued to embeds in the War in Iraq, stating: Media coverage of any future operation will, to a large extent, shape public perception of the national security environment now and in the years ahead. This holds true for the U.S. public: the public in allied countries whose opinion can affect the durability of our coalition; and publics in countries where we conduct operations, whose perceptions of us can affect the cost and duration of our involvement. P. 402 app. (citing Dep't of Def. Public Affairs Guidance on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Commands Area of Responsibility para. 2.A (2003), available online at: <http://www.dod.mil/Unews/Feb2003/d20030228 pag.pdf>.

journalists (including reporters, TV cameramen, and technicians) into the pool system, and throughout the war even detained such journalists as the New York Times' Chris Hedges for avoiding the pool system and covering events at their own risk. There were many times the military blocked journalists from covering events, including nearly all of the war's thousands of air missions (the military allowed no journalists with pilots).

Similar to rules in World War I and the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War had rules against reporting special operations forces' methods, unique equipment, or tactics and information on intelligence collection activities (including targets, methods, and results). Although journalists were allowed to accompany the army and the media to report comprehensively on the war, their real purpose was to make better use of the media and control public opinion. Following rules set in the Vietnam War, "no questions about American and British casualties, no questions about ongoing military operations, and no questions about the next battle plan". The military further banned discussion of details of missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or under way, names of operations in progress, size of friendly/coalition forces involved in operations in progress, location of mission aircraft points of origin, and rules of engagement. The Persian Gulf War's new rules were ones banning release of information on the operational or support vulnerabilities of US and coalition forces; specific operating methods and tactics (e.g., air angles of attack or speeds, naval tactics, and evasive manoeuvres); level of security at military installations or encampments; and photos/video showing the level of security at military installations or encampments. Every rule in the Persian Gulf War protected the US military or allies.

The Times Poll in 1993 showed that 88% of the American public said that the news media, overall, did a "good" job, only 17% said the media did a "very good" job-down from 30% in a 1985 Times poll; 11% said they did a "bad" job-up from the 4% "bad" rating the media received in 1985 (David Shaw, 1993). However, Gallup and Knight's Trust, Media and Democracy studies had found in its recent poll that Americans' trust in the news media has fallen significantly over the past 20 years: a majority of Americans currently see "a great deal" (46%) or "a fair amount" (37%) of political bias in news coverage.



Figure 1 Views on the Role of News Media (2017-2019)

Source: Gallup Research Center

Overall, it can be seen from the conclusions that public confidence in and respect for the news media are seriously eroding.

The U.S. government adopted a policy different from that of the 1991 Gulf War when it came to reporting on military operations in Iraq, and while ostensibly few changes to journalists' coverage, the policy on media censorship was actually stricter. The military agreed to let 600 journalists join selected U.S. troops, eat, live, travel with soldiers in their units, and conduct interviews and reports in designated units, that was, embedded news reporting. The Media at War in Iraq, through its sheer breadth of interviews, had established itself as the definitive account, not of the fighting, but the coverage of the fighting. Embedded successfully mobilized the public to support the government's action to overthrow Saddam Hussein's government through reports by military reporters, and to calm domestic and international public opinion's opposition and doubts about the war. The U.S. military made it clear that they were not responsible for the fate of freelance journalists who did not join the U.S. military or one of its allies (Daoud Kuttub, 2007, pp. 879-891). This showed that the US government did not want non-embedded media to report, because such reporting was not under their control. In order to ensure that journalists participating in this operation were under the control of the military, the US Department of Defense released a 13-page special document on this issue, including guidance document of 7 parts and 97 paragraphs on purpose, policy, procedure, basic rules, immunization and personal protective equipment, safety, etc. Although the document claimed that the military recognizes that the news media had the right to report on military operations, the military had no intention of preventing the media from publishing negative and embarrassing reports, and asked the relevant troops to give priority to the use of transportation, communication facilities, etc. But overall, there were more concrete restrictions than vague promises. For example, the document stipulated that during operations into Iraq, "information about ongoing combat shall not be released unless approved by the field commander", "relevant to previous military operations and the results of these actions could only be described in general, general language, otherwise they would not be published". The document also stipulated that, at the beginning of the war, special attention should be paid in reporting to ensure maximum abruptness of action, journalists accompanying the military could broadcast live from airfields, battleships or land only when the first attacking unit had returned safely, or with the approval of the unit commander.

In the section marked "Basic Rules", the document listed 14 categories of information that could be published and 19 categories of information that could not be published. Prohibited information included: specific numbers of troops, warplanes, warships, photographs that may reveal the level of security, information about enemy camouflage, concealment, deception, and direct or indirect firepower, intelligence gathering or the effectiveness of security measures, etc. News organizations were prohibited from disclosing information about downed planes or ships in the course of planning or conducting search or rescue operations for downed planes or missing ships. The Pentagon's rules also prevented journalists from using their own transport, so that most of the press would get to see only what the military high command wanted them to see. There would be no safety guarantees for correspondents who took a chance on going it alone. On the contrary, they were being specifically warned that using their satellite phones could make them targets for unfriendly missile fire. The U.S. military also required journalists participating in military reports and their news organizations to sign very harsh life and death documents with the government, expressly stating that in the event of personal or property accidental injury or loss the right to sue the government. The document also stipulated that journalists should agree to abide by the basic rules and sign before participating in reporting with the army. Anyone who violated

these regulations would be immediately stopped from reporting with the army and would be removed.

In a February 18 interview on the US Public Broadcasting Service, Bryan Whitman, deputy assistant secretary of defense for media operations, disclosed some of the motivation behind the new system. He spoke of the “beauty of embedding” from the Pentagon’s point of view. “We want to be able to protect that information that is going to determine the success of an operation, and we don’t want any reporting that’s going to unnecessarily jeopardize those individuals that are executing that mission.... I also have never met a journalist, particularly one that’s traveling with that unit, that would have any interest in compromising the mission of the unit.” (Henry Michaels, 2003).

The policy is detailed in a Pentagon document called Annex Foxtrot. Much of the news information comes from briefings organized by the military. Only selected journalists were allowed to visit the front lines or interview soldiers. These visits always took place in the presence of officers and require prior approval and review by the military. This policy, heavily influenced by the military’s experience in the Vietnam War, was ostensibly designed to protect sensitive information from being leaked to Iraq, but it restricted not only information in the Middle East, but also what the media could say about the war.

Many reporters found such conflict unavoidable; in one survey, many said that the only way to get access to real information in a timely fashion was to operate outside of the Pentagon-imposed restrictions, thereby exposing themselves to official sanctions.³

According to the Los Angeles Times, the Pentagon contracted a small Washington company called The Lincoln Group to help translate and tell the story. Iraqi employees of the Lincoln Group or its subcontractors sometimes disguised themselves as freelance journalists or advertisers when reporting to Baghdad media (Mark Mazzetti & Borzou Daragahi, 2005). Articles written by the U.S. military’s “Information Operations” unit were translated into Arabic and published in Baghdad newspapers with their help. “Many articles one-sidedly touted the work of the U.S. and Iraqi forces, condemned insurgents and touted U.S.-led efforts to rebuild the country”. One investigation made by New York Times found that senior Pentagon officials met with news analysts who gave them “special information” and then tried to persuade them to speak positively about the Iraq war (David Barstow, 2008). The discovery was based on 8,000 pages of confidential information disclosed to New York Times through a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act. The article said that senior Pentagon officials will invite news analysts to secret meetings and urge analysts to positively evaluate the war. Typically, the United States provides classified information to news analysts. This was designed to obscure any links to the U.S. military (Mark Mazzetti & Borzou Daragahi, 2005).

Seventy-two percent of Americans interviewed in a CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted Saturday and Sunday favored the war against Iraq, while 25% were opposed. Roughly the same number approved of the job President George W. Bush did. President George W. Bush’s job approval rating was now at 71%. This represented a jump of 13 points from last weekend — an expected “rally effect” increase that usually accompanied U.S. involvement in war or a situation in which Americans were in harm’s way on foreign shores.

³ Gannett Foundation, *supra* note 24, at 32 (“Four-fifths went outside established channels to find information, while two-thirds (68 percent) said that they knew journalists who violated the guidelines.... Most said that the only way to get access to any real information in a timely fashion..., was to operate outside the [Pentagon’s Joint Information Bureau].”)




Figure 2 George W. Bush's Job Approval Rating (March 22-23, 2003)

Source: Gallup Research Cent

According to Colin Sparks, the Propaganda model acknowledges the existence of tactical arguments; it is, of course, developed to accommodate some heterogeneity, but it positions unity as the media's normal state (Collin Sparks, 2007, pp. 68-84). Its biased role towards corporate governance referred to Iraq as a threat and linked it to the September 11 attacks. The invasion of Iraq was explained to the US public by a complex propaganda campaign that followed a think tank's idea for a new foreign policy. Conversely, US media outlets failed to perform their watchdog role, failing to address and investigate the claims of the US military that they were victims of violence. A variety of media outlets fervently believed Bush's claims, and irrational beliefs, such as the assumption that Iraq had WMDs, were prevalent that caused significant damage to the credibility of the news source.

In addition, during the Iraq War, the US military continuously released "smoke screens" to exaggerate its own record and deceive the enemy, so as to cause the enemy to act wrongly. Afterwards, a lot of news was confirmed to be false, and the military's approach also aroused strong criticism and protests from the media. For example, the day after the war started, the Associated Press reported the surrender of all 8,000 soldiers of the Iraqi 51st Division. In this report, there was an authoritative source — Pentagon officials with specific time, place and background. Therefore, reliability is high. However, the Iraqi spokesman denied the news the next day, saying that the 51st Division was still fighting with the U.S. military. Subsequently, the division commander appeared on Iraqi TV and fully refuted the U.S. lie. Throughout the news dissemination of the war, the principle of authenticity of news was severely violated.

The media do not stop to ponder the bias that is inherent in the priority assigned to government-supplied raw material, or the possibility that the government might be manipulating the news, imposing its own agenda, and deliberately diverting attention from other material. One structural relationship of importance is the media companies' dependence on and ties with government. The political ties of the media have been impressive.

Mark Fishman calls this "the principle of bureaucratic affinity: only other bureaucracies can satisfy the input needs of a news bureaucracy" (Mark Fishman, 1980, p. 143). Government and corporate sources also have the great merit of being recognizable and credible by their status and prestige. This is important to the

mass media. As Fishman notes, newswriters are predisposed to treat bureaucratic accounts as factual because news personnel participate in upholding a normative order of authorized knowers in the society. Reporters operate with the attitude that officials ought to know what it is their job to know. In particular, a newswriter will recognize an official's claim to knowledge merely as a claim, but as a credible, competent piece of knowledge. This amounts to a moral division of labor: officials have and give the facts; reporters merely get them (Mark Fishman, 1980, pp. 144-145).

Another reason for the heavy weight given to official sources is that the mass media claim to be "Objective" dispensers of the news. Partly to maintain the image of objectivity, but also to protect themselves from criticisms of bias and the threat of libel suits, they need material that can be portrayed as presumptively accurate (Gaye Tuchman, 1972, pp. 662-664). Editorial distortion is aggravated by the news media's dependence upon private and governmental news sources. If a given newspaper, television station, magazine, etc., incurs disfavor from the sources, it is subtly excluded from access to information. To minimize such financial danger, news media businesses editorially distort their reporting to favor government and corporate policies in order to stay in business (Edward S. Herman & Noam Chomsky, 2010, pp. 10-40).

The relationship between the US media and the government's military has not always been harmonious. Once these reports contradict the government's decision-making, the government will be in an embarrassing situation. The White House and the Pentagon had successively criticized the American media's coverage of the confrontation between the United States and Iraq. Former presidential press secretary Ari Fleisher once had a confrontation with the media, criticizing report was like "a floorball game"⁴. On March 29, 2003, the "*Washington Times*" said that some officials revealed that Bush was disappointed in the press in private, and even accused the press of being "stupid".⁵ Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld also publicly charged American journalists from "highs to lows to highs and back again" for "immature reporting" of military news.⁶ However, the American news media has always claimed that it is the "fourth level" independent of the government, that it is the monitor of the government and the defender of the public interest. The media also want to influence the government's agenda through their reporting, so they often disagree with the government on some issues. This is why the U.S. government strictly controls the media during wartime.

Weaponized Social Media

The transmission of information has become ubiquitous. Unlike traditional media, social media improves reach, frequency, permanence and immediacy. Social media allows the interactive communication between people without spatial limits or time constraints and offer the opportunity to transfer the content of any messages under any form (vocal, visual, written) to anyone on the planet. Social media has become an amplifier of ideas, a creator of meaning and a generator of conflicts as well (Jean-Marc Rickli & Anja Kaspersen, 2016). Social media is the current vector of choice. New developments in technology such as advanced machine intelligence and learning will make these issues even more salient in the future.

⁴ See Press Secretary Briefings by Ari Fleischer, Mar. 28, 2003, available online at: <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030328-4.html>.

⁵ "Press Corps Writes off Complaints by White House", *The Washington Times*, Mar 29, 2003.

⁶ See Pentagon Press Briefing, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld gave details of Saddam Hussein's death squads, Mar 28, 2003, available online at: <https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0303/S00477/dod-detail-war-progress-death-squad-atrocities.htm>.

Social Media’s Role in Government

The battle of narratives has become the bedrock of international politics, and social media a powerful tool to fight this battle. The unique characteristic of social media is that it empowers and enables individuals to engage in ways unseen before. Propaganda or so-called “psy-ops” is not a new phenomenon in warfare to shape opinions and influence outcomes. The development of information and communication technologies provides new opportunities for state actors to use non-traditional warfare to achieve their goals. Warfare in the information domain has become an integral part of modern military operations, with social media platforms playing an increasing role in organization, mobilization, dissemination and intelligence. With the continuous development of social media, the use of social media to amplify fake news has become a new trend in current information warfare and public opinion warfare.

Roughly one-quarter of U.S. adults now use Twitter, and the site has become a space where users get news, discuss topics like sports, engage in personal communication or hear from elected officials. Pew Research Center conducted an in-depth survey of U.S. adults who use Twitter last year which found that Twitter users reported a mix of both positive and negative experiences on the site. For instance, 46% of these users said the site had increased their understanding of current events in the last year, and 30% said it had made them feel more politically engaged.




Figure 3 The Most Important Reason Why Using Twitter




Figure 4 Twitter Users 50 and Older Are More Likely to be Active

Source: PEW Research Center

It is critical for DoD to understand the extent to which both governments and nonstate actors use social media to influence public opinion, as well as their success in doing so (William Marcellino, Meagan L. Smith, Christopher Paul, Lauren Skrabala, 2017). Monitoring social media networks and the progress of changing sentiments gives military planners an opportunity to better understand how and where these actors are working to influence public opinion. These data can then inform efforts to counter their campaigns. According to reports, the Pentagon had planned to use social networking sites to counter threats such as cyberterrorism to determine where a major event like the Arab Spring might take place next. The U.S. Department of Defense had provided \$42 million in research to monitor social networks to track the formation, development and spread of ideas, and to identify misinformation and attempts to incite unrest. The program was originally implemented in 2011 by DARPA, which DARPA calls the strategic communication of social media, to develop media tools to identify misinformation and implement deceptive tactics. As of 2015, the project has spent a total of \$50 million and has published more than 200 papers. These articles analyze the cognitive impact of social media on the public in terms of coordinated filtering algorithms, complementary cumulative distribution functions, egocentric networks, emotional cognition, and retweet probability models. These articles analyzed the cognitive impact of social media on the public in terms of coordinated filtering algorithms, complementary cumulative distribution functions, egocentric networks, emotional cognition, and retweeted probability models. With its openness and strong communication ability, social media has inherent advantages in guiding and manipulating public opinions, interests, emotions and psychological states, which enables it to directly attack the public's spiritual and psychological targets and reveal their values. As former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advocated in her speech on "Internet freedom", the Internet should become an important tool for the US government to promote ideological infiltration overseas for a long time. Compared with the one-way nature of traditional media, social media, with its interactivity and timeliness, delivers carefully selected information to a large number of users, including military personnel, and subtly illuminates the psychology of the target audience. Disseminating values, exporting ideology, fabricating false information, setting issues, and inciting public opinion through social media to the "key audiences" in target countries have also become the usual tactics of some countries. Its purpose is to exert influence on a specific target group, shake or change its inherent cognition, and facilitate its external cognitive manipulation.

The US Department of Defense has also set up the Advanced Research Projects Agency, which aims to study the user activities of social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook, in order to control social emotions by manipulating information. According to media reports, the Pentagon not only monitors the comments of users of social networking sites on their accounts through the above-mentioned research projects, but also grasps their specific reactions to certain specific events.

Social media sites like Twitter and Facebook employ an algorithm to analyze words, phrases, or hashtags to create a list of topics sorted in order of popularity. This "trend list" is a quick way to review the most discussed topics at a given time. According to a 2011 study on social media, a trending topic "will capture the attention of a large audience for a short time" and thus "contributes to agenda setting mechanisms" (Sitaram Asur, Bernardo A. Huberman, Gabor Szabo, & Chunyan Wang, 2011). Using existing online networks in conjunction with automatic "bot" accounts, foreign agents can insert propaganda into a social media platform, create a trend, and rapidly disseminate a message faster and cheaper than through any other medium. Social media facilitates the spread of a narrative outside a particular social cluster of true believers by commanding the trend. It hinges on four factors: (1) a message that fits an existing, even if obscure, narrative; (2) a group of

true believers predisposed to the message; (3) a relatively small team of agents or cyber warriors; and (4) a network of automated “bot” accounts (Jarred Prier, 2017). Twitter trends can spread information to a broad group of people outside of a person’s typical social network. Additionally, malicious actors can exploit trends to spread information across multiple platforms using multiple media formats, with the ultimate goal of gaining mainstream media coverage. Mastering trends is a powerful method of disseminating information, in the process of issue production and promotion, a closed loop of polyphonic communication is formed among government departments, Internet companies, think tanks and the media, brainwashing specific values through different channels and forms, and through the “meme” algorithm pushing to form a dominant frame with considerable traffic, so as to completely squeeze the expression space of “different” sounds. According to an article in the Guardian, “you can take an existing trending topic, such as fake news, and then weaponise it. You can turn it against the very media that uncovered it.” (Carole Cadwalladr, 2017).

The Pentagon’s strategic communications plan has penetrated social networking sites, a new step in its media campaign. DARPA is working on tools to help the U.S. government monitor information against U.S. interests. According to the researchers who have been exposed to the above-mentioned research projects, everyone on the Internet is seen as a potential factor that may spread information, so their job is to find the right person at a particular moment in order to spread information that is beneficial to the interests of the United States. The Pentagon has been running virtual intelligence programs in recent years to predict public reactions to its propaganda campaigns and to discredit and discredit activists, politicians and media personalities who point to them.

Conclusion

Every armed conflict has brawled on two fronts: on the battlefield and in the populace’s minds via propaganda. Both good and bad media persons are frequently guilty of misleading and publishing false news to their constituents through falsifications, stereotypes, misunderstanding, and even manipulation to garner support and a sense of legitimacy. US media benefits US administration in its wars for an extended foreign policy agenda, and in reciprocity, get benefits for media houses businesses. Thus, US media reporting has evolved into a combination of deception, falsification, and manipulation. It is concluded that whether during times of war or not, media behaviour and practices are referred to as propaganda.

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Realism Guided by Idealism — Foreign Strategy from the Perspective of American Official Discourse

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Since the founding of the United States, American diplomacy has reflected a complex interweaving of ideological considerations, moral overtones, realistic interests, and power politics, that is, a complex interweaving of “idealism” and “realism”. Formulating U.S. diplomatic strategy has always sought a balance between “idealism” and “realism”. With the development of the world today, the development of science and technology has become increasingly important. In the Internet era, the U.S. information technology strategy has been continuously increased and followed up with the continuous development of the world's science and technology, striving to always maintain the leading position of information technology in the world. The U.S. informatization strategy is advanced, and its advancement comes from the support and protection of information technology and industry by the government and various parties in society. Innovation can be promoted only with support and protection, thus bringing strong impetus to the economic and social development of the whole country. Starting from the literature, this paper clarifies the historical origin and theoretical development of U.S. foreign policy and outlines the “idealism” and “realism” in U.S. diplomacy based on the current hot “metaverse”. This paper also discusses the evolution and contrast of “idealism” and “realism” in U.S. history in chronological order, and how they have influenced current developments.

Keywords: idealism and realism, Wilsonianism, metaverse

Introduction

The idealism and realism in international relations are the two important genres of the theory of international relations. The two are different in terms of theoretical origin and main point of view. The idealism of idealism pursues the noble principles and goals (James Germany, Dai Yuan, 2003). Its core idea is based on the principles of moral standards and legal norms as the principles of international relations, and advocate international morality and treaties to standardize order, open diplomatic and collective security systems. Realism is based on the power and politics of the world's anarchic state as the theoretical core and believes that all countries tend to maximize power or security.

Idealism

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The idealism of modern international relations can also be called progressive theory or jurisprudence. Its origin can be traced back to the 13th century. The typical representative is French diplomat and lawyer Pierre Dubois and Italian thinker and poet Algeli Dante. Based on inheritance and development of these ideas, the more systematic rationalism was born after the First World War. This is also the first wave of international relations theory activities, that is, to observe and handle international relations and deal with international relations and processing international relations and processing international relations (James Doliti, 2003). The trend of foreign policy. In fact, the term “idealism” is not that these authors have always used their title to describe their title, but the title of their critics using them" The most famous representative of the United States President Wilson.

The idealism is based on the assumptions of human nature. Insufficient or defects but can also be improved and improved. It is believed that the occurrence of wars and conflicts between the country is just caused by the morality and conscience of some people. The power to save the world is morality. Misunderstanding, the human world can return to a state of harmony and peace. The idealist scholar believes that the environment can determine behavior. By changing the international community environment, establishing international behavior norms and international organizations, national behavior is constrained, thereby avoiding conflicts and war.

It can be seen that the core idea of idealism pursuing the noble principles and goals is based on the principles of moral standards and legal norms as the principle of international relations. Essence Proposal disclosure of diplomatic, collective security, freedom and peace, righteousness and justice, trade equality, etc. (Wang Yizhou, 1998). It is believed that “peace and justice, international laws and international organizations should also be a goal and architecture pursued by the international community’s family”. It is believed that the “moral principles” and “loyalty principles” have the function of reviving the world order. Emphasizing the moral power of the maintenance of the world must be maintained by the people of the people. Based on explaining the history and reality of international relations, the idealist actively researches and demonstrates what the future international community should be like and how to run, and try to propose to seek to avoid war, maintain peace, and solve international contradictions and conflicts (Ulrviotti, Markv Kauppi I., 1999).

Realism

Realist thoughts can be traced back to Kuoshid and later political philosophers such as Machiavili, Hegel, and they are regarded as the founders of realism (James Dalti, 2003). However, the theory of international relations realism became a theoretical wave, and appeared before and after the Second World War, and became the mainstream view of international politics in the 20th century international relations theory and practice. Those who have been tested in the theory of realism and the core assumptions of the long -tested basic ideas and core assumptions are reserved, while the heirs of realism continue to make new interpretations and amendments under the new situation and international background (E. H. Carl, 2005).

Realism is in development and changes from beginning to end, and briefly summarizes the most basic views in this theoretical group here. Although there are different branches within realism, the basic views between realist theorists are also argued, but one thing is that the theoretical core that reflects its basic views consists of its basic assumptions or propositions, and they “What is concerned about the following two fundamental issues: (1) How to explain the general reasons and specific reasons for the actions taken by the country for survival? (2) How to explain the motivation of the changes in the international system?” In addition,

these theorists are accustomed Assume that as the foundation or logic point of its theoretical and adhere to the common theoretical core (Bai Yunkai, Li Kaisheng, 2009).

First, in terms of basic assumptions, realism theory all agrees with the international community in an anarchy, and as the logical starting point of its theory. Realist believes that the international community is in the state of anarchy, that is to say, the international community runs in a system that does not dominate everything or the world government. Therefore, Similar to the relationship between people in the natural state, each country can only survive in self-protection based on its own strength.

Second, identifying the national center theory, believes that the state is essentially a rational behavior of decision-making based on national interests, which constitutes a physical actions of international political behavior: the country is a rational, main and unified behavior in the state of no government (Daniel Burstine, 1987).

Third, adhere to the philosophical position of pessimistic human nature, that is, it is believed that human nature is evil, and from this, it is believed that the essence of international politics is conflict. It is believed that international politics is the stage for national struggles.

Fourth, use rights and political theory as the core of theory, emphasizing national strength and national interests. It is believed that the country has the tendency to maximize power or security, and power conflict is the core of all conflicts, and there is no unified authority in the international community to provide security guarantees. Countries must rely on their own strength to safeguard their own interests.

Therefore, realist people attach great importance to national strength and the role of force. It is believed that international political acts — the country is divided into countries due to differences in strength. The most important thing in the international community is a strong country, and the key to the structure of the international system depends on the interrelationship between the big nations and the strong country, and the country (George Vocke Bush, 2003). The average momentum mechanism is an important aspect of understanding international politics.

Comparison of Idealism and Realism

The opposite side of the idealism and realism is mainly reflected in the diplomatic concept, which is maximized in the foreign policy, means, and behavior. In the philosophical position, the idealist is adhering to the basic assumptions that human nature is kind or can be better through education and the environment, and realists start from the cruelty brought by the war between the country, especially the war. The philosophical position that is evil and cannot be changed. The two looks at the world from their different philosophical stances and international relations, and from this to the logical starting point to interpret different international relations.

The idealism of US diplomacy attaches great importance to values and moral effects, is used to holding the banner of democracy, freedom, and human rights, advocating international mechanisms such as international law, international organizations, and international arbitration, and believes that this is the most effective way to resolve disputes and maintain world peace.

It advocates cooperation and coordination and establish fair international relations, and pursue world peace and stability, which has caused the gorgeous connotation such as morality and benevolence in American diplomacy, acting in accordance with international law, international cooperation and coordination (Strobetalbott, 1996). The realism in US diplomatic practice focuses on national strength and national interests

and rights, and pursue the power of power in the international system and the maximization of their own interests and the advantages of political power. If it does not play a role, propose that power and politics is the law of international life. This adds main connotations such as power politics, hegemonism, strength diplomacy, and political non-morality to US diplomacy. The contradiction between the consideration of realistic interests and ideological considerations, curbing the choice between strategic and cooperative strategies is also a refraction between realism and idealism.

In a macro level, idealistic diplomacy is to promote American values, political systems, and social systems, and establish a world empire led by the United States based on American moral ideals, values, and democratic models. Realist diplomacy is to ensure the national security of the United States and maximize economic interests and political power. The former is relatively abstract, the latter is reality and specific, while the two promote each other, and together constitute the national interests and strategic goals of the United States.

At the specific level, it is mainly reflected in the means or methods of US diplomacy. In order to achieve US national interests and established strategic goals, whether it is the presidents such as Jefferson, Wilson, Nixon, or the presidents such as Clinton, Bush, Obama at the same time, cooperate with each other, and different places are only focused on their strength and pattern changes. Generally speaking, the idealist diplomacy of the United States provides a very gorgeous moral coat for its realist means, while realist diplomacy provides a strong backing and foundation for the realization of idealist diplomatic goals.

In daily diplomatic activities, there is no more pragmatic than the United States, but in the pursuit of its historical traditions, there is no country that is more idealistic than the United States. “Just as in the United States for more than a decade, under the name counterterrorism”, as “leaders of counter-terrorism business” to implement power politics, with “democracy”, “human rights” or “humanitarianism” as the banner, one hand holds The Bible, holding the other hand with a grab, creating a color revolution everywhere, interference in other domestic affairs and even subverting the regime of other countries.

In the field of economy and trade, the United States often conducts anti-trade barriers and anti-dumping of anti-trade barriers on the grounds of the rules of other countries that do not comply with the WTO organizations (Henry Kissinger, 1998). Wait for sanctions, and you often make technical barriers or carry out trade protection with security as an excuse. The saying and practices in the United States are essentially the name, order, and values that the moral rules, order and values that idealism are idealism. Different diplomatic actions are adopted.

From the Monroe Doctrine to the Wilsonian Doctrine

The Early Days of the Founding of the United States: The Germination of Ideals and the Plight of Reality

In 1630, Winthrop, a British colonist, made such a declaration when he landed in the Massachusetts Bay Colony in North America, “We will be the city on the hill of the whole world, and the eyes of the people of the whole world will be on us. If we deceived God in the pursuit of this cause, if God stopped helping us as he does today, then we would be the laughingstock of the world.” As the historian Boursestine commented: “No one has done anything like Wen Throp, expressing the sense of American destiny so precisely, set the tone of American history.” (Daniel Boorstin, 1987). This is also the germ of American idealism.

Felix Gilbert once wrote: “America’s foreign policy has oscillated between idealism and realism, and her great historical moments have occurred when the two combined.” (Frederick W. Marks, 1978). So we also need

to look at the reality.

After the United States became independent, because of its weak military power, the policy of “isolation” became the mainstream, and “reducing diplomatic activities, avoiding entanglement, and non-alignment” became the focus of the United States’ foreign strategy.

Just like one of the six principles of Hans Morgenthau’s political realism — “power defines interests”, in reality the United States is under the control of the will and actions of other countries. The disadvantage of strength makes it impossible for the United States to adopt a tough posture in its diplomatic strategy, and it is often in a passive position.

At this time, the United States needs a new ideal to guide the direction. In response to this dilemma, Presidents Jefferson and Madison stepped onto the stage of history. In his inaugural speech, Jefferson reiterated the unique idealism formed in the historical environment of the United States: “America is the hope of the world, and the success of this democratic experimental field in the United States will herald the future success of democracy throughout the world.” (Edited by Philip Foner, 1963). He linked the autonomy of the United States with the future of mankind, and formulated a realistic foreign strategy based on this — to ensure the strength of the United States through expansionism. It successfully acquired the Louisiana area and began to seek maritime power.

The Monroe Doctrine: The Change of Diplomatic Focus and the Development of Idealism Under Realistic Conditions

But, as historian Brad Perkins puts it, “Jefferson and Madison were diplomatically bungling and humiliating the nation.” (Warren I. Cohen, 2004). The United States was dragged into the vortex of the European war. Facing Britain’s plundering at sea, Jefferson and Madison were superstitious about commercial strategies to defeat the enemy, but they could not avoid the loss of the United States after all. Trade issues have sparked wars.

After the war, the actual conditions in the United States changed:

- 1) The rise of national industries brought about by the industrial revolution increased the importance of the inland market.
- 2) European and American countries have strengthened their penetration into Latin America, threatening the interests of the United States.

The victory of the war also developed the idealism of the United States. It proved that the United States has sufficient military strength to maintain its own security. Nationalism is at an all-time high, and they have strengthened their ideals. Henry Adams commented: “In 1815, for the first time, Americans no longer doubted the way they were going.” (Henry Adams, 2004).

These influences culminated in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. In order to protect the expansion interests of the United States in the Americas and prevent European and American countries from infiltrating the Americas. Monroe and Adams revisited “independence” and “freedom” in American idealism. In his address to Congress, Monroe said: “The American continent, with the conditions of freedom and independence it has assumed and maintained, should not be dominated by any European powers in the future.” It should be regarded as the object of future colonization. Under this ideal, the United States has formulated a series of realistic policy systems for Latin America, which are based on the “principle of the American system”, “principle of mutual non-interference”, and “principle of non-colonization”. It distinguished the image of “protector” of the

Americas from the image of “dictator” of Europe, and declared the diplomatic independence of the Americas. The Monroe Doctrine largely laid the foundation for the United States’ subsequent diplomatic strategy, “gradually becoming a tool for the expansion and defense of the Western Hemisphere.” (Warren I. Cohen, 2004).

From a realistic perspective, Wang Wei and Dai Chaowu wrote: “The proposal of the Monroe Doctrine not only shows the reality of the international pattern that the American system is separated from the European system, but also promotes the historic shock and split of the pattern and structure of international relations. Therefore, it has great world-historical significance.... Thus, these principles laid the ‘theoretical’ basis and strategic guidelines for the United States to rule the Americas in the future.” (Wang Wei, 2007).

From an ideal perspective, as the scholar Ammon said: “The United States has reached a place so far away from 1776, and has finally formed its own national identity.” (Ammon, 1990).

Scholar Mark Gilderhurst argues: “The Monroe Doctrine, enunciated in Congress in 1823, established a rhetorical style that was associated years later with similar statements during and after the Cold War. Often in the spirit of idealism and high principle Expressed in language, this affirmation of the President’s purpose is often aimed at advancing the human cause, or at least a large part of it, by upholding the values of liberty, democracy, and peace. This language sometimes obscures the relevance of defending strategic and economic interests The less noble ends of these actions, and usually involve some kind of threat of countermeasures if other countries go beyond what the United States deems appropriate.” (Gilderhus M. T., 2006). This should also prove that idealism and realism are inseparable in the US diplomatic strategy.

Roosevelt’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine: The Vision and Interest Expansion of an “International Police”

Under the protection of the Monroe Doctrine, the industrialization, urbanization and frontier development of the United States are proceeding smoothly, and the United States has gradually become a developed country in the world, and as Kissinger said: “Once the strength of any country increases greatly, no one wants to Transforming power into global influence.” (Henry Kissinger, 1997). Therefore, the next step of the United States’ foreign strategic goal is to expand overseas and establish its status as a major power in the world.

Consistent with the previous discussion, the implementation of realist policies in the United States is often based on its national ideals. At this stage, Roosevelt played a key role in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Social Darwinism had a great influence on Roosevelt’s view of progress in civilization. He emphasized the values of “progress” and “civilization”, and made inferences based on this: “In America, as elsewhere, the intervention of a particular civilized country will eventually be required...., in order to abide by the Monroe Doctrine, he also has to exercise the power of the international police, although he (the United States) is not willing to do so.” (Thomas G. Paterson, 1984). Through the advanced nature of its own civilization, endowing itself with the identity and power of an “international policeman” has enabled the United States to link its own national interests with the progress of human civilization, thereby implementing a realistic foreign strategy that helps the United States expand its interests around the world. For example, interventions in the Dominican Republic, Cuba.

Since then, Roosevelt’s Corollary have overturned the U.S. diplomatic tradition of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. “The tradition of isolationism was broken, and the U.S. turned to internationalism. Roosevelt’s diplomacy took a big step on the road to forming the tradition of internationalism.”

(Li Qingyu, 2010).

From a realistic perspective, scholar Frank Ninkovich writes: “It also marked an epochal break with traditional isolationist attitudes toward Europe. The Monroe Doctrine posited a wall between Europe and the United States, with two radically different system of domestic governance and foreign relations, whereas the Roosevelt corollary postulated a global process, typified by Anglo-American rapprochement, in which these differences were greatly reduced or disappeared altogether.” (Frank Ninkovich, 1986). This brings European countries closer to the United States, giving the United States the greater international influence it desires.

From an ideal perspective, as the scholar Greg Russell puts it: “Although Roosevelt was always a defender of the national interest standard, he did not ignore the mutual concerns of great powers in an increasingly interdependent world. As a statesman, he did not see a nation’s interests or power as something entirely independent of the broad ethical foundations of Western civilization. It cannot be denied that Roosevelt’s homage to civilization often manifested a gap between the purpose of American foreign policy and the demands of world order by an almost miraculous coincidence... When Roosevelt’s efforts won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906, the awarding committee cited his ability to ‘infuse peaceful ideals into practical politics’ as a major factor in their decision.” (Russell G., 2008). This ideal of linking national interests with the responsibility of the United States to exert influence on a global scale has continued to play its role in later generations.

Wilsonianism: The Contradiction Between Idealism and Realism

“The whole world has become a single neighborhood, every part has become a neighbor of the rest, no country can survive and develop alone, and the tasks and responsibilities of neighborhood relations are entrusted to each country.” (Arthur S. Link, 1982). Wilson, who was at the intersection of the 19th and 20th centuries, saw the trend of global cooperation and the interests behind this trend. Therefore, the United States must enter the world political stage to a greater extent and build a new world order.

Based on the thinking method of “Roosevelt’s inference”, Wilson further emphasized the responsibility and mission of the United States. In a speech in 1914, he said: “How should we use the influence and power of this great country? Should we continue to Playing the old role to use these powers only for expansion and profit?... We built this country to maintain human rights.” And his way of maintaining human rights is mainly reflected in his “Wilson Ten Four Points”, and Wilson’s conception of an idealized postwar world order. It can be roughly summarized into three key words: free trade, national self-determination, and the League of Nations.

According to Bluntschli, “History itself brings about a growing emotional unity first within nations and then between them, awakening a general consciousness of human community” (Wilson, 1886). Therefore, the scholar Stephen Wertheim believes that the community of power is the goal of Wilson’s international alliance, and he hopes to knit mature countries together through a unified emotion (Wertheim S., 2011).

However, at this time, Wilson’s ideal was too advanced to be accepted by the world. In the contradiction between ideal and reality, Wilson still compromised with utilitarian realism, and finally his ideal was shattered. In order to preserve the establishment of the League of Nations, Wilson made diplomatic compromises with Britain, France, Japan and other countries. “Mandate rule” is in vain, no different from colonial rule in the past, and “national self-determination” is finally shattered; the premise of Britain’s acceptance of the “14 Articles” is that the United States is not allowed to shake Britain’s maritime supremacy in the name of trade freedom, and Wilson made a concession, recognized the privileges of Britain, and “free trade” was finally shattered; and because of the opposition of the Senate, the United States did not finally join the League of Nations, which

Wilson most valued, but instead became a tool for Britain and France to consolidate their status.

To sum up, in the face of the contradiction between ideal and reality, Wilson always compromised with the immediate interests of the United States. In the end, Wilson's diplomatic ideals came to naught.

From a realistic perspective, scholar Joseph Nye Jr. argues: “Wilson failed in changing the attitudes of other world leaders and ultimately the American public toward the new world order he outlined. Initially, Wilson was viewed as a hero by the European masses, but the nationalist backers of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando proved more effective as the bargain at Versailles dragged on. His excessive idealism also contributed to the interwar austerity response. Overly ambitious transformational goals, combined with overconfidence in its own inspiring power, ultimately prove counterproductive to effective or ethical U.S. foreign policy.” (Joseph S. Nye, Jr, 2019).

From an ideal perspective, as Kissinger said: “The United States firmly believes that its own path will shape the destiny of mankind. . . . it expands across the American continent in the name of ‘Manifest Destiny’, but it claims that there is no empire; exerts decisive influence on major events but denies any motive of national interest; eventually becomes a superpower, but declares that it has no intention of practicing power politics. American foreign policy shows that the United States believes that its domestic principles are universally applicable. There is no harm to others in implementing these principles. America’s foreign engagement is not foreign policy in the traditional sense, but a project of spreading values. It believes that all other people’s aspire to copy American values.” (Henry Kissinger, 2015). Therefore, the failure of diplomatic strategy brought about by the contradiction between ideals and reality this time did not make the United States give up idealistic diplomacy, and the Wilsonian doctrine still has a profound impact on future generations.

From the Truman Doctrine to the Internet Age

The American ideal at the end of World War II

After the second world war, the United States found such a fact, if the core of the Christian civilization is still the traditional European powers, after the early 1945 Yalta conference, the old core of Christian civilization has declined in the European battlefield ruins, and the United States, with its unparalleled overall power, had become the new “spokesman” of Christian civilization. The original ideal since 1776 of “separating from feudal, chaotic Europe, establishing a pure Christian state, realizing the freedom and equality that God gave to everyone, and realizing the well-being of gifted human rights” seemed about to be realized. In response, Henry Luce, a very famous American media mogul, said “This is America’s century, America will lead the world, and it’s a great time to exert our full influence and power on the world.” (Henry Robinson Luce, 1941). Americans then revived their Wilsonianism and consciously volunteered to lead the world to a new world of “liberal democracy”. Victory has given the American people a constant and urgent need to lead the world, and the United States will assume full responsibility as a leader in international affairs, Truman said in his message to Congress in December 1945. In this new world, the United States should become the leader of democracy and freedom, and spread the perfect institutional form, lifestyle, ideology and culture to all the world, so as to realize the harmony and stability of the world.

The Transformation of American Ideals under the Soviet Threat

However, this ideal of a “liberal and democratic” world soon met a red giant called the Soviet Union, and

in 1946, when the Greek civil war broke out in full swing, it went head-to-head with another ideal called communism. Griswold, the head of the U.S. aid mission to Greece, had reported to the State Department with no small amount of concern that “the Communists could win because of economic collapse and popular resistance to the existing political and social structure”. At this time the Soviet Union was a militarily powerful red giant, forcing the Americans to reacquaint the fact that the Soviet Union had become another global superpower. “If this continues,” wrote U.S. Ambassador to Britain Lewis Douglas, “then we are in grave danger of losing half of Western Europe.” (David Horowitz, 1974). Forced by the urgent realities of the situation, on March 12, 1947, then President Harry S. Truman pushed for direct U.S. action against Greece to contain Soviet power, and with it, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In his memoirs, then-President Harry Truman described the introduction of the Truman Doctrine as a turning point in American foreign policy (Harry S. Truman, 1955). In this situation, Americans had to move from the ideal of building a new world to the reality of a crisis-ridden world.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Acheson argued that building a strong military and adding elements that promote political unity would create a viable world system that would stabilize international power contrasts. At this time, the United States believed that in a two-tiered world pattern, only political, economic, military and other hard power could help it defeat its rival, the Soviet Union, thereby eliminating communism and spreading the concept of freedom and democracy throughout the world. As Acheson stated in his 1958 congressional testimony, “If the United States is to contain Soviet ambitions for world domination, it must do two things. First, the United States continues to maintain an open attitude of consultation with the flatterers Second, the United States has to create the position of strength that will enable the Western Alliance to maintain a combined force capable of standing up to the Soviet Union at the governance, economic, and military levels. Only by accomplishing the latter will we have the capital to be able to negotiate with the Soviet Union.” Then hard power, especially strong military power, became the most important realistic need of the United States. Thus, from Truman to Eisenhower to Johnson, the United States engaged in a series of hard power confrontations with the Soviet Union, including intense military competition and proxy wars.

The Transformation of U.S. Foreign Strategy Under the Real Crisis

However, after more than two decades of hard power confrontation with the Soviet Union, the Americans found new realities. Militarily, the Korean and Vietnam wars in the 1950s and 1960s dragged U.S. military power into the mud. Economically, the huge military spending over a long period of time resulted in a deterioration of the U.S. financial situation, while the political sphere was equally unpromising. Black movement leader Martin Luther King Jr. said “History has unfortunately made some peoples (whites) the oppressors and some peoples (blacks) the oppressed, but between the two paths of uprising, violent confrontation, and acquiescence and submission to oppression there is a third path, which is to organize massive nonviolent resistance in the name of love.” (King M. L., 2010). On the other hand, Stokely Carmichael, the leader of the Black Panther Party, has triggered the slogan of “black power”. He contends that there is deep-seated “institutional racism” throughout the United States that prevents blacks from gaining access to key social positions, substantial power and social resources. The racial violence of white racialists and white police officers is a direct manifestation of this nature, which prevents racial integration from being achieved.

Therefore, Blacks can no longer depend on Whites, but should unite to fight for power on their own strength and achieve Black self-determination in all political, social, and economic spheres (Stokely

Carmichael, 1967). A series of “marches on Washington”, Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” and the emergence of the Black Panther Party in the United States brought the government’s image into serious crisis. It became increasingly unrealistic to continue to insist on the export of hard power by force, so on July 25, 1969, Richard Milhous Nixon, with his “Guam Doctrine”, adjusted his foreign strategic policy since Truman and instead adopted a policy of military contraction to stabilize his country’s international position. Nixon replied, “The United States will avoid getting involved quietly because it will drown itself. I am not criticizing how we got involved in the Vietnam War but I know we can learn something useful from our past experience. We must avoid further involvement in such wars in the future.” However, the threat from the Soviet Union still existed, and the strategy of “peaceful evolution” became an excellent way for the United States to reduce the loss of its own hard power while gradually destroying the communist concept. For the next two decades until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. pursued the strategic system of peaceful evolution outlined by Nixon in “1999: Victory Without War” to the end and achieved the ultimate victory in the Cold War (Pan Rui, 2004).

The American Ideal of Democracy After the End of the Cold War

After the successful peaceful evolution, reality once again ushered in a change and the United States became the world’s sole superpower. The Cold War left a huge military, political, scientific and technological legacy for the United States, shaping its unrivaled hard power after the Cold War. In 1989, Francis Fukuyama declared in his book “The End of History” that “liberal democracy” is “the last form of human ideology and polity” and that “liberal democracy is the last form of human ideology and polity”. “The ideal of liberal democracy has been perfected”. “He saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as marking the end of an era. This is what he said in 1989 when he wrote his essay of the same name, and it was a starting point for what was later expanded into a book.” (Francis Fukuyama, 1989). Thus, the United States, which had won the Cold War, was truly at the top of the world and rightly turned once again to the ideal of a “perfectly free and democratic world” and proceeded to promote this ideal throughout the world.

But contrary to expectations, after the “End of History”, the world has not ushered in a future of American-style liberal democracy, but rather a wild ride in the direction of multipolarity, pluralism and Internetization, and the methods that won the Cold War may not apply at all to the post-Cold War globalized world, and the strategies that applied to the mechanized-electrified era may lose their effectiveness in the Internet-smart era. The strategy that was applied in the era of mechanization-electrification may lose its effect in the era of Internet-intelligence. Once again, America’s beautiful ideals have met the challenge of reality, only this time, American idealism will be faced with a new and unknown reality.

Blocked, Busted Investment Boom, The Dream, and Reality of Metaverse

The growth of the Metaverse will lead to a surge in investment in a wider range of sectors. Firstly, this will lead to a further boom in the virtual goods market. Virtual goods, which currently stand at around US\$50 billion, are expected to grow to US\$190 billion by 2025. Secondly, it could drive rapid growth in AR/VR. Spending related to the global AR/VR market will reach US\$12 billion in 2020 and is expected to grow at a 54% CAGR over the five years 2020-2024; total AR/VR devices shipped reached 5.12 million in 2020 and are expected to reach 43.2 million by 2025. Third, it will further contribute to the rapid growth of cloud computing, as the implementation of the Metaverse will require larger-scale data storage and computing requirements. Fourth, for the content or platform builders themselves, who can build an immersive virtual world with

integrated social, entertainment, advertising, e-commerce, and other features, their business value illustrates geometric growth as the user value chain expands (Huang J., Sun P., Zhang W., 2022).

ROBLOX

On March 10, 2021, ROBLOX rose 54% on the day of its IPO, while the company's valuation increased sevenfold in six months compared to its last pre-IPO financing six months earlier, reaching almost \$40 billion outright, making this track the hottest in the primary market for a short period. Roblox and the Metaverse it represents became the hottest topic in the US stock market, with another Metaverse favorite, Facebook, the most risen underlying in the FAAMG, hitting a new all-time high of nearly \$1 trillion market cap.

Roblox reached more than 55 million daily active users in February 2022, according to a report by metaverse online gaming platform Roblox (Stefanie Notaney & Anna Yen, 2022).

Roblox has experimented with different business models. Initially, revenues came from advertising and a premium membership model called Builders Club. But after a few years, the company shifted to its current model: selling Robux (in-game virtual currency). The two key points of the Roblox platform's success are the open economy and decentralization (devolution to game developers), and the company's business figures have exploded since opening up the platform. Developers and creators use the company's platform and the engine and tools provided by the company to continuously create content, which the company calls Experiences, and then players play on the platform and build social relationships with other players based on the platform. In other words, Roblox's investment strategy is to develop gaming platforms that give users a new and more authentic social network.

According to an announcement from Roblox, developers will receive more than \$250 million in share input from the platform in 2020 through the operation of the strategy, which, according to the company's previously announced distribution of revenue from developer-created content, means that Roblox has generated more than \$1 billion in third-party game revenue alone this year. In the first nine months of 2020, more than 960,000 developers earned game tokens Robux. 1,050 of these developers earned \$10,000 in revenue, with 250 developers earning \$100,000 through Robux. Although the company is still in the red, with an operating loss of \$59.9 million and a net loss of \$5.04 million for 1Q21. However, because it is supported by almost twice the amount of player recharges as operating revenue, the company has a healthy operating cash flow and free cash flow, allowing it to continue to operate steadily.

Facebook

Facebook, which has its heart set on VR, is also a firm practitioner of another meta-universe. Mark Zuckerberg has committed more than \$10 billion to its Reality Labs division (Jacob Kastrenakes, Alex Heath, 2021) which produces hardware related to the metaverse, such as VR glasses.

Back in September 2019, Facebook released Facebook Horizon, a VR social platform, and launched a public beta version in August 2020. Users can build environments and games in it to socialize with friends. In an interview, founder Mark Zuckerberg talked about how “Facebook Horizon’s development cycle is taking longer than we expected because we have high hopes that the app will play a big role in building a broader, cross-VR and AR meta-universe”.

Facebook has recently acquired Crayta, a meta-universe platform like Roblox. Crayta currently allows for character creation, with a focus on medium to lightweight games, and the ability to interact with other players

during the switching and playing of game scenes, creating a rich social scene. It would seem that Facebook's investment strategy is to push for a change in VR technology and to create VR-based social experiences that are not limited to personal space and can be interacted with (DeAngelo Epps June, 2022).

It was only after years of investment that this Facebook set of ecology seemed to start to turn around until last year when the VR hardware Oculus quest 2 was a big seller. In terms of investment in Oculus, Zuckerberg said in Facebook's 1Q2021 results that it would invest a 2,000-strong R&D team into the VR business. During an AMA Q&A on Instagram a few days ago Zuckerberg confirmed that Facebook is building a microkernel-based operating system. He said, "We're building a microkernel-based operating system Ultimately, we need to be able to design and customize each layer of the stack from essentially the ground up to deliver the performance and efficiency that (AR/VR) these systems need."

Meta reported net revenues of \$10,285 million for the fourth quarter (Q4) of its fiscal year (FY) that ended December 31, 2021, on total revenues of \$33,671 million. the Reality Labs segment reported revenues of \$877 million for the fourth quarter of FY 2021, representing approximately 3% of the company's revenues. Compared to the same period last year, revenue from this segment increased by 22.3%. The segment reported fourth-quarter operating Losses of \$3.3 billion and an operating loss much larger than the \$2,099 million operating loss reported by the segment in the prior year quarter, which also reduced the company's overall operating income.

Thus, it seems that meta is still relying more on advertising for profitability, and more effort is needed to create a new interactive four-way social scene through VR technology. One academic study found that "through its recent rebranding, Meta has embraced the option of gradually shifting from an advertising revenue model to a transaction-based revenue model. Nonetheless, Meta's core offering aimed at fostering social communities remains intact, even as the company aims to provide a more digital, virtual, and enhanced environment. Contrary to the increasing number of companies changing their BM from hardware to software companies, Meta is focusing on hardware and software development to make the metaverse accessible to the mass market and encourage user loyalty by increasing the cost of the exchange. Meta's strategic acquisition of Oculus planned partnerships with hardware and software providers such as Ray-Ban, Microsoft, and Rockstar Games, and the development of Horizon World and Horizon Workroom has therefore created the conditions around which to develop the most social network." (Kraus S., Kanbach D. K., Krysta P. M. et al., 2022).

Behind the hype, the meta-universe continues to grow: Microsoft says its \$69 billion acquisition of gaming company Activision Blizzard will "provide the building blocks for the meta-universe" (Microsoft, 2022). Fortnite has more than 20 million active users (DAUs) per day (William E. Ketchum III, 2020) and hosts concerts (on 24 April last year, more than 27 million indie gamers attended Travis Scott's show last April 24) and generated more than \$14 billion in transactions between 2018 and 2020. Naver Z's Zepeto – Asia's largest metaverse platform with over 300 million global subscribers (Joo-Wan Kim, 2022) and a Galaxy S22 scavenger hunt in April in partnership with Samsung (Kathy B., 2022).

Conclusions

It seems that every influential company is investing huge amounts of money into virtual reality. All are making progress in developing games, and practical applications, and developing virtual reality technology using virtual reality, but it is impossible to tell which strategy will yield the greatest benefit.

While promoting globalization and international information flow, the Internet also profoundly impacts the

ideological field. From the metaverse's current technical and ecological characteristics, its features, such as high immersion and virtual and reality fusion, are the best Petri dishes for spreading ideological and cultural soft power. In such a new communication scene, ideologies may be more radical and have more substantial social control, which will cause a more severe impact on mainstream ideologies and traditional social governance. This is why countries compete around the meta-universe's digital resources, core technologies, and technical standards.

Since the metaverse is still exploring whether it can be a tool for ideological communication, combining its various characteristics and development directions, ideological communication in the metaverse is just around the corner.

The development of a metaverse based on the ease of forming a new type of international political ideology in the communication scene further highlights the impact of cybersecurity on national security. The Internet era has made cybersecurity a new issue in international politics, and the United States and other major Western developed countries have made cybersecurity one of the core parts of national security. Its importance is on par with military and economic security. Cybersecurity has also become an important area of competitive gaming between different countries, and the metaverse will further strengthen this dynamic. Due to the high immersion and virtual reality integration characteristics of the metaverse, cybersecurity issues will be more directly translated into real national security issues. This will also drive countries to take measures to deal with it and push them to be stricter in metaverse standard design and ecological construction.

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Disinformation as Tool of Information Warfare: Example of Disinformation Against Russia

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Disinformation has been widely used as an information warfare tool since the Cold War. After Putin came to power in 2000, the disinformation against Russia did not subside with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Instead, the West launched the third generation of normalized information warfare against Russia, in which disinformation is the main tool. The notion of disinformation results from the subjective interpretation of events, and the ordinary audiences are unconvinced of the information's authenticity. The dissemination of disinformation has a significant effect on the people's minds and behavior. Therefore, Russia listed the online spread of disinformation as one of the main threats to Russia's national information security in 2021. By identifying disinformation to strengthening the overall resilience of societies against these threats, "disinformation" has gradually become a labeling tool to expose propaganda, which meanwhile decline the public trusts in the media and the country that publishes the information.

Keywords: information warfare, disinformation, Russia

"The West unleashed an information war against Russia. The world has moved into the era of disinformation from the era of 'information'," Federal Council President Valentina Matvienko said at the first plenary meeting of the Federation Council in 2022 (Matviyanko, 2022, p. 3), the remarks came as the "Ukrainian crisis" escalated again. Since Putin came to power in 2000, Russian government personnel have repeatedly issued statements that the West is launching an information war against Russia, and this vigilance against information warfare attacks originated the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Western Disinformation Against Russia Stems From Cold War

Disinformation includes "deliberately misleading or biased information; manipulated narrative or facts; propaganda". Disinformation is more subjectively misleading than misinformation, meaning that those who spread disinformation intentionally manipulate the direction of public opinion and change people's mind and behavior. In 2014, President Putin talked about the western media's discourse in his Crimean speech: "The West says it's white today, but says it's black tomorrow."

Disinformation is not a product of this era, but the prevalence of disinformation is closely related to the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the United States and Russia

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conducted an all-round confrontation. Among them, information warfare was an important area. The Russian historian Andriy Vsov (Андрей Фурсов) believes that the information warfare against Russia can be traced back to earlier, that is, in 1953, when the United States created the “Radio Liberty” to support the “dissent” against Russia, which means that the United States was the first to launch an information warfare against the Soviet Union (Fursov A., 2013). Besides, America had a lot of plans for large-scale information warfare against the USSR: US Law No. 402 of 1948 requiring the media to exercise systematic influence over public opinion of other peoples; task of directive No. 68 of April 15, 1950 was to “ensure a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet Union” and to sow the seeds of destruction in the Soviet system, encouraging and supporting unrest in some of the Soviet Union’s strategically disadvantaged neighbors (Craylov E. A., 2016, pp. 116-121).

But during the reigns of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, American propaganda was successfully blocked. After Gorbachev launched perestroika (“restructuring”) and glasnost (“openness”), the United States was able to successfully implement an information warfare that eventually promoted to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Ekaterina Petrova (Петрова Екатерина), the chief researcher of the Department of Philosophy of Natural Sciences at Moscow State University, believes that the Information warfare can be either military or non-military in nature. “Non-military” information warfare, that is, the use of information technology by one country to deliberately attack the information, power, management systems, and consciousness of another country, the purpose of which is to impose its culture and ideology on the other rather than adopt military action (Petrova E. C., 2016, p. 429).

In information warfare, fake news is the main form of disinformation. Russian scientist Zinoviev (А. Зиновьев) believes: “The globalized world has formed a new war. Fake news is the main weapon of this war. Fake news has become a new form of information.” Another scientist Parshev (А. Паршев) said: “The essence of globalization is an invisible war in which other countries create fake news.” (Zaldasbaeva Aizhamal, 2020, pp. 117-119).

The West Wages the Third Generation of Normalized Information Warfare Against Russia: Disinformation Is the Main Tool

In 2016, Dmitry Peskov, the Press Secretary for the President of Russia, pointed out that “now we are in a state of information warfare, an information confrontation with the trendsetters in the field of information, mainly the Anglo-Saxon media” (Peskov D., 2016). In the 1998 “Strategic Information Warfare Rising” report, the American “Rand” Corporation classified information confrontation into the first and second generations. Among them, the first generation of information confrontation emphasizes more targeted activities to disrupt the opponent’s system, rather than the use of traditional force means; the second generation of information confrontation is “a brand new strategy, caused by the information revolution, where the information space and many other domains are introduced. The execution period can be divided into weeks, months and years.” (Shatillo I. C. & Cherkasov V. N., 2009).

The third generation of information warfare is mainly based on disinformation. From the experience of the history of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the most important principle for launching information warfare is that the intruder constantly expands the controlled information space, bypasses the established moral standards and rules, deliberately violates all social restrictions, and erodes moral principles.

In March 2021, Andrei Ilnitsky, an advisor to the Russian minister of defense, put forward the theory of “Mental War”, arguing that the “Mental War” of the United States against Russia is a kind of strategy aimed at

changing the self-perception of the Russian people, destroying the Russians' national identity and their foundation of spiritual field Russian national civilization. The probability of a "Mental War" between the United States and Russia in the next ten years is far greater than that of an armed war.¹

The concept of "Mental War" is similar to the Pentagon's positioning of special operations in 1956, when then-General Troxel said: "Special methods of warfare combine the methods of psychological operations with various other means aimed at destroying the enemy from within. Combined together." This method was fully used in the Cold War and the Vietnam War. After the Vietnam War, Americans made great strides in their ability to wage psychological warfare, as well as in the way they reached audiences and interacted with so-called independent media. For example, during the Georgia War in August 2008, the United States used foreign media to portray Russia as an aggressor against Georgia.² Although the term "psychological operations" was renamed "Military Information Support Operations" twice in June 2010 and 2015, it was finally changed back to "psychological operations" in 2017. It can be said that American psychological warfare is mainly carried out under the guidance of the military.

The understanding from information warfare to mental warfare means that the confrontation in the information field has become more intense and targeted. Russia is the main target of this informational attack. And in addition to the US military that launched psychological warfare, the Information and Psychological Operations (IPSO) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Command is also at the forefront of the attack, the Czech Republic's 103rd CIMIC/PSYOPS (Center for Information Management, Integration, and Connectivity/psychological operations) is also active against Russia. Their psychological warfare operations are overseen and directed by the NATO Strategic Communications Center in Riga, the NATO Cyber Center, Special Operations Command, and the Pentagon's Fourth Information Operations Group.

The main tool to launch information warfare against Russia is disinformation. Disinformation is the most important and effective tool among all the measure in information warfare (Brusnitsin N. A., 2001, p. 30). In 2021, the Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said that the West has deployed an entire training center for information attacks on Russia. The first are the propaganda and strategic centers in Riga, Tallinn, and Warsaw. Their main job is to fabricate and spread various rumors in Russia, and to train dozens of Russian citizens to subvert the government in Russia.³

In addition, some other institutions in the West also spread disinformation or conduct black propaganda through social networks against Russia. Among them, "Workshop of bloggers" ("Мастерская блогеров"), "School of local self-government" ("Школа местного самоуправления") and other institutions successfully carried out so-called "election preparations", but it is actually training extremists to prepare for street riots. After Vladimir Putin participated in the 2012 presidential election, information pressure on Russia from the United States and Western countries has increased significantly. With the help of foreign funds and a domestic "fifth column", the "White Ribbon" movement (Белая Лента), which is the symbol of Russia's 2011-2013 protest movement, attempted to implement a color revolution in Russia. After a series of counter-rallies organized by

¹ Advisor to Russian Defense Minister warns of "mental war": Who is waging it and against whom?, available online at: <https://jamestown.org/program/advisor-to-russian-defense-minister-warns-of-mental-war-who-is-waging-it-and-against-whom/>.

² Как западные спецслужбы ведут информационную войну против России (How western intelligence agencies launch an information war against Russia), available online at: <https://news.rambler.ru/other/43831134-kak-zapadnye-spetssluzhby-vedut-informatsionnyu-voynu-protiv-rossii/>.

³ Шойгу рассказал о центрах антироссийской пропаганды в Европе (Shoigu talks about the centers of anti-Russian propaganda in Europe), available online at: <https://ria.ru/20210806/propaganda-1744625304.html>.

Patriots and supporters of the current government, the White Ribbon Revolution failed. Its leaders were ultimately discredited and the “Opposition Coordinating Council” collapsed. However, many participants of the White Ribbon continue their anti-Russian activities today, despite the damage to their reputations. And the pro-western rallies also continued in Moscow (Craylov E. A., 2016, pp. 116-121).

Alexandra Grabernikov (Александр Грабельников), professor at the Department of Journalism from the People’s Friendship University of Russia, said that at this stage, the information warfare carried out by the West against Russia has penetrated into almost every aspect, such as the delivery of natural gas from Russia to Europe. Unlike the Soviet period, the reason why the West, especially the United States, is conducting information warfare at this stage is that it has lost its leading position in the world. Therefore, the information warfare is carried out to urge the targeted countries to act as they want.

The Judgment of Disinformation in Information Warfare Is Subjective

Compared with disinformation in the scientific and social fields, the judgment criteria of disinformation in information warfare are more subjective and difficult to verify. For example, in the Covid-19 epidemic, a series of rumors such as “wearing a mask is not conducive to epidemic prevention” are relatively easy to be verified by scientists and quickly refuted. However, the judgment of false information in information warfare is highly subjective, because disinformation in information warfare is usually provocative and resonant, and the viral spread of disinformation is mainly because it creates a kind of emotions and it is difficult for ordinary citizens to judge the actual situation.⁴

Andrey Manoilo (Андрей Манойло), professor at the Department of Politics from Moscow State University, said, “Fake news is information that is deliberately created, which usually draws information from the context of resonant events, with the sole purpose of creating excitement.” Combining media and “Virus” technology and transmission mechanism in social networks, fake news in modern political movements are becoming a kind of dangerous tool to influence people’s mind. The main task of fake news in modern political movements and processes is to set the political agenda, then create general buzz around informational events generated by fake news itself. In some cases, extremists can use “fake” news to create socio-political tensions, spark panic and protests, which pose a major threat to national security.⁵

Some Russian scholars have compared the image of Russia in the Western media and the events from the Russian perspective when Russia intervened in the Syrian civil war in September 2015.

From the Following table, we can see the difference between the facts from the Russian perspective and the discourse constructed by Western media. The information constructed from the interests of the West is disinformation in Russia’s opinion, on the other hand, the West called the “facts” from the Russian perspective fiction, which means “fakeness” of disinformation in information warfare is more reflected in the interpretation of different events, that is, the distortion of the interpretation of the purpose of the action, such as “Russian intervention at the request of the authorities” is understood as “aggression”, or the emphasis on negative cases, such as “All Russian artillery shells are ineffective and endanger the lives of the people”, to generalize. This set

⁴ “Фейковые новости” как метод перехвата информационной повестки в условиях современного информационного противоборства (“Fake news” as a method of intercepting the information agenda in the context of modern information confrontation), available online at: <https://nstarikov.ru/fejkovye-novosti-kak-metod-perehvata-informacionnoj-povestki-v-uslovijah-sovremenного-informacionного-protivoborstva-112296>.

⁵ Фейки – часть глобальных информационных войн (Fakes are part of the global information wars), available online at: <https://news.myseldon.com/ru/news/index/242514208>.

of words is basically similar in events such as “Ukraine crisis” and “Belarus/Kazakhstan anti-government protests”. Denis Denisov, director of the Institute for Peacekeeping Initiatives and Conflictology, believes that the United States and its partners need to cement Russia’s image in the minds of Ukrainian citizens as an aggressor and a country that could wage war against them.⁶

Events from the Russian perspective	Image of Russia in the Western media
Russia joins fight against IS at Syrian leader’s request	Russia joins fight against IS at Syrian leader’s request Russia goes to war in Syria without world authorization
Russia respects Syria’s sovereignty as it treats other countries	Russia wants to save the dictator, just like it has always done
Russia protects the interests of its southern border and the Eurasian Economic Union	Russia wants to annex the Middle East (e.g., Ukraine)
Russia wants to ensure regional peace	Russia is a natural aggressor
Russian Air Force cracks down on IS group and other terrorist groups	Russia is bombing moderate opposition; Russia strikes civilian buildings, mosques, schools
Russia conducted effective strikes on fixed targets from the air	Russian missiles landed in Iran and did not reach Syria, their missiles flew past the target or did not explode at all
Russia protects Syria in anti-IS operation and prevents large numbers of refugees from fleeing to Western countries	Russia’s crackdown prompts refugees to flee to Europe in retaliation for European economic sanctions
Russia destroyed IS infrastructure, including hydrocarbon black market	Russia bombed IS to raise world oil prices
Russia shows world its military capability to abide by international law and defend national interest	Russia seeks retaliation after Ukraine Crisis
Russia is not fighting the war against the Sunnis in the Middle East, but to protect the true Islam and fight against terrorists and extremist Islamists	Russia supports Shiites, opposes Sunnis

In August 2020, the Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) of US government published “Pillars in Russia’s Disinformation and Propaganda Ecosystem” in six languages, proposing five pillars of Russian disinformation: official government communication; state-funded global messaging; cultivation of proxy sources; weaponization of social media; and cyber-enabled disinformation. Two years later, on January 20, 2022, the US State Department released a series of reports on Russian disinformation, proposing five major disinformation themes in Russia: “Russia is an innocent victim”; historical revisionism; “Western civilization is about to collapse” “Mass movements are US-sponsored ‘color revolutions’”; reality is arbitrarily defined by the Kremlin. They also accused Russia’s foreign propaganda media RT and Russia’s largest satellite news agency, the state-directed media, of spreading Russian rhetoric to foreign audiences, and regularly amplifying content from several other parts of Russia’s disinformation ecosystem, including websites linked to Russian intelligence.⁷ Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the report could not stand any critical analysis and that the report itself is a lie.⁸

The subjectivity of disinformation judgment criteria makes it difficult to verify, and the general audience cannot understand the full picture of the situation. Western media can create a “mimic image” of “Russian invaders”, and in the eyes of Western media, the facts from the Russian perspective have become “disinformation”. The completely different interpretations of the two have led to completely different understandings by the audiences of different countries, and the differences of opinion have further widened and

⁶ Аналитик: Против России развязана гибридная информационная война (Analyst: Launch a mixed information war against Russia), available online at: <https://www.politnavigator.net/analitik-protiv-rossii-razvyazana-gibridnaya-informacionnaya-vojna.html>.

⁷ Disarming disinformation: Our shared responsibility, available online at: <https://www.state.gov/disarming-disinformation/>.

⁸ Лавров начал переговоры с блинченом с едкой шутки о сотрудниках госдепа (Lavrov started negotiations with Blinken with a catering joke about state department employees), available online at: https://by.tsargrad.tv/news/lavrov-nachal-peregovory-s-blinkenom-s-edkoj-shutki-o-sotrudnikah-gosdepa_481890.

are difficult to narrow.

Conclusion: “Disinformation” Has Become a Label Tool for Russia to Expose — Propaganda in Information Warfare

“Disinformation” is gradually becoming a label tool for exposing propaganda after “foreign agents”, and the government has become the main body of exposing disinformation in the information warfare. At the same time, the information of the two sides is often referred to as “dis information” in each respective, because the judgment of false information is subjective and difficult to verify. Merely stating that “this is not the fact” is not enough to effectively combat the attack of disinformation. Under these conditions, “disinformation” becomes a label. After being labeled as “disinformation”, the credibility of the media that publishes the news and the country to which it belongs will be weakened, thereby further losing its discourse right in international events. And the republics of the Russian Federation have responded unanimously to disinformation under the guidance of the government.

In order to deal with the offensive of disinformation, in the new version of the “National Security Strategy” released in July 2021, Russia listed “information security” as a national strategic priority for the first time, and included the online spread of disinformation in the current Russian national information security one of the main threats. According to relevant Russian laws, individuals who does not constitute a crime to create but spread disinformation, will face a fine of up to 400,000 rubles (1 US dollar is about 122 rubles), and officials and legal entities will be subject to administrative penalties of up to 900,000 and 10 million rubles respectively; if the act constitutes a crime, the offender faces up to 5 years in prison.

The punishment for disinformation is more severe than the punishment for “foreign agents”. Russia’s latest legislation on “foreign agents” was on December 30, 2020, “Amendment to the Law on Supplementary Measures for Responses to National Security Threats”, which was introduced to improve the management of foreign agents’ activities, also known as the “New Foreign Agents Law”. Although foreign agents are listed as a “state threat” earlier than disinformation, Russia’s maximum penalty for foreign agents is 500,000 rubles, while the penalty for disinformation starts at 400,000 rubles. Moreover, there is no establishment of criminal responsibility for foreign agents in Russia’s “New Foreign Agents Law”. Putin therefore believes that Russia’s “Foreign Agents Law” is much more liberal than the American version of “Foreign Agents Law” and demanded that this version of the law be re-examined and that criminal responsibility be introduced. For disinformation, the Russian procuratorate will investigate the administrative or criminal responsibility of the corresponding responsible subjects according to the specific illegal circumstances and the consequences.

After Putin announced the special military operation on February 24 with the Russian-Ukraine conflict escalation, disinformation against the Russian army was rampant. On March 4, (Roskomnadzor) the Russian media regulator announced the ban on Facebook, Twitter and a number of Western media. On the same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an amendment to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which will severely punish disinformation involving the Russian military.

It stipulates that anyone who publicly and knowingly publishes disinformation about the Russian Armed Forces can be punished with up to three years in prison or a fine of 1.5 million rubles. Those who use their public office to violate the relevant laws for reasons of employment, or based on political, ideological, racial, ethnic, or religious hatred are punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years or a fine of up to 5 million rubles. If the disinformation has serious consequences, the sentence is 10 to 15 years in prison.

Compared with the previous regulations, the new regulations make a special interpretation of the punishment for disinformation against the Russian military, and the prison time has also increased from a maximum of 5 years to a maximum of 15 years. The harsher punishment is to ensure the justice of Russia's special military operations and reduce domestic anti-war voices. The anti-war voices try to create an image of Russian troops killing innocents, similar to the 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, Georgia, when a South Ossetian girl told Fox News that Russian peacekeepers saved her from an attack by Georgian soldiers, "Fox News" did not report this. The scene of the Georgian armed forces installing artillery shells, shot by RT, was used by CNN to prove that the Russian army was bombing Georgia.

So in the 2022 Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the western countries tried to prevent RT and Sputnik from reporting. The reason is that many Russian journalists are on the front line of the conflict and have access to first-hand reporting materials, while Western media reporters are difficult to access the front of the conflict, and lack of first-hand information makes more likelihood for them to make fake news, which lead to what the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Zakharova calls "the day of Western propaganda failure".

It is foreseeable that disinformation, as an "offensive tool" in Western information warfare, will become a "labeling tool" for its self-defense under the identification of Russia. In the future, strict control of disinformation and the effective combination of foreign agents will make Russia more vigilant against Western disinformation attacks and have stronger defense capabilities in information warfare.

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